The Apex court in the case of Raj Kishore (supra)
has held that it is mandatory for the plaintiff in a suit for specific
performance to plead and prove that he was always ready and willing to
perform his part of contract. In the facts and circumstances of the present
case, I am more than satisfied that the Plaintiff has failed to plead and
prove his continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of
contract. IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SECOND APPEAL NO.296 OF 1989
Parshram Tanaji Aher, age 30 years
versus
Dattu Kadu Aher;
CORAM: R. G. KETKAR, J
PRONOUNCED ON: 24th September, 2013
Heard Mr. S. M. Gorwadkar, learned counsel for the Appellants and
Mr. S. K. Shinde, learned counsel for the Respondents, at length.
2
By this Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, (for short C.P
.C.), the original Defendants No.1A to 1H have
challenged the judgment and decree dated 5101985 passed by the
Learned Civil Judge Junior Division, Chandwad in Regular Civil Suit No.96
of 1975 as also the Judgment and Decree dated 1291988 passed by the
Learned III Additional District Judge, Nashik in Civil Appeal No.46 of
1986. By these orders, the courts below decreed the suit instituted by
Respondent No.1 Plaintiff for specific performance of contract dated 30
121968. The parties shall, herein after be referred as per their status in
the trial court. The facts and circumstances, giving rise to the filing of the
Respondent No.1 (original Plaintiff) instituted the suit initially for
present Second Appeal briefly stated, are as under:
redemption of mortgage. The controversy in this Appeal is in respect of
land which previously was bearing CTS No.96/5 measuring 32 Gunthas
assessed at Rs.1.69 ps. and subsequently merged in the lands of Appellants
(Defendants No.1A to 1H) and formed block No.294 which together
measures at 1 Acre and 37 gunthas (for short 'suit land'). It was the case of
the Plaintiff that on 2181968 (exhibit 46) he had mortgaged the suit
land to defendant No.2 i.e. Pundalik. The document was however styled
as a sale deed and consideration of Rs.2000/ was shown. It is the case of
the Plaintiff that he had received Rs.1500/. The said document was
executed by way of security for repayment of the loan. The Plaintiff needed
Rs.1000/ more, so he demanded Rs.1000/ from Defendant No.2.
Defendant No.2 did not have that much amount and on the contrary he
demanded Rs.1500/ paid to the Plaintiff under Exhibit 46. The Plaintiff
approached Defendant No.1, since deceased who paid Rs.2500/ and
document dated 30121968 Exhibit 45 was executed. Though this
document was styled as sale deed, the said document was executed by way
of security only. Under that document possession was delivered to
Defendant No.1. At that time Defendant No.1 agreed to execute a separate
document about reconveyance of the suit land to the Plaintiff. Accordingly
Defendant No.1 executed a receipt on 30121968 (exhibit 40). The
Plaintiff issued notice on 14111975 to Defendant No.1 for redemption of
mortgage. It was alleged that defendant No.1 had executed a receipt on
30121968 and agreed to sell the suit land to the Plaintiff upon paying
Rs.2500/. Defendant No.1 gave reply on 2121975. On 8121975 the
Plaintiff instituted the suit for redemption of mortgage. It was alleged by
him that the sale deed dated 30121968 was in fact a mortgage with
conditional sale. It was further alleged that the document even though
styled as a sale deed, in reality, it was agreed between the parties that the
Defendant No.1 would take agricultural produce in lieu of interest and
after return of Rs.2500/, would convey the suit land to the Plaintiff.
4
The Plaintiff filed application on 1781982 for amendment of the
plaint. By that amendment the plaintiff sought specific performance of the
contract dated 30121968. By judgment and order dated 2091982 the
Trial Court rejected that application. Aggrieved by that decision, the
plaintiff instituted Civil Revision Application No. 714 of 1982 in this court.
By judgment and order dated 221984 this court allowed the civil revision
application thereby permitting the plaintiff to amend the plaint.
5
Original Defendant No.1 Tanaji filed Written Statement on 248
1976 and additional written statement on 3181984. It was interalia
contended that the transaction dated 2181968 (Exhibit 46) between the
Plaintiff and Defendant No.2 was an out and out sale and not a transaction
of mortgage as alleged by the Plaintiff. Defendant No.1 further contended
that one Babulal had obtained his blank signatures and taking undue
advantage of signatures on blank papers, the plaintiff has alleged that
Defendant no.1 had executed receipt dated 31121968 (exhibit 40)
allegedly agreeing to reconvey the suit land.
The learned Trial Court framed the necessary issues. The parties led
oral as well as documentary evidence before the Trial Court. By Judgment
and decree dated 5101985 the Learned Trial Judge decreed the suit for
specific performance of contract dated 3012198 (Exhibit 40). The Trial
Judge held that the Plaintiff had failed to prove that the suit property was
mortgaged with defendant no.2. He further held that the suit instituted by
the Plaintiff was within limitation and was not barred by provisions of
Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act,
1947. He further held that the Plaintiff had proved receipt dated 3012
1968 (exhibit 40 executed by Defendant no.1. During the pendency of the
suit, defendant No.1Tanaji died and Defendant Nos.1A to 1H being his
heirs and legal representative were brought on record. Aggrieved by the
decision of the Trial Court, Defendant Nos.1A to 1H preferred appeal no.46
of 1986. By Judgment and decree dated 1291988, the Learned District
Judge dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decree of the Trial Court. It
is against these decisions Defendant Nos.1A to 1H have instituted the
present second appeal. The second appeal was admitted on 181989 as
involved substantial questions of law mentioned in ground nos.(a) to (e).
The ground nos.(a) to (e) read as under:
“(a) Whether the alleged agreement dated 30 th
December 1968 between the defendant and the
plaintiff is void as without consideration in view of the
findings of the lower appellate court that the title in
the suit land had already passed in favour of the
defendant under sale deed dated 21 st August 1968
(Exhibit 46).
December, 1968 in respect of CTS No.96/5
admeasuring 32 gunthas was liable to be specifically
(b) Whether the alleged agreement dated 30 th
performed when on the date of the suit it had merged
with other lands and has become part of the Gat
No.294 admeasuring 1 Acre and 37 gunthas and has
lost its original identity.
ig
(c) Whether in view of the findings of the lower
appellate court that exhibit 46 dated 21 st August 1968
and Exhibit 45 dated 30th December 1968 are
simplicitors sale deeds and not mortgage transactions
as contended by the plaintiff. The suit filed by the
plaintiff was maintainable in the present form.
(d) Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to
perform his part of contract in view of the specific
findings of the courts below that he had not deposited
Rs.2,500/ in the court till the date of the judgment by
the trial court on 5th October 1985 though he had
stated so in his plaint and the said statement was found
to be false.
limitation when the plea and relief of specific
performance was sought by an amendment to the
(e) Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff was barred by
plaint beyond the period of limitation and whether the
amendment related back to the date of the suit.”
In support of this appeal, Mr. Gorwadkar submitted that the courts
below committed serious error in decreeing the suit instituted by the
Plaintiff for specific performance of contract dated 30121968 (Exhibit
40). In the first place, he submitted that the plaintiff had misused the
signatures of defendant no.1 that were taken on blank papers and further
he alleged that defendant no.1 had executed receipt on 30121968
(exhibit 40) thereby purportedly agreed to reconvey the suit land.
Secondly, he submitted that in any case the courts below committed
serious error in holding that suit for specific performance of contract was
within limitation. He submitted that initially the plaintiff had instituted
suit only for redemption of the mortgage. The suit was instituted on 812
1975 at that time, the plaintiff did not pray for specific performance of
contract. He further filed application for amendment of plaint which was
rejected by the trial court on 2091982. By judgment and order dated 22
1994 in civil revision application no.714 of 1982, this court allowed the
civil revision application thereby permitting the plaintiff to amend the
plaint. He submitted that basically when the plaintiff filed application for
amendment of plaint on 1781982, the relief of specific performance itself
was barred by limitation. He submitted that though this court permitted
the plaintiff to amend the plaint on 221994, the amendment so allowed
does not relate back to the date of institution of the suit namely 8121975.
In support of this submission, he relied upon the following decisions:
(i) Tarlok Singh Vs. Vijay Kumar Sabharwal, (1996) 8 SCC 367
(2001) 6 SCC 163
(ii) Vishwambhar & Ors. Vs. Laxminarayan (dead) through LRS & Anr,
(iii) South Konkan Distilleries & Anr. Vs. Prabhakar Gajanan Naik & Ors.,
(2008) 14 SCC 632
(iv) Sampath Kumar Vs. Ayyakannu & Anr., (2002) 7 SCC 559
(v) RAgu Thilak D. John Vs. S. Rayappan & Ors., (2001) 2 SCC 472
(vi) Southern Ancillaries Pvt Ltd., Vs. Southern Alloy Foundaries Pvt. Ltd.,
AIR 2003 MADRAS 416
(vii) Sri Gobina Ghosh & Ors. Vs. Biswanath Ghosh & Ors., AIR 2005
Calcutta 359
8
In any case, Mr. Gorwadkar submitted that the courts below
committed serious error in decreeing the suit instituted by the Plaintiff for
specific performance of contract dated 30121968 (Exhibit 40), when the
plaintiff was not all along ready and willing to perform his part of contract.
He submitted that plaintiff had neither pleaded nor proved his readiness
and willingness to perform his part of contract as required under Section
16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and as per form Nos.47 and 48 of the
1st Schedule of CPC. Though the plaintiff had issued notice on 14111975
(exhibit 86), he did not offer to pay the amount as per the alleged
agreement dated 30121968 (exhibit 40). He did not deposit any amount
at the time of instituting the suit on 8121975 nor during the pendency of
the suit. The plaintiff also did not comply the specific direction issued
while passing the decree by the trial court for depositing the balance
consideration on or before 2121985. Thus the plaintiff has not
established his continuous readiness and willingness as required under
section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. In support of this submission,
he relied upon the following decisions:
(i) Abdul Khader Rowther Vs. P
. K. Sara Bai, AIR 1990 SC 682
(ii) N.P
. Thirugnanam Vs. R. Jag Mohan Rao, AIR 1996 SC 116,
(iii) Rajkishore (dead) by LRS. Vs. Prem Singh & Ors., (2011) 1 SCC 657
9
On the other hand, Mr. Shinde supported the impugned orders. He
submitted that the courts below have concurrently held that the suit
instituted by the plaintiff was within limitation and that the plaintiff was
all along ready and willing to perform his part of contract. He submitted
that since the Plaintiff has deposited the amount as per the directions of
the trial court, it cannot be said that he was not ready and willing to
perform his part of the contract. He further submitted that the courts
below have rightly held that the suit for specific performance was not
barred by limitation. In any case when this court allowed the civil revision
application on 221984, this court did not keep the issue of limitation
open. This court also did not direct that the amendment permitted by it
shall not relate back to the date of the suit and to the extent permitted by
it, shall be deemed to have been brought before the court on the date of
which the application seeking amendment was filed. In other words, he
submitted that the issue of limitation was not left open for being agitated
by the parties. Once this court had allowed the amendment though on 22
1984, it relates back to the date of the institution of the suit namely 812
1975. He further submitted that the trial court decreed the suit. The
Appellate Court confirmed the decree. The discretion exercised by the
Appellate Court cannot be termed as arbitrary or capricious. He, therefore,
submitted that since the appeal does not raise any question of law much
less any substantial question of law, the same is liable to be dismissed.
I have considered the rival submissions made by the parties. I have
also perused the material on record. From the material on record, the
(i)
following facts are emerged.
The Plaintiff had executed sale deed in favour defendant no.2 on 21
81968 (exhibit 46). Though the plaintiff alleged that it was a transaction
of mortgage, the courts below have concurrently held that it was an out
and out sale
(ii) Defendant no.1 purchased the suit land from defendant no.2 on 3012
1968 (exhibit 45). It is the case of the plaintiff that on the same day i.e.
30121968 defendant no.1 executed receipt (exhibit 40) where under he
agreed to reconvey the suit land to the plaintiff. Defendant no.1 contended
that his signatures on blank papers were misused. The courts below
concurrently found that defendant no.1 had executed receipt on 3012
1968 in favour of the plaintiff.
(iii) on 14111975, the plaintiff issued notice to defendant no.1 for
redemption of mortgage. It was alleged that defendant no.1 had executed
a receipt on 30121968 where under he agreed to reconvey the suit land
to the plaintiff when he returns Rs.2500/. Defendant no.1 gave reply on 2
121975 and refused to convey the land to the plaintiff.
(iv) on 8121975, the plaintiff instituted suit for redemption of mortgage.
At that time, the plaintiff did not pray for specific performance of contract
dated 30121968.
(v) on 1781982 the plaintiff filed application for amendment of the plaint
thereby praying for specific performance of contract dated 30121968.
The trial court rejected that application on 2091982.
(vi) Aggrieved by this decision, the plaintiff instituted civil revision
The question that requires to be considered is whether the relief of
11
application no.714 of 1982 in this Court which was allowed on 221984.
specific performance of contract was barred by limitation or not. Mr.
Gorwadkar submitted that on the date of filing application on 1781982,
the claim for specific performance of contract dated 30121968 was
obviously time barred, as in reply dated 2121975 defendant no.1 had
refused to convey the suit land to the plaintiff. The time will start running
from date of refusal on the part of defendant no.1 to perform his part of
contract. The relief for specific performance ought to have been made
within 3 years from the date of refusal by defendant no.1 i.e. to say on or
before 1121978.
As against this Mr. Shinde submitted that while allowing civil
revision application on 221984, this court did not keep the issue of
limitation open. He submitted that this Court while permitting the
amendment did not direct that the amendment permitted by it shall not
relate back to the date of the suit and to the extent permitted by it shall be
deemed to have been brought before the court on the date on which
application seeking the amendment was filed. I find merit in the
submission of Mr. Shinde in the case of Sampath Kumar, (supra) the Apex
Court observed in paragraph 10 as under :
“10. An amendment once incorporated relates back to
the date of the suit. However, the doctrine of relation
back in the context of amendment of pleadings is not
one of universal application and in appropriate cases
the court is competent while permitting an
amendment to direct that the amendment permitted
by it shall not relate back to the date of the suit and to
the extent permitted by it shall be deemed to have
13
been brought before the court on the date on which
the application seeking the amendment was filed.”
In the light of the above judgment, amendment once incorporated
relates back to the date of the suit. However, the doctrine of relation back
in the context of amendment of pleadings is not one of universal
application and in appropriate cases the court is competent, while
permitting an amendment to direct that the amendment permitted by it
shall not relate back to the date of the suit and to the extent permitted by
it shall be deemed to have been brought before the court on the date on
which the application seeking the amendment was filed.
13
In case of Ragu Thilak D. John Vs. S. Rayappan & Ors, (2001) 2
Supreme Court Cases 472, the Apex Court observed that whether the
amendment was barred by time or not was a disputed question of fact and
therefore that prayer for amendment could not be rejected and in such
circumstance the issue of limitation can be made an issue in the suit itself.
In other words, the court while allowing the application for amendment
can permit the parties to agitate issue of limitation by keeping that issue
open as observed in the case of Ragu Thilak (supra) or as observed in
Sampath Kumar's case (supra) in case while permitting the amendment,
the court directs that the amendment permitted by it shall not relate back
to the date of the suit and shall be deemed to have been brought before the
court on the date on which the application seeking amendment was filed,
in such circumstance only the question of limitation can be agitated.
14
Perusal of the order dated 221984 passed by this Court in CRA
No.714 of 1982 shows that this court neither kept the issue of limitation
open nor directed that the amendment so allowed shall not relate back to
the date of institution of the suit but shall be deemed to have been brought
before the Court on the date of which application seeking the amendment
was filed. In view thereof it is not possible to accept the submissions of Mr.
Gorwadkar that the amendment allowed by this court will not relate back
to the date of the suit. The reliance placed on the Judgments (i) Tarlok
Singh (supra), (ii) Vishwambhar (supra), (iii) South Konkan Distilleries
(supra), (iv) Sampath Kumar (supra), (v) Ragu Thilak D. John (supra),
ig
(vi) Southern Ancillaries Pvt Ltd. (supra), (vii) Sri Gobinda Ghosh (supra),
does not advance the case of Defendant Nos.1A to 1H.
The next question that is required to be considered is whether the
courts below were justified in holding that the plaintiff was all along ready
and willing to perform his part of contract. Mr. Gorwadkar relied upon the
decision of Abdul Khader Rowther (Supra) and in particular paragraphs
10, 11 and 12 thereof. In that case the Apex court held that even by
putting a liberal construction on the various statement contained in the
plaint, it is difficult to hold that there has been even a faint attempt to
make it to conform to the requirements prescribed in Forms 47 and 48 of
the First schedule in the CPC, that the plaintiff had applied to the
defendants specifically to perform the agreement and that he had been and
is still ready and willing to specifically perform his part of the agreement.
In such circumstance equitable relief of specific performance cannot be
granted. He also relied upon decision of the apex court in the case of N.P
.
Thirugananam (supra). In that case, the apex Court held that evidence did
not show that the plaintiff was ever ready to perform his part of contract.
To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of
the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the
plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other
attending circumstances. He also relied upon the decision of Raj Kishore
(Supra) and in particular paragraph 27. In this case the apex court held
that it is mandatory for the plaintiff to assert that he/she was always ready
and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract sought to be
enforced against the defendant. In the absence of such an averment, relief
of specific performance cannot be granted.
In the light of this, if the record of the present case is perused, it
would be evident that the Plaintiff did not aver specifically that he was and
is ready and willing to perform his part of contract namely payment of
consideration of Rs.2500/. In fact perusal of the averments made in
paragraph 3 of the plaint, shows that it was asserted that an amount of
Rs.2500/ is being deposited in the Court. The appellate court in paragraph
10 of the impugned order observed that Rs.2500/ were not deposited in
the court though there is a recital about such deposit being made in the
Court. The Plaintiff in fact did not deposit the amount in the Court. Perusal
of the operative part of the trial court order and in particular clauses (1)
and (3) thereof clearly shows that the plaintiff did not deposit the amount
even during the pendency of the suit and in fact the plaintiff was directed
to deposit the amount in the trial court on or before 2121985. In
paragraph 11, the appellate court observed that since the plaintiff has
already deposited the amount as per the directions of the trial court, he is
entitled to specific performance of contract.
In the light of the aforesaid discussions, I am more than satisfied that
17
the plaintiff was not all along ready and willing to perform his part of
contract. As noted earlier, all that was asserted in the plaint was that
amount of Rs.2500/is being deposited in the court. Factually the plaintiff
did not deposit the amount in the trial court. Apart from that even during
the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff did not deposit the amount of
Rs.2500/ in the trial court. Perusal of clauses (1) and (3) of the operative
part of the trial court clearly shows that the plaintiff did not deposit any
amount in the trial court and was therefore, directed to deposit the amount
on or before 2121985. The Apex court in the case of Raj Kishore (supra)
has held that it is mandatory for the plaintiff in a suit for specific
performance to plead and prove that he was always ready and willing to
perform his part of contract. In the facts and circumstances of the present
case, I am more than satisfied that the Plaintiff has failed to plead and
prove his continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of
contract.
18
Mr. Shinde, submitted that the trial court decreed the suit. Against
that order, Defendants No.1A to 1H preferred Appeal. The Appellate Court
dismissed the appeal. He submitted that it cannot be said that discretion
exercised by the Appellate Court under Section 20 of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963, was either arbitrary or capricious. The Appellate Court has
exercised sound discretion while confirming the trial court's decree. He
therefore submitted that no case is made out for exercising discretion
under Section 20 of the said Act. In any case, he submitted that the courts
below have concurrently decreed the suit and even otherwise no case is
made out under Section 100 of CPC.
19
In case of N.P
. Thirugnanam (supra), the Apex Court observed in
paragraph 5 as under:
5. It is settled law that remedy for specific
performance is an equitable remedy and is in the
discretion of the court, which discretion requires
to be exercised according to settled principles of
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law and not arbitrarily as adumbrated under S.20
Act'). Under S.20, the court is not bound to grant
the relief just because there was valid agreement
of the Specific Relief Act 1963 (for short, 'the
of sale. Section 16(c) of the Act envisages that
plaintiff must plead and prove that he had
performed or has always been ready and willing
to perform the essential terms of the contract
which are to be performed by him, other than
those terms the performance of which has been
ig
prevented or waived by the defendant. The
continuous readiness and willingness on the part
of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant
the relief of specific performance. This
circumstance is material and relevant and is
required to be be considered by the court while
granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the
plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he
must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is
ready and willing to perform his part of the
contract, the court must take into consideration
the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent
to the filing of the suit alongwith other attending
circumstances.
20
mmj
Perusal of paragraph 5 extracted herein above shows that the
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remedy for specific performance is an equitable remedy and is in the
discretion of the court, which discretion is required to be exercised
according to settled principles of law and not arbitrarily. Under Section 20,
the court is not bound to grant the relief just because there was valid
agreement of sale. Section 16(c) of the Act envisages that plaintiff must
plead and prove that he had performed or has always been ready and
willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be
ig
performed by him, other than those terms the performance of which has
been prevented or waived by the defendant. The continuous readiness and
willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the
relief of specific performance.
I have already held that the plaintiff was not all along ready and
21
willing to perform his part of contract. In view of the Judgment of the Apex
Court in the case of N.P Thirugnanam (supra), the Appellate Court
.
committed serious error in exercising discretion under Section 20 of the
Act. In the case of Abdul Khader Rowther (Supra) the Apex Court has held
that a suit for specific performance has to conform to the requirements
prescribed in form Nos.47 and 48 of the 1st Schedule of CPC. The Plaintiff
must further plead that he has been and is still ready and willing to
specifically perform his part of the agreement. I am, therefore, satisfied
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that the courts below could not have decreed the suit for specific
Coming to the submissions of Mr. Shinde based upon Section 100 of
22
performance of contract.
CPC, I do not find any merit in the submission of Mr. Shinde. In the case of
Union of India Vs. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148, the Apex Court
considered various Judgments. In paragraphs 68 and 70 it was observed as
under:
ig
“68. In Jai Singh Vs. Shakuntala, this Court held that
it is permissible to interfere even on question of fact
but it may be only in “very exceptional cases and on
extreme perversity that the authority to examine the
same in extenso stands permissible it is a rarity rather
than a regularity and thus in fine it can be safely
concluded that while there is no prohibition as such,
but the power to scrutiny can only be had in very
exceptional circumstances and upon proper
circumspection
mmj
70. There may be exceptional circumstances where
the High Court is compelled to interfere,
notwithstanding the limitation imposed by the
wording of Section 100 CPC. It may be necessary to
do so for the reason that after all the purpose of the
establishment of courts of justice is to render justice
between the parties, though the High Court is bound
to act with circumspection while exercising such
jurisdiction. In second appeal, the Court frames the
substantial question of law at the time of admission of
the appeal and the Court is required to answer all the
said questions unless the appeal is finally decided on
one or two of those questions or the Court comes to
the conclusion that the questions(s) framed could not
be the substantial question(s) of law. There is no
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prohibition in law to frame the additional substantial
question of law if the need so arises at the time of the
final hearing of the appeal.”
In my opinion, the present case squarely falls in the criteria laid
23
sa-296-89.sxw
down by the Apex Court. Though the Plaintiff was not all along ready and
willing to perform his part of the contract, still the courts below decreed
the suit. It is held by the Apex Court that the requirement of pleading and
ig
mandatory requirement.
proof of readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract is
In the light of this discussions, I am satisfied that the courts below
committed serious error in decreeing the suit instituted by the plaintiff for
24
specific performance of the contract.
In the result Appeal succeeds and the same is allowed. The
impugned Judgment and decree dated 5101985 passed by the trial court
in Regular Civil Suit No.96 of 1975 as also the impugned Judgment and
decree dated 1291988 passed by the Learned District Judge, Nasik in
Civil Appeal No.46 of 1986 are quashed and set aside. The suit instituted
by the plaintiff for specific performance of contract stands dismissed with
no order as to costs.
mmj
(R. G. KETKAR, J)
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