In the process, the Court also explained the expression 'expressly
excluded' appearing in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 in
the following manner:
“34. Though, an argument was raised based on
Section 29 of the Limitation Act, even assuming
that Section 29(2) would be attracted, what we
have to determine is whether the provisions of
this section are expressly excluded in the case of
reference to the High Court.
35. It was contended before us that the words
“expressly excluded” would mean that there must
be an express reference made in the special or
local law to the specific provisions of the
Limitation Act of which the operation is to be
excluded. In this regard, we have to see the
scheme of the special law which here in this case
is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the
remedy provided therein is such that the
legislature intended it to be a complete code by
itself which alone should govern the several
matters provided by it. If, on an examination of
the relevant provisions, it is clear that the
provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily
excluded, then the benefits conferred therein
cannot be called in aid to supplement the
provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that
even in a case where the special law does not
exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act by an express reference, it would
nonetheless be open to the court to examine
whether and to what extent, the nature of those
provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and
scheme of the special law exclude their
operation. In other words, the applicability of the
provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be
judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act
but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act
relating to filing of reference application to the
High Court.”
The aforesaid judgment is a complete answer to the
arguments of the appellant.
15. It may be relevant to mention here that after the judgment in
Hongo India Private Limited & Anr., Section 35-H of the Central
Excise Act, 1994 was amended by the Parliament by Act 32 of
2003 with effect from 14.05.2003 giving power to the High Court
to condone the delay by inserting sub-section (2A). It is,
therefore, for the legislature to set right the deficiency, if it intends
to give power to the High Court to condone the delay in filing
revision petition under Section 81 of the VAT Act.
16. Argument predicated on 'no express exclusion' loses its force
having regard to the principle of law enshrined in Hukumdev
Narain Yadav. Therein, the Court made following observations
while examining whether the Limitation Act would be applicable to
the provisions of the Representation of the People Act or not:
“17. … but what we have to see is whether the
scheme of the special law, that is in this case the
Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein
are such that the legislature intended it to be a
complete code by itself which alone should govern
the several matters provided by it. If on an
examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that
the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily
excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot
be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the
Act. In our view, even in a case where the special
law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to
24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it
would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine
whether and to what extent the nature of those
provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and
scheme of the special law exclude their operation.”
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 49-50 OF 2017
M/S PATEL BROTHERS Vs STATE OF ASSAM AND ORS.
Dated:JANUARY 04, 2017.
Citation:(2017) 2 SCC 350
Leave granted.
2. The question of law which has fallen for determination in these
appeals is as to whether provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 are applicable in respect of revision petition filed in the
High Court under Section 81 of the Assam Value Added Tax Act,
2003 (hereinafter referred to as the 'VAT Act').
3. In order to decide this question, which is a pure question of law, it
is not necessary to state the facts in greater detail. The seminal
facts which require reproduction are mentioned below:
The appellant was running a business of purchasing tea
and is a registered dealer under the Assam General Sales Tax
Act, 1993 as well as the VAT Act and the Central Sales Tax Act,
1956. Based on the sales of his business, the appellant had
submitted the declaration in Form ‘C’ for the years 1998-1999,
1999-2000, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 reflecting the value of
sales. Based on the representation made by the appellant,
Respondent No. 2/Superintendent of Tax allowed full exemption
of sales tax as per Section 8(5) of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.
But, the information given by the appellant turned out to be false
and as a result of which Respondent No. 2 passed an order dated
29.06.2004 reducing the exemption granted to the petitioner for
the year 19998-99 along with imposing penalty. Similar orders of
re-assessment were passed in respect of the other assessment
years giving rise to the connected proceedings. Aggrieved by the
order dated, 29.06.2004, the appellant preferred appeals before
Respondent No. 3/Appellate Authority along with applications for
the stay of the demand. By order dated 29.07.2005, Respondent
No. 3 had directed the appellant to deposit 25% of the demanded
dues within 30 days and stayed rest of the demand. The
appellant preferred appeals before the Assam Board of
Revenue/Appellate Tribunal against the order dated 29.07.2005,
which was dismissed by the order dated 26.08.2008. A review
application filed against the aforesaid order came to be dismissed
by the Appellate Tribunal by the order dated 27.08.2013.
Aggrieved, appellant filed Revision Petitions under section 81(1)
of the VAT Act.
4. Section 81 of the VAT Act also prescribes a limitation period of 60
days within which such revision petition is to be preferred to High
Court. Since there was a delay of 335 days in filing these revision
petitions, these petitions were filed along with applications under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of
delay. The High Court has dismissed the applications for
condonation of delay holding that provisions of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable. For this purpose, the
High Court has referred to Section 84 of the VAT Act which makes
provisions of Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to such
petitions. On that basis, it is held by the High Court that since
only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are made
specifically applicable to these proceedings, by necessary
implication Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded.
5. It was argued by Mr. Chowdhury, learned counsel appearing for
the appellant, that the approach of the High Court in dealing with
the provisions of VAT Act and applicability of Limitation Act, 1963
to such proceedings was faulty inasmuch as the High Court did
not take note of and discussed other provisions of the VAT Act
and also failed to give due weightage to Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act, 1963.
In the first instance, he referred to Section 79 of the VAT Act
which is a provision relating to appeals to the Appellate Authority.
As per Section 79(1) of the VAT Act, appeal against the order of
the taxing authority can be filed with the appellate authority within
60 days from the date of receipt of such order of the taxing
authority. Sub-section (2) of Section 79 of the VAT Act empowers
the appellate authority to entertain the appeal even beyond 60
days, provided it is presented within a further period of 180 days,
if the appellate authority is satisfied that the appellant was
prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within
the stipulated period of 60 days1
.
6. The learned counsel next referred to Section 80 of the VAT Act2
which deals with appeals to the Appellate Tribunal inter alia
against the orders of the Appellate Authority. Here also, period of
60 days for preferring such an appeal is provided under
sub-section (3) of Section 80 of the VAT Act and proviso to
sub-section (3) empowers the Appellate Tribunal to condone the
delay, if the appeal is preferred within a further period of 120
days, on sufficient cause being shown for not filing the appeal
within 60 days of limitation prescribed. The learned counsel
contrasted the aforesaid provisions of Sections 79 and 80 with
1 Relevant portion of Section 79 of the VAT Act reads as under: “79. Appeals to the appellate
authority: (1) Any person aggrieved by an order passed under the Act by a taxing authority
lower in rank than a Deputy Commissioner of Taxes, may appeal to the Appellate Authority, in
the manner as may be prescribed, within sixty days from the date of receipt of such order.
(2) Where the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient
cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of sixty days, it may admit an
appeal after the expiry of the said period provided it is presented within a further period of one
hundred eighty days”
2 80. Appeals to the Appellate Tribunal: (1) Any person aggrieved by any of the following orders
may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against such order,-
(a) an order passed by the Appellate Authority under Section 79, and
(b) an order passed by an authority not below the rank of Deputy Commissioner of
Taxes.
(2) omitted.
(3) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within sixty days of the date on
which the order sought to be appealed against is communicated to the person;
Provided that the Appellate tribunal may admit an appeal after the expiry of sixty days if he is
satisfied that the Appellant had sufficient reasons for not filing the appeal within the aforesaid
time, if, it is within a further period of one hundred twenty days.
Section 813
of the VAT Act and pointed out that whereas there
was specific provision for condonation of delay in filing appeals
under Sections 79 and 80 of the VAT Act, no such equivalent
provision was made in Section 81 of the VAT Act. As per Section
81 of the VAT Act, revision can be preferred to the High Court
against the order of the Appellate Tribunal within 60 days.
However, there is no provision giving specific power to the High
Court to condone the delay if the revision is preferred beyond 60
days. As per the learned counsel, the reason for not providing
such a provision was that provisions of Limitation Act, 1963
including Section 5 thereof were applicable.
7. Insofar as Section 84 of the VAT Act4
is concerned, it was
submitted that Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 were
made applicable for specific purpose of computing the period of
limitation under the said Chapter and High Court committed a
grave error while holding that because of the aforesaid provision
only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 were made
applicable to the VAT Act thereby excluding other provisions of
3 “81. Revision to High Court : (1) Any dealer or other person, who is dissatisfied with the decision
of the Appellate Tribunal, or the Commissioner may, within sixty days after being notified of the
decision of the Appellate Tribunal, file a revision to the High Court, and the dealer or other person so
appealing shall serve a copy of the notice of revision on the respondents to the proceedings.”
4 Section 84 of the VAT Act reads as under: “84. Application of Section 4 and 12 of Limitation Act,
1963 : In computing the period of limitation under this chapter, the provisions of Section 4 and 12 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 shall, so far as may be, apply.”
the Act.
8. For this purpose, the learned counsel relied upon Section 29(2) of
the Limitation Act, 19635
which makes provisions contained in
Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable
in case of suit, appeal or application under any special or local
law, where these provisions are not expressly excluded by such
special or local law.
9. It was argued that in the absence of any provision expressly
excluding the applicability of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act,
1963, those Sections were applicable qua revision petitions filed
under Section 81 of the VAT Act and, therefore, Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 was also applicable to such proceedings. To
placate his aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel relied
upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Mangu Ram v.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr.6
. In that case, special
leave petitions were filed against the condonation of delay to the
application for grant of special leave under Section 417, Cr.P.C.,
5 Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under: “29(2). Where any special or local law
prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period
prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period
prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for
any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to
24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly
excluded by such special or local law.”
6 (1976) 1 SCC 392
1898 against acquittal of the petitioners by the trial court, in spite
of the mandatory period of limitation provided in sub-section (4) of
Section 417. Question arose whether in the case of Kaushalya
Rani v. Gopal Singh7
, which held Section 417, Cr.P.C., 1898 a
special law and excluded application of Section 5 on a
construction of Section 29(2)(b) of the old Act of 1908 applied
under the corresponding provision of Limitation Act, 1963 which
governed the case. The Court held that since the case was
governed by Limitation Act, 1963, judgment in Kaushalya Rani
case did not apply. For applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 to
such proceedings, the Court referred to Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act, 1963 holding that there is an important departure
made by the Limitation Act, 1963 insofar as the provision
contained in Section 29, sub-section (2), is concerned. Under the
Indian Limitation Act, 1908, clause (b) to sub-section (2) of
Section 29 provided that for the purpose of determining any
period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application
by any special or local law the application of Section 5 was in
clear and specific terms excluded. But under Section 29(2) of
Act, the provisions of Section 5 shall apply in case of special or
7 (1964) 4 SCR 982
local law to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded
by such special or local law. Since under the Limitation Act, 1963,
Section 5 is specifically made applicable by Section 29 (2), it is
only if the special or local law expressly excludes the applicability
of Section 5 that it would stand displaced. The Court held that
there is nothing in Section 417(4), Cr.P.C., which excludes the
application of Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant also referred to the case of
State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Anshuman Shukla8
. In that
case, question of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act
arose in relation to revision petition that can be preferred under
Section 19 of the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983
(as it stood prior to its amendment in 2005). The Court held that
since unamended Section 19 did not contain any express rider on
power of the High Court to entertain applications for revision after
expiry of prescribed limitation thereunder, provisions of Limitation
Act, 1963 would become applicable vide Section 29(2) thereof. It
further held that as the High Court was conferred with suo moto
power under Section 19 of Adhiniyam, 1983 to call for record of
an award at any time, there was no legislative intent to exclude
8 (2014) 10 SCC 814
the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
11. Mr. Nalin Kohli, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the High Court
had exhaustively dealt with the issue and rightly found that since
Section 84 of the VAT Act confined the applicability of Limitation
Act only in respect of Sections 4 and 12 thereof to the
proceedings under the said Chapter, by necessary implication the
other provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 including Section 5
thereof stood excluded. He submitted that for the purpose of
finding whether other provisions are excluded or not, the focus
should be on the scheme of the special law as laid down in
Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra9
wherein it was
held that even if there exists no express exclusion in the special
law, the Court has right to examine the provisions of the special
law to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the legislative intent
was to exclude the operation of the Limitation Act. According to
him, Section 84 of the VAT Act clearly depicted such a legislative
intent.
12. After examining the matter in the light of law laid down in various
9 (1974) 2 SCC 133
judgments cited by both the parties, we are of the view that the
High Court has given correct interpretation to the provisions of
Section 81 of the VAT Act, when this provision is read along with
Section 84 thereof.
13. In the case of Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise
v. Hongo India Private Limited & Anr.10, the question that fell for
determination was that as to whether the High Court had power to
condone the delay in presentation of the reference application
under unamended Section 35-H(1) of the Central Excise Act,
1994 beyond the period prescribed by applying Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. Unamended Section 35-H dealt with reference
application to the High Court. Under sub-section (1) thereof, such
reference application could be preferred within a period of 180
days of the date upon which the aggrieved party is served with
notice of an order under Section 35-C of the Central Excise Act.
There was no provision to extend the period of limitation for filing
the application to the High Court beyond the said period and to
condone the delay. Pertinently, under the scheme of the Central
Excise Act as well, in case of appeal to the Commissioner under
Section 35 of the Act, which should be filed within 60 days, there
10 (2009) 5 SCC 791
was a specific provision for condonation of delay upto 30 days if
sufficient cause is shown. Likewise, appeal to the Appellate
Tribunal could be filed within 90 days under Section 35-B thereof
and sub-section (5) of Section 35-B gave power to the Appellate
Tribunal to condone the delay irrespective of the number of days,
if sufficient cause is shown. Further, Section 35-EE provided 90
days time for filing revision by the Central Government and
proviso thereto empowers the revisional authority to condone the
delay for a further period of 90 days. However, when it came to
making reference to the High Court under Section 35-G of the
Act, the provision only prescribed the limitation period of 180 days
with no further clause empowering the High Court to condone the
delay beyond the said period of 180 days. It was, thus, in almost
similar circumstances, the judgment was rendered by this Court.
The categorical opinion of the Court was that in the absence of
any such power, the High Court did not have power to condone
the delay. In that case also, provisions of Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act, 1963 were pressed into service. But this argument
was rejected in the following manner:
30. In the earlier part of our order, we have
adverted to Chapter VI-A of the Act which
provides for appeals and revisions to various
authorities. Though Parliament has specifically
provided an additional period of 30 days in the
case of appeal to the Commissioner, it is silent
about the number of days if there is sufficient
cause in the case of an appeal to the Appellate
Tribunal. Also an additional period of 90 days in
the case of revision by the Central Government
has been provided. However, in the case of an
appeal to the High Court under Section 35-G and
reference application to the High Court under
Section 35-H, Parliament has provided only 180
days and no further period for filing an appeal
and making reference to the High Court is
mentioned in the Act.
31. In this regard, it is useful to refer to a recent
decision of this Court in Punjab Fibres Ltd.
[(2008) 3 SCC 73] The Commissioner of
Customs, Central Excise, Noida was the
appellant in this case. While considering the very
same question, namely, whether the High Court
has power to condone the delay in presentation
of the reference under Section 35-H(1) of the
Act, the two-Judge Bench taking note of the said
provision and the other related provisions
following Singh Enterprises v. CCE [(2008) 3
SCC 70] concluded that: (Punjab Fibres Ltd.
case [(2008) 3 SCC 73] , SCC p. 75, para 8)
“8. … the High Court was justified in
holding that there was no power for
condonation of delay in filing reference
application.”
32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in
Sections 35, 35-B, 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes
the position clear that an appeal and reference to
the High Court should be made within 180 days
only from the date of communication of the
decision or order. In other words, the language
used in other provisions makes the position clear
that the legislature intended the appellate
authority to entertain the appeal by condoning
the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60
days which is the preliminary limitation period for
preferring an appeal. In the absence of any
clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient
cause after the prescribed period, there is
complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in
holding that there was no power to condone the
delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180
days.
33. Even otherwise, for filing an appeal to the
Commissioner, and to the Appellate Tribunal as
well as revision to the Central Government, the
legislature has provided 60 days and 90 days
respectively, on the other hand, for filing an
appeal and reference to the High Court larger
period of 180 days has been provided with to
enable the Commissioner and the other party to
avail the same. We are of the view that the
legislature provided sufficient time, namely, 180
days for filing reference to the High Court which
is more than the period prescribed for an appeal
and revision.”
14. In the process, the Court also explained the expression 'expressly
excluded' appearing in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 in
the following manner:
“34. Though, an argument was raised based on
Section 29 of the Limitation Act, even assuming
that Section 29(2) would be attracted, what we
have to determine is whether the provisions of
this section are expressly excluded in the case of
reference to the High Court.
35. It was contended before us that the words
“expressly excluded” would mean that there must
be an express reference made in the special or
local law to the specific provisions of the
Limitation Act of which the operation is to be
excluded. In this regard, we have to see the
scheme of the special law which here in this case
is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the
remedy provided therein is such that the
legislature intended it to be a complete code by
itself which alone should govern the several
matters provided by it. If, on an examination of
the relevant provisions, it is clear that the
provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily
excluded, then the benefits conferred therein
cannot be called in aid to supplement the
provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that
even in a case where the special law does not
exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act by an express reference, it would
nonetheless be open to the court to examine
whether and to what extent, the nature of those
provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and
scheme of the special law exclude their
operation. In other words, the applicability of the
provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be
judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act
but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act
relating to filing of reference application to the
High Court.”
The aforesaid judgment is a complete answer to the
arguments of the appellant.
15. It may be relevant to mention here that after the judgment in
Hongo India Private Limited & Anr., Section 35-H of the Central
Excise Act, 1994 was amended by the Parliament by Act 32 of
2003 with effect from 14.05.2003 giving power to the High Court
to condone the delay by inserting sub-section (2A). It is,
therefore, for the legislature to set right the deficiency, if it intends
to give power to the High Court to condone the delay in filing
revision petition under Section 81 of the VAT Act.
16. Argument predicated on 'no express exclusion' loses its force
having regard to the principle of law enshrined in Hukumdev
Narain Yadav. Therein, the Court made following observations
while examining whether the Limitation Act would be applicable to
the provisions of the Representation of the People Act or not:
“17. … but what we have to see is whether the
scheme of the special law, that is in this case the
Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein
are such that the legislature intended it to be a
complete code by itself which alone should govern
the several matters provided by it. If on an
examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that
the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily
excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot
be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the
Act. In our view, even in a case where the special
law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to
24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it
would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine
whether and to what extent the nature of those
provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and
scheme of the special law exclude their operation.”
17. Thus, the approach which is to be adopted by the Court in such
cases is to examine the provisions of special law to arrive at a
conclusion as to whether there was legislative intent to exclude
the operation of Limitation Act. In the instant case, we find that
Section 84 of the VAT Act made only Sections 4 and 12 of the
Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings under the VAT Act.
The apparent legislative intent, which can be clearly evinced, is to
exclude other provisions, including Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Section 29(2) stipulates that in the absence of any express
provision in a special law, provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act would apply. If the intention of the legislature was
to make Section 5, or for that matter, other provisions of the
Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings under the VAT Act,
there was no necessity to make specific provision like Section 84
thereby making only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act
applicable to such proceedings, inasmuch as these two Sections
would also have become applicable by virtue of Section 29(2) of
the Limitation Act. It is, thus, clear that the Legislature intended
only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, out of Sections 4 to
24 of the said Act, applicable under the VAT Act thereby excluding
the applicability of the other provisions.
18. Judgment in the case of Mangu Ram would not come to the aid
of the appellant as the Court found that there was no provision
under the Cr.P.C. from which legislative intent to exclude Section
5 of the Limitation Act could be discerned and, therefore, Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act was taken aid of. Similar situation
prevailed in Anshuman Shukla's case. On the contrary, in the
instant case, a scrutiny of the scheme of VAT Act goes to show
that it is a complete code not only laying down the forum but also
prescribing the time limit within which each forum would be
competent to entertain the appeal or revision. The underlying
object of the Act appears to be not only to shorten the length of
the proceedings initiated under the different provisions contained
therein, but also to ensure finality of the decision made there
under. The fact that the period of limitation described therein has
been equally made applicable to the assessee as well as the
revenue lends ample credence to such a conclusion. We,
therefore, unhesitantly hold that the application of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 to a proceeding under Section 81(1) of the
VAT Act stands excluded by necessary implication, by virtue of
the language employed in section 84.
19. The High Court has rightly pointed out the well settled principle of
law that “the court cannot interpret the statute the way they have
developed the common law ‘which in a constitutional sense
means judicially developed equity'. In abrogating or modifying a
rule of the common law the court exercises the same power of
creation that built up the common law through its existence by the
judges of the past. The court can exercise no such power in
respect of statue, therefore, in the task of interpreting and
applying a statue, Judges have to be conscious that in the end
the statue is the master not the servant of the judgment and no
judge has a choice between implementing it and disobeying it.”
What, therefore, follows is that the court cannot interpret the law
in such a manner so as to read into the Act an inherent power of
condoning the delay by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 so as to supplement the provisions of the VAT Act which
excludes the operation of Section 5 by necessary implications.
20. We, thus, do not find any infirmity in the judgment rendered by
the High Court. The present appeals are devoid of any merit and
are, accordingly, dismissed.
.............................................J.
(A.K. SIKRI)
.............................................J.
(ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 04, 2017.
Print Page
excluded' appearing in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 in
the following manner:
“34. Though, an argument was raised based on
Section 29 of the Limitation Act, even assuming
that Section 29(2) would be attracted, what we
have to determine is whether the provisions of
this section are expressly excluded in the case of
reference to the High Court.
35. It was contended before us that the words
“expressly excluded” would mean that there must
be an express reference made in the special or
local law to the specific provisions of the
Limitation Act of which the operation is to be
excluded. In this regard, we have to see the
scheme of the special law which here in this case
is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the
remedy provided therein is such that the
legislature intended it to be a complete code by
itself which alone should govern the several
matters provided by it. If, on an examination of
the relevant provisions, it is clear that the
provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily
excluded, then the benefits conferred therein
cannot be called in aid to supplement the
provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that
even in a case where the special law does not
exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act by an express reference, it would
nonetheless be open to the court to examine
whether and to what extent, the nature of those
provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and
scheme of the special law exclude their
operation. In other words, the applicability of the
provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be
judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act
but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act
relating to filing of reference application to the
High Court.”
The aforesaid judgment is a complete answer to the
arguments of the appellant.
15. It may be relevant to mention here that after the judgment in
Hongo India Private Limited & Anr., Section 35-H of the Central
Excise Act, 1994 was amended by the Parliament by Act 32 of
2003 with effect from 14.05.2003 giving power to the High Court
to condone the delay by inserting sub-section (2A). It is,
therefore, for the legislature to set right the deficiency, if it intends
to give power to the High Court to condone the delay in filing
revision petition under Section 81 of the VAT Act.
16. Argument predicated on 'no express exclusion' loses its force
having regard to the principle of law enshrined in Hukumdev
Narain Yadav. Therein, the Court made following observations
while examining whether the Limitation Act would be applicable to
the provisions of the Representation of the People Act or not:
“17. … but what we have to see is whether the
scheme of the special law, that is in this case the
Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein
are such that the legislature intended it to be a
complete code by itself which alone should govern
the several matters provided by it. If on an
examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that
the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily
excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot
be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the
Act. In our view, even in a case where the special
law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to
24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it
would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine
whether and to what extent the nature of those
provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and
scheme of the special law exclude their operation.”
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 49-50 OF 2017
M/S PATEL BROTHERS Vs STATE OF ASSAM AND ORS.
Dated:JANUARY 04, 2017.
Citation:(2017) 2 SCC 350
Leave granted.
2. The question of law which has fallen for determination in these
appeals is as to whether provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 are applicable in respect of revision petition filed in the
High Court under Section 81 of the Assam Value Added Tax Act,
2003 (hereinafter referred to as the 'VAT Act').
3. In order to decide this question, which is a pure question of law, it
is not necessary to state the facts in greater detail. The seminal
facts which require reproduction are mentioned below:
The appellant was running a business of purchasing tea
and is a registered dealer under the Assam General Sales Tax
Act, 1993 as well as the VAT Act and the Central Sales Tax Act,
1956. Based on the sales of his business, the appellant had
submitted the declaration in Form ‘C’ for the years 1998-1999,
1999-2000, 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 reflecting the value of
sales. Based on the representation made by the appellant,
Respondent No. 2/Superintendent of Tax allowed full exemption
of sales tax as per Section 8(5) of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.
But, the information given by the appellant turned out to be false
and as a result of which Respondent No. 2 passed an order dated
29.06.2004 reducing the exemption granted to the petitioner for
the year 19998-99 along with imposing penalty. Similar orders of
re-assessment were passed in respect of the other assessment
years giving rise to the connected proceedings. Aggrieved by the
order dated, 29.06.2004, the appellant preferred appeals before
Respondent No. 3/Appellate Authority along with applications for
the stay of the demand. By order dated 29.07.2005, Respondent
No. 3 had directed the appellant to deposit 25% of the demanded
dues within 30 days and stayed rest of the demand. The
appellant preferred appeals before the Assam Board of
Revenue/Appellate Tribunal against the order dated 29.07.2005,
which was dismissed by the order dated 26.08.2008. A review
application filed against the aforesaid order came to be dismissed
by the Appellate Tribunal by the order dated 27.08.2013.
Aggrieved, appellant filed Revision Petitions under section 81(1)
of the VAT Act.
4. Section 81 of the VAT Act also prescribes a limitation period of 60
days within which such revision petition is to be preferred to High
Court. Since there was a delay of 335 days in filing these revision
petitions, these petitions were filed along with applications under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of
delay. The High Court has dismissed the applications for
condonation of delay holding that provisions of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable. For this purpose, the
High Court has referred to Section 84 of the VAT Act which makes
provisions of Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to such
petitions. On that basis, it is held by the High Court that since
only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are made
specifically applicable to these proceedings, by necessary
implication Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded.
5. It was argued by Mr. Chowdhury, learned counsel appearing for
the appellant, that the approach of the High Court in dealing with
the provisions of VAT Act and applicability of Limitation Act, 1963
to such proceedings was faulty inasmuch as the High Court did
not take note of and discussed other provisions of the VAT Act
and also failed to give due weightage to Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act, 1963.
In the first instance, he referred to Section 79 of the VAT Act
which is a provision relating to appeals to the Appellate Authority.
As per Section 79(1) of the VAT Act, appeal against the order of
the taxing authority can be filed with the appellate authority within
60 days from the date of receipt of such order of the taxing
authority. Sub-section (2) of Section 79 of the VAT Act empowers
the appellate authority to entertain the appeal even beyond 60
days, provided it is presented within a further period of 180 days,
if the appellate authority is satisfied that the appellant was
prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within
the stipulated period of 60 days1
.
6. The learned counsel next referred to Section 80 of the VAT Act2
which deals with appeals to the Appellate Tribunal inter alia
against the orders of the Appellate Authority. Here also, period of
60 days for preferring such an appeal is provided under
sub-section (3) of Section 80 of the VAT Act and proviso to
sub-section (3) empowers the Appellate Tribunal to condone the
delay, if the appeal is preferred within a further period of 120
days, on sufficient cause being shown for not filing the appeal
within 60 days of limitation prescribed. The learned counsel
contrasted the aforesaid provisions of Sections 79 and 80 with
1 Relevant portion of Section 79 of the VAT Act reads as under: “79. Appeals to the appellate
authority: (1) Any person aggrieved by an order passed under the Act by a taxing authority
lower in rank than a Deputy Commissioner of Taxes, may appeal to the Appellate Authority, in
the manner as may be prescribed, within sixty days from the date of receipt of such order.
(2) Where the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient
cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of sixty days, it may admit an
appeal after the expiry of the said period provided it is presented within a further period of one
hundred eighty days”
2 80. Appeals to the Appellate Tribunal: (1) Any person aggrieved by any of the following orders
may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against such order,-
(a) an order passed by the Appellate Authority under Section 79, and
(b) an order passed by an authority not below the rank of Deputy Commissioner of
Taxes.
(2) omitted.
(3) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within sixty days of the date on
which the order sought to be appealed against is communicated to the person;
Provided that the Appellate tribunal may admit an appeal after the expiry of sixty days if he is
satisfied that the Appellant had sufficient reasons for not filing the appeal within the aforesaid
time, if, it is within a further period of one hundred twenty days.
Section 813
of the VAT Act and pointed out that whereas there
was specific provision for condonation of delay in filing appeals
under Sections 79 and 80 of the VAT Act, no such equivalent
provision was made in Section 81 of the VAT Act. As per Section
81 of the VAT Act, revision can be preferred to the High Court
against the order of the Appellate Tribunal within 60 days.
However, there is no provision giving specific power to the High
Court to condone the delay if the revision is preferred beyond 60
days. As per the learned counsel, the reason for not providing
such a provision was that provisions of Limitation Act, 1963
including Section 5 thereof were applicable.
7. Insofar as Section 84 of the VAT Act4
is concerned, it was
submitted that Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 were
made applicable for specific purpose of computing the period of
limitation under the said Chapter and High Court committed a
grave error while holding that because of the aforesaid provision
only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 were made
applicable to the VAT Act thereby excluding other provisions of
3 “81. Revision to High Court : (1) Any dealer or other person, who is dissatisfied with the decision
of the Appellate Tribunal, or the Commissioner may, within sixty days after being notified of the
decision of the Appellate Tribunal, file a revision to the High Court, and the dealer or other person so
appealing shall serve a copy of the notice of revision on the respondents to the proceedings.”
4 Section 84 of the VAT Act reads as under: “84. Application of Section 4 and 12 of Limitation Act,
1963 : In computing the period of limitation under this chapter, the provisions of Section 4 and 12 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 shall, so far as may be, apply.”
the Act.
8. For this purpose, the learned counsel relied upon Section 29(2) of
the Limitation Act, 19635
which makes provisions contained in
Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable
in case of suit, appeal or application under any special or local
law, where these provisions are not expressly excluded by such
special or local law.
9. It was argued that in the absence of any provision expressly
excluding the applicability of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act,
1963, those Sections were applicable qua revision petitions filed
under Section 81 of the VAT Act and, therefore, Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 was also applicable to such proceedings. To
placate his aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel relied
upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Mangu Ram v.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr.6
. In that case, special
leave petitions were filed against the condonation of delay to the
application for grant of special leave under Section 417, Cr.P.C.,
5 Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under: “29(2). Where any special or local law
prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period
prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period
prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for
any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to
24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly
excluded by such special or local law.”
6 (1976) 1 SCC 392
1898 against acquittal of the petitioners by the trial court, in spite
of the mandatory period of limitation provided in sub-section (4) of
Section 417. Question arose whether in the case of Kaushalya
Rani v. Gopal Singh7
, which held Section 417, Cr.P.C., 1898 a
special law and excluded application of Section 5 on a
construction of Section 29(2)(b) of the old Act of 1908 applied
under the corresponding provision of Limitation Act, 1963 which
governed the case. The Court held that since the case was
governed by Limitation Act, 1963, judgment in Kaushalya Rani
case did not apply. For applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 to
such proceedings, the Court referred to Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act, 1963 holding that there is an important departure
made by the Limitation Act, 1963 insofar as the provision
contained in Section 29, sub-section (2), is concerned. Under the
Indian Limitation Act, 1908, clause (b) to sub-section (2) of
Section 29 provided that for the purpose of determining any
period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application
by any special or local law the application of Section 5 was in
clear and specific terms excluded. But under Section 29(2) of
Act, the provisions of Section 5 shall apply in case of special or
7 (1964) 4 SCR 982
local law to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded
by such special or local law. Since under the Limitation Act, 1963,
Section 5 is specifically made applicable by Section 29 (2), it is
only if the special or local law expressly excludes the applicability
of Section 5 that it would stand displaced. The Court held that
there is nothing in Section 417(4), Cr.P.C., which excludes the
application of Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant also referred to the case of
State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Anshuman Shukla8
. In that
case, question of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act
arose in relation to revision petition that can be preferred under
Section 19 of the M.P. Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983
(as it stood prior to its amendment in 2005). The Court held that
since unamended Section 19 did not contain any express rider on
power of the High Court to entertain applications for revision after
expiry of prescribed limitation thereunder, provisions of Limitation
Act, 1963 would become applicable vide Section 29(2) thereof. It
further held that as the High Court was conferred with suo moto
power under Section 19 of Adhiniyam, 1983 to call for record of
an award at any time, there was no legislative intent to exclude
8 (2014) 10 SCC 814
the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
11. Mr. Nalin Kohli, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the High Court
had exhaustively dealt with the issue and rightly found that since
Section 84 of the VAT Act confined the applicability of Limitation
Act only in respect of Sections 4 and 12 thereof to the
proceedings under the said Chapter, by necessary implication the
other provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 including Section 5
thereof stood excluded. He submitted that for the purpose of
finding whether other provisions are excluded or not, the focus
should be on the scheme of the special law as laid down in
Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra9
wherein it was
held that even if there exists no express exclusion in the special
law, the Court has right to examine the provisions of the special
law to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the legislative intent
was to exclude the operation of the Limitation Act. According to
him, Section 84 of the VAT Act clearly depicted such a legislative
intent.
12. After examining the matter in the light of law laid down in various
9 (1974) 2 SCC 133
judgments cited by both the parties, we are of the view that the
High Court has given correct interpretation to the provisions of
Section 81 of the VAT Act, when this provision is read along with
Section 84 thereof.
13. In the case of Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise
v. Hongo India Private Limited & Anr.10, the question that fell for
determination was that as to whether the High Court had power to
condone the delay in presentation of the reference application
under unamended Section 35-H(1) of the Central Excise Act,
1994 beyond the period prescribed by applying Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. Unamended Section 35-H dealt with reference
application to the High Court. Under sub-section (1) thereof, such
reference application could be preferred within a period of 180
days of the date upon which the aggrieved party is served with
notice of an order under Section 35-C of the Central Excise Act.
There was no provision to extend the period of limitation for filing
the application to the High Court beyond the said period and to
condone the delay. Pertinently, under the scheme of the Central
Excise Act as well, in case of appeal to the Commissioner under
Section 35 of the Act, which should be filed within 60 days, there
10 (2009) 5 SCC 791
was a specific provision for condonation of delay upto 30 days if
sufficient cause is shown. Likewise, appeal to the Appellate
Tribunal could be filed within 90 days under Section 35-B thereof
and sub-section (5) of Section 35-B gave power to the Appellate
Tribunal to condone the delay irrespective of the number of days,
if sufficient cause is shown. Further, Section 35-EE provided 90
days time for filing revision by the Central Government and
proviso thereto empowers the revisional authority to condone the
delay for a further period of 90 days. However, when it came to
making reference to the High Court under Section 35-G of the
Act, the provision only prescribed the limitation period of 180 days
with no further clause empowering the High Court to condone the
delay beyond the said period of 180 days. It was, thus, in almost
similar circumstances, the judgment was rendered by this Court.
The categorical opinion of the Court was that in the absence of
any such power, the High Court did not have power to condone
the delay. In that case also, provisions of Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act, 1963 were pressed into service. But this argument
was rejected in the following manner:
30. In the earlier part of our order, we have
adverted to Chapter VI-A of the Act which
provides for appeals and revisions to various
authorities. Though Parliament has specifically
provided an additional period of 30 days in the
case of appeal to the Commissioner, it is silent
about the number of days if there is sufficient
cause in the case of an appeal to the Appellate
Tribunal. Also an additional period of 90 days in
the case of revision by the Central Government
has been provided. However, in the case of an
appeal to the High Court under Section 35-G and
reference application to the High Court under
Section 35-H, Parliament has provided only 180
days and no further period for filing an appeal
and making reference to the High Court is
mentioned in the Act.
31. In this regard, it is useful to refer to a recent
decision of this Court in Punjab Fibres Ltd.
[(2008) 3 SCC 73] The Commissioner of
Customs, Central Excise, Noida was the
appellant in this case. While considering the very
same question, namely, whether the High Court
has power to condone the delay in presentation
of the reference under Section 35-H(1) of the
Act, the two-Judge Bench taking note of the said
provision and the other related provisions
following Singh Enterprises v. CCE [(2008) 3
SCC 70] concluded that: (Punjab Fibres Ltd.
case [(2008) 3 SCC 73] , SCC p. 75, para 8)
“8. … the High Court was justified in
holding that there was no power for
condonation of delay in filing reference
application.”
32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in
Sections 35, 35-B, 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes
the position clear that an appeal and reference to
the High Court should be made within 180 days
only from the date of communication of the
decision or order. In other words, the language
used in other provisions makes the position clear
that the legislature intended the appellate
authority to entertain the appeal by condoning
the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60
days which is the preliminary limitation period for
preferring an appeal. In the absence of any
clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient
cause after the prescribed period, there is
complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in
holding that there was no power to condone the
delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180
days.
33. Even otherwise, for filing an appeal to the
Commissioner, and to the Appellate Tribunal as
well as revision to the Central Government, the
legislature has provided 60 days and 90 days
respectively, on the other hand, for filing an
appeal and reference to the High Court larger
period of 180 days has been provided with to
enable the Commissioner and the other party to
avail the same. We are of the view that the
legislature provided sufficient time, namely, 180
days for filing reference to the High Court which
is more than the period prescribed for an appeal
and revision.”
14. In the process, the Court also explained the expression 'expressly
excluded' appearing in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 in
the following manner:
“34. Though, an argument was raised based on
Section 29 of the Limitation Act, even assuming
that Section 29(2) would be attracted, what we
have to determine is whether the provisions of
this section are expressly excluded in the case of
reference to the High Court.
35. It was contended before us that the words
“expressly excluded” would mean that there must
be an express reference made in the special or
local law to the specific provisions of the
Limitation Act of which the operation is to be
excluded. In this regard, we have to see the
scheme of the special law which here in this case
is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the
remedy provided therein is such that the
legislature intended it to be a complete code by
itself which alone should govern the several
matters provided by it. If, on an examination of
the relevant provisions, it is clear that the
provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily
excluded, then the benefits conferred therein
cannot be called in aid to supplement the
provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that
even in a case where the special law does not
exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act by an express reference, it would
nonetheless be open to the court to examine
whether and to what extent, the nature of those
provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and
scheme of the special law exclude their
operation. In other words, the applicability of the
provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be
judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act
but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act
relating to filing of reference application to the
High Court.”
The aforesaid judgment is a complete answer to the
arguments of the appellant.
15. It may be relevant to mention here that after the judgment in
Hongo India Private Limited & Anr., Section 35-H of the Central
Excise Act, 1994 was amended by the Parliament by Act 32 of
2003 with effect from 14.05.2003 giving power to the High Court
to condone the delay by inserting sub-section (2A). It is,
therefore, for the legislature to set right the deficiency, if it intends
to give power to the High Court to condone the delay in filing
revision petition under Section 81 of the VAT Act.
16. Argument predicated on 'no express exclusion' loses its force
having regard to the principle of law enshrined in Hukumdev
Narain Yadav. Therein, the Court made following observations
while examining whether the Limitation Act would be applicable to
the provisions of the Representation of the People Act or not:
“17. … but what we have to see is whether the
scheme of the special law, that is in this case the
Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein
are such that the legislature intended it to be a
complete code by itself which alone should govern
the several matters provided by it. If on an
examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that
the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily
excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot
be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the
Act. In our view, even in a case where the special
law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to
24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it
would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine
whether and to what extent the nature of those
provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and
scheme of the special law exclude their operation.”
17. Thus, the approach which is to be adopted by the Court in such
cases is to examine the provisions of special law to arrive at a
conclusion as to whether there was legislative intent to exclude
the operation of Limitation Act. In the instant case, we find that
Section 84 of the VAT Act made only Sections 4 and 12 of the
Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings under the VAT Act.
The apparent legislative intent, which can be clearly evinced, is to
exclude other provisions, including Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Section 29(2) stipulates that in the absence of any express
provision in a special law, provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act would apply. If the intention of the legislature was
to make Section 5, or for that matter, other provisions of the
Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings under the VAT Act,
there was no necessity to make specific provision like Section 84
thereby making only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act
applicable to such proceedings, inasmuch as these two Sections
would also have become applicable by virtue of Section 29(2) of
the Limitation Act. It is, thus, clear that the Legislature intended
only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act, out of Sections 4 to
24 of the said Act, applicable under the VAT Act thereby excluding
the applicability of the other provisions.
18. Judgment in the case of Mangu Ram would not come to the aid
of the appellant as the Court found that there was no provision
under the Cr.P.C. from which legislative intent to exclude Section
5 of the Limitation Act could be discerned and, therefore, Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act was taken aid of. Similar situation
prevailed in Anshuman Shukla's case. On the contrary, in the
instant case, a scrutiny of the scheme of VAT Act goes to show
that it is a complete code not only laying down the forum but also
prescribing the time limit within which each forum would be
competent to entertain the appeal or revision. The underlying
object of the Act appears to be not only to shorten the length of
the proceedings initiated under the different provisions contained
therein, but also to ensure finality of the decision made there
under. The fact that the period of limitation described therein has
been equally made applicable to the assessee as well as the
revenue lends ample credence to such a conclusion. We,
therefore, unhesitantly hold that the application of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 to a proceeding under Section 81(1) of the
VAT Act stands excluded by necessary implication, by virtue of
the language employed in section 84.
19. The High Court has rightly pointed out the well settled principle of
law that “the court cannot interpret the statute the way they have
developed the common law ‘which in a constitutional sense
means judicially developed equity'. In abrogating or modifying a
rule of the common law the court exercises the same power of
creation that built up the common law through its existence by the
judges of the past. The court can exercise no such power in
respect of statue, therefore, in the task of interpreting and
applying a statue, Judges have to be conscious that in the end
the statue is the master not the servant of the judgment and no
judge has a choice between implementing it and disobeying it.”
What, therefore, follows is that the court cannot interpret the law
in such a manner so as to read into the Act an inherent power of
condoning the delay by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 so as to supplement the provisions of the VAT Act which
excludes the operation of Section 5 by necessary implications.
20. We, thus, do not find any infirmity in the judgment rendered by
the High Court. The present appeals are devoid of any merit and
are, accordingly, dismissed.
.............................................J.
(A.K. SIKRI)
.............................................J.
(ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 04, 2017.
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