Supreme Court: The revisional court should apply liberal approach while considering the question of limitation in regard to the time barred criminal revision

The Supreme Court noted that the High Court should have exercised its discretion to condone the delay given the “facts and circumstances of the present case.” It found that the interests of justice required the matter to be decided on merits rather than disposed of on a technical ground. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s order and remitted the revision petition for fresh consideration on its substantive merits.

Ratio: Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that criminal revision cannot be dismissed on technical ground like limitation otherwise if the order passed by Lower Court is illegal that illegality will perpetuate and survive if the power of revision is not exercise by the revisional court for technical reason like limitation. The revisional court should apply liberal approach while considering the question of limitation in regard to the time barred criminal revision.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 558 and 559 of 2000

Decided On: 21.07.2000

Shilpa and Ors. Vs. Madhukar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.B. Pattanaik and U.C. Banerjee, JJ.

Citation: 2001 SUPREME 4 4892001 BOMCR SC SUPP 2 498,2001 (1) JIC 588 (SC),MANU/SC/3177/2000

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Legal Framework for Amendment of plaint at Appellate Stage

 Under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, amendment to add properties in a plaint can be allowed at the appellate stage, but courts apply strict scrutiny and specific conditions must be met.

Basic Provision: Order VI Rule 17 states that "The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just". This provision explicitly allows amendments at any stage, including the appellate stage.

Key Principles for Appellate Stage Amendments

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What is limitation period for filing of execution of compromise decree of S 138 of N I Act case?

 Introduction

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) is a widely used legal provision to address the offence of dishonour of cheques. Often, parties involved in such cases opt for a compromise or settlement, which is recorded by the court. If the terms of the compromise are not fulfilled, the aggrieved party may seek execution of the compromise decree. Understanding the limitation period for filing such execution petitions is crucial for effective legal recourse.

What is a Compromise Decree in Section 138 NI Act Cases?

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Madras HC: Under which circumstances Motor accident claim tribunal should not refuse to entertain Claim petition as barred by limitation?

The Parliament in its wisdom has ensured that the hapless victims of motor accidents need not depend upon stakeholders in Court for the purpose of initiation of proceedings. The proceeding itself is initiated on the basis of the report filed by the Police Authorities. In effect, the petition under Section 166 is only a reminder to the Court that the police have already filed the Detailed Accident Report containing all the requisite details like the First Information Report, Interim Accident Report, First Accident Report and therefore, it has to take up the said report as a claim petition. In other words, the claim petition is only a reminder to the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal to perform its duty under Rule 21 Annexure XIII of Central Motor Vehicles Rules and to process the claim petition. {Para 28}

29. In view of the above discussion, it is clear that in cases where any request is filed and accessible by the Tribunal, then there will be no question of six months limitation arising. The issue of six months limitation will arise only in case where no FIR has been registered by the Police and no report has been sent/uploaded.

30. The members of the Bar represented that the Police are not sending the report and hence, there arises a problem.

31. A reading of Section 166(4) shows that if any report of the accident is forwarded to it under Section 159, the same shall be treated as an application for compensation. It is no more the discretion of the police. Rule 4(A)(5)(1) of the Tamil Nadu Rules read with the Central rules make it mandatory. It has now become a statutory duty of the Police to sent a report. It is pertinent to point out that the amendment under Section 166(4) does not speak about the Interim Accident Report (IAR), First Accident Report (FAR) and Detailed Accident Report (DAR) but speaks about “any report that has been sent by the police”. Therefore, even if an FIR sent by the police to the Tribunal, the same should be treated a Claim Petition.

32. The upshot of the discussion is that on registration of an FIR, a claimant is entitled to present the petition without the fear of it being thrown out, on the ground of limitation. This would be the correct reading of the present legal dispensation in all cases where FIR is registered within six months, of the date of any motor accident which takes place after 01.04.2022.

In the High Court of Madras

(Before V. Lakshminarayanan, J.)

Malaravan Vs  Praveen Travels Private Limited and Others 

C.R.P. No. 2558 of 2023

Decided on August 18, 2023, 

Citation: 2023 SCC OnLine Mad 5467 : (2023) 2 TN MAC 416 : (2023) 5 Mad LJ 57 : 2023 ACJ 2062.

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Supreme Court: The starting point of limitation to set aside or cancel an instrument, a contract or a decree on the ground of fraud is the date of knowledge of the alleged fraud

In Md. Noorul Hoda v. Bibi Raifunnisa and Ors.   MANU/SC/1414/1996 : (1996)7SCC767 , this Court held:

...There is no dispute that Article 59 would apply to set aside the instrument, decree or contract between the inter se parties. The question is whether in case of person claiming title through the party to the decree or instrument or having knowledge of the instrument or decree or contract and seeking to avoid the decree by a specific declaration, whether Article 59 gets attracted? As stated earlier, Article 59 is a general provision. In a suit to set aside or cancel an instrument, a contract or a decree on the ground of fraud, Article 59 is attracted. The starting point of limitation is the date of knowledge of the alleged fraud. When the plaintiff seeks to establish his title to the property which cannot be established without avoiding the decree or an instrument that stands as an insurmountable obstacle in his way which otherwise binds him, though not a party, the plaintiff necessarily has to seek a declaration and have that decree, instrument or contract cancelled or set aside or rescinded. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 regulates suits for cancellation of an instrument which lays down that any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable and who has a reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding, may cause him serious injury, can sue to have it adjudged void or voidable and the court may in its discretion so adjudge it and order it to be delivered or cancelled. It would thus be clear that the word `person' in Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act is wide enough to encompass a person seeking derivative title from his seller. It would, therefore, be clear that if he seeks avoidance of the instrument, decree or contract and seeks a declaration to have the decrees set aside or cancelled he is necessarily bound to lay the suit within three years from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the decree set aside, first became known to him.

{See also Sneh Gupta v. Devi Sarup and Ors.   MANU/SC/0238/2009 : (2009)6SCC194 }

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1573 of 2009.

Decided On: 06.03.2009

Abdul Rahim and Ors. Vs. SK. Abdul Zabar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.B. Sinha, A.K. Ganguly and R.M. Lodha, JJ.

Author: S.B. Sinha, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0379/2009.AIR 2010 SC 211.

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Whether an appeal shall be barred by limitation if a party fails to obtain certified copy of judgment within limitation even if it is entitled to get free copy of judgment?

The import of Section 12 of the Limitation Act and its explanation is to assign the responsibility of applying for a certified copy of the order on a party. A person wishing to file an appeal is expected to file an application for a certified copy before the expiry of the limitation period, upon which the "time requisite" for obtaining a copy is to be excluded. However, the time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy is made cannot be excluded. If no application for a certified copy has been made, no exclusion can ensue. In fact, the explanation to the provision is a clear indicator of the legal position that the time which is taken by the court to prepare the decree or order cannot be excluded before the application to obtain a copy is made. It cannot be said that the right to receive a free copy Under Section 420(3) of the Companies Act obviated the obligation on the Appellant to seek a certified copy through an application. 

The act of filing an application for a certified copy is not just a technical requirement for computation of limitation but also an indication of the diligence of the aggrieved party in pursuing the litigation in a timely fashion. 

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3327 of 2020

Decided On: 22.10.2021

V. Nagarajan Vs. SKS Ispat and Power Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Vikram Nath and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ.

Author: Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.

 Citation: 2021 INSC 663,MANU/SC/0956/2021.

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What approach the court should adopt while dealing with delay condonation application filed by Government department?

Thus, the Supreme Court has, in clear terms, held that existence of sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time is a condition precedent for exercising discretionary power to condone the delay. The Court further clarified that the phrases 'liberal approach', justice-oriented approach' and cause for the advancement of 'substantial justice' cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

17. The Supreme Court, while highlighting the aspect of protecting the interest of institution, has also observed that the law of limitation will have to be implemented, though would harshly affect the party. Thus, at the end of the day, the delay will have to be condoned only upon showing sufficient cause. At the same time, the institutional interest of the State will have to be considered but then the default of individuals cannot be ignored as well.

18. The default will have to be dealt with in terms of Section 10 of the Maharashtra Government Servants Regulation of Transfers and Prevention of Delay in Discharge of Official Duties Act, 2005 (for short "the Act of 2005"), which reads thus :

"10. (1) Every Government servant shall be bound to discharge his official duties and the official work assigned or pertaining to him most diligently and as expeditiously as feasible :

Provided that, normally no file shall remain pending with any Government servant in the Department or Office for more than seven working days :

Provided further that, immediate and urgent files shall be disposed of as per the urgency of the matter, as expeditiously as possible, and preferably the immediate file in one day or next day morning and the urgent file in four days :

Provided also that, in respect of the files not required to be referred to any other Department, the concerned Department shall take the decision and necessary action in the matter within forty-five days and in respect of files required to be referred to any other Department, decision and necessary action shall be taken within three months.

(2) Any wilful or intentional delay or negligence in the discharge of official duties or in carrying out the official work assigned or pertaining to such Government servant shall amount to dereliction of official duties and shall make such Government servant liable for appropriate 1.[disciplinary action under the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, the] Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 or any other relevant disciplinary rules applicable to such employee.

(3) The concerned competent authority on noticing or being brought to its notice any such dereliction of duties on the part of any Government servant, after satisfying itself about such dereliction on the part of such Government servant shall, take appropriate disciplinary action against such defaulting Government servant under the relevant disciplinary rules including taking entry relating to such dereliction of duty in the Annual Confidential Report of such Government servant."

19. As could be seen, sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Act of 2005 provides that every Government servant shall discharge his official duties assigned or pertaining to him most diligently and expeditiously and that no file shall remain pending with any Government servant in the department, usually for more than seven working days. Thus, additional time taken will have to be properly justified. In addition, Rules 10 to 13 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Delay in Discharge of Official Duties Rules, 2013 (for short "the Rules of 2013) provides for detailed mechanism to prevent/avoid delay. Despite such a provision and several judgments of the Supreme Court deprecating casual approach in processing files, there is no improvement.

20. There is a reason for the same and the reason is not taking action, provided under sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 10. It is unfortunate that the effect of sub-section (1) of Section 10 has been neutralized by not taking recourse to sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 10. In that sense, all the officials have collectively failed to protect institutional interest of the State. Resultantly, the casual approach of Government servants continue and on top of it, the judgments of the Supreme Court are cited to argue as if the Government Servants have license to sit over the files and to expect the Courts to take liberal view.

21. As stated earlier, to expect from the Court a liberal approach, the officers, like the applicants, are/were duty bound to show that despite due diligence and bona fide efforts, the appeal could not be filed within stipulated time because of certain administrative exigencies, which were beyond their control. The Government Officials are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with due diligence and commitment.

22. The application as also the affidavit filed by the applicants before the First Appellate Court is completely silent as to what prevented the applicants to adhere to rigor of Section 10 of the Act of 2005. In fact, the reasons assigned to condone the delay does not show any cause, much less sufficient cause, to condone the delay. This is not a case where certain leeway could be provided to the applicants. The judgment of Sheo Raj Singh (supra) is, therefore, of no help to the applicants.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Second Appeal No. 305 of 2009

Decided On: 25.04.2024

The State of Maharashtra and Ors. Vs. Omprakash

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anil L. Pansare, J.

Citation: 2024:BHC-NAG:4790, 2024:BHC-NAG:4722,

MANU/MH/2714/2024, 2024(4) MhLJ 428(Bom).

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Supreme Court: The merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.

 It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand and Ors. v. Ashok Kumar Chokhani and Ors.   MANU/SC/0039/2009 : AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. {Para 22}

26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 31248 of 2018

Decided On: 08.04.2024

Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. and Ors. Vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA)

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bela M. Trivedi and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.

Author: Pankaj Mithal, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0285/2024,2024:INSC:286.

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Bombay High Court Allows 2010 Acid Attack Victims To Seek Compensation Despite Lapse Of Limitation Period

The learned counsel for the petitioners fairly submits that insofar as prayer clauses (c) and (c-i) of the writ petition are concerned, the same stand answered by virtue of the aforesaid Scheme of 2022. He submits that the petitioners desire to seek benefit under the said Scheme. However, under Clause 16 thereof, a period of limitation has been prescribed and the claim is required to be made within a period of three years from the date of occurrence of the offence or conclusion of the trial. He submits that in the present case, the incident in question occurred on 4th October 2010 while the trial concluded in the year 2015. He, therefore, submits that the claims sought to be raised by the petitioners be directed to be entertained without being treated as being barred by limitation. {Para 5}

6. We find that under the Proviso to Clause 16, the delay beyond a period of three years can be condoned in deserving cases. We find the present case to be a deserving one for the reason that after being subjected to an acid attack, the petitioners were required to approach this Court in the matter of grant of compensation. During pendency of this writ petition, the Scheme of 2022 came to be implemented. We therefore find that the petitioners can be permitted to move an application seeking compensation in accordance with the Scheme of 2022.

7. Accordingly, it is directed that if the petitioners seek compensation under the Scheme of 2022 by making an appropriate application within a period of four weeks from today, the application shall be considered on its own merits and in accordance with law. Keeping all grounds for seeking compensation as raised in the writ petition open, it is disposed of in aforesaid terms.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO.962 OF 2016

ALONG WITH

INTERIM APPLICATION NO.2022 OF 2020

 Petitioners/  Applicants  Vs 1. State of Maharashtra, 

CORAM : A.S. CHANDURKAR & JITENDRA JAIN, JJ

DATE : 3RD APRIL, 2024.

ORAL JUDGMENT : ( Per A.S. Chandurkar, J. )

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Bombay HC: Any deficiency in filing the appeal / application Can't Make Appeal/application Filed Within Prescribed Period Of Limitation To Be Labelled As Time Barred

We may observe that, in such circumstances, any deficiency in filing the appeal / application like failure to file physical documents, cannot make the appeal, which was registered on the online portal within the prescribed period of limitation, to be labelled and/or held to be barred by limitation. Once the appeal was filed (albeit under the Online method) within the prescribed limitation, any deficiency in the appeal certainly could be removed later on, as the law does not provide, that the proceeding be strictly filed sans deficiency, and only then, the proceedings would be held to be validly filed. If such proposition is to be recognized as the correct position, it would not only tantamount to a patent absurdity, but also would result in a gross injustice, prejudicially affecting the legitimate rights of persons to a legal remedy(access to justice). Thus, the parties would necessarily have an opportunity to remove the deficiencies, if any, which may prevail at the time of filing of the proceedings, after the proceedings are filed. It may be observed that procedural compliances can never defeat the substantive remedy/right to pursue any proceedings when filed within limitation. Thus, any procedural deficiency in the proceeding filed within the prescribed limitation cannot be labelled to be a proceeding filed beyond limitation. {Para 16}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 1632 OF 2024

Shri Yogesh Rajendra Mehra Vs  Principal Commissioner CGST &

Central Excise Raigad (appeal)

CORAM: G. S. KULKARNI &

FIRDOSH P. POONIWALLA, JJ.

ORAL JUDGMENT: (PER G. S. KULKARNI, J.)

DATED: 20th February, 2024

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Under which circumstances coparceners can challenge alienation of immovable property done by karta of joint hindu family?

  It is trite law that Karta/Manager of a joint family property may alienate joint family property only in three situations, namely, (i) legal necessity (ii) for the benefit of the estate and (iii) with the consent of all the coparceners of the family. In the instant case, the alienation of the joint family property under Ex.P1 was not with the consent of all the coparceners. It is settled law that where an alienation is not made with the consent of all the coparceners, it is voidable at the instance of the coparceners whose consent has not been obtained (See: Thimmaiah and Ors. Vs. Ningamma and Anr; (2000) 7 SCC409). Therefore, the alienation of the joint family property in favour of the second defendant was voidable at the instance of the plaintiff whose consent had not been obtained as a coparcener before the said alienation.{Para 12}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Coram:  S. ABDUL NAZEER; KRISHNA MURARI, JJ.

 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2582 OF 2010;

Dated: April 19, 2022

 K.C. LAXMANA Vs K.C. CHANDRAPPA GOWDA & ANR.

Author: S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Whether provisions of S 468 of CRPC are applicable to Domestic violence Act proceeding before the stage of S 32 of said Act?

This Court is of the view that Section 468 of Cr.P.C.

has applicability in the matter of Domestic Violence only at the

stage of applicability of Section 32 of Domestic Violence Act

where question of taking cognizance is involved. So far as

applicability of Section 468 of Cr.P.C. is concerned, this section

shall not apply in Domestic Violence Act prior to Section 32 of

Domestic Violence Act.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA

CRIMINAL REVISION No.993 of 2019

Amit Kumar  Ramanand Singh Vs State of Bihar

CORAM:  MR. JUSTICE DR. ANSHUMAN

Date : 11-04-2023.

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Whether service of scanned copy of arbitral award by email is valid service of signed copy of award so as to start limitation for filing an application U/S 34 of Arbitration Act?

When scanned signed copy of order dated 07th March, 2018 was received by petitioner by email dated 22nd May, 2018 and scanned signed copy of Addendum to Award dated 17th May, 2018 was received by the petitioner on 17th May, 2018 itself, the same was valid delivery in terms of Section 31(5) of the Arbitration Act. The law has to keep its pace in tandem with the developing technology. When service by email is an accepted mode of service, then sending scanned signed copy of the award/order of the Arbitral Tribunal to the parties would be a valid delivery as envisaged under Section 31(5) of the Arbitration Act. {Para 47}

48. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board Vs. Lakhvinder Singh MANU/DE/1290/2017 has held that the expression 'signed copy' in Section 31(5) of the Arbitration Act indicates the legislative intent that a copy authenticated by the Arbitrator is served on each party. It was held that authenticity of correspondence in the technologically advanced times of today does not necessarily pertain to only signatures in writing, and it would be adverse to read the expression 'signed copy' of the award/order in a restrictive manner so as to connote a copy bearing the original signatures of the Arbitrator in his hand writing. Thus, it was held as follows:

"15. The reference to the case of ARK Builders Private Limited (supra) where there was a dispute as to the delivery of a copy of the award by the arbitrator, by the Appellant would be inapplicable since, in the present case, the delivery of the copy of the award is not in contention. The only question is whether the copy of the impugned award, delivered to DUSIB by the arbitrator was a signed copy. 

16. As observed by the Single Judge, the expression 'signed copy' in Section 31(5) clearly indicates the legislative intent that a copy authenticated by the arbitrator is served on each party. The purpose of enacting the said provision is clearly to ensure that the parties receiving the award are in a position to act on the same. Emphasizing on this legislative intent, the Single Judge elaborated on how the authenticity of correspondence in the technologically advanced times of today does not necessarily pertain to only signatures in writing, and it would be adverse to read the expression "signed copy of the award" in a restrictive manner as to connote a copy bearing the original signatures of the arbitrator in his handwriting. 

49. Considering the aforesaid, it is clear that valid delivery of the Addendum to Award dated 17th May, 2018 and order dated 07th March, 2018 took place respectively on 17th May, 2018 and 22nd May, 2018 in terms of Section 31(5) of the Arbitration Act. Thus, the period of limitation for filing of petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act in the present case commenced on 22nd May, 2018. Thus, the limitation period for filing the present petition was till 22nd August, 2018.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

O.M.P. (Comm.) 377/2018

Decided On: 23.08.2023

Ministry Of Youth Affairs And Sports, Dept. of Ports, Govt. of India Vs. ERNST and Young Pvt. Ltd. (Now Known As ERNST and Young LLP) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Mini Pushkarna, J.

Citation:  MANU/DE/5541/2023.

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Whether sanction for prosecution is necessary for filing criminal offence against accused under the provisions of Maharashtra regional and town planning Act?

 If the complaint was to be filed by some officers of the Corporation then the previous sanction by the Chief Officer for enabling Officer to file a complaint would be imperative.

Bombay High Court

Municipal Corporation Through ... vs Shankar S/O Haribhau Jadhav And ... on 23 July, 1985

Equivalent citations: 1986 (2) BomCR 38

Bench:  Sharad Manohar, J.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Whether offences under Maharashtra regional and town planning Act are continuing offences?

 After the judgment was over Mr. Patil asked for permission from the Court to urge additional point on behalf of the accused. His contention was that the offence of the accused was complete on 15-12-1980. The prosecution launched by the Chief Officer on 28-7-1981 was, therefore, according to him barred by limitation having regard to the provisions of section 468 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

In the first place this point is being aired before this Court for the first time in this appeal against the acquittal and that too after all the arguments were over and even after the judgment was completely dictated.

But that apart, the argument is without substance. The offences which are susceptible to the plea of limitation under section 468 of the Code are offences which are not continuing offences. It is nobody's case that unauthorised construction has been removed by the accused even till this date. The offence, therefore, continues and there is the cause of action for the Corporation to file the complaint against the accused every day until the offences continue. The complaint filed on 28-7-1981, therefore, does not suffer from any bar of limitation. To give to the said section 52 of the Town Planning Act an interpretation by virtue of which the offence will be deemed to have been completed once for all even though the unauthorised construction remains there on the land in the teeth of the objections raised by the Corporation, would be to defeat the very intendment and spirit of the Town Planning Act and the planned development of the cities.

The argument must, therefore, be rejected.

{Para 18}

Bombay High Court

Municipal Corporation Through ... vs Shankar S/O Haribhau Jadhav And ... on 23 July, 1985

Equivalent citations: 1986 (2) BomCR 38

Bench:  Sharad Manohar, J.

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Under which circumstances the court can reject the plaint as barred by limitation?

The trial court must remember that if on a meaningful and not formal reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise the power Under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, it has to be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly Under Order 10 of the Code. (See T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [MANU/SC/0034/1977 : (1977) 4 SCC 467].) {Para 12}

7.1. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Nusli Neville Wadia (supra) is concerned, again there cannot be any dispute with respect to the proposition of law laid down by this Court that while deciding the application Under Order VII Rule XI, mainly the averments in the plaint only are required to be considered and not the averments in the written statement. However, on considering the averments in the plaint as they are, we are of the opinion that the plaint is ought to have been rejected being vexatious, illusory cause of action and barred by limitation and it is a clear case of clever drafting.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2717 of 2023

Ramisetty Venkatanna and Ors.  Vs. Nasyam Jamal Saheb and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.R. Shah and C.T. Ravikumar, JJ.

Author; M.R. Shah, J.

Decided On: 28.04.2023.

Citation: MANU/SC/0483/2023.

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Can the court grant consequential relief if the plaintiff has not claimed foundational relief barred by limitation?

 We are of the view that the respondent is right in contending that enforcement of the negative covenants presupposes the existence of a subsisting agreement. As noticed earlier, the law is well settled that the renewal of an agreement or lease requires execution of a document in accordance with law evidencing the renewal. The grant of renewal is also a fresh grant. In the instant case, the appellant-plaintiff did exercise their option and claimed renewal. The respondents denied their right to claim renewal in express terms and also unequivocally stated that the agreement did not stand renewed as contended by the appellants. Having regard to these facts it must be held that a cause of action accrued to the appellant- plaintiff when their right of renewal was denied by the respondents. This happened in December, 2001 and, therefore, within three years from that date they ought to have taken appropriate proceedings to get their right of renewal declared and enforced by a court of law and/or to get a declaration that the agreement stood renewed for a further period of 5 years upon the appellants' exercising their option to claim renewal under the original agreement. The appellants-plaintiffs have failed to do so. The appellants ought to have prayed for a declaration that their agreement stood renewed automatically on exercise of option for renewal and only on that basis they could have sought an injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with their possession and operation. Having not done so, they cannot be permitted to camouflage the real issue and claim an order of injunction without establishing the subsistence of a valid agreement. In the instant suit as well they could have sought a declaration that the agreement stood renewed automatically but such a claim would have been barred by limitation since more than 3 years had elapsed after a categoric denial of their right claiming renewal or automatic renewal by the respondents- defendants. {Para 32}

33. Mr. Nariman contended that this case was governed not by Article 58 of the Limitation Act but, if at all, by Article 113 thereof because there is no specific article provided for enforcement of positive or negative covenants. We shall assume that he is right in contending that Article 113 may apply where enforcement of a positive or negative covenant is sought in a suit for injunction. However, in this case we have found that the real foundation for the suit was that the earlier agreement stood renewed automatically containing the same terms and conditions as in the original agreement including the negative covenants. There is neither a document to prove that the agreement stood renewed nor is there a declaration by a court that the agreement stood renewed automatically on exercise of option for renewal by the appellants. The basis for claiming the relief of injunction, namely, a subsisting renewed agreement did not exist in fact. In its absence, no relief as prayed for in the suit could be granted by the clever device of filing a suit for injunction, without claiming a declaration as to their subsisting rights under a renewed agreement, which is apparently barred by limitation.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2517 of 2007 

Decided On: 15.05.2007

Hardesh Ores Pvt. Ltd. Vs.  Hede and Company

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.P. Singh and H.S. Bedi, JJ.

Author: B.P. Singh, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/7671/2007,(2007) 5 SCC614

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How to ascertain the limitation for filing a suit for specific performance of the contract if the purchaser was put in possession of the purchased property on the day of agreement of sale?

In view of Order VII Rule 11(a) and 11(d) the Court has to satisfy that the plaint discloses a cause of action and does not appear to be barred by any law. Article 54 of the Limitation Act stipulates that the limitation for filing the suit for specific performance of the contract is three years from the date fixed for the performance or if no such date is fixed, when the Plaintiff has noticed that performance is refused.

7. The fact that the Plaintiffs were put in possession of the property agreed to be sold on the date of agreement itself would not make any difference with regard to the limitation of filing the suit for specific performance. In fact both the courts below have rightly held that Article 54 of the Limitation Act does not make any difference between a case where possession of the property has been delivered in part performance of the agreement or otherwise.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 3912 of 2015

Decided On: 24.04.2015

Fatehji & Company and Ors. Vs.  L.M. Nagpal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Gopala Gowda and C. Nagappan, JJ.

Author: C. Nagappan, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0493/2015

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When the court should not reject plaint in suit for specific performance of contract on the ground of limitation?

 Whereas the decision of the Supreme Court in the of Urvashiben

and another vs. Krishnakant Manuprasad Trivedi (supra) is fully

applicable to the case in hand, in which it has been held :-

“12. It is fairly well settled that, so far as the issue of limitation is concerned, it is a mixed question of fact and law. It is true that limitation can be the ground for rejection of plaint in exercise of powers under O.VII R.11(d) of the CPC. Equally, it is well settled that for the purpose of deciding application filed under O.VII R.11 only averments stated in the plaint alone can be looked into, merits and demerits of the matter and the allegations by the parties cannot be gone into. Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes the limitation of three years, for suits for specific performance.

The said Article reads as under :

Suits for Specific Performance 3 Years The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice

that performance is refused

13. From a reading of the aforesaid Article, it is clear that when the date is fixed for performance, limitation is three years from such date. If no such date is fixed, the period of three years is to be computed from the date when the plaintiff, has notice of

refusal. When rejection of plaint is sought in an application filed under O.VII R.11, same is to be considered from the facts of each case, looking at the averments made in the plaint, for the purpose of adjudicating such application. As averred in the plaint, it is the case of the plaintiff that even after payment of the entire consideration

amount registration of the document was not made and prolonged on some grounds and ultimately when he had visited the site on 25.05.2017 he had come to know that the same land was sold to third parties and appellants have refused performance of contract. In such event, it is a matter for trial to record correctness or otherwise of

such allegation made in the plaint. In the suits for specific performance falling in the second limb of the Article, period of three years is to be counted from the date when it had come to the notice of the plaintiff that performance is refused by the defendants.

For the purpose of cause of action and limitation when it is pleaded that when he had visited the site on 25.05.2017 he had come to know that the sale was made in favour of third parties and the appellants have refused to execute the Sale Deed in which event same is a case for adjudication after trial but not a case for rejection of plaint under O.VII R.11(d) of CPC.”

7. In the present case, no date or period has been fixed for

performance of the agreement or for execution of sale deed and the plaintiff has come with the case that he was put in possession on the date of agreement of sale and during life time, the vendor Narayandas and after his death the defendant 1 assured the plaintiff to execute the sale deed but first time on 08.11.2021 by way of reply to the notice, he has denied from the agreement. Further, the plaintiff claiming himself to be in possession of the disputed land, has also prayed relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from making interference in possession of the plaintiff.

8. As such, in view of the aforesaid facts and legal position, at thepresent stage of suit, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC and the impugned order does not suffer from any legal infirmity.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

AT JABALPUR

CIVIL REVISION No. 281 of 2022

BHERU CHANDANI  Vs SHIVKUMAR GUPTA 

BEFORE

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DWARKA DHISH BANSAL

ON THE 3rd OF FEBRUARY, 2023

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Bombay HC: Removal Of Objections In Any Proceedings Before An Authority Does Not Render The Proceedings Time Barred

Correction/removal of objections in any proceeding before a Court or an authority does not render proceeding time barred, particularly when the objection does not alter the nature of the proceeding. In this case, it is an admitted fact that Petitioner had purchased the stamps and it is only a ministerial act that Petitioner's partner's name was voluntarily corrected to include the Petitioner's name. Naturally, therefore, removal of such objection would relate back to the date of the original application. {Para 29 }

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 8021 of 2019

Decided On: 09.01.2023

Freedom City Ventures Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Ahuja, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/0046/2023,2023 Lawweb (Bom HC ) 3.

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