Leading judgment on inherent powers of tribunals

It   is   a   settled   principle   that   where   a   Tribunal   or
statutory   appellate   Authority   that   has   been   conferred   with
jurisdiction to decide proceedings under a statute, it is also clothed
with   such   ancillary     or   incidental   powers   as   are   necessary   to
discharge its functions effectively for the purposes of doing justicebetween the parties. The reliance placed by the learned Counsel
for the petitioners on the decision of the Supreme Court in Income
Tax Officer (supra) in that regard is apposite.  In para 4 thereof, it
has been observed by the Supreme Court as under:
“4.....................................................................
It is a firmly established  rule that an express
grant   of   statutory   power   carries   with   it   by
necessary implication to authority to use all
reasonable means to make such grant effective
(Sutherland   Statutory   Construction,   Third
Edition, Articles 5401 and 5402).  The powers
which have been conferred by Section 254 on
the   Appellate   Tribunal   with   widest   possible
amplitude must carry with them by necessary
implication all powers and duties incidental
and necessary to make the exercise of those
powers fully effective.  In Domat's Civil Law,
Cushing's  Edition, Vol. I  at  page  88, it has
been stated:
“It is the duty of the judges to apply the
laws,   not   only   to   what   appears   to   be
regulated   by   their   express   dispositions
but   to   all   the   cases   where   a   just
application of them may be made, and
which appear to be comprehended either
within   the   consequences   that   may   be
gathered from it.”
Maxwell   on   Interpretation   of   Statutes,
Eleventh Edition contains a statement at
p.   350   that   “where   an   Act   confers   a
jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the
power   of   doing   all   such   acts,   or
employing such means, as are essentiallynecessary to its execution. Cui jurisdictio
data   est,   ea   quoqe   concessa   esse
vindenture,   since   guibus   jurisdictio
explicari   non   potuit.”    An   instance   is
given based on Ex Parte, Martin, (1879)
4  QBD   212   at   p.  491  that   “where   an
inferior court is empowered to grant an
injunction,   the   power   of   punishing
disobedience   to   it   by   commitment   is
impliedy conveyed by the enactment, for
the power would be useless if it could
not be enforced.”
The judgment of the Supreme Court in Radhakrishna

Mani Tripathi (supra) proceeds on aforesaid principle.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR.
WRIT PETITION NO. 2300 OF 2015
PETITIONERS:
         
Shri Omprakash Nathuji Vaidhya, 
V The   Divisional   Joint   Registrar,   Cooperative  Societies,   
        CORAM: A.S. CHANDURKAR, J.
        DATED: 14thDECEMBER, 2015.
Citation: 2016(2) MHLJ 936

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Whether procedural law will prevail over substantive law?

 The key word for determination of question involved is underlined, i.e., "name of any party improperly joined". The word improperly, in my view, is wide enough to include the name of a defendant who was no more when suit was filed. Learned counsel for the parties, during the course of arguments, fairly admitted that defendant No.2 died even before filing of the suit. If plaintiff was not aware about his death and impleaded him as defendant No.2, it can be said that he was improperly impleaded. Apart from this, no prejudice is caused to petitioner by the impugned order. Thus, I am unable to hold that the Court below has committed any error in permitting the deletion of the name of said defendant under Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC. It cannot be forgotten that the procedural law is made for smooth functioning. It is not made to strangulate the litigants on hyper technical grounds. This Court has considered this aspect in a recent judgment reported in 2014(3) M.P.L.J. 612 (Dataram Singh & others Vs. Brindawan Singh and others) and opined as under:-

"In the opinion of this Court, the court below has taken a view to advance the cause of justice and did not permit itself to be strangulated by hyper- technicalities. This is settled in law that all the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The Apex Court in AIR 1955 SC 425 (Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah) opined that A code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is "procedure", something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against. The Apex Court in (1975 (1) SCC 774 (Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar) opined that the mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a judge's conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer. The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex debito justitiae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. Justice is the goal of jurisprudence - processual, as much as substantive. In (1976) 1 SCC 719 (State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari), the Apex Court held that processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice. In (1984) 3 SCC 46 (Ghanshyam Dass v. Dominion of India) the Apex Court reiterated the need for interpreting a part of the adjective law dealing with procedure alone in such a manner as to subserve and advance the cause of justice rather than to defeat it as all the laws of procedure are based on this principle. In (2005) 4 SCC 480 (Kailash vs. Nanhku and others) the Apex Court held that the provisions of CPC or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice."

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Smt. Rama Agrawal vs Smt. Mithlesh Agrawal on 29 June, 2015

BENCH AT GWALIOR

JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL.

Writ Petition No. 3596/15

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