Saturday, 12 March 2016

Whether minor can be held liable for dishonour of cheque drawn by him if cheque bears date subsequent to his attaining majority?

  Next question is, whether the quondam minor can be held

liable for dishonour of a cheque, drawn by him/her, for want of funds in the

account,      if the cheque bears a date subsequent to his/her attaining

majority and further the dishonour takes place after he/she attained

majority? For this question also, the answer can only be in the negative.

Indisputable proposition is that a cheque defined under Section 6 NI Act is

also a bill of exchange, but it is drawn on a banker and it is payable on

demand. It is, thus, obvious that even though a bill of exchange is drawn

on a banker, if it is not payable on demand, it is not a cheque. A postdated

cheque is only a bill of exchange when it is written or drawn and it becomes

a cheque when it is payable on demand. A postdated cheque is not

payable till the date, which is shown on the face of the document. (see



Ashok Yeshwant Badeve v. Surendra               Madhavrao Nighojakar and

another (2001 Cri.L.J. 1674 (SC)) and Shri Ishar Alloys Steels Ltd. v.

Jayaswals NECO Ltd.(2001 Cri.L.J. 1250 (SC)). In the normal course,

dishonour of a postdated cheque, after it has become a cheque in the eye

of law, would have attracted the offence under Section 138 NI Act.

Nevertheless, the law pronounced distinctly in Section 26 NI Act makes it

clear that though a minor can draw, indorse, deliver and negotiate a

promissory note, cheque, etc. so as to bind all parties, it excludes the

minor's capacity to bind himself.        In other words, the said provision

insulates the minor from binding himself from the consequences of

drawing, indorsing, delivering and negotiating a negotiable instrument. On

recapitulating the principles discussed above, I arrive at the following

findings:

                 A minor, who had drawn a cheque, which is dishonoured for

want of funds in the account after his/her attaining majority, is exempted

from prosecution because the cheque is one without consideration.

Besides, the minor at the time when the cheque was drawn was incapable

of incurring any debt or liability, which could have been legally enforced

against him/her, in spite of the fact that he/she attained majority on the date

of dishonour of the cheque. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALAAT ERNAKULAM

                                                       PRESENT:

                            THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.HARIPRASAD

                TUESDAY, THE 2ND DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2014

                                              Crl.MC.No. 3805 of 2012 ()
                                              
            ANAGHA PRASAD,

Vs

             M.C.ABU, MACHINCHERY HOUSE, 
    Citation;2016 CRLJ(NOC)86 Kerala
                 
                

            Common questions of fact and law arise in these three cases.

Hence, they are heard together and disposed by this common order.

      2.    Legal puzzles arising herein for determination are as follows:

            i.     Whether dishonour of a cheque, drawn by a person

during minority for discharging a debt or liability towards another, will invite

an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881?

            ii.    Does it make any difference if the cheque was a post-

dated one and its dishonour takes place after the quondam minor attained

majority?

      3.    In order to find out answers to these questions, we shall

consider the skeletal facts in these cases. Petitioner in these cases are the

accused in three different private complaints filed by the 1st respondent

before the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nilambur. In all the three

complaints, the offence alleged against the petitioner is one under Section

138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short, "the NI Act"). 1st

respondent/complainant is the Managing Partner of a firm, conducting a



business by name Persian Jewellery, Nilambur. Petitioner's mother was an

employee in the said firm. While so, the petitioner, her mother and brother

approached the 1st respondent seeking financial help for the petitioner to

pursue study in an engineering college in Tamil Nadu. They required about

`2,50,000/- as fees for admission to the college and the hostel.             1st

respondent paid `1,50,000/- to the petitioner for meeting the initial

expenses. Thereafter, on 08.08.2010, the petitioner again approached the

1st respondent and requested to lend `1,00,000/- more for her study.

Petitioner made the 1st respondent believe that the entire amount borrowed

from him would be repaid before 10.01.2011 as she was sure of getting

the education loan applied for. On 12.07.2010, the petitioner, her brother

and mother again approached the 1st respondent and requested for

advancing money. As agreed earlier, an agreement was executed between

the parties.       As per the terms of the agreement the total amount of

`2,50,000/- demanded and received by the petitioner, including `1,00,000/-

later received by her, should be repaid on or before 10.01.2011. It was

further agreed that if the petitioner did not repay the money, a portion of the

property belonging to them should be conveyed to the 1st respondent. On

that assurance, on 08.08.2010, 1st respondent advanced to the petitioner a

further sum of `1,00,000/-, thereby she got the entire amount of `2,50,000/-

from the 1st respondent. However, the petitioner did not fulfil her promise to


pay back money promptly. Later, on 14.01.2011, the petitioner with her

brother and mother again approached the 1st respondent and the petitioner

acknowledged her liability. It was represented by the petitioner that she got

the education loan sanctioned.           Petitioner paid `10,000/- to the 1st

respondent on the said date. Thereafter three cheques were issued for the

remaining liability of `2,40,000/- on 14.01.2011 by the petitioner to the 1st

respondent.         One cheque was for `1,50,000/.         Another one was for

`80,000/- and yet another one for `10,000/-. All of them were drawn on

14.01.2011 with a post date 31.01.2011.              When the cheques were

presented for collection, they were dishonoured due to insufficiency of

funds in the account of the petitioner. 1st respondent caused to issue the

statutory notices. Even after receiving notices, the amounts were not paid.

Hence, three prosecutions were launched.

       4.        Main contention raised by the petitioner is that the complaints

are not legally maintainable, because the petitioner, being a minor on the

date of drawal of the cheques, cannot be prosecuted as she was

incompetent to bind herself at that time by virtue of Section 26 NI Act.

       5.        It is seen from the records that the petitioner filed applications

before the trial court in all the cases claiming the benefit of Section 7 of the

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 contending

that she was a minor on the date of the alleged commission of offence.



Those applications were considered by the learned Magistrate, but all of

them were dismissed.              Now she challenges the maintainability of the

complaints on other legal grounds.

       6.        Heard Shri P.Venugopal, learned counsel for the petitioner

and Shri P.Samsudin, learned counsel for the 1st respondent. Learned

Public Prosecutor is also heard.

       7.        According       to Shri Venugopal,   the   prosecution  is   a

misconceived legal action. Section 26 NI Act, though permits a minor to

draw, endorse, deliver and negotiate a promissory note, bill of exchange or

cheque, makes it clear that such instrument shall never bind the minor. For

clarity, Section 26 NI Act is reproduced hereunder:

                        "Capacity to make, etc., promissory

                notes, etc.- Every person capable of contracting,

                according to the law to which he is subject, may

                bind himself and be bound by the making, drawing,

                acceptance, indorsement, delivery and negotiation

                of a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque.

                        Minor.- A minor may draw, indorse, deliver

                and negotiate such instruments so as to bind all

                parties except himself.

                        Nothing herein contained shall be deemed

                to empower a corporation to make, indorse or

                accept such instruments except in cases in which,

                under the law for the time being in force, they are


                so empowered."

        8.       Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 specifies the

persons competent to contract. One of the main requirements therein is

that the contracting party must be of the age of majority according to the

law to which he is subject.        It is provided by Section 3 of the Indian

Majority Act, 1875 that all persons domiciled in India shall attain the age of

majority on his completing the age of eighteen years and not before. It

can legitimately be presumed that the framers of the NI Act must not have

perceived the possibility of incorporating a provision like Section 138 in the

statute in future, creating a statutory offence for the dishonour of a cheque.

Stated differently, dishonour of a cheque was conceived as a civil wrong at

the time when the NI Act was enacted. Later, Section 138 and other

affiliated provisions were inserted in the NI Act by the Banking, Public

Financial Institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act,

1988 with effect from 01.04.1989. Now it becomes, therefore, a necessity

to find out whether there is any material change in law in case a cheque

drawn by a minor is dishonoured for want of funds in his account and also

whether he can be held liable for the offence under Section 138 NI Act in

such a situation. Very pertinent aspect to be noted here is that what is

made punishable under Section 138 NI Act is the dishonour of a cheque

drawn by a person in the name of another for the discharge, in whole or in



part, of any debt or other liability(underline supplied for emphasis). Then

the quintessential question will be whether a minor is capable of incurring

any debt or liability?

       9.        I shall deal with the liability of a minor, in case a cheque drawn

by him is dishonoured, as per the law stated in Section 26 NI Act. On a

reading of Section 26 NI Act, it is crystal clear that a minor, like any other

person capable of contracting, may draw, indorse, deliver and negotiate a

promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque. Such instrument so drawn,

indorsed, delivered and negotiated by the minor is capable of binding all

parties, except the minor himself. It gives a protection or an insulation to

the minor from binding himself when he is drawing, indorsing or delivering

or negotiating a negotiable instrument. Privy Council considered an appeal

from a decree of a Bench of three Honourable Judges of the High Court of

Calcutta in Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose (Vol.XXX ILR Calcutta

539). Facts in the case in brief are that on 20.07.1895, the respondent

Dharmodas Ghose executed a mortgage in favour of                    Brahmo Dutt, a

money lender to secure repayment of `20,000/- with interest. At that time,

the respondent Dharmodas Ghose was an infant (as described in the

decision for a minor). On 10.09.1895, the respondent through his mother

as next friend commenced an action against Brahmo Dutt stating that he

was under aged when he executed the mortgage and prayed for a


declaration that it was void and inoperative and should be delivered upon

to be cancelled. The defendant Brahmo Dutt put in a defence that the

respondent was of full age when he executed the mortgage, that even if he

was a minor, the declaration of his age was fraudulently made to deceive

the defendant and, therefore, he was disentitled to claim any relief.

Considering all the issues, the Privy Council held thus:

                      "On the true construction of the Contract Act (IX

              of 1872) a person, who by reason of infancy is

              incompetent to contract, cannot make a contract

              within the meaning of the Act. A mortgage, therefore,

              made by a minor is void; and a money-lender who

              has advanced money to a minor on the security of the

              mortgage is not entitled to repayment of the money on

              a decree being made declaring the mortgage invalid;

              sections 64 and 65 of the Contract Act being based

              on there being a contract between competent parties,

              and being inapplicable to a case where there is not,

              and could not have been, any contract at all."

       10.       Whether the immunity provided by Section 26 NI Act excludes

the obligation of a minor to restitute the benefit derived by him in the

transaction from the other party was contested in many cases. Although

the question was argued before the Judicial Committee in Mohori Bibee`s

case (supra), their Lordships did not give any decision on it. In another

decision, viz.,       Nawab Sadiq v. Jai Kishori (55 MLJ 88 (PC)), their



Lordships unequivocally held that a contract entered into by a minor is a

nullity. Regarding the right of restitution, there is one view that it can arise

only if the person entering into the transaction was not aware of the fact of

minority and there was some representation by the minor as to his age with

a view to deceive the other party. (see Hari Mohan v. Dulu Miya - AIR

1935 Calcutta 198). Yet another view expressed by courts is that even in

such a situation, the minor is not liable to restitute. The decision in

Gokeda Lateharao v. Viswanadham Bhimayya (AIR 1956 Andra

Pradesh 182) is of relevance in this context.              The appellant therein

executed two promissory notes during his minority. It is alleged that he

made a fraudulent representation to the respondent that he was a major.

When the suit was filed to recover money, the appellant, inter alia,

contended that the promissory notes were not supported by consideration

and they were not enforceable as he was a minor on the date of their

execution. Subba Rao, C.J. summarised the law as follows:

                      "43. The law may be briefly summarised.        A

             contract entered into with a minor is a nullity for want

             of legal competency. Except otherwise provided by

             statute, it is not enforceable and it does not give rise

             to any rights or liabilities.

                      44.     It is non est. It follows from this legal

             position that a person, who parted with his goods can

             trace them into the hands of the quondam minor and


             recover them back in specie, for he has not lost his

             title to them. But he cannot seek to recover their price

             or damages for, if allowed, he would be indirectly

             asking for the enforcement of the contract and to

             recover damages for the breach. Nor can a person

             who lends money to such a minor, recover it.            If

             allowed to do so, the Court would be enforcing a

             contract of loan.     The English decisions graphically

             describe this position as "restitution stops where

             repayment begins". But, there is another principle of

             equity, namely, that one who seeks equity must do

             equity. If a quondam minor as plaintiff seeks relief

             from a Court on the basis that the contract was void,

             the Court could refuse that relief unless he has made

             good his fraudulent representation.      If he seeks to

             recover through Court goods which he parted with

             after receiving the consideration, the Court will not

             help him except by imposing the condition of returning

             the consideration amount. The principle is embodied

             in Ss.39 and 41, Specific Relief Act. Apart from the

             fact it statutorily recognises a well-settled principle of

             equity, it is not open to extend the limits of the

             operation of the provisions by stretching the language

             or otherwise adding to its contents. When a statute

             specifically provides for the case of a plaintiff seeking

             to cancel a document, it is not permissible to invoke

             other equitable principles, which would make the

             provisions nugatory.     Further, this will enable the



             parties to circumvent the prohibition against dealing

             with minors and by clever drafting of pleadings, help

             them to indirectly enforce a contract which is a nullity.

             Nor can S.65 be invoked as it pre-supposes the

             existence of a contract between persons with legal

             competency."

Hence, it is clear that a contract in which one of the parties is a minor

cannot be enforced against him as it is void due to minor's lack of capacity

to contract.

       11.       Now, the question remaining is whether there is any difference

if a post dated cheque was drawn by a minor payable after the coming of

his age. Halsbury's Laws in India, Vol.IV is cited by the learned counsel

for the petitioner to contend a proposition that a post dated cheque drawn

by a minor payable after his coming of age is on the same footing as a

cheque drawn by the minor dated before his coming of age. Similarly, a bill

or note given by a person after attaining majority in renewal of a bill or note

executed by him during his minority is void, unless there is some new

consideration.

       12.       The High Court of Judicature, Allahabad in Suraj Narain v.

Sukhu Ahir and another (ILR Vol.LI Allahabad 164) considered a case

where a minor borrowed a sum of money executing a simple bond and

after attaining majority, he executed a second bond in respect of the loan



then existed plus the interest thereon. The question raised was whether

the consideration received by a person during his minority could be a good

consideration for a fresh promise after attaining majority. Per majority, it

was held that in consideration of the first advance made by the creditor, he

obtained a promissory note from the minor and thereafter there was no

longer any subsisting consideration, which would support a subsequent

promise to pay after attaining majority. Such a fresh promise, if no further

advance is taken, is totally without consideration and, therefore, void. The

same view was taken by the Madras High Court in Indran Ramaswami

Pandia Thalavar v. Anthappa Chettiar and others (Vol.XVI MLJ 422). It

is held that a promissory note executed by a person on attaining majority in

settlement of an earlier one executed by him while a minor, in consideration

of his having received from the obligee a certain sum of money when he

was a minor, is bad for want of consideration.

       13.        Learned counsel for the 1st respondent relying on Section 68

of the Contract Act, 1872 contended that the cheque is supported by

consideration and, therefore, by applying the principle of law in the said

Section, it should be seen that the petitioner issued the cheque in

discharge of a legally enforceable debt. Section 68 of the Indian Contract

Act is excerpted hereunder for clarity:

                      "Claim for necessaries supplied to person


              incapable of contracting, or on his account.-If a

              person, incapable of entering into a contract, or any

              one whom he is legally bound to support, is supplied

              by another person with necessaries suited to his

              condition in life, the person who has furnished such

              supplies is entitled to be reimbursed from the

              property of such incapable person.

                               Illustrations

                      (a) A supplies B, a lunatic, with necessaries

              suitable to his condition in life. A is entitled to be

              reimbursed from B's property.

                      (b) A supplies the wife and children of B, a

              lunatic, with necessaries suitable to their condition in

              life. A is entitled to be reimbursed from B's property."

The principle underlying in the Section is that where a person incapable of

entering into a contract (it includes a minor also) or any other person whom

he is legally bound to support, is supplied by another person with

necessaries, the supplier is entitled to be reimbursed out of the property of

the incapable person. The liability here is not to pay the agreed price, but

to reimburse. In the case of a minor, he is not personally liable, but his

property will be liable. The Section applies to minors and also to persons

of unsound mind. That is evident from the illustrations given to the Section.

It is, therefore, clear that the Section will not apply where necessaries have

been supplied to someone, who is a person competent to contract. Even



though by virtue of the Section it can be contended that the petitioner's

liability to reimburse the 1st respondent may be enforced against her

property, the law in the above Section does not enable the 1st respondent

to seek prosecution of the erstwhile minor.

        14.      The conclusion that can be drawn from the above discussion is

that a contract entered into with a minor, being a void contract, cannot be

enforced against him and that a minor at any rate cannot be personally

held liable under civil law for the dishonour of a cheque drawn, indorsed,

delivered or negotiated by him.

        15.      Now, we shall consider whether the minor can be held

criminally liable for the statutory offence under Section 138 of the NI Act.

Celebrated commentaries on the Negotiable Instruments Act by learned

authors Bhashyam and Adiga (18th Edition - Page No.743) shows the

salient features and ingredients of Section 138 NI Act as follows:

                      "Ingredients of the offence.-To constitute an

             offence under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments

             Act the following ingredients need to be fulfilled:

                      1.      Cheque should have been issued for the

             discharge, in whole or part, of any debt or other

             liability.

                      2.      The cheque should have been presented

             within the period of six months or within the period of

             its validity, whichever is earlier.


                              Note.-The cheque may be presented any

             number of times for collection within its validity.

                      3.      The payee or the holder in due course

             should have issued a notice in writing to the drawer

             within thirty (fifteen prior to 2002 amendments) days

             of the receipt of information by him from the bank

             regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid.

                      4.      After the receipt of the said notice by the

             payee or the holder in due course, the drawer should

             have failed to pay the cheque amount within fifteen

             days of the receipt of the said notice.

                                 Note.-   Notice     of   dishonour    is

             unnecessary when the party entitled to notice cannot

             after due search be found (See section 98, Negotiable

             Instruments Act).

                      5.      On non-payment of the amount due on

             the dishonoured cheque within fifteen days of the

             receipt of the notice by the drawer, the complaint

             should have been filed within one month from the date

             of expiry of the grace time of fifteen days, before the

             Metropolitan Magistrate or not below the rank of a

             Judicial Magistrate of the first class. The cognizance

             of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the

             prescribed period, if the complaint satisfies the Court

             that he had sufficient cause for not making a

             complaint within such period.

                      6.      The    offence    under     this   Act   is


             compoundable (inserted by the 2002 Amendment

             Act)."

It can only be presumed that the legislature was fully conscious of the

existence of Section 26 in the NI Act when it incorporated Chapter XVII in

the statute containing new provisions, particularly Section 138. Hence,

going by the rule of interpretation of statutes, definitely it has to be seen

that both Section 26 and Section 138 of the NI Act must be construed

harmoniously. Even the location and placement of Section 138 NI Act

assume importance.

       16.       Before going into other legal aspects, it will be beneficial to

restate the relevant dates. The cheques in all the cases were drawn on

14.01.2011. Admittedly all the three cheques bore the date 31.01.2011 on

their face. The orders passed by the learned Magistrate would show that

there was a dispute regarding the date of birth of the petitioner. Her school

records showed the date of birth as 08.07.1993, whereas the birth

certificate issued by the concerned Grama Panchayat indicated that the

petitioner was born on 22.01.1993.

       17.       Section 35 of the Evidence Act deals with the relevancy of

entry in public record or an electronic record made in performance of duty.

Interpreting that provision, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in

Brij Mohan Singh v. Priya Brat Narain Sinha (AIR 1965 SC 282) ruled on



the evidentiary value of entries relating to date of birth in school admission

register in the following words:

                      "In actual life it often happens that persons

              give false age of the boy at the time of his admission

              to a school so that later in life he would have an

              advantage when seeking public service for which a

              minimum age for eligibility is often prescribed. The

              Court of fact cannot ignore this fact while assessing

              the value of the entry and it would be improper for

              the court to base any conclusion on the basis of the

              entry, when it is alleged that the entry was made

              upon false information supplied with the above

              motive."

The principle laid down by the Apex Court in Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand

Purohit (AIR 1988 SC 1796) reads as follows:

                       "To render a document admissible under

              S.35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry

              that is relied on must be one in a public or other

              official book, register or record, secondly, it must be

              an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and

              thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in

              discharge of his official duty, or any other person in

              performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An

              entry relating to date of birth made in the school

              register is relevant and admissible under S. 35 of

              the Act but the entry regarding to the age of a


              person in a school register is of not much

              evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in

              the absence of the material on which the age was

              recorded."

       18.       The birth certificate is issued in consonance with a register

kept by the officer concerned as per the prescription of a statute.

Therefore, in the absence of any reason to find that the date of birth of the

petitioner shown in the birth register is wrong, it gets precedence over the

entry in the school register. Certified copy of the entry in the birth register

mentioned by an official in discharge of his official duty is admissible under

Section 35 of the Evidence Act and it is not necessary to examine the

official (see - Harpal Singh v. State of H.P. - AIR 1981 SC 361) Hence, it

can be safely concluded that the date of birth of the petitioner is

22.01.1993.

       19.       As the date of birth of the petitioner is 22.01.1993, it can be

seen that she had attained majority on 22.01.2011. Therefore, on the date

of drawal of the three cheques, ie., on 14.01.2011, the petitioner was a

minor. Question that falls for decision is whether the petitioner was legally

competent to incur any liability on the date of drawal of the said cheques?

The answer can only be an emphatic negative. From the discussion above

made, it is evident that a minor is incompetent to bind himself/herself in any

way if he/she draws, indorses, delivers or negotiates a cheque. Further, the



offence under Section 138 NI Act will be attracted only on dishonour of a

cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with the

banker for payment of any amount of money to another person to

discharge, in whole or in part, any debt or liability. It is unchallengeable

that during minority the petitioner could not have incurred any debt or

liability so as to bind herself. Therefore, the essential ingredient to attract

the offence is lacking in the fact situation. For that primary reason, it can be

held that the petitioner cannot be prosecuted for an offence under Section

138 NI Act.

        20.      Next question is, whether the quondam minor can be held

liable for dishonour of a cheque, drawn by him/her, for want of funds in the

account,      if the cheque bears a date subsequent to his/her attaining

majority and further the dishonour takes place after he/she attained

majority? For this question also, the answer can only be in the negative.

Indisputable proposition is that a cheque defined under Section 6 NI Act is

also a bill of exchange, but it is drawn on a banker and it is payable on

demand. It is, thus, obvious that even though a bill of exchange is drawn

on a banker, if it is not payable on demand, it is not a cheque. A postdated

cheque is only a bill of exchange when it is written or drawn and it becomes

a cheque when it is payable on demand. A postdated cheque is not

payable till the date, which is shown on the face of the document. (see



Ashok Yeshwant Badeve v. Surendra               Madhavrao Nighojakar and

another (2001 Cri.L.J. 1674 (SC)) and Shri Ishar Alloys Steels Ltd. v.

Jayaswals NECO Ltd.(2001 Cri.L.J. 1250 (SC)). In the normal course,

dishonour of a postdated cheque, after it has become a cheque in the eye

of law, would have attracted the offence under Section 138 NI Act.

Nevertheless, the law pronounced distinctly in Section 26 NI Act makes it

clear that though a minor can draw, indorse, deliver and negotiate a

promissory note, cheque, etc. so as to bind all parties, it excludes the

minor's capacity to bind himself.        In other words, the said provision

insulates the minor from binding himself from the consequences of

drawing, indorsing, delivering and negotiating a negotiable instrument. On

recapitulating the principles discussed above, I arrive at the following

findings:

                 A minor, who had drawn a cheque, which is dishonoured for

want of funds in the account after his/her attaining majority, is exempted

from prosecution because the cheque is one without consideration.

Besides, the minor at the time when the cheque was drawn was incapable

of incurring any debt or liability, which could have been legally enforced

against him/her, in spite of the fact that he/she attained majority on the date

of dishonour of the cheque. The essential requirement in Section 138 NI

Act that the dishonoured cheque must be one issued for discharge of a



debt or liability is also not satisfied in such cases.         I also find that the

quondam minor becoming a major on the date of dishonour of cheque is of

no consequence, if the subject matter is a cheque drawn by him during

his/her minority. Hence, I find that the prosecution has to fail on each

count.

                 In the result, all the petitions are allowed. The complaints in

S.T.Nos.806, 807 and 808 of 2011 pending before the Judicial First Class

Magistrate Court, Nilambur are hereby quashed.

                 All pending interlocutory applications will stand dismissed.




                                                  A. HARIPRASAD, JUDGE.








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