‘Residual
doubt’
is
a
mitigating
circumstance,
sometimes, used and urged before the Jury in the United
States and, generally, not found favour by the various
Courts in the United States. In Donald Gene Franklin v.
James A. Lynaugh, Director, Texas Department of
Corrections 487 US 164 (1988) : 101 L Ed 2d 155, while
dealing with the death sentence, held as follows:
“Petitioner also contends that the sentencing
procedures followed in his case prevented the
jury from considering, in mitigation of sentence,
any "residual doubts" it might have had about his
guilt. Petitioner uses the phrase "residual doubts"
to refer to doubts that may have lingered in the
minds of jurors who were convinced of his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, but who were not
absolutely certain of his guilt. Brief for Petitioner
14. The plurality and dissent reject petitioner's
"residual doubt" claim because they conclude
that the special verdict questions did not prevent
the jury from giving mitigating effect to its
"residual doubt[s]" about petitioner's guilt. See
ante at 487 U. S. 175; post at 487 U. S. 189. This
conclusion is open to question, however. Although
the jury was permitted to consider evidence
presented at the guilt phase in the course of
answering the special verdict questions, the jury
was specifically instructed to decide whether the
evidence supported affirmative answers to the
special questions "beyond a reasonable doubt."
App. 15 (emphasis added). Because of this
instruction, the jury might not have thought that,
in sentencing petitioner, it was free to demand
proof of his guilt beyond all doubt.
In California v. Brown 479 U.S. 541 and other
cases, the US Courts took the view, “"Residual doubt" is
not a fact about the defendant or the circumstances of
the crime, but a lingering uncertainty about facts, a state
of mind that exists somewhere between "beyond a
reasonable doubt" and "absolute certainty." Petitioner's
"residual doubt" claim is that the States must permit
capital sentencing bodies to demand proof of guilt to "an
absolute certainty" before imposing the death sentence.
Nothing in our cases mandates the imposition of this
heightened burden of proof at capital sentencing.”
We also, in this country, as already indicated, expect
the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt, but not with “absolute certainty”. But, in between
“reasonable doubt” and “absolute certainty”, a decision
maker’s mind may wander possibly, in a given case, he
may go for “absolute certainty” so as to award death
sentence, short of that he may go for “beyond reasonable
doubt”.
Suffice it to say, so far as the present case is
concerned, we entertained a lingering doubt as to
whether the appellant alone could have executed the
crime single handedly, especially when the prosecution
itself says that it was the handiwork of a large group of
people. If that be so, in our view, the crime perpetrated
by a group of people in an extremely brutal, grotesque
and dastardly manner, could not have been thrown upon
the appellant alone without charge-sheeting other group
of persons numbering around 35. All element test as well
as the residual doubt test, in a given case, may favour the
accused, as a mitigating factor.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.47-48 OF 2013
Ashok Debbarma @ Achak Debbarma Vs State of Tripura
K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.
Dated;March 4, 2014.
