Whether burden of proof is on panchayat/Municipality to establish that land was voluntarily surrendered to them?

In the present case, admittedly, there is neither any acquisition proceedings nor any transfer of rights by the appellants by way of sale, gift or otherwise. What is being alleged is that it was a voluntarily surrender of rights for no consideration. This is the stand taken by Panchayat / Municipality. If the Panchayat / Municipality is taking this stand, the burden would be on the Panchayat / Municipality to establish such voluntary surrender. A memorandum or an agreement or a written document ought to have been executed by the appellants stating their free will to surrender for no consideration in favour of the Panchayat / Municipality.  {Para 12}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 3189 OF 2022

KALYANI (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & ORS. Vs THE SULTHAN BATHERY MUNICIPALITY & ORS.

Coram: DINESH MAHESHWARI; VIKRAM NATH, JJ. 

Author: VIKRAM NATH, J.

Dated: April 26, 2022 

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Whether suit for declaration against municipalities is maintainable without issuing statutory notice?

 Respondent No.1-plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of title and
permanent injunction. In view of bar of suit for declaration of title in absence
of notice under Section 319 the suit was not maintainable. The Courts below

wrongly held that the suit was perpetual injunction though the respondent
No.1-plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of title and for permanent injunction.
9. Respondent No.1-plaintiff cannot derive advantage of sub Section (3)
of Section 319 which stipulates non-application of the Section 319 when the
suit was instituted under Section 54 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (old
provision) equivalent to Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and reads
as follows:
“Section 38.Perpetual injunction when granted.-
(1)Subject to the other provisions contained in or referred to
by this Chapter, a perpetual injunction may be granted to
the plaintiff to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in
his favour, whether expressly or by implication.
(2)When any such obligation arises from contract, the Court
shall be guided by the rules and provisions contained in
Chapter-II.
(3)When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the
plaintiff’s right to, or enjoyment of, property, the Court may
grant a perpetual injunction in the following cases, namely:
(a)where the defendant is trustee of the property
for the plaintiff;
(b)where there exists no standard for ascertaining
the actual damage caused, or likely to be causes,
by the invasion;
(c)where the invasion in such , that compensation
in money would not afford adequate relief;
(d) where the injunction is necessary to prevent a
multiplicity of judicial proceedings.”
The benefit aforesaid cannot derive by Respondent No.1-plaintiff as the
suit was filed for declaration of title coupled with permanent injunction.
Respondent No.1 having claimed title, the suit cannot be termed to be suit for
perpetual injunction alone.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4454 OF 2014
(arising out of SLP(C)No.30146 of 2012)
NAGAR PALIKA PARISHAD,
MIHONA AND ANR
V
RAMNATH AND ANR.
Citation: 2014(4) ALLMR 405 SC

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Whether appeal is maintainable against order of Chief Officer of municipality directing sealing of premises?

 In the instant case, there is no right of appeal
expressly conferred upon the person aggrieved by the order of
Chief Officer directing sealing of premises passed under Section
184A(1) of the Act, 1968. The appropriate remedy in such a case,
would be a revision application filed under Section 303 of the Act,
1968. The learned Presiding Officer of Municipalities Appellate
Tribunal has ignored the well settled principles of law when he
recorded his finding that the remedy of appeal can be inferred
from the interpretation of Sections 184, 184A and other provisions
of Chapter XII of the Act, 1968. In fact, there is no question of
referring to the other provisions, including the provision of Section
184C(3), as the learned Counsel for the respondent no.3 would
like to do for implying the presence of power to decide appeal filed
against an order passed under Section 184A(1) by the Chief
Officer, in view of the settled principles of law discussed earlier.
It is pertinent to note here that the learned Presiding Officer of
Municipalities Appellate Tribunal in the impugned order has
admitted that there is no express statutory provision laying down
that the appeal shall lie from the order of sealing passed under
Section 184A (please see page 16 of the impugned order) and yet
he has painstakingly carried out the whole exercise to carve out a
right of appeal by implication. The finding recorded in the
impugned order regarding maintainability of appeal against the
order passed by the Chief Officer under Section 184A is perverse
and cannot be sustained in the eye of law.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
WRIT PETITION NO.830 of 2015

 Shri Dilip Trimbak Alve  Vs The Chief Officer,

 CORAM :- S. B. SHUKRE, J.

 Dated : 10th March, 2016
Citation:2016(5) ALLMR 527

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Maharashtra Municipalities Amendment Act 2012

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5vWGtQ14k1BTW5pWUprNmdnaUU/edit?usp=sharing

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