Before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, the question was whether the ad-interim exparte order should be vacated without going into the merits of the case solely because the Respondent - Plaintiff had failed to discharge its obligation cast by the proviso of Rule 3 of Order 39. While examining contentions in that behalf, the Delhi High Court referred to para 4 of the application for vacating the injunction and then held that ordinarily, ex-parte injunction may not be granted and referred to Order 39 Rule 3 in that behalf. It referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation Delhi MANU/SC/0522/1993 : 3SCR522 . That decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was more on the question as to whether in the absence of reasoning being recorded to grant an ex-parte ad-interim injunction, the same must be vacated only on that ground. In other words, the exercise of power to grant injunction without notice is vitiated only because reasons are not recorded. It is in that context that the Supreme Court made the observations which have been relied upon by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. Further, the observations of the Delhi High Court in para 36 must be seen in the context of satisfaction by the Applicant of the requirement in the proviso. If the Court is persuaded to grant an ex-parte interim injunction on the basis that having shown indulgence, he would comply with the requirement of the proviso, it would simply vacate the ad-interim injunction without merit of the case leaving it open to the parties to have a hearing on the grant of the Application for Injunction and thereafter, it would be hearing both sides. How these observations assist Mr. Devitre in contending that the order must be vacated only on the ground of requirement not being complied with is not clear to me at all. In the instant case, it cannot be said that the injunction must be vacated only on the grounds prayed by the Appellant.
This does not mean that the learned Judge can go on adjourning the application merely because the affidavits are not filed. If he has granted an ex-parte injunction, then, he must see to it that the application is disposed off or else the very purpose and object of the confirmation of power to grant it would be defeated.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Arbitration Appeal No. 13 of 2009
Decided On: 24.04.2009
Appellants: Vascon Engineers Limited
Respondent: Sansara Hotels India Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.
Respondent: Sansara Hotels India Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.
S.C. Dharmadhikari, J.
S.C. Dharmadhikari, J.
Citation: 2009 (4) Mh.L.J. 859
1. Admit. Respondent No. 1 waives service. By consent of parties, taken up for hearing forthwith.
2. Mr. Devitre, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellants states that other Respondents are duly served. However, for the limited purposes of this Appeal, I do not see that their presence is necessary. There would be no prejudice caused to them if the Appeal is decided in their absence as the contesting parties are before the Court.
3. This Appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 challenges an order passed by the learned District Judge, Pune dated 1st April 2009 on an Application (Exhibit 30) in Arbitration Petition No. 215 of 2009.
4. Counsel appearing for parties are agreed that the effect of the order is that an ad-interim relief prayed by the First Respondent has been granted by the Court below and that is how the instant Appeal is maintainable. The Appeal questions continuation of an ex-parte and interim order made under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and refusal of the Trial Court to vacate it on the ground that the same is in breach of the principles enshrined under Order 39 Rule 3 of C.P.C. For the purposes of this Appeal, I need not go into the larger issue as to whether an Appeal would lie under this provision against the order of the present nature otherwise. That is a matter left upon for being considered in an appropriate case.
5. It is not in dispute in the present Appeal that the First Respondent had moved the Court below by filing a Petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the First Respondent applied for interim measures and more particularly that pending the arbitration proceedings and till the making and implementation of the award therein, the First Respondent - Appellant before me be directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 48.50 crores being the aggregate payments made alongwith interest calculated at 15% p.a. as more particularly stated in prayers a(i) to a(iv). It was prayed inter-alia that pending the arbitration proceedings and till the making and implementation of the award, the Court below be pleased to pass an order of injunction restraining the Respondents to the Arbitration Petition (which include the Appellant before me) from dealing with, disposing off, alienating, encumbering, constructing and/or creating any third party right in any manner whatsoever in respect of the Suit property or any part thereof. This application/petition was made on 19th February 2009. Therein, a distinct application for interim reliefs was made and the same interim measures have been prayed for.
6. Upon this application, the First Respondent applied for an ex-parte injunction against the Appellants and others restraining them from creating any third party interest or dealing with or disposing off the Suit property in any manner whatsoever.
7. It is not in dispute that the application was moved for ad-interim ex-parte injunction. Admittedly, no notice of this application was served on the Appellants and other Respondents to the main Petition. The learned Judge heard the Advocate appearing for the First Respondent and by an order dated 6th March 2009 granted the following relief:
The Respondents are hereby restrained of creating any 3rd party interest in the suit property and also from inducting any 3rd person in the suit property. Issue show cause notice to the Respondents as to why the ad-interim relief granted to the petitioner should not be confirmed. The notice R/o. 23.3.2009.
8. The reasoning based upon which the learned Judge concluded that if notice is given to the Respondent that is the Appellant before me prior to passing off the order of injunction, is of the possibility is that the parties may create third party rights and then the loss that would be caused cannot be compensated in terms of money. The order to the extent of this reasoning reads thus:
Considering the prima facie material on record the Petitioner has made out the case that the Respondents need to be injuncted from dealing with the suit property. The next question before this Court is whether a case is made out by the petitioner for granting ex- parte relief to the petitioner. From perusal of documents on record, it is clear that the charge is created in respect of the suit property in favour of the petitioner and thus the petitioner is entitled to recover the amounts pursuant to rescinding the agreement. Considering the correspondence of the parties it is clear that though the agreement specifically mentions about handing over of the possession of the suit property to the petitioner, however, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has made a statement across the bar that the respondents have dispossessed the petitioner from the suit property. In view of this, I am in agreement with the apprehension of the Petitioner that if the notice is given to the respondent prior to passing any order of junction then the possibility of creating of 3rd party interest in respect of the suit property is not rules out and in such event the loss otherwise would cause to the petitioner cannot be compensated in terms of money. On the other hand the respondents would be at liberty to substantiate their case and can get such injunction vacated. At this stage the balance of convenience squarely falls in favour of the petitioner.
9. It was the grievance of the Appellants that this is an ad-interim ex-parte injunction and the Court below has granted the same without any notice admittedly. The ex-parte order is liable to be and must be set aside or vacated solely on the ground that no intimation or service of any such ex-parte order (passed without notice) was given to or effected on the Respondents, that is the Appellant before me. The intimation was not given until after the lapse of 14 days from the date of passing of the ex-parte order which shows lack of bonafides on the part of the First Respondents before me. They do not comply with the requirements of serving copies of the application and proceedings on the next day of the ex-parte order nor did they file any affidavit proving such service. These requirements are obligations cast on parties who seek ex-parte injunctions, as a condition for being obtaining an ex-parte order without notice. It was contended that non-compliance of these obligations vitiates the order and it liable to be set aside on that ground alone, without considering the merits.
10. Thus, the argument was that the requirements provided by Order 39 Rule 3 of the C.P.C. read with its proviso applies fully to the grant of ex-parte orders in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and therefore, in the absence of compliance with that requirement vitiates such an ex-parte order and it must be quashed and set aside on this ground alone. This is the substance of the application made by the Appellants on 25th March 2009.
11. This application was numbered as Exhibit 30 and was placed before the learned District Judge - 12, Pune who, by the impugned order has dismissed the same. Aggrieved by the said dismissal, the original First Respondent to Arbitration Petition No. 215 of 2009 is in Appeal before this Court.
12. Mr. Devitre, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant contended that Section 9 of this Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a provision conferring power on the Court to make interim measures. The provision is that a party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time after making an arbitral award but before its enforcement in accordance with Section 36, apply to Court for several reliefs and more particularly, those enumerated in Sub-clause (i) and (ii) of Section 9. However, the Court while making such interim measures has the same power of making orders as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to any proceedings before it. He contends that this power is conferred upon a Court. The term "Court" is defined in Section 2(e) to mean the Court of Principal Civil Jurisdiction and includes the High Court in its Original Civil Jurisdiction having the jurisdiction to decide the question forming the subject matter of the arbitration, if the same had been subject matter of the Suit. He submits that taking clue from this definition, it is apparent that what is contemplated under the definition or is the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a District. This Court tries Civil Suits and Civil proceedings. If this is the Court which is contemplated by Section 9 then, it must have all powers as are conferred upon a Civil Court by the C.P.C. Once there is a power to grant temporary injunction that is contemplated by Order 39, Mr. Devitre's contention is that if the power to grant temporary injunction is engrafted by the wide phraseology of Section 9, then, all conditions as are applicable for grant of such injunction must also be read into the powers conferred by Section 9. Therefore, the Court must have a power to grant an ex-parte ad-interim injunction but that cannot be unconditional and if Order 39 Rule 3 prescribes certain conditions or requirements which have to be fulfilled before such a power is exercised, then, they must be fulfilled while granting ad-interim ex-parte measures under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act. If that is not read into such power then, it is likely that the Court will grant ex-parte ad-interim orders but not comply with the requirements of recording reasons for its opinion as contemplated by Order 39 Rule 3 and may not require the Applicant to comply with certain other matters enlisted in Order 39 Rule 3 proviso. Therefore, if the power is granted unconditionally, there is every likelihood of if being exercised arbitrarily. Consequently, if that requirement is not ready and the power is exercised, the ultimate order must also be vitiated or else, the party obtaining the ex-parte ad-interim order would be at an advantage. Further, he submits that the Court below is in error in not reading the entire Order 39 Rule 3 of the C.P.C. If that is the error committed, then, ex-facie, the order is abide in law and must be quashed and set aside.
13. He has taken me through the order passed by the Court below and has urged that the learned Judge should not have rejected the application by holding that only general principles governing grant of interim relief under Order 39 Rule 3 of C.P.C. are applicable. Mr. Devitre further urges that the learned Judges' reasoning in para 13 of the impugned order is ex-facie erroneous. In other words, the Court has come to a conclusion that it has power to grant ex-parte ad-interim order but there is no need for it to comply with the obligations in that behalf nor can it visit the party with adverse consequences on the part of the Applicant/party to comply with the requirement enumerated in the proviso. For all these reasons, according to Mr. Devitre, the order under challenge must be quashed and set aside.
14. Mr. Devitre has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in MANU/SC/0581/2000 : AIR2000SC3032 (A. Ventakasubbalah Naidu v. S. Chellappan and Ors.) and a Division Bench Judgment of Delhi High Court reported in MANU/DE/0311/1997 : AIR1998Delhi126 (S.B.L. Limited v. Himalaya Drug Co.).
15. On the other hand, Mr. Bhatt, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the contesting Respondents submits that the order passed by the Court below need not be set aside. The learned Judge has committed no error inasmuch as it is undisputed that a power to make interim measure by implication includes powers to make it exparte at an ad-interim stage. If such a power is implied into the power to make interim measure, then, the party applying for such interim measure has to satisfy the Court about the urgency and once the Court is so satisfied, it can grant relief by recording its opinion. However, neither Order 39 Rule 3 proviso nor general principles hold that merely because the Applicant does not comply with the requirements of the proviso to Order 39 Rule 3 that the ad-interim injunction or ad-interim measures must be vacated forthwith. He submits that all that the law contemplates is that a party who does not comply with the requirement under the proviso will not be in a position to proceed against the other side for breach or violation of the order but the order is not vitiated by itself. That apart, he submits that the Appellants did not move the learned Judge for vacating the order on merits. All that they urged was that the order must be vacated only on the ground that Order 39 Rule 3 and more particularly, proviso thereto has not been complied with. However, despite several opportunities to the Appellants, they did not file a reply on the merits. They are seeking adjournments to do so and a result of which the main Petition is pending. If such is the conduct of the Appellants, then, they cannot seek vacation of the ad-interim order. Therefore, assuming without admitting that the requirement of the proviso has to be read into the powers under Section 9, yet, in the peculiar facts of this case, the order under challenge need not be set aside. In any event, the ad-interim exparte injunction granted on 6th March 2009 should not be vacated on that ground alone.
16. From a reading of the application (Exhibit 30) it is apparent to me that request before the Court below to vacate the order dated 6th March 2009 is on the ground enumerated in paragraphs 1 to 14 of the said application and without considering the merits of the matter at this stage. In fact, the Appellant contended that it will file its reply on merit on a later stage, if required and reserved it right to do so. However, the request made was to vacate the order on these grounds alone.
17. On such an application, the learned Judge held that the parties do not dispute applicability of the C.P.C. to the request of the nature made by the First Respondent. Further, the learned Judge concluded that for the purpose of exercising the powers under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, principles governing the Order 39 will be applicable. He reproduced order 39 Rule 3 and then holds that the provision contemplates that the applicant is required to deliver to the opposite party after the order of ad-interim injunction is made, the proceedings that is both, copy of injunction application and the affidavit in support of the application, copies of the plaint and documents relied upon have to be served so also an affidavit has to be filed on the day on which the injunction is granted or on the day immediately following that the copies of affidavit are delivered or sent. Thereafter, the learned Judge concludes that the general principles governing grant of interim injunction under Order 39 Rule 3 are applicable. However, Order 39 Rule 3 proviso cannot be held to be applicable because according to the learned Judge, the requirement of thereof is penal in nature. For this reason, he says that the exparte order need not be vacated in this case.
18. The learned Judge somewhat contradicts himself in para 15 by holding that the wide powers which are conferred in Section 9 would include an injunction contemplated by Order 39 Rules 1 and 2. The Court can grant ex-parte order in appropriate circumstances but the proviso to Order 39 Rule 3 is not attracted to such a case or exercise.
19. To my mind, the learned Judge is in clear error while recording this conclusion. If both provisions are perused, viz. Order 39 of the C.P.C. and Section 9 of the Act, then, there is substance in the contentions of Mr. Devitre that the requirements which are stipulated before the Court grants an ad-interim ex-parte injunction, Order 39 Rule 3 must be read into the wide power that is contemplated and granted by Section 9. The provision of Section 9 and the ambit and scope of the Courts powers thereunder fall for determination of the Supreme Court in a decision reported in MANU/SC/2936/2007 : AIR2007SC2563 (Adhunik Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals (P) Ltd. The Hon'ble Supreme Court holds thus:
11. It is true that Section 9 of the Act speaks of the Court by way of an interim measure passing an order for protection, for the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods, which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement and such interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient. The grant of an interim prohibitory injunction or an interim mandatory injunction are governed by well-known rules and it is difficult to imagine that the legislature while enacting Section 9 of the Act intended to make a provision which was dehors the accepted principles that governed the grant of an interim injunction. Same is the position regarding the appointment of a receiver since the section itself brings in the concept of "just and convenient" while speaking of passing any interim measure of protection. The concluding words of the section, "and the court shall have the same power for making orders as it has for the purpose and in relation to any proceedings before it" also suggest that the normal rules that govern the court in the grant of interim orders is not sought to be jettisoned by the provision. Moreover, when a party is given a right to approach an ordinary court of the country without providing a special procedure or a special set of rules in that behalf, the ordinary rules followed by that court would govern the exercise of power conferred by the Act. On that basis also, it is not possible to keep out the concept of balance of convenience, prima-facie case, irreparable injury and the concept of just and convenient while passing interim measures under Section 9 of the Act.
16. Injunction is a form of specific relief. It is an order of a Court requiring a party either to do a specific act or acts or to refrain from doing a specific act or acts either for a limited period or without limit of time. In relation to a breach of contract, the proper remedy against a defendant who acts in breach of his obligations under a contract, is either damages or specific relief. The two principal varieties of specific relief are, decree of specific performance and the injunction. The Specific Relief Act, 1963 was intended to be "an Act to define and amend the law relating to certain kinds of specific reliefs". Specific relief is relief in specie. It is a remedy which aims at the exact fulfilment of an obligation. According to Dr. Banerjee in his Tagore Law Lectures on Specific Relief, the remedy for the non-performance of a duty are (1) compensatory, (2) specific. In the former, the court awards damages for breach of the obligations. In the latter, it directs the party in default to do or forbear from doing the very thing, which he is bound to do or forbear from doing. The law of specific relief is said to be, in its essence, a part of the law of procedure, for, specific relief is a form of judicial redress. Thus, the Specific Relief Act, 1963 purports to define and amend the law relating to certain kinds of specific reliefs obtainable in civil courts. It does not deal with the remedies connected with compensatory reliefs except as incidental and to a limited extent. The right to relief of injunctions is contained in Part III of the Specific Relief Act. Section 36 provides that preventive relief may be granted at the discretion of the court by injunction, temporary or perpetual. Section 38 indicates when perpetual injunctions are granted and Section 39 indicates when mandatory injunctions are granted. Section 40 provides that damages may be awarded either in lieu of or in addition to injunctions. Section 41 provides for contingencies when an injunction cannot be granted. Section 42 enables, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 41, particularly Clause (e) providing that no injunction can be granted to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced, the granting of an injunction to perform a negative covenant. Thus, the power to grant injunctions by way of specific relief is covered by the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
20. A perusal of these observations makes it abundantly clear that the legislature never intended to confer powers on a Court to make interim measures under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act dehors the accepted principles that govern the grant of an interim injunction and similar is the position regarding the appointment of a Receiver. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that language of Section 9 suggests that normal rules which govern the grant of interim orders was not sought to be excluded by the provision. Therefore, broad principles upon which the injunction is granted are also held to be applicable to the exercise of the power to make interim measure conferred by Section 9 of the Arbitration Act.
21. To my mind, in this case, if the general principles are applicable and are attracted, then, while making an order of injunction in proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and/or particularly, upon an application under Section 9 thereof, the Court has power to grant an ex-parte order or make an ex-parte measure. However, it cannot be forgotten than if the Court has an obligation to direct notice to opposite party in all cases when it makes such an order and it can make exception to the normal rule on the grounds indicated by Order 39 Rule 3 of the C.P.C. so also the learned Judge not ruling out the applicability of order 39 Rule 3, then, it is inconceivable that the proviso would not be attracted.
22. In this behalf, it would be of some relevance to note that when the C.P.C. was amended in 1976, the Joint Committee while recommending amendments to the Code was of the opinion that Rule 3 of Order 39 should be modified and it should be provided that copies of application etc. should be sent or delivered to the Defendant immediately after the injunction has been granted. An affidavit should be filed by the Applicant for injunction stating that it has been so sent. This was because before the Committee it was urged that the proviso proposed to be inserted to Order 39 Rule 3 would, instead of serving the purpose have the opposite effect. The Committee felt that in case when the party applying for ex-parte injunction, if required to deliver a copy of the injunction or other documents to the opposite party, before the Court grants an ad-interim injunction, the Defendant would come to know of the impending application for temporary injunction and he would hasten the mischief's which the proposed injunction indicated to prevent. Under these circumstances, when the amendment was made, the legislature harmonized provision in such a way that there would be a power to grant ad-interim ex-parte injunction but that would be in a nature of exception and not a rule. Ordinarily, notice will have to be given of the application for injunction to the opposite party before the Court grants an injunction. Order 39 Rule 3 is an obligation on the Court. The Court shall in all cases before granting an injunction direct notice of the application to be given to the opposite party. However, at the same time, if the object of granting the injunction is being defeated by delay and that appears to be the position before the Court then it has to record its opinion as contemplated by the proviso.
23. I do not see how the proviso is penal in nature and which part of it according to the learned Judge is a penalty. What it does is to enable the Court to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party but mandates that it must records reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay. Thus, it is in furtherance of the power conferred by Order 39 Rule 3 in its substantive part. However, the proviso requires the Applicant to deliver notice by Registered Post immediately after the order of granting the injunction had been made and a copy of the order of the injunction, etc. so also file an affidavit stating that it has been so sent or delivered. This is not a penalty at all. On the other hand, it enables the Court to make an order without the presence of the other side and at the same time ensure that the opposite party is not prejudiced or that the order of the Court is not defeated on account of the same being not intimated to the other side. These are all obligations on the Court and there is no question of their being any penalty in the same.
24. In MANU/SC/0581/2000 : AIR2000SC3032 (A. Ventakasubbalah Naidu v. S. Chellappan and Ors.) the question before Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether the power to grant exparte injunction without notice as contemplated by Order 39 emanates from the substantive provision, the provision in Order 39 Rule 3 is a distinct power. In this context, this is what the Supreme Court observes:
13. It cannot be contended that the power to pass interim ex-parte orders of injunction does not emanate from the said Rule. In fact, the said Rule is the repository of the power to grant orders of temporary injunction with or without notice, interim or temporary, or till further orders or till the disposal of the suit. Hence, any order passed in exercise of the aforesaid powers in Rule 1 would be appealable as indicated in Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code. The choice is for the party affected by the order either to move the appellate court or to approach the same court which passed the ex-parte order for any relief.
15. What would be the position if a court which passed the order granting interim exparte injunction did not record reasons thereof did not require the applicant to perform the duties enumerated in clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 3 of Order 39. In our view such an order can be deemed to contain such requirements at least by implication even if they are not stated in so many words. But if a party, in whose favour an order was passed ex-parte, fails to comply with the duties which he has to perform as required by the proviso quoted above, he must take the risk. Non-compliance with such requisites on his part cannot be allowed to go without any consequence and to enable him to have only the advantage of it. The consequence of the party (who secured the order) for not complying with the duties he is required to perform is that he cannot be allowed to take advantage of such order if the order is not obeyed by the other party. A disobedient beneficiary of an order cannot be heard to complain against any disobedience alleged against another party.
25. The effect of the injunction order not being intimated to the other side by failure to comply with the requirement in the proviso to Order 39 Rule 3 would mean that the advantage cannot be taken of such an order by the Applicant.
26. Before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, the question was whether the ad-interim exparte order should be vacated without going into the merits of the case solely because the Respondent - Plaintiff had failed to discharge its obligation cast by the proviso of Rule 3 of Order 39. While examining contentions in that behalf, the Delhi High Court referred to para 4 of the application for vacating the injunction and then held that ordinarily, ex-parte injunction may not be granted and referred to Order 39 Rule 3 in that behalf. It referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation Delhi MANU/SC/0522/1993 : 3SCR522 . That decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was more on the question as to whether in the absence of reasoning being recorded to grant an ex-parte ad-interim injunction, the same must be vacated only on that ground. In other words, the exercise of power to grant injunction without notice is vitiated only because reasons are not recorded. It is in that context that the Supreme Court made the observations which have been relied upon by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. Further, the observations of the Delhi High Court in para 36 must be seen in the context of satisfaction by the Applicant of the requirement in the proviso. If the Court is persuaded to grant an ex-parte interim injunction on the basis that having shown indulgence, he would comply with the requirement of the proviso, it would simply vacate the ad-interim injunction without merit of the case leaving it open to the parties to have a hearing on the grant of the Application for Injunction and thereafter, it would be hearing both sides. How these observations assist Mr. Devitre in contending that the order must be vacated only on the ground of requirement not being complied with is not clear to me at all. In the instant case, it cannot be said that the injunction must be vacated only on the grounds prayed by the Appellant.
27. In the result to the extent, the learned Judge holds that the proviso is penal in nature, his conclusion is vitiated by non-application of mind and is erroneous. It deserves to be quashed and set aside. However, the ultimate conclusion dismissing the application (Exhibit 30) of the Appellants requires no interference in the Appeal. The final result is maintained but for different reasons.
28. This does not mean that the learned Judge can go on adjourning the application merely because the affidavits are not filed. If he has granted an ex-parte injunction, then, he must see to it that the application is disposed off or else the very purpose and object of the confirmation of power to grant it would be defeated.
29. In these circumstances, the hearing of Arbitration Petition No. 215 of 2009 is expedited. The learned Judge should endeavour and dispose off the same within the period of six weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order and after hearing both sides. The ad-interim order passed by the Court below shall continue till hearing and final disposal of the Arbitration Petition. It is clarified that no opinion is expressed on the merits of the controversy and all pleas and contentions in that behalf are kept open.