Whether rent control Act will prevail over Municipal Act?

 The High Court has returned a finding that the Rent Act will

prevail over the Act. However, we are unable to agree with

this observation. Both the statutes are enacted by the State

of Karnataka. The Act deals with the municipal functions

which are wider and welfare-oriented towards the residents of

the area of Corporation, whereas the Rent Act has a limited

application for determining the rights of land owner and tenant.

Both operate in separate spheres as both have different

objectives to be achieved.{Para 38}

40. In Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank & Anr19, this Court held

that there can be a situation in law where the same statute is

treated as a special statute vis-à-vis one legislation and again

as a general statute vis-à-vis another legislation. Between

the Act and the Rent Act, the Act is a general statute enacted

as a third tier of local Government administration. The functions

of the Corporation, inter alia, includes the regulation

and maintenance of the land and building, hygiene and

health, public streets and other for a larger section of the inhabitants

falling in the municipal area, whereas the Rent Act

deals with the issues between the landlord and the tenant

conferring right to the landlord to seek eviction and correspondingly

provide protection to the tenant. Therefore, the

finding of the High Court that Rent Act would prevail over the

Act is clearly erroneous as both legislations operate in separate

distinct spheres having different objectives in mind.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1833 OF 2008

ABDUL KHUDDUS  Vs  H.M. CHANDIRAMANI (DEAD) THR LRS. & ORS.

Print Page

Whether Statutory Tenant Can Seek Repossession After Demolition Of Building Under Section 108B(e) Of Transfer Of Property Act?

In view of the binding decisions of the larger bench and

keeping in view the fact that the judgment of this Court in

Shaha Ratansi Khimji was dealing with the rights of

contractual tenant, the statutory tenant cannot seek

repossession after the demolition of building under Section

108(B)(e) of the TP Act as the rights and liabilities of a

statutory tenant have to be found under the Rent Act alone.

32. The petition for eviction filed by the landlord was withdrawn.

Since the premises are situated within the urban areas

governed by the Rent Act, the tenant has a right to seek

possession only in terms of Section 27 of the Act if the decree

for eviction has been passed by a Court on the ground

specified under clause (j) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of

Section 21. Even if it is assumed that decree of eviction was

passed on the withdrawal of the eviction petition, the tenant

has to seek possession of the premises from the date on

which he delivered vacant possession of the premises to the

landlord. The plaintiff filed first suit claiming right over the

land after demolition of the building but being a statutory

tenant, he had to avail the remedy under the Rent Act as the

provisions of the TP Act are not applicable to the building and

land situated within urban area. In view of the provisions of

the Act, the terms of the TP Act cannot be applied for in

respect of statutory tenants. The High Court has returned a

finding that the plaintiff was a statutory tenant. In view of the

said fact, the remedy of the tenant, if any, has to be found

within four corners of the Rent Act and not under the TP Act.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1833 OF 2008

ABDUL KHUDDUS  Vs  H.M. CHANDIRAMANI (DEAD) THR LRS. & ORS.

Author: HEMANT GUPTA, J.

Dated: SEPTEMBER 14, 2021.

Print Page

Difference between Contractual tenant and Statutory tenant

'Statutory tenant is not an expression to be found in any provision of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 or the rent control legislation of any other State. It is an expression coined by the judges in England and, like many other concepts in English law, it has been imported into the jurisprudence of this country and has become an expression of common use to denote a tenant whose contractual tenancy has been determined but who is continuing in possession of the premises by virtue of the protection against eviction afforded to him by the rent control legislation. Though the expression 'statutory tenant' has not been used in any rent control legislation the concept of statutory tenant finds recognition in almost every rent control legislation The definition of 'tenant' in Section 2(1) of tie Delhi Rent Control Act 1958-and I am referring here to the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 because that is the statute with which we are concerned in the present case-includes a statutory tenant. It says in Clause (ii) that 'tenant' includes any person continuing the possession after the termination of his tenancy'. Such a person would not be a tenant under the ordinary law but he is recognised as a 'tenant' by the rent control legislation and is therefore described as a statutory tenant as contra-distinguished from contractual tenant. The statutory tenant is, by virtue of inclusion in the definition of 'tenant', placed on the same footing as contractual tenant so far as rent control legislation is concerned. The rent control legislation in fact, as pointed out by this Court in a seven judge Bench decision in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal MANU/SC/0504/1979 : [1980]2SCR334 does not make any distinction between contractual tenant and statutory tenant. "It does not permit the landlord to snap his relationship with the tenant merely by his act of serving a notice to quit on him. Inspite of the notice, the law says that he continues to be a tenant and he does so enjoying all the rights of a lessee and is at the same time deemed to be under all the liabilities such as payment of rent etc. in accordance with the law." The distinction between contractual tenancy and statutory tenancy is thus completely obliterated by the rent control legislation. Though genetically the percentage of these two legal concepts is different, one owing its origin to contract and the other to rent control legislation, they are equated with each other and their incidents are the same. If a contractual tenant has an estate or interest in the premises which is heritable, it is difficult to understand why a statutory tenant should be held not to have such heritable estate or interest. In one case, the estate or interest is the result of contract while in the other it is the result of statute. But the quality of the estate or interest is the same in both cases. The difficulty in recognising that a statutory tenant can have estate or interest in the premises arises from the fact that throughout the last century and the first half of the present, almost until recent times, our thinking has been dominated by two major legal principles, namely, freedom of contract and sanctity of private property and therefore we are unable to readily accept that legal relationships can be created by statute despite want of contractual consensus and in derogation of property rights of the landlord. We are unfortunately not yet reconciled to the idea that the law is moving forward from contract to status. Why can estate or interest in property not be created by statute ? When the rent control legislation places a statutory tenant on the same footing as a contractual tenant, wipes out the distinction between the two and invests a statutory tenant with the same right, obligations and incidents as a contractual tenant, why should it be difficult to hold that, just like a contractual tenant, a statutory tenant also has estate or interest in the premises which can be inherited.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3441 of 1972

Decided On: 01.05.1985

Gian Devi Anand  Vs. Jeevan Kumar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J., P.N. Bhagwati, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, V. Balakrishna Eradi and A.N. Sen, JJ.

Citation: AIR 1985 SC 796

Print Page

Whether interest in tenancy can be transferred by way of will?

The principal question that arises for consideration in these two appeals, preferred against the judgments of the High Court of Bombay, is whether tenancy rights under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') can be devised by a will. Ancillary thereto arises the question whether the words 'assign' and 'transfer' in Section 15 of the Act include 'bequest'. 

From a plain reading of Section 5(11)(c)(i) it is obvious that the legislative prescription is first to give protection to members of the family of the tenant residing with him at the time of his death. The basis for such prescription seems to be that when a tenant is in occupation of premises the tenancy is taken by him not only for his own benefit but also for the benefit of the members of the family residing with him. Therefore, when the tenant dies, protection should be extended to the members of the family who were participants in the benefit of the tenancy and for whose needs as well the tenancy was originally taken by the tenant. It is for this avowed object, the legislature has, irrespective of the fact whether such members are 'heirs' in the strict sense of the term or not, given them the first priority to be treated as tenants. It is only when such members of the family are not there, the 'heirs' will be entitled to be treated as tenants as decided, in default of agreement, by the court. In other words, all the heirs are liable to be excluded if any other member of the family was staying with the tenant at the time of his death. When Section 15, which prohibits sub-letting, assignment or transfer, is read in juxtaposition with Section 5(11)(c)(i)it is patently clear that the legislature intends that in case no member of the family as referred to in the first part of the clause is there the 'heir', who under the ordinary mode of succession would necessarily be a relation of the deceased, should be treated as a tenant of the premises subject, however, to the decision by the court in default of agreement. The words "as may be decided in default of agreement by the Court" as appearing in Section 5(11)(c)(i) are not without significance. These words in our view have been incorporated to meet a situation where there are more than one heirs. In such an eventuality the landlord may or may not agree to one or the other of them being recognised as a 'tenant'. In case of such disagreement the court has to decide who is to be treated as 'tenant'. Therefore, if 'heir' is to include a legatee of the will then the above-quoted words cannot be applied in case of a tenant who leaves behind more than one legatee for in that case the wishes of the testator can get supplanted, on the landlord's unwillingness to respect the same, by the ultimate decision of the court. In other words, in case of a testamentary disposition, where the wish or will of the deceased has got to be respected a decision by the court will not arise and that would necessarily mean that the words quoted above will be rendered nugatory. What we want to emphasise is it is not the heirship but the nature of claim that is determinative. In our considered view the legislature could not have intended to confer such a right on the testamentary heir. Otherwise, the right of the landlord to recover possession will stand excluded even though the original party (the tenant) with whom the landlord had contracted is dead. Besides, a statutory tenancy is personal to the tenant. In certain contingencies as contemplated in Section 5(11)(c)(i) certain heirs are unable to succeed to such a tenancy. To this extent, a departure is made from the general law.

15. The matter may be viewed from another angle also. If the word 'heir' is to be interpreted to include a 'legatee' even a stranger may have to be inducted as a tenant for there is no embargo upon a stranger being a legatee.

The contention of Mr Sorabjee that 'heir' under a will may be confined to only members of the family cannot be accepted for there is no scope for giving such a restrictive meaning to that word in the context in which it appears in the Act as earlier noticed, unlike in other Rent Acts.

16. Coming now to the meaning of the words 'assign' or 'transfer' as appearing in Section 15 we find that 'transfer' has been qualified by the words 'in any other manner' and we see no reason why it should be restricted to mean only transfer inter vivos. As has been rightly pointed out by the High Court in the impugned judgment the Transfer of Property Act limits its operation to transfer inter vivos and, therefore, the meaning of the word 'transfer' as contained therein cannot be brought in aid for the purpose of the Act. On the contrary, the wide amplitude of the words 'in any other manner' clearly envisages that the word 'transfer' has been used therein in a generic sense so as to include transfer by testament also.

Supreme Court of India

Vasant Pratap Pandit vs Dr Anant Trimbak Sabnis on 12 April, 1994

Equivalent citations: 1994 SCC (3) 481, JT 1994 (3) 267

Author: M M.K.

Bench: Mukherjee M.K. (J)

Print Page