Can a Tractor Owner Be Convicted for Homicide When a Minor Drives and Causes Death? Criminal Acquittal, MV Act Liability, and the Widow’s Compensation Claim

 A tractor owner who permits a minor to drive is not automatically liable for conviction under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code merely because the accident resulted in death. The more direct statutory exposure ordinarily arises under Sections 180 and 199A of the Motor Vehicles Act, while a conviction under Section 304 IPC still requires proof of the necessary ingredients of that offence against the owner in a criminal trial.

Why this issue matters

In rural accident cases, especially those involving tractors, courts often face a difficult overlap of criminal law, juvenile liability, and motor accident compensation law. A recurring situation is this: the owner allows a minor to drive the tractor, the minor causes an accident, the owner himself or another person dies, the criminal case is prosecuted before the Sessions Court, and at the same time the widow or dependants pursue compensation before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.

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Supreme Court: On which ground, the court can order revocation of Succession certificate?

Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 governs

applications for grant of succession certificates, whereas Section

383 provides for revocation of such certificates on specified

grounds. Where an application is defective or material facts have

been suppressed or misstated, the certificate issued pursuant

thereto is liable to be revoked under Section 383 of the Act.

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO…………………………OF 2026

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil)No.11006 of 2021)

DEEPESH MAHESWARI AND ANR. Vs RENU MAHESWARI

AND ORS 

Author: SANJAY KAROL, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 306.

Dated: April 1, 2026.

Read full judgment here : Click here.

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Supreme Court: Order IX Rule 13 CPC Application Not Barred By Dismissal Of Appeal Against Ex-Parte Decree

 The Supreme Court on Wednesday (April 1) observed that the filing of an appeal against an ex-parte decree would not bar the filing of an application for setting aside the ex-parte decree under Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO…………………………OF 2026

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil)No.11006 of 2021)

DEEPESH MAHESWARI AND ANR. Vs RENU MAHESWARI

AND ORS 

Author: SANJAY KAROL, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 306.

Dated: April 1, 2026.

Read full judgment here : Click here.

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Supreme Court: What is distinction between jurisdiction of court under Section 96 of CPC vs. Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC?

 The settled principle of law is that the scope of proceedings

under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Order IX

Rule XIII CPC are distinct. Order IX Rule XIII CPC confers a

wider jurisdiction, enabling the applicant to demonstrate

sufficient cause for non-appearance and seek setting aside of an

ex parte decree (Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar) (2005) 1 SCC 757-3J.

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO…………………………OF 2026

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil)No.11006 of 2021)

DEEPESH MAHESWARI AND ANR. Vs RENU MAHESWARI

AND ORS 

Author: SANJAY KAROL, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 306.

Dated: April 1, 2026

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Delhi HC: Forcible removal of minor child by parent to new place doesn’t make that place an ordinary residence

 A reading of the above would show that, for invoking the jurisdiction of the Family Court under the G&W Act, it has to be shown that the minor ‘ordinarily resides’ within its jurisdiction. The forceful removal of a minor child from his original place of residence and shifting him to a new residence will not make him an ordinary resident of the new place. {Para 42}

43. In Lahari Sakhamuri (supra), where the child was born in the USA and was brought to India by the appellant therein despite an interim order of the USA Court, and an application for the custody of the minor child was filed in the learned Family Court at Hyderabad within 20 days of her arrival in India, the Court held that the minor child was not an ordinary resident of Hyderabad (India), as envisaged under Section 9(1) of the G&W Act.

44. This Court in Paul Mohinder Gahun (supra), while considering a case where the respondent therein had come to India along with the child for a planned short vacation and, thereafter, filed a petition under Section 9 of the G&W Act in India, held that a residence by compulsion, howsoever long, cannot be treated as a place of ordinary residence. Where the child is removed by mischief to an interim location, the place of his/her original residence would alone have jurisdiction.

45. In Philip David Dexeter (supra), the Court emphasized that to ordinarily reside at a place should be more than a flying visit to or a casual stay at a particular location.

47.  As noted hereinabove, such forceful removal/detention, even by a parent, at a place that is not the natural habitation of the minor child, would not render such other place the ordinary place of residence of the minor child.

48. While it is correct that for purposes of invoking jurisdiction under Section 9 of the G&W Act, it is not necessary for the child to be a permanent resident of the place and even a temporary residence shall suffice, such temporary residence should not be illegal or forceful. The court, on an overall reading of the petition shall have to determine whether the child can be said to be ordinarily residing within its jurisdiction.

49. In the present case, on a bare reading of the petition filed by the wife under the G&W Act, and the surrounding circumstances that are admitted by her, the minor child could not be said to be ordinarily residing within the jurisdiction of the learned Family Court.

 In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before Navin Chawla and Renu Bhatnagar, JJ.)

Mat. APP.(F.C.) 135/2024

Sunaina Rao Kommineni   Vs Abhiram Balusu 

Citation: 2025 SCC OnLine Del 4176, 2025:DHC:4483-DB

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Supreme Court: Minor Can Repudiate Guardian's Voidable Sale Through Conduct After Attaining Majority, Not Necessary To File Suit

 The above discussion leads us conclusively to hold that it is

not always necessary for a minor to institute a suit for

cancellation of a voidable sale transaction executed by his

guardian on attaining majority within the limitation provided

and that such a transaction can be avoided or repudiated by

his conduct. The question stands answered accordingly. {Para 34}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11342 OF 2013

K. S. SHIVAPPA  Vs SMT. K. NEELAMMA

 Author: PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

Dated: OCTOBER 07, 2025. 

Citation: 2025 INSC 1195

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Supreme Court: Sessions or Pocso Courts Must Order Victim Compensation or interim compensation In Cases Of Sexual Offences Against Minors And Women

 In the circumstances, we direct that a Sessions Court, which adjudicates a case concerning the bodily injuries such as sexual assault etc. particularly on minor children and women shall order for victim compensation to be paid having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and based on the evidence on record, while passing the judgment either convicting or acquitting the Accused. Secondly, the said direction must be implemented by the District Legal Services Authority or State Legal Services Authority, as the case may be, in letter and spirit and in the quickest manner and to ensure that the victim is paid the compensation at the earliest. {Para 16}

17. There can also be a direction for payment of interim compensation which could be made by the Sessions Court depending upon the facts of each case.

19. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the second Respondent shall also be entitled to be considered for compensation Under Rule 7 of the POCSO Rules, 2012 and now Under Rule 9 of the POCSO Rules, 2020.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 4495 of 2024.

Decided On: 04.11.2024

Saibaj Noormohammad Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.V. Nagarathna and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1363/2024.

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Bombay HC: An adult member can sell the Minor's undivided interest in joint family property if it is for legal necessity

Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act (1956), Ss.6,8,12 - Minor's undivided interest in joint family property - Sale of minor's share - An adult member can sell the minor's share if it is for legal necessity - S.8 would not be applicable to minor's interest in the joint family property.

So far as Section 6 is concerned, it speaks about the natural guardian of a Hindu minor. However, it specifically excludes a minor's undivided interest in joint family property. Thus, the natural guardian father and, thereafter, the mother cannot be considered as natural guardian in respect of his undivided interest in joint family property. Section 8 lays down the powers of natural guardian. Since section 6 excludes the minor's undivided interest in the joint family property, section 8 also, would not be applicable to the minor's share in the undivided interest in the joint family property. Thus, the provisions of obtaining prior permission by the natural guardian as envisaged under section 8 sub-clause (2) would not arise in respect of a minor's undivided interest in the joint family property. Section 12 of the Act carves out an exception in respect of a minor's undivided interest in the joint family property when it states that the guardian is not to be appointed in respect of his undivided interest in joint family property. It further states that if a minor has an adult member and the property is under the management of the joint family property, no guardian should be appointed for the minor. Thus, an exception is carved out in respect of minor's interest in an undivided joint family property. Thus in view of the said provision an adult member can sell the minor's share if it is for legal necessity. [Para 12]

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY(NAGPUR BENCH)

Vishwanath S/O Bhika Kolase & Anr.Vs.Kisan Mahadeo Bahadure & Ors.

Second Appeal No.241 of 1990

4th April, 2003

Coram: V.M. KANADE, J.

                  Citation: 2003(4) ALL MR 1093.

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Whether Karta Of Hindu Undivided Family Can Alienate HUF Property Even If Minor Has Undivided Interest In It?

The position on the rights of a Karta vis-à-vis an HUF property is well settled. This Court in Sri Narayan Bal v. Sridhar Sutar1 has held that the Karta has the right to sell/dispose of/alienate an HUF property, even if a minor of the family has undivided interest. The reason is that an HUF is capable of acting through its Karta or an adult member of the family in the management of the HUF property.

Thus, the father of the petitioner herein, as the Karta of the HUF, was entitled to mortgage the HUF property. The son(s) or other member(s) of the HUF need not be consenting parties to the mortgage. Post alienation, a coparcener may challenge the act of a Karta, if the alienation is not for legal necessity or for betterment of the estate, which is not the assertion established in the present case. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

 Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 2147621477/2023; 

N.S. BALAJI Vs THE PRESIDING OFFICER DEBT RECOVERY TRIBUNAL & ORS.

Coram: SANJIV KHANNA; J., S.V.N. BHATTI; J.

Dated: 03-10-2023.

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Supreme Court: Sale Of Minor's Property By Guardian Can Be Avoided Only By Filing Suit To Set Aside Deed Within Period as mentioned Under Art.60 of Limitation Act

  We may notice one more judgment of this Court

relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants

that is G. Annamalai Pillai vs. District Revenue

Officer and others, (1993) 2 SCC 402. The question

which arose for consideration in the said case has

been noticed in paragraph 1 of the judgment in

following words:

“1. The short question for consideration in

this appeal is whether lease deed in dispute, which

was voidable in terms of Section 8(3) of the Hindu

Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (the Act) when

validly avoided, was effective from the date of the

lease deed so as to make the transaction void and

unenforceable from the very inception.” {Para 32}

33. The land in dispute was owned by one Janarthanan.

His father, Purushothaman executed a registered lease

deed in favour of appellant on 12.12.1971 on which

date the owner was minor. The appellant filed

application before Tehsildar to be registered as a

tenant which was contested by Janarthanan.

Janarthanan contended that his father has no right or

title to deal with land and lease by his father is in

contravention of Section 8 of Hindu Minority and

Guardianship Act, 1956. Tehsildar held that there was

no valid lease which order was confirmed by the High

Court against which judgment appeal was filed. In

paragraphs 5 and 6 following has been laid down:

“5. We have heard learned counsel for the

parties. We have been taken through the

orders of the Revenue authorities, judgment

of the learned Single Judge and of the

Division Bench of the High Court in writ

appeal. The Division Bench of the High

Court, in a lucid judgment, answered the

question — posed by us in the beginning —

in the affirmative and against the

appellant-Annamalai Pillai on the following

reasoning:

“We have already seen that clause (3) of

Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and

Guardianship Act, 1956, specifically makes

the transaction voidable. The lease

executed by the guardian in this case is

prohibited and in that sense it was

without any authority. On the legal

efficacy and the distinction between

valid, void and voidable agreements, we

find the following passage in Salmond on

Jurisprudence, Twelfth Edition at page

341:

‘… A valid agreement is one which is

fully operative in accordance with the

intent of the parties. A void agreement

is one which entirely fails to receive

legal recognition or sanction, the

declared will of the parties being

wholly destitute of legal efficacy. A

voidable agreement stands midway

between these two cases. It is not a

nullity, but its operation is

conditional and not absolute. By reason

of some defect in its origin it is

liable to be destroyed or cancelled at

the option of one of the parties to it.

On the exercise of this power the

agreement not only ceases to have any

efficacy, but is deemed to have been

void ab initio. The avoidance of it

relates back to the making of it. The

hypothetical or contingent efficacy

which has hitherto been attributed to

it wholly disappears, as if it had

never existed. In other words, a

voidable agreement is one which is void

or valid at the election of one of the

parties to it.’

This distinction has also been

judicially noticed in the Privy Council

judgment reported in Satgur Prasad v.

Harnarain Das and in the Division Bench

judgment in S.N.R. Sundara Rao and Sons,

Madurai v. CIT. The Division Bench held,

following the said Privy Council judgment as

follows:

‘When a person, who is entitled to

dissent from the alienation, does so, his

dissent is in relation to the transaction

as such and not merely to the possession

of the alienee on the date of such

dissent.

The effect of the evidence is,

therefore, to get rid of the transaction

with the result that in law it is as if

the transaction had never taken place.’

We have, therefore, no doubt that when the

fifth respondent avoided the lease executed

by his father, the fourth respondent, the

lease became void from its inception and no

statutory rights, could, therefore, accrue

in favour of the appellant herein.”

6. We agree with the reasoning and the

conclusions reached by the Division Bench

of the High Court and as such this appeal

has to be dismissed.”

34. Learned counsel for the appellants relying on the

above decision contends that sale by Balaraman when

has been avoided by release deed it became void from

the very beginning. There can be no quarrel to the

proposition laid down in G. Annamalai Pillai vs.

District Revenue Officer and others(supra). In the

present case there having been no repudiation of sale

deed on behalf of minor, the question of voidable

sale deed becoming void does not arise.

35. We are, thus, of the considered opinion that in

the present case it was necessary for the person

claiming through minor to bring an action within a

period of three years from the date of the death of

the minor to get sale deed executed by Balaraman set

aside. We, thus, conclude that the sale deeds

executed by Balaraman were not repudiated or avoided

within the period of limitation as prescribed by law.

Issue No.3 is answered accordingly.

36. In view of the foregoing discussions, we do not

find any merit in this appeal. The appeal is

dismissed accordingly.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1782 OF 2019

MURUGAN & ORS. Vs. KESAVA GOUNDER (DEAD)

THR. LRS. AND ORS.

Author: ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

Dated: February 25, 2019.

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What are powers and limitations of natural guardian of a Hindu minor ?

S 6 of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act:- Natural guardians of a Hindu minor.—The natural guardians of a Hindu minor, in respect of the minor's person as well as in respect of the minor's property (excluding his or her undivided interest in joint family property), are—

(a) in the case of a boy or an unmarried girl—the father, and after him, the mother:

Provided that the custody of a minor who has not completed the age of five years shall ordinarily be with the mother;

(b) in the case of an illegitimate boy or an illegitimate unmarried girl—the mother, and after her, the father;

(c) in the case of a married girl—the husband:

Provided that no person shall be entitled to act as the natural guardian of a minor under the provisions of this section—

(a) if he has ceased to be a Hindu, or

(b) if he has completely and finally renounced the world by becoming a hermit (vanaprastha) or an ascetic (yati or sanyasi).

Explanation.—In this section, the expressions “father” and “mother” do not include a stepfather and a stepmother.

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Whether Insurance Company can recover MACT Compensation Amount from Father of Minor Driver?

 In the light of these findings, I am of the view that the learned Tribunal was justified in not accepting the appellant’s version that the keys of the insured vehicle were taken by his minor son from his bed side drawer without his knowledge and permission. Once the appellant, despite being aware that his son was a minor child, left the keys of his car at home and has failed to give any explanation as to why the keys of the car at home were left unattended when he himself was not there, the defence being taken by the appellant is apparently an afterthought in an attempt to somehow to escape his liability. Even otherwise, the appellant did not lead any independent witness in support of his plea that the car was being driven by his minor son without his knowledge and permission. {Para 7}

8. I may also note that as observed by the learned Tribunal, this plea of his minor son having taken the car without his permission, was not even taken by the appellant either before the concerned police authority or the Juvenile Justice Board. In a matter like this, when the parents of minor children permit him/her to drive a motor vehicle, not only they put the lives of their own children in danger but also endager the life of common citizens.

 Neutral Citation No.2023/DHC/000289

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

MAC.APP. 24/2023 & CM APPL 1722-24/2023

SHEKHAR NIJHAWAN Vs IFFCO TOKIO GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. & ORS.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA PALLI

Date of Decision:- 13.01.2023

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Whether the police can register an offence against a child nine year old in respect of accident?

 Central Government Act

Section 83 in The Indian Penal Code

83. Act of a child above seven and under twelve of immature understanding.—Nothing is an offence which is done by a child above seven years of age and under twelve, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion.

 Misconception or ignorance of law is not an excuse, much less, for a police officer and in the peculiar facts, more so, having regard to the fact that the child was only 9 years of age. This action of the police i.e. of registration of FIR, has resulted in traumatizing a 9 year old boy. Despite Section 83 of the Indian Penal Code, the police have proceeded to register the FIR as against the petitioner’s son, a minor aged 9 years, at the behest of the respondent No.3. The action reflects complete non-application of mind by the concerned officer whilst registering the offence. {Para 15}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 3062 OF 2022; 

`AK’ Vs State of Maharashtra

Coram: REVATI MOHITE DERE; J., S. M. MODAK, J.

Dated: 20th OCTOBER 2022

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Whether Parents Can Give Consent On Behalf Of Minor Victim To Compromise Sexual Offence?

 It is also settled that offences which involve moral turpitude and grave offences like rape, murder etc. even if compromised cannot be quashed in exercise of High Court’s power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. inasmuch as such offences are against the State and cannot be restricted to two individuals or groups.

11. In the case in hand, the offences are grave in nature involving minor victim. The allegations are under Section 354A (2)/307 read with Section 18 of the POCSO Act. Therefore, when the offences are grave in nature and allegation is of an attempt of rape of a minor, such allegation and criminal proceeding cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise entered into between the

families of the victim and accused inasmuch when it is a sexual offence involving a minor, the parents, in the considered opinion of this court, cannot give consent on behalf of the minor to compromise such serious offences.

THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT

KOHIMA BENCH

Case No. : CRL.REVN 5/2021

MR. LIMHATHUNG Vs THE STATE OF NAGALAND

BEFORE

 MR JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY

Date of Judgment/ Order :24.03.2022

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Whether Karta of a joint Hindu family must obtain the permission of the court for disposal of immovable property involving an undivided interest of the minor?

 A conjoint reading of the provisions contained in sections 6, 8

and12 of the Act, indicates that natural guardian of the property of Hindu minor is enjoined to seek permission of the Court to dispose of any immovable property of the minor. However, where the minor has undivided interest in the joint family property, the previous permission of the Court under section 8 of the Act for disposing of the undivided interest of the minor in the joint family property is not required. In other words, in view of the provisions contained in section 6 and 12, the permission envisaged under section 8 of the Act would not be required where a joint family property is alienated by Karta involving an undivided interest of minor in the said joint Hindu family property. A useful reference in this context can be

made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sri

Narayan Bal & Others vs. Sridhar Sutar & Ors (1996) 8 Supreme Court Cases 54.. The observations in paragraph 5 are material and hence, extracted below. {Para 20}

5. With regard to the undivided interest of the Hindu minor

in joint family property, the provisions afore-culled are beads

of the same string and need be viewed in a single glimpse,

simultaneously in conjunction with each other. Each

provision, and in particular Section 8, cannot be viewed in

isolation. If read together the intent of the legislative in this

beneficial legislation becomes manifest. Ordinarily the law

does not envisage a natural guardian of the undivided interest

of a Hindu minor in joint family property. The natural

guardian of the property of a Hindu minor, other than the

undivided interest in joint family property, is alone

contemplated under Section 8, where under his powers and

duties are defined. Section 12 carves out an exception to the

rule that should there be no adult member of the joint family

in management of the joint family property, in which the

minor has an undivided interest, a guardian may be

appointed; but ordinarily no guardian shall be appointed for

such undivided interest of the minor. The adult member of the

family in the management of the Joint Hindu Family property

may be a male or a female, not necessarily the Karta. The

power of the High Court otherwise to appoint a guardian, in

situations justifying, has been preserved. This is the legislative

scheme on the subject. Under Section 8 a natural guardian of

the property of the Hindu minor, before he disposes of any

immovable property of the minor, must seek permission of the

court. But since there need be no natural guardian for the

minor's undivided interest in the joint family property, as

provided under sections 6 to 12 of the Act, the previous

permission of Court u/s. 8 of disposing of undivided interest of

the minor in the joint family property is not required. The joint

Hindu family by itself is a legal entity capable of acting

through its Karta and other adult members of the family in

management of the joint Hindu family property. Thus section

8 in view of the express terms of Sections 6 and 12 , would not

be applicable where a joint Hindu family property is

sold/disposed of by the Karta involving an undivided interest

of the minor in the said joint Hindu family property. The

question posed at the outset therefore is so answered.

(emphasis supplied)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

INTERIM APPLICATION NO.1499 OF 2021

IN

SUIT NO.108 OF 2021

Hriday Niraj Mehta  Vs. Umesh Jayantilal Mehta and Others 

CORAM : N. J. JAMADAR, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 15th FEBRUARY, 2022

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Whether application for declaration and injunction about the minor's property is maintainable before the High court in the absence of guardianship petition?

This scheme of law indicates that what lies before a court, other than a family court under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, is an application for appointment of guardian of the property of a minor or an application for permission to deal with such property. It is only these applications which  are made by means of a guardianship or a miscellaneous petition before this court. It is another matter that in such petition, filed for either of these two reliefs, other ancillary reliefs concerning the property of the minor may be prayed for, but no substantive petition can possibly lie simply for such ancillary reliefs without praying for either of the two main reliefs as the main prayer. It is not in dispute that the present application seeks neither of these two reliefs. 

The Act, however, does not provide for any application for the sole relief of perpetual injunction or recovery of the minor’s property dealt with contrary to Section 11 to be made by way of a guardianship petition. The injunction against a de facto guardian for dealing with the minor’s property has been provided for in the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act concomitantly with the powers to be exercised by the natural guardian for dealing with the minor’s estate or property in accordance with Section 8, which, as we have noted above, provides for seeking of a permission of the court to deal with such estate or property. But that does not mean that relief in enforcement of such injunction can be sought in a guardianship petition under that Act. Such relief can only be sought in an ordinary suit by the next friend or guardian appointed of the minor.

7 Having regard to the foregoing narration, in either event, this

court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present petition as framed.

Accordingly, the guardianship petition is dismissed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

GUARDIANSHIP PETITION NO. 16 OF 2018

WITH

INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO. 5266 OF 2021

WITH

MISC.APPLICATION NO. 4 OF 2018

Ashu Khurana Dutt  Vs  Aneesha Ashu Dutt 

CORAM : S.C. GUPTE, J.

DATE : 1 APRIL 2021

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Whether High court can entertain petition for appointment of guardian of person of the minor in its original jurisdiction at Mumbai?

  The judgment of the Full Bench leaves no room for doubt that the High Court must be considered as a District Court for the purposes of the Family Courts Act and since the Family Courts have been established in the city of Mumbai, a Guardianship Petition for the custody or access to any minor would lie in the Family Court. The Guardians and Wards Act was enacted in 1890 and the High Court exercising its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction is considered a District Court under that Act. The High Court's jurisdiction has been ousted in the light of the provisions of the Family Court Act in case of guardianship proceedings instituted by a relative of a minor for guardianship of the minor's person. Such a proceeding clearly falls within the purview of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act. Therefore, only the Family Court would have jurisdiction in view of the provisions of Section 20, By virtue of Section 20, the Family Courts Act has an overriding effect over any other law. However, the High Court will continue to exercise its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction in respect of petitions relating to the guardianship of the property of a minor.{11}

12. In my opinion, therefore, a Guardianship Petition seeking guardianship of the person of a minor filed by either the parents or any relative of a minor would lie before the Family Court, irrespective of whether there is a matrimonial dispute pending before that Court. The Petition in the instant case, therefore, is not maintainable before this Court exercising its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction and is accordingly, returned to the petitioner for presenting the same before the appropriate Court.

Bombay High Court

Girish J. Bobade vs Ajay Thakur And Ors. on 22 December, 2005

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Whether a father taking away a minor child from the custody of the mother can be held guilty for the offence of kidnapping?

Therefore what we have proved in this case is that the child was in the keeping of his mother who was a lawful guardian within the meaning of Section 361, Indian Penal Code and that the child was taken or enticed away out of her keeping. Section 361 says that "whoever takes or entices...is said to kidnap" and there can be no doubt that the word "whoever" will include P.W. l's husband. But this is not quite sufficient. The exception to Section 361 states as follows:

This section does not extend to the act of any person who in good faith believes himself to be the father of an illegitimate child, or who in good faith believes himself to be entitled to the lawful custody of such child, unless such act is committed for an immoral or unlawful purpose.

7. Now, if a person who in good faith believes himself to be entitled to the lawful custody of a child cannot commit an offence under Section 361, Indian Penal Code, it seems to follow a fortiori that a person who is in fact the father of the child, and therefore in law entitled to the lawful custody of the child cannot come within the scope of Section 361, Indian Penal Code. In this case it can be said on behalf of the first accused that he did not merely in good faith believe himself to be entitled to the lawful custody of his child, but that he was beyond the possibility of any challenge entitled to the lawful custody of the child, and that therefore his act in taking the child from the keeping of his mother could not amount to an offence of kidnapping from lawful guardianship.

I am fortified in this opinion by the reasoning of Rankin, C.J., in the case in Saharali Mohammad v. Kamizuddin Mahammad (1930) I.L.R. 58 Cal. 897. The learned Chief Justice quoted with approval the decision in Emperor v. Sital Prasad (1919) I.L.R. 42 All. 146 as authority for the proposition that:

The explanation to Section 361 cannot be used* to mean that, as against a person, who, in fact, is the civil guardian of the minor, mere de facto guardianship can be set up so as to convict the real civil guardian of an offence under Section 361.
Madras High Court

In Re: Kanneganti Chowdarayya And ... vs Unknown on 22 February, 1938

Equivalent citations: (1938) 1 MLJ 670

Author: Burn

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Guidelines of Supreme Court for protection of money paid to victim of motor accident

The tribunal while awarding the compensation had stated

that the amount payable to the share of Kajal would be kept in a

Fixed Deposit till she attains the age of 18 years. The High

Court while enhancing the amount of compensation has directed

that the enhanced amount be paid to the appellant within 45

days. This is totally contrary to the guidelines laid down by this

Court in General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport

Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas and Ors.15 (1994) 2 SCC 176,

wherein it has been held clearly that the amount payable to the

minors should not be normally released. The guidelines in this

case were as follows :

“17….(i) The Claims Tribunal should, in the case of minors,

invariably order the amount of compensation awarded to

the minor be invested in long term fixed deposits at least

till the date of the minor attaining majority. The expenses

incurred by the guardian or next friend may, however, be

allowed to be withdrawn;

(ii) In the case of illiterate claimants also the Claims Tribunal

should follow the procedure set out in (i) above, but if

lump sum payment is required for effecting purchases of

any movable or immovable property such as, agricultural

implements, rickshaw, etc., to earn a living, the Tribunal

may consider such a request after making sure that the

amount is actually spent for the purpose and the demand

is not a ruse to withdraw money;

(iii) In the case of semiliterate

persons the Tribunal should

ordinarily resort to the procedure set out at (i) above

unless it is satisfied, for reasons to be stated in writing,

that the whole or part of the amount is required for

expanding and existing business or for purchasing some

property as mentioned in (ii) above for earning his

livelihood, in which case the Tribunal will ensure that the

amount is invested for the purpose for which it is

demanded and paid;

(iv) In the case of literate persons also the Tribunal may

resort to the procedure indicated in (i) above, subject to

the relaxation set out in (ii) and (iii) above, if having regard

to the age, fiscal background and strata of society to

which the claimant belongs and such other

considerations, the Tribunal in the larger interest of the

claimant and with a view to ensuring the safety of the

compensation awarded to him thinks it necessary to do

order;

(v) In the case of widows the Claims Tribunal should

invariably follow the procedure set out in (i) above;

(vi) In personal injury cases if further treatment is necessary

the Claims Tribunal on being satisfied about the same,

which shall be recorded in writing, permit withdrawal of

such amount as is necessary for incurring the expenses

for such treatment;

(vii) In all cases in which investment in long term fixed

deposits is made it should be on condition that the Bank

will not permit any loan or advance on the fixed deposit

and interest on the amount invested is paid monthly

directly to the claimant or his guardian, as the case may

be;

(viii) In all cases Tribunal should grant to the claimants

liberty to apply for withdrawal in case of an emergency. To

meet with such a contingency, if the amount awarded is

substantial, the Claims Tribunal may invest it in more

than one Fixed Deposit so that if need be one such F.D.R.

can be liquidated….”

These guidelines protect the rights of the minors, claimants who

are under some disability and also widows and illiterate person

who may be deprived of the compensation paid to them in lump

sum by unscrupulous elements. These victims may not be able

to invest their monies properly and in such cases the MACT as

well the High courts must ensure that investments are made in

nationalised banks to get a high rate of interest. The interest in

most cases is sufficient to cover the monthly expenses. In

special cases, for reasons to be given in writing, the MACT or the

trial court may release such amount as is required. We reiterate

these guidelines and direct that they should be followed by all

the tribunals and High Courts to ensure that the money of the

victims is not frittered away.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 735 OF 2020

KAJAL Vs  JAGDISH CHAND 

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Whether purchaser of immovable property is bound to make enquiry whether seller is minor or suffering from legal disability?

 Once it is proved that the plaintiff was a minor at the time of execution of the sale deed, the sale deed cannot be held to be a legal and valid document and is liable to be set aside to the extent of share of the plaintiff. As per law, there cannot be any estoppel against the statute. Once the law provides that a minor cannot enter into a valid contract, the contract, if any, entered into by the minor cannot be held to be legal and valid, using the doctrine of estoppel. The defendant should have been vigilant enough to ascertain that vendor Vikas had attained majority and was not suffering from any legal disability, before entering into the transaction in question with him and his brother.

15. Learned District Judge has referred to the judgment Lakhwinder Singh vs. Miss Paramjit Kaur, MANU/PH/0817/2003 : 2004 (1) LJR 371 (P&H), by this Court wherein it was observed that a transferee must make all reasonable and diligent enquiries regarding the capacity of the transferor and the necessity to alienate the estate of the minor and on satisfying those requirement, he is to enter into and have the sale deed from the guardian or manager of the estate of the minor. It was further observed that under the Guardian and Wards Act, the estate of the minor cannot be alienated unless a specific permission in that behalf is obtained from the District Court. Learned District Judge has observed that no such permission was ever obtained in the instant case by brother of the minor to alienate the share of the minor in the property in dispute. Therefore, sale of the share of the minor respondent, made by his brother vide impugned sale deed Exhibit P-3 is void ab initio and not binding upon the rights of the respondent and sale deed is liable to be set aside to the extent of share of minor plaintiff Vikas.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

RSA No. 2752 of 2013 (O&M)

Decided On: 31.07.2019

Pearls Dream Palaces Construction (P) Ltd. Vs.  Vikas

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Harminder Singh Madaan, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 P &H 164

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