Then comes the question as to what is
the effect of an amendment of the
Constitution in the two types of cases. So
far 'as pre-Constitution laws are concerned
the amendment of the Constitution which
removes the inconsistency will result in the
revival of such laws by virtue of the
doctrine of eclipse, as laid down in Bhikaji
Narain's case (1) for the pre-existing laws
were not still-born and would still exist
though eclipsed on account of the
inconsistency to govern_ pre-existing
matters. But in the case of post-
Constitution laws, they would be still
born to the extent of the contravention.
And it is this distinction which results
in the impossibility of applying the
doctrine of eclipse to post-Constitution
laws, for nothing can be revived which
never had any valid existence. We are
therefore of opinion that the meaning of the
word "void" is the same both in Art 13 (1)
and Art. 13 (2), and that the application of
the doctrine of eclipse in one case and not
in the other case does not depend upon
giving a different meaning to the word
"void' in the two parts of Art. 13; it arises
from the inherent difference between Art.
13 (1) and Art. 13 (2) arising from the fact
that one is dealing with pre-Constitution
laws, and the other is dealing with post-
Constitution laws, with the result that in
one case the laws being not still-born the
doctrine of eclipse will apply while in the
other case the laws being still born-there
will be no scope for the application of the
doctrine of eclipse. Though the, two clauses
form part of the same Article, there is a
vital difference in the language employed
in them as also in their content and scope.
By the first clause the Constitution
recognises the existence of certain
operating laws and they are declared void,
to the extent of their inconsistency with
fundamental rights. Had there been no
such declaration, these laws would have
continued to operate. Therefore, in the case
of pre- Constitution laws what an
amendment to the Constitution does is to
remove the shadow cast on it by this
declaration. The law thus revives.
However, in the case of the second
clause, applicable to post Constitution
laws, the Constitution does not
recognise their existence, having been
made in defiance of a prohibition to
make them. Such defiance makes the
law enacted void. In their case
therefore there can be no revival by an
amendment of the Constitution, MO
though the bar to make the law is
removed, so far as the period after the
amendment is concerned. In the case
of post- Constitution laws, it would be
hardly appropriate to distinguish
between laws which are wholly void-as
for instance, those which contravene
Art. 31-and those which are
substantially void but partly valid, as
for instance, laws contravening Art.
19. Theoretically, the laws falling
under the latter category may be valid
qua non-citizens; but that is a wholly
unrealistic consideration and it seems
to us that such nationally partial
valid existence of the said laws on the
strength of hypothetical and pedantic
considerations cannot justify the
application of the doctrine of eclipse
to them. All post Constitution laws
which contravene the mandatory
injunction contained in the first part
of Art. 13 (2) are void, as void as are
the laws passed without legislative
competence, and the doctrine of
eclipse does not apply to them. We are
therefore of opinion that the Constitution
(Fourth Amendment) Act cannot be applied
to the Transfer Act in this case by virtue of
the doctrine of eclipse It follows therefore
that the Transfer Act is unconstitutional
because it did not comply with Art. 31 (2),
as it stood at the time it was passed. It will
therefore have to be struck down, and the
petitioner given a declaration in his favour
accordingly.
(emphasis supplied)”
(vii) In the case of State of Manipur (supra),
recently a three-judge Bench of this Court, was
dealing with an appeal against the judgement of
the Manipur High Court which had declared the
Manipur Parliamentary Secretary (Appointment,
Salary and Allowances and Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act, 2012 (Manipur Act No. 10 of
2012) as also the Repealing Act, 2018, as
unconstitutional. Justice L. Nageswara Rao,
speaking for the Bench, observed that where a
statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional, it is
as if it had never been and any law held to be
unconstitutional for whatever reason, whether
due to lack of legislative competence or in
violation of fundamental rights, would be void
ab initio. Paragraph Nos. 22 and 23 of the said
judgment are reproduced hereunder:
“22. Where a statute is adjudged to be
unconstitutional, it is as if it had
never been. Rights cannot be built up
under it; contracts which depend upon it
for their consideration are void; it
constitutes a protection to no one who has
acted under it and no one can be punished
for having refused obedience to it before the
decision was made. Field, J. in Norton v.
Shelby County, observed that “an
unconstitutional act is not law, it
confers no rights, it imposes no duties,
it affords no protection, it creates no
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never
been passed”.
23. An unconstitutional law, be it
either due to lack of legislative
competence or in violation of
fundamental rights guaranteed under
Part III of the Constitution of India, is
void” ab initio. In Behram Khurshid
Pesikaka v. State of Bombay, it was held
by a constitution bench of this Court that
the law-making power of the State is
restricted by a written fundamental law
and any law enacted and opposed to the
fundamental law is in excess of the
legislative authority and is thus, a nullity.
A declaration of unconstitutionality
brought about by lack of legislative
power as well as a declaration of
unconstitutionality brought about by
reason of abridgement of fundamental
rights goes to the root of the power
itself, making the law void in its
inception. This Court in Deep Chand v.
State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. summarised
the following propositions:
“(a) Whether the Constitution
affirmatively confers power on the
legislature to make laws subject-wise or
negatively prohibits it from infringing any
fundamental right, they represent only
two aspects of want of legislative power;
(b) The Constitution in express terms
makes the power of a legislature to make
laws in regard to the entries in the Lists
of the Seventh Schedule subject to the
other provisions of the Constitution and
thereby circumscribes or reduces the said
power by the limitations laid down in
Part III of the Constitution;
(c) It follows from the premises that a
law made in derogation or in excess
of that power would be ab initio
void…
(emphasis supplied)”
Further after discussing the law laid
down by the previous pronouncements, the
principles were deduced in paragraph no. 28 to
state that a statute declared unconstitutional
by a court of law would be still born and non
est for all purposes. Paragraph 28 of the report
is reproduced hereunder:
“28. The principles that can be deduced
from the law laid down by this Court, as
referred to above, are:
I. A statute which is made by a
competent legislature is valid till it is
declared unconstitutional by a court of law.
II. After declaration of a statute as
unconstitutional by a court of law, it is
non est for all purposes.
III. In declaration of the law, the
doctrine of prospective overruling can be
applied by this Court to save past
transactions under earlier decisions
superseded or statutes held
unconstitutional.
IV. Relief can be moulded by this Court
in exercise of its power under Article 142 of
the Constitution, notwithstanding the
declaration of a statute as
unconstitutional.
(emphasis supplied)”
43. From the above discussion, it is crystal clear
that once a law is declared to be
unconstitutional, being violative of Part-III of the
Constitution, then it would be held to be void ab
initio, still born, unenforceable and non est in
view of Article 13(2) of the Constitution and its
interpretation by authoritative pronouncements.
Thus, the declaration made by the
Constitution Bench in the case of
Subramanian Swamy (supra) will have
retrospective operation. Section 6A of the
DSPE Act is held to be not in force from the
date of its insertion i.e. 11.09.2003.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.377 OF 2007
CBI Vs R.R. KISHORE
Author: VIKRAM NATH, J.
SEPTEMBER 11, 2023.
Citation: 2023INSC817.
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