When court should direct that subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with previous sentences?

The law on the orientation of two sentences awarded to an offender following his conviction successively, to define the cumulative duration thereof is envisaged in Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "Code") in following terms:

427. Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence. - (1) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence:

Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an order Under Section 122 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sentence shall commence immediately.

(2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence.

13. Though this provision has fallen for scrutiny of this Court umpteen times, we can profitably refer to one of the recent pronouncements in V.K. Bansal v. State of Haryana and Anr. MANU/SC/0673/2013 : (2013) 7 SCC 211 where it was held that though it is manifest from Section 427(1), that the Court has the power and discretion to issue a direction that a subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with the previous sentences, the very nature of the power so conferred, predicates that the discretion, would have to be exercised along judicial lines or not in a mechanical or pedantic manner. It was underlined that there is no cut and dried formula for the Court to follow, in the exercise of such power and that the justifiability or otherwise of the same, would depend on the nature of the offence or offences committed and the attendant facts and circumstances. It was however postulated, that the legal position favours the exercise of the discretion to the benefit of the prisoners in cases where the prosecution is based on a single transaction, no matter even if different complaints in relation thereto might have been filed. The caveat as well was that such a concession cannot be extended to transactions which are distinctly different, separate and independent of each other and amongst others where the parties are not the same.

14. The imperative essentiality of a single transaction as the decisive factor to enable the Court to direct the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous one was thus underscored. It was expounded as well that the direction for concurrent running of sentence would be limited to the substantive sentence alone.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 988-989 of 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 6226-27 of 2016)

Decided On: 28.10.2016

 Shyam Pal Vs. Dayawati Besoya and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipak Misra and Amitava Roy, JJ.
Citation:(2016) 10 SCC 761

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Whether court can pass concurrent sentences if separate prosecutions are instituted relating same transaction?

Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the allegations for misappropriation were for one transaction, in a 3 block period, for a quantified sum. The appellant will have to undergo the sentences consecutively for each conviction, after the earlier sentence in a case exhausted itself. The appellant is 68 years old. Reference was made to Section 427(1) Cr.P.C. and Shyam Pal (supra) to contend that the sentences awarded individually ought to be directed to run concurrently.

7. Learned counsel for the respondent, referring to Section 31 Cr.P.C. submits that each case was a separate prosecution, relating to a different time period, and for a different sum. It is only in a case where a person is tried in respect of two or more offences in a single transaction, that the sentence can be directed to run concurrently.

8. We have considered the respective submissions, and are of the opinion, that essentially the allegations constituted a single transaction, between the same parties for a block period, split up by the prosecution, presumably for its convenience, into three different cases. The evidence also was 4 common, and so is the conviction. Section 427(1), Cr.P.C. stipulates that where a person undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment, it shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment previously sentenced, unless the court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. The jurisdiction being discretionary must be exercised on fair and just principles in the facts of a case.

9. We do not consider it necessary to further elucidate or enter into an exposition of the law, in view of the precedents noticed above. Suffice it to observe that in the facts of the case, the exercise of discretion under Section 427(1) Code of Criminal Procedure, mandates that the substantive sentences imposed upon the appellant in the three separate prosecutions, are directed to run concurrently, except the default sentence, if the fine by way of compensation as imposed has not been paid by him.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

P.N. Mohanan Nair Vs. State of Kerala

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1102-1104 of 2017

O R D E R

NAVIN SINHA, J.

Ranjan Gogoi) J

Dated: 11July2017

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