Basic concepts: What is An Anton Piller injunction?

 An Anton Piller injunction is an extraordinary form of court-ordered injunctive relief that compels a defendant to permit a plaintiff to enter their property to search for and seize evidence and records, including electronic data and equipment. Also known as a "search order" in some jurisdictions, this remedy serves as a form of ex parte interlocutory injunction that grants the plaintiff certain rights of access to documents or articles in the defendant's possession.

Origins and Legal Foundation

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Basic concepts: What is John Doe order?

 A John Doe order is a type of legal injunction that allows a plaintiff to take action against unknown or unidentified defendants. The term "John Doe" serves as a placeholder name for anonymous parties whose identities are not known at the time of filing the lawsuit.

Origins and Background

The concept of John Doe orders has its origins in England during the reign of King Edward III, when such orders were used to refer to unidentifiable defendants. The Oxford Dictionary defines "John Doe" as an "anonymous party". This legal mechanism was later adopted by U.S. and Canadian courts before making its way to India.

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Supreme Court: Injunction Suit Maintainable Without Declaratory Relief When Plaintiff's Title Isn't Disputed By Defendant

The law is well settled that if the defendants do not dispute

the title of the plaintiffs then the suit should not fail only on

the ground that the matter has been filed only for injunction

simpliciter and no main relief in the form of declaration has been

prayed for. {Para 18}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.159/2025

(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) No.686/2025

(@Diary No.28071/2024)

KRUSHNA CHANDRA BEHERA & ORS. Vs  NARAYAN NAYAK & ORS. 

Dated: 6TH JANUARY, 2025.

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Whether S 10 of CPC relating to stay of suit bars the court to entertain subsequent suit and to pass interlocutory orders in that suit?

By virtue of Section 10 Code of Civil Procedure, a Court is prohibited from proceeding with trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit, of course, subject to other conditions mentioned therein. This Court has explained that the object of the prohibition contained in Section 10 Code of Civil Procedure is to prevent the Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits and to avoid inconsistent findings. However, this Rule of procedure is held not affecting the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain and deal with the latter suit and does not create a bar to the institution of the suit. The Courts have also consistently held that Section 10 Code of Civil Procedure does not create a bar to the passing of interlocutory orders including those of injunction. These principles are succinctly summarised by this Court in the case of Indian Bank v. Maharashtra State Cooperative Marketing Federation Ltd. MANU/SC/0350/1998 : (1998) 5 SCC 69. Therein, this Court was, of course, considering the applicability of bar Under Section 10 to summary suit Under Order XXXVII of Code of Civil Procedure but, while explaining the connotation of the expression "trial" in Section 10 Code of Civil Procedure, observed as under: {Para 17}

8. Therefore, the word "trial" in Section 10 will have to be interpreted and construed keeping in mind the object and nature of that provision and the prohibition to "proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit". The object of the prohibition contained in Section 10 is to prevent the courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits and also to avoid inconsistent findings on the matters in issue. The provision is in the nature of a Rule of procedure and does not affect the jurisdiction of the court to entertain and deal with the latter suit nor does it create any substantive right in the matters. It is not a bar to the institution of a suit. It has been construed by the courts as not a bar to the passing of interlocutory orders such as an order for consolidation of the latter suit with the earlier suit, or appointment of a receiver or an injunction or attachment before judgment. The course of action which the court has to follow according to Section 10 is not to proceed with the "trial" of the suit but that does not mean that it cannot deal with the subsequent suit any more or for any other purpose. In view of the object and nature of the provision and the fairly settled legal position with respect to passing of interlocutory orders it has to be stated that the word "trial" in Section 10 is not used in its widest sense.

18. The above principles of law, with necessary variations, when applied to the present case, lead to the position that even if final determination of the question of maintainability (in case the constitutional validity of the impugned provision is to be decided) may depend upon the decision of Larger Bench, the supplemental proceedings in the present suit, particularly those relating to the prayer of interim relief, cannot be put on hold.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Original Suit No. 1 of 2021

Decided On: 11.05.2023

State of Meghalaya Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dinesh Maheshwari and P.V. Sanjay Kumar, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0559/2023.

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Can a person be estopped from claiming an injunction if they file a lawsuit after the construction of a road over their land?

 Sri Ajit J. Gunjal, learned Government Pleader appearing for the appellant submits that as the plaintiff was fully aware of the fact that the land in question was being used for laying the road and as he did not raise any objection, he must be deemed to have consented to laying the road on the suit land, therefore, he was estopped from seeking a relief of permanent injunction at the belated stage.

{Para 5}

6. The appeal has been admitted on the following substantial question of law;

"Whether on facts and circumstances of the case the plaintiff is not estopped from challenging the laying of the road by the defendant in his land and whether he is entitled to the injunction at this belated stage."

8. The State which takes law into its own hand, and acts in wilful disobedience to law and usurps the property of a citizen, cannot be permitted to contend that the citizen having not raised any objection is not entitled to seek an order of mandatory injunction or a permanent injunction. If the State is allowed to do such act, it would amount to putting a premium on the illegal act of the State. The action of the State may have a laudable object but it has to be accomplished in accordance with law. The STATE is not above law. It is as much bound by Rule of Law as any citizen or person. The actions of the State when they affect the life, liberty and property of a person or a citizen must be dictated by accepted notions of fair-play justice and the laws governing them. Therefore, I am of the view that it is not possible to hold that the plaintiff is estopped from seeking a decree for permanent injunction and also a decree for mandatory injunction as it is not proved that the plaintiff consented to or waived his right by allowing the State to lay the road on the suit land.

Karnataka High Court

State Of Karnataka vs Basalingappa on 29 May, 1989

Equivalent citations: ILR 1989 KAR 3363, 1989 (2) KarLJ 189

Author: K Swami.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Whether it is duty of the court to give mandatory injunction in cases of trespass?

  The entire circumstances revealed from the evidence on record unerringly point to the fact that the Appellant had encroached upon land belonging to the Respondent and without bona fides effected constructions which is verandah which is extension of residential building. The object of estoppel, as held in Madanappa's case, would be defeated if the said illegality is recognized and allowance is granted therefor. In the contextual situation, a decision of a learned Single Judge of High Court of Andhra Pradesh in N.C. Subbayya v. Pattan Abdulla Khan (1956) 69 LW (Andhra) 52 extracted in agreement in the decision by the learned Single Judge of High Court of Madras in the decision in Bodi Reddy v. Appu Goundan MANU/TN/0426/1970 : (1971) ILR 2 Madras 155, is worthy to be looked into. In the decision the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh after posing a question "has the court an absolute discretion to award damages instead of a mandatory injunction where there is a trespass by the Defendant on the Plaintiff's land?" held thus:

To say the building erected in such circumstances should not be directed to be removed and only damages could be awarded would, in my opinion, be ineffective, to sanction a condemnation of the Plaintiff's property and an appropriation of it for the Defendant's use.... To confine the relief to compensation in such a case is tantamount to allowing a trespasser to purchase another man's property against that man's will. No man should be compelled to sell his property against his will at a valuation and no person should be encouraged to do a wrongful act or commit a trespass relying on the length of his purse and his ability to pay damages for it.

To say that a small strip of building site could thus be appropriated by a trespasser would be to admit a Rule of law which can be applied limitlessly. In cases of trespass, the Court should ordinarily grant an injunction directing the Defendant to remove the encroachment and restore possession of the vacant site to the Plaintiff. Neither serious inconvenience to the Defendant--trespasser nor the absence of serious injury to the Plaintiff is a ground for depriving the latter for his legal right to the property.

As held by the learned Single Judge we are of the considered view that in a case where the owner of the land filed suit for recovery of possession of his land from the encroacher and once he establishes his title, merely because some structures are erected by the opposite party ignoring the objection, that too without any bona fide belief, denying the relief of recovery of possession would tantamount to allowing a trespasser/encroacher to purchase another man's property against that man's will. In Bodi Reddy's decision (supra) the learned Judge held that in a suit for recovery of possession filed within the period of limitation provided under Limitation Act, the doctrine of laches or acquiescence has no place to defeat the right of the Plaintiff to obtain the relief on his establishing his title.  {Para 20}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 6182-6183 of 2009

Decided On: 02.02.2023

Baini Prasad (D) Thr. LRs. Vs. Durga Devi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai and C.T. Ravikumar, JJ.

Author: C.T. Ravikumar, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0088/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Are directions of the Supreme Court in Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Private Limited applicable to interim orders that do not stay the trial of civil or criminal cases?

 To be more specific, the issue as urged by the petitioner is as to whether the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 36 of its decision in "Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency' case, can be construed to mean that in cases wherein interim orders in the nature of stay or injunction are passed and which have continued to remain in operation for more than six months, would stand automatically vacated after a period of six months of such orders being passed. {Para 10}

40. In conclusion, it needs to be observed that the directions of the Supreme Court in paragraph 36 and 37 in Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Private Limited, operate only qua the criminal and civil cases pending trial, and such directions cannot be construed to be applicable to the other category of orders in proceedings which do not stay the trial of the civil or criminal cases as observed in paragraph 30 above. Such orders of the Supreme Court are also not applicable to the proceedings before the Tribunals. Thus, the tribunal was not correct in passing the impugned order as also applying the government circular dated 6 May, 2021.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 5483 of 2021

Decided On: 18.04.2022

 Devsing Ramchandra Chavan  Vs.  The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.S. Kulkarni, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1337/2022

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Whether the court can grant injunction against muslim husband restraining him from performing second marriage?

 The Court have no role in restraining the

parties invoking their personal law remedies. The Court

should not forget the mandate of Article 25 of the

Constitution of India, which not only allows one profess

religion but also to practice. In essence, if any orders

are passed restraining one from acting in accordance with

the personal belief and practice, that would amount to

encroaching his constitutionally protected rights. No

doubt, aggrieved can challenge any action emanates out of

exercise of faith and practice; if it was not done in

accordance with the personal law, belief and practice but

that stage would arise only after the performance of the

act. The jurisdiction of the Court is limited in these

kinds of processes. The Family Court cannot restrain a

person performing his act in accordance with the personal

law. The act complained, invoking irrevocable invocation

of Talaq yet to come into existence. It is only after the

completion of the process and the procedure act qua the

Talaq, it can be said that whether it was in accordance

with the procedure as prescribed under the personal law or

not. It is unfortunate before that exercise is being done

he has been restrained from acting in accordance with the

personal belief and practice. The right to marry more

than one person at a time is prescribed under the personal

law. If the law ensures such protection, it is not for

the Court to decide that one person should not act in

accordance with the personal conscious and belief in

accordance with his religious practices. The Court has no

role to restrain or regulate one's behavior or decision in

accordance with the personal law guarantied. In the light

of exercise of the husband in accordance with the personal

law as above, we are of the view, the orders impugned are

without any justification and jurisdiction. We set aside

both the orders. We make it clear that at appropriate

time, if Talaq is not exercised in accordance with the

law, the respondent-wife can approach the competent Court

to redress her grievances.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

OP (FC) NO. 394 OF 2022

ANVARUDEEN  Vs SABINA, 

PRESENT

 MR. JUSTICE A.MUHAMED MUSTAQUE & MRS. JUSTICE SOPHY THOMAS

Author:A. Muhamed Mustaque, J

 Dated: 17TH DAY OF AUGUST 2022 

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Supreme Court: Court should not grant an injunction in case of tender of infrastructure project; Instead, Relegate Party To Seek Damages

If the Court finds that there is total arbitrariness or that the tender has been granted in a malafide manner, still the Court should refrain from interfer- ing in the grant of tender but instead relegate the parties to seek damages for the wrongful exclusion rather than to injunct the execution of the contract. The injunction or interference in the tender leads to additional costs on the State and is also against public interest. Therefore, the State and its citizens suffer twice, firstly by paying escalation costs and secondly, by being deprived of the infrastructure for which the present-day Governments are expected to work.

26. A word of caution ought to be mentioned herein that any contract of public service should not be interfered with lightly and in any case, there should not be any interim order derailing the entire process of the services meant for larger public good. The grant of interim injunction by the learned Single Bench of the High Court has helped no-one except a contractor who lost a contract bid and has only caused loss to the State with no corresponding gain to anyone.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1846 OF 2022 

 M/S. N.G. PROJECTS LIMITED VERSUS M/S. VINOD KUMAR JAIN & ORS.

Coram: HEMANT GUPTA; V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.

HEMANT GUPTA, J.

Dated: MARCH 21, 2022

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Whether the court can grant interim relief U/S 9 of Arbitration Act if the contract is determinable?

 However, even in these circumstances, when a question arises before the Court, to consider granting of reliefs in the nature as prayed for by the petitioner, in my opinion, the basic consideration for the Court would be to examine as to what is the nature of the contract between the parties. Perusal of the contract and the general terms and conditions as appended thereto, more particularly, Clause (5) thereof, clearly indicate that the parties have provided that either of the parties can terminate the contract with a fifteen days notice to be served on the other party. Further such clause also provides for the validity of the contract up to 30 June 2022. It is thus clear that nature of the contract in question is determinable. If that be so, then Mr.Nankani would be correct in his contention that the provisions under sub-clause (d) of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act which provides that a contract which is in its nature determinable,cannot be specifically enforced becomes applicable.

19. In the context of Section 14(d) of the Specific Relief Act, another

provision which would become relevant is Section 41 of the Specific

Relief Act, which provides as to when an injunction would be refused or when it cannot be granted. Section 41(e) provides that an

injunction cannot be granted by the Court to prevent the breach of a contract, the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. Thus once the nature of the contract itself is such, that it cannot be specifically enforced, Section 41 (e) of the Specific Relief Act would stare at the petitioner when the petitioner claims a relief of an injunction. Certainly the principles which are embodied in Section 14(d) read with Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act are applicable even when the Court considers an application under Section 9 of the Act for interim measures. It is a settled principle of law that although Section 9 is a remedy available to the parties having an arbitration agreement between them, however, when a relief for grant of an injunction is prayed for, certainly the Court would be guided by the principles as contained in the Specific Relief Act read with the provisions of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO. 1366 OF 2022

Chetan Iron LLP  V/s. RC Ltd. 

CORAM : G.S.KULKARNI, J.

PRONOUNCED ON: 24 January, 2022

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Whether the Civil court can entertain dispute relating to wakf property?

 In our opinion, all matters pertaining to Wakfs should be filed in the first instance before the Wakf Tribunal constituted under Section 83 of the Wakf Act, 1995 and should not be entertained by the Civil Court or by the High Court straightaway under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. {Para 10}

14. Thus, the Wakf Tribunal can decide all disputes, questions or other matters relating to a Wakf or Wakf property.

The words "any dispute, question or other matters relating to a Wakf or Wakf property" are, in our opinion, words of very wide connotation. Any dispute, question or other matters whatsoever and in whatever manner which arises relating to a Wakf or Wakf property can be decided by the Wakf Tribunal.

The word 'Wakf' has been defined in Section 3(r) of the Wakf Act, 1995 and hence once the property is found to be a Wakf property as defined in Section 3(r), then any dispute, question or other matter relating to it should be agitated before the Wakf Tribunal.

15. Under Section 83(5) of the Wakf Act, 1995 the Tribunal has all powers of the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, and hence it has also powers under Order 39 Rules 1, 2 and 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure to grant temporary injunctions and enforce such injunctions. Hence, a full-fledged remedy is available to any party if there is any dispute, question or other matter relating to a Wakf or Wakf property.

16. We may further clarify that the party can approach the Wakf Tribunal, even if no order has been passed under the Act, against which he/she is aggrieved. It may be mentioned that Sections 83(1) and 84 of the Act do not confine the jurisdiction of the Wakf Tribunal to the determination of the correctness or otherwise of an order passed under the Act. No doubt Section 83(2) refers to the orders passed under the Act, but, in our opinion, Sections 83(1) and 84 of the Act are independent provisions, and they do not require an order to be passed under the Act before invoking the jurisdiction of the Wakf Tribunal. Hence, it cannot be said that a party can approach the Wakf Tribunal only against an order passed under the Act. In our opinion, even if no order has been passed under the Act, the party can approach the Wakf Tribunal for the determination of any dispute, question or other matters relating to a Wakf or Wakf property, as the plain language of Sections 83(1) and 84 indicates.

18. It is well-settled that when there is a special law providing for a special forum, then recourse cannot be taken to the general law vide Justice G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretation (9th Edn. 2004, pp 133-134).

20. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that since the matter fell under the purview of the Wakf Act, only the Wakf Tribunal has jurisdiction in the matter, and not the Civil Court.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5297 of 2004

Decided On: 23.11.2010

Board of Wakf, West Bengal Vs. Anis Fatma Begum and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Markandey Katju and Gyan Sudha Misra, JJ.

Author: Markandey Katju, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0970/2010,2010 ALLSCR 2690,(2010) 14 SCC 588

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Whether plaintiff can claim permanent injunction against defendant if the court has rejected her prayer for declaration and cancellation of sale deed?

In the present case the plaintiff, who has failed to get any declaratory relief and the defendant No.1 is held to be a true and absolute owner on the basis of the registered sale deed on payment of full sale consideration thereafter the plaintiff’s possession cannot be said to be “lawful possession”. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to any permanent injunction against the true owner in the instant case.

11. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has not properly appreciated the distinction between a substantive relief and a consequential relief. The High Court has observed that in the instant case the relief of permanent injunction can be said to be a substantive relief, which is clearly an erroneous view. It is to be noted that the main reliefs sought by the plaintiff in the suit were cancellation of the sale deed and declaration and the prayer of permanent injunction restraining defendant No.1 from disturbing her possession can be said to be a consequential relief. Therefore, the title to the property was the basis of the relief of possession. If that be so, in the present case, the relief for permanent injunction can be said to be a consequential relief and not a substantive relief as observed and held by the High Court. Therefore, once the plaintiff has failed to get any substantive relief of cancellation of the sale deed and failed to get any declaratory relief, and as observed hereinabove, relief of injunction can be said to be a consequential relief. Therefore, the prayer for permanent injunction must fail. In the instant case as the plaintiff cannot be said to be in lawful possession of the suit land, i.e., the possession of the plaintiff is “not legal or authorised by the law”, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to any permanent injunction.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1382 OF 2022;

Padhiyar Prahladji Chenaji (Deceased) Through L.R.s Vs Maniben Jagmalbhai (Deceased) Through L.R.s and Ors.

Coram: M.R. SHAH; B.V. NAGARATHNA, JJ. 

Dated:  MARCH 03, 2022

Author: M.R. SHAH, J.

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Whether court should dismiss the suit for injunction and declaration if it rejects prayer of plaintiff for injunction?

 The bar contained in proviso to Section 34 of the 1963 Act, in our opinion, could not be applied in the case of the plaintiffs as consequential relief for injunction from interference with the suit land was claimed. The prohibition contained in the proviso to Section 34 would operate only if the sole relief is for declaration without any consequential relief. In the plaint of the 1987 suit, relief for injunction was asked for. Such dual relief would protect the suit from being dismissed on maintainability ground. It is a fact that the plaintiff ought to have had asked for recovery of possession, given the factual background of this case, but the plaint as it was originally framed reflected that the original plaintiff was in possession of the suit land. Such plea rightly failed before the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court.

16. The prohibition or bar contained in proviso to Section 34 of the 1963 Act determines the maintainability of a suit and that issue has to be tested on the basis the plaint is framed. If the plaint contains claims for declaratory relief as also consequential relief in the form of injunction that would insulate a suit from an attack on maintainability on the sole ground of bar mandated in the proviso to the aforesaid section. If on evidence the plaintiff fails on consequential relief, the suit may be dismissed on merit so far as plea for consequential relief is concerned but not on maintainability question invoking the proviso to Section 34 of the 1963 Act. If the plaintiff otherwise succeeds in getting the declaratory relief, such relief could be granted.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5884 OF 2009

Akkamma & Ors. Vs Vemavathi & Ors.

Author: ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.

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Is the landlord a proper party in a suit for perpetual injunction for restraining Municipal corporation from demolishing rented premises?

The question is: whether the landlord is a necessary or proper party to the suit for perpetual injunction against the Municipal Corporation for demolition of demised building? The landlord has a direct and substantial interest in the demised building before the demolition of which notice under Section 351 was issued. In the event of its demolition, his rights would materially be affected. His right, title and interest in the property demised to the tenant or licences would be in jeopardy. It may be that the construction which is sought to be demolished by the Municipal Corporation was made with or without the consent of the landlord or the lessor. But the demolition would undoubtedly materially affect the right, title and interest in the property of the landlord. Under those circumstances, the landlord necessarily is a proper party, though the relief is sought for against the Municipal Corporation for perpetual injunction restraining the Municipal Corporation from demolition of the building.

 Supreme Court of India

M/S. Aliji Momonji & Co vs Lalji Mavji & Ors on 12 July, 1996

Citations: JT 1996 (7) 53, 1996 SCALE (5)485

Author: K Ramaswamy

Bench: Ramaswamy, K.

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Whether a person who has no legal right to a property can claim an injunction against a municipal corporation restraining it from dispossessing him from that property?

  However, it appears that the plaintiff in his pleadings has stated about previous possession simplicitor. But that too cannot be protected by granting injunction as prayed, because the eviction order was there against him. He was even offered alternate accommodation pursuant to his prayer, may be as freedom fighter. Therefore since the Corporation decided to give alternate accommodation, the plaintiff lost all his right in the property, i.e. the rights arising out of possession simplicitor. Because no legal right over the property is claimed, asserted and proved by the plaintiff. It is true that number of documents produced to show that he was in possession but mere possession in the absence of any right does not give protection to the plaintiff particularly in all the circumstances mentioned above.

{Para 22}

Bombay High Court

Motillal Mahadev Sharma (Since ... vs The Municipal Corporation Of ... on 1 April, 2005

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Whether suit simpliciter for injunction without claiming declaration is maintainable if title of plaintiff is in dispute?

 The issue is no more res integra. The position has been crystalised by this Court in the case of Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (dead) by L.Rs. and others, (2008) 4 SCC 594 in paragraph 21, which read thus:
“21. To summarise, the position in regard to suits for prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property, is as under:
(a) Where a cloud is raised over the plaintiff's title and he does not have possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the remedy. Where the plaintiff's title is not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a consequential injunction. Where there is merely an interference with the plaintiff's lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an injunction simpliciter.
(b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only with possession, normally the issue of title will not be directly and substantially in issue. The prayer for injunction will be decided with reference to the finding on possession. But in cases where de jure possession has to be established on the basis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, the issue of title may directly and substantially arise for consideration, as without a finding thereon, it will not be possible to decide the issue of possession.
(c) But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a suit for injunction, unless there are necessary pleadings and appropriate issue regarding title (either specific, or implied as noticed in Annaimuthu Thevar [Annaimuthu Thevar v. Alagammal, (2005) 6 SCC 202] ). Where the averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no issue relating to title, the court will not investigate or examine or render a finding on a question of title, in a suit for injunction. Even where there are necessary pleadings and issue, if the matter involves complicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the court will relegate the parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction.
(d) Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, and appropriate issue relating to title on which parties lead evidence, if the matter involved is simple and straightforward, the court may decide upon the issue regarding title, even in a suit for injunction. But such cases, are the exception to the normal rule that question of title will not be decided in suits for injunction. But persons having clear title and possession suing for injunction, should not be driven to the costlier and more cumbersome remedy of a suit for declaration, merely because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to encroach upon his property. The court should use its discretion carefully to identify cases where it will enquire into title and cases where it will refer to the plaintiff to a more comprehensive declaratory suit, depending upon the facts of the case.”{Para 9}

10. It could thus be seen that this Court in unequivocal terms has held that where the plaintiff’s title is not in dispute or under a cloud, a suit for injunction could be decided with reference to the finding on possession. It has been clearly held that if the matter involves complicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the court will relegate the parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction.

Supreme Court

JUSTICE L. NAGESWARA RAO JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI

T.V. RAMAKRISHNA REDDY Vs. M. MALLAPPA & ANR.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5577 OF 2021

7th September 2021

Author: B.R. GAVAI, J.

Citation:  2021 ALL SCR (ONLINE) 409

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Whether court can consider an unregistered family settlement at the time of deciding temporary injunction?

 Similarly, it is yet to be established whether the alleged family settlement Ex.P-1 is a genuine document or not. It may, however, be noted that in this document there is no mention of oral family settlement alleged to have been arrived at on 24.5.1979. From this document it is also clear that the alleged family arrangement was with regard to the partition of the immoveable properties and was reduced in writing so that it could be used in future at the time of need. Such a document is required to be registered compulsorily under Section 17(1) (b) of the Registration

Act, 1908. In this connection reference may be made to the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Tek Bahadur (supra). In this case the Supreme Court held that “it is only when the parties reduce the family arrangement in writing with the purpose of using that writing as proof of what they had arranged and, where the arrangement is brought about by the document as such, that the document would require registration, as it is then that it would be a document of title declaring for future what rights and in what properties the parties possess.” In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, I am prima facie of the view that the document Ex.P-1 required registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act as the said document was with regard to the partition of the immoveable properties and was reduced to writing with the purpose of using the same as proof of what the parties had decided in respect of those properties. Since the said document was not registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act, the plaintiff and defendant No. 2 cannot be permitted to rely on this document at this stage.

 HIGH COURT OF DELHI

IAS No. 7532/88, 8290/88, 211/89 3160/90 and 8916/92 in S.NO. 159/86

K.G. Mal Vs Sham Behari Mal 

Sat Pal, J

Decided on : 5th July, 1994

Citation: 1994 SCC OnLine Del 388 : (1994) 30 DRJ 242 : (1994) 55 DLT 137 : PLR (1994) 108 Del 3

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Whether court can grant an interim injunction based on unregistered agreement?

  It may be pointed out that no suit for specific performance of unregistered agreements dated 31.3.1965 and 16.10.1965 was filed nor have the respondents sought cancellation of the registered sale deed dated 31.3.1965 and 19.10.1965. This would lead to a situation where the respondents are not avoiding the transaction in the registered instrument but are seeking to use the unregistered agreements dated 31.3.1965 and 16.10.1965 to seek mandatory and permanent injunction as also possession. Such is impermissible and any interim order in furtherance thereof cannot be granted. It has been held by the Supreme Court in S. Saktivel (dead) by LRs. v. M. Venugopal Pillai and Ors., 2000 (7) SCC 104, that registered document cannot be rescinded, varied or altered by unregistered document. Therefore, no final relief can be granted on the basis of unregistered agreement in the teeth of the registered sale deed. Consequently, where a final relief cannot be granted, an interim relief to the same effect is also barred.{Para 5}

6. I need hardly go into other aspects of the matter raised by learned counsel, but suffice it to say that the injunction order under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC cannot be sustained in view of the registered sale deed not being canceled.

HIGH COURT OF DELHI

C.M. (M) 672 of 2002 & C.M. 1369 of 2003

Punjab National Bank  Vs Iqbal Ahmad 

R.S. Sodhi, J.

Decided on : November 7, 2003

Citation: 

2003 SCC OnLine Del 1060 : (2004) 72 DRJ 89 : (2003) 108 DLT 378

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Under Which section of CPC court can grant temporary Injunction to a party?

  The question, therefore, which stares at us, now, is this : whether it is Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, which confer jurisdiction and powers on the courts of civil jurisdiction to grant temporary injunction ? Since the orders and the rules framed thereunder merely prescribe the procedure for exercise of the powers by the courts, it logically follows that the power to grant temporary injunction lies elsewhere and not in Order 39, Rules 1 and 2. The question is, as to where lies the power to grant temporary injunction. The answer to this question really lies in Section 94 of the Code, for, the relevant portion of Section 94 reads, thus :

94. Supplemental proceedings. - In Order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated the court may, if it is so prescribed -

(a) ...

(b) ...

(c) grant of temporary injunction and in case of disobedience commit the person guilty thereof to the civil prison and Order that his property be attached and sold.

(d) ...

(e) ...                                                   {Para 15}

16. What is, thus, clear from the above discussion is that it is Section 94(c), which vests the civil courts with the power to grant temporary injunction and also to punish for disobedience of the Order of temporary injunction. How, under what circumstances and in what manner, this power can be exercised is actually given in Order 39, Rules 1 and 2.

Gauhati High Court

Reboti Ray vs Sashi Kanta Budhia @ Agarwal on 22 February, 2006

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What should the court consider if the plaintiff is seeking an injunction against the demolition of construction by Municipal Corporation?

  There is no dispute that the Municipal Corporation has issued a notice under section 55 of the M.R.T.P. Act A perusal of section 55(1) of the M.R.T.P. Act clearly indicates if it is found that any person has carried out any development of a temporary nature unauthorizedly as indicated in section 52 of the M.R.T.P. Act, the Corporation is empowered to order such person to remove or discontinue the use of the land unauthorizedly. The Municipal Corporation has to be satisfied that the authorized construction of a temporary nature is carried out as provided in section 52 of the M.R.T.P. Act. A perusal of section 55(2) of the M.R.T.P. Act clearly indicates that the decision of the planning authority on the question whether the development is a temporary in nature shall be final. In my view, the action taken by the Municipal Corporation under section 55 of the M.R.T.P. Act thus in the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of section 55 read with section 55(2) is final and conclusive.{Para 12}

13. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, I have perused the documents referred to and relied upon by the appellant in support of the submission of the appellant that the suit structure was not of a temporary nature and that the appellant has been carrying on business in the suit structure since 1961-1962.

14. I have given an opportunity to the learned counsel appearing for the appellant to demonstrate before this Court from the documents produced before the learned trial Judge in support of his contention that the suit structure was not temporary structure and that the appellant has been carrying on business in the suit premises since 1961-1962. Pursuant to this opportunity granted by this Court, the learned counsel for the appellant invited my attention to some of the documents which were on record before the learned trial Court, which are dealt with in the later part of the order.

15. Insofar as the alleged Deed of Declaration relied by the appellant dated 11th May, 1949 is concerned, a perusal of the said alleged Deed of Declaration does not indicate any description of the alleged structure between the two buildings. If according to the appellant, the appellant was carrying on business since 1961-1962 in the suit premises, such structure would have been definitely assessed by the Municipal Corporation in last several decades till date. Admittedly the temporary structure of the subject matter of the suit is not assessed between 1961 till date.

16. In my view merely on the basis of the said alleged Deed of Declaration dated 11th May, 1949, this Court cannot accept the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant had been carrying on business in the said premises from 1961-1962.

17. Insofar as the notices issued by the Municipal Corporation under different provisions of the M.M.C. Act issued in the year 2005 and thereafter relied upon by the appellant is concerned, a perusal of such notices clearly indicates that the Municipal Corporation in the year 2005 had found that the appellant had stored some of the empty boxes in the open space between two buildings. The said empty boxes were without obtaining permission from the Municipal Corporation. The prosecution was launched against the appellant pursuant to such action initiated by the Municipal Corporation. All such documents which are relied upon by the appellant would clearly indicate that there was no shed found by the Municipal Corporation on its visit in the year 2005. The empty boxes were stored in the open space. It is thus clear beyond reasonable doubt that whatever structures are put up by the appellant were after the year 2005.

18. In my view, none of these documents which are relied by the appellant would indicate that the suit structure which is the subject matter of the notice was a pacca structure or is in existence since 1961-62.

19. It is not the case of the appellant that the appellant had obtained any permission from the Municipal Corporation for erection of such structure.

20. A perusal of the application, which was filed by the appellant for the purpose of obtaining the license under the provisions of the Shops and Establishment Act, which is annexed to the civil application filed by the intervenor clearly indicates that it was the case of the appellant himself that he started business in the premises some time in the year 2014.

21. Even copy of the passport, electricity bill and telephone bill, produced on record by the appellant would not indicate that the suit premises was a pacca structure or that the appellant was carrying on business in the premises since 1961-1962. If the appellant was carrying on any business in the premises since 1961-1962, the appellant would have in his possession several documents and/or permission from the Municipal Corporation or other authorities to indicate that such business was being carried on since 1961-1962. In my view the appeal is devoid of merits. 

Bombay High Court

Mohammed Ismail Gulam Shaikh vs Municipal Corporation Of Greater ... on 1 February, 2016

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