REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 2277-2278/OF 2009
DURYODHAN ROUT
VERSUS
STATE OF ORISSA
Citation;2014 CRLJ4172 SC
Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.
These appeals are directed against the common judgment
dated 8th January, 2008 passed by the High Court of Orissa at
Cuttack in Death Reference Case No.2 of 2007 and J. Crl.
A.No.12 of 2007. By the impugned judgment, the High Court
upheld the conviction of the appellant for the offence under
Section
376,
302
and
201
IPC.
However,
taking
into
consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, the
age of the appellant, his family background and the fact
that the appellant had no criminal antecedent, the capital
sentence for the offence under Section 302 IPC has been
commuted to life imprisonment; and rest of sentence remain
unaltered.
2.
The case of the prosecution is that on 11th September,
2004, at about 3 p.m. accused Duryodhan Rout, on the pretext
that the deceased, Subhasini, a minor girl aged about 10
years would talk over phone with his brother, Bamodev Bhoi
took her on a bicycle. When the evening set in, the accused
alone
returned
to
the
village
and
on
enquiry
about
Subhasini, by Mulia Bhoi (PW-5), father of the deceased, he
told that she had gone with a woman of Ranibandha to her
house. On the next day, as she did not return Mulia Boi (PW-
5) again questioned the accused regarding the where about of
the deceased. The accused confessed in presence of Rabi
Biswal (PW-3), Dasarathi Bhoi (PW-4) and Subashini Bhoi that
he killed the deceased by pressing her neck. With the help
of these three witnesses, Mulia Bhoi (PW-5) took the accused
to Thakurgarh P.S. got the FIR scribed by one Laxman Senapti
and lodged it before Udit Narayan Pany, Officer-in-charge of
the
said
Police
Station.
A
P.S.
Case
No.51
dated
12th
September, 2004 under Section 302/201 IPC was instituted.
The accused was arrested, his statement was recorded under
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act on the basis of which
he went to the spot made recovery of the dead body of the
deceased,
held
inquest
over
it,
seized
the
Chadi
(underwear) of the victim lying near the spot, prepared
seizure list in respect thereof and sent the dead body to
Adhamalik Hospital for autopsy. He also seized the wearing
apparels of the accused, forwarded to the Court
on 13th
December, 2004 and handed over charge of investigation of
Page 2
3
the
case
to
the
C.I.
of
Police.
After
completion
of
investigation, Investigating Officer (I.O.) submitted charge
sheet against the accused under Sections 376/302/201 IPC.
3.
Learned
Session
Judge
secured
the
presence
of
the
accused, framed charges u/s 376/302/201 I.P.C. The accused
pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4.
In
examined
order
to
establish
its
case,
the
prosecution
8 witnesses. The accused examined himself as DW-1
besides examined DW-2, his father to prove his stand. After
assessing the evidence on record, the Trial Court found the
accused guilty for the offence under Sections 376(f)/302/201
IPC convicted him thereunder and sentenced him to death for
the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. The Session
Judge also sentenced him to undergo RI for 10 years and to
pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- for the offence punishable under
Section 376(f)IPC and RI for one year and to pay a fine of
Rs.1,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 201 IPC.
It was further ordered that in default of payment of fine,
the convict would suffer imprisonment for one year for the
offence punishable under Section 376(f) IPC and three months
for the offence punishable under Section 201 IPC and the
substantive sentences would run consecutively.
5.
The
High
Court,
as
noticed
above
in
Reference,
converted the capital sentenced to life imprisonment but
ordered that rest of the sentence remain unaltered.
Page 3
4
6.
Admittedly, there was no eye-witness to the occurrence,
the order of conviction was based on the circumstantial
evidence only. From the evidence of Paramla Nahak (PW-1) and
Pechi @ Bilas Bhoi (PW-2), it transpires that on the date
occurrence at about 4 p.m. while they were making chips by
braking boulders by the side of road, they saw the accused
carrying the deceased on a cycle and at about 5 p.m. they
saw him returning alone. Mulia Bhoi (PW-5) and Kalpana Bhoi
(PW-6),
the
father
and
the
mother
of
the
deceased
respectively, stated that the accused took the deceased on a
cycle
on
the
pretext
that
the
later
would
talk
to
her
brother, working at Bargarh, over phone from the house of
Bijaya Bhoi of village Anandpur. While the accused was in
Police custody, he confessed his guilt which was recorded
under Ext.7. The Ext.7 reflects that on 11th September, 2004
afternoon
he
took
the
deceased
near
Arakhkuda
Salabani
Jungle, undraped her and then committed rape on her. When
she cried. He strangulated her to death and left the dead
body covering it with branches of trees. On the basis of
statement of the accused the I.O recovered the dead body and
the Chadi (underwear) of the deceased lying nearby, from
Arakhkuda Salabani Jungle. The statement of the accused made
before the Police Officer which distinctly relates to the
facts of recovery is admissible under the law.
Page 4
5
7.
Dr. Narayan Udgata (PW-9) stated that on 12th September,
2004 he was attached to Sub-Divisional Hospital, Athamallik
as a Specialist in O and G. On that date at 5 p.m. on Police
requisition, he conducted autopsy over the dead body of the
deceased-Subhasini Bhoi aged about 10 years and found as
follows:
"(i)
Bleeding from nostrils and mouth and both the ears
with small clotting of blood.
Eyes were half opened.
Bloody froth present in the nostrils and mouth.
Stool had been discharged from anus.
Thumb marks were present on the front of the
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
neck.
(vi)
Two linear abrasions of size 3” x 4” on the front of
the neck due to scratching by some sharp weapon
like human nail.
(vii) Finger marks were present on both sides of the
neck and back of the neck.
(viii) Extravasation of blood in to the sub-cutaneous
tissues under the thumb and finger marks and
adjacent muscles of the neck.
(ix)
Muscles of neck corresponding to the thumb and
finger marks were mildly lacerated.
(x)
Multiple abrasions (linear) of size varying from 2”
and 3” on both sides of scapular region. Most
probably caused by weapon like human nails.
(xi)
Multiple abrasions on the back of both buttocks due
to friction on a rough surface, like rough ground
and the abrasions were associated with very mild
bleeding. The size of multiple abrasions varies from
1⁄2” x 1⁄2” to 3⁄4” x 1⁄2”.
(xii) Laceration of the vagina with bleeding with clots,
most probably because of attempt to introduce the
penis-forcibly. The penis most probably was large
in size and the vaginal orifice of the deceased girl,
aged about 10 years was very narrow. The
laceration appears to have been caused by several
attempts to introduce the penis into the vagine.
(xiii) All the injuries were ante mortem in nature. The
throttling was also ante mortem in nature. There
was no evidence of seminal fluid in or around
vagina or on any part of the body of anywhere in
the clothings of the victim.
Page 5
6
According to Dr. Narayan Udgata (PW-9), the cause of
death
was
nature.
He
due
to
further
throttling
stated
and
that
probably
the
homicidal
accused
might
in
have
attempted three to four times to introduce his penis into
the vaginal orifice of the deceased. From his evidence, it
further transpires that on 13th September, 2004, he examined
the accused and found seminal fluid marks on his pant. He
also found one linear abrasion of size 1⁄4 on the postero-
lateral aspect of the left elbow and another linear abrasion
of the same size on the medial aspect of his right knees.
According to him, those injuries might have been caused 12
hours earlier to the alleged incident. Therefore, it is not
safe to hold that in course of rape and murder of deceased,
the accused sustained those injuries. Dr. Narayan Udgata
(PW-9),however, could not notice any sign of recent sexual
intercourse on the private part of the accused.
8.
Mulia Bhoi (PW-5), stated that the accused confessed
before him and Rabindra Biswal (PW-3) and Dasarathi Bhoi
(PW-4) that he killed the deceased. Rabindra Biswal (PW-3)
and Dasarathi Bhoi (PW-4) turned hostile and did not support
the prosecution. However, Kalpana Bhoi (PW-6) corroborated
this part of evidence of Mulia Bhoi (PW-5). When asked by
Mulia Bhoi (PW-5) regarding the whereabout of the deceased,
accused told that she went with a woman of Ranibandha, which
was found to be incorrect.
Page 6
7
9.
The Trial Court convicted the appellant on the basis of
the chain of circumstantial evidence available against the
accused.
It
was
found
that
the
accused
carried
on
the
deceased in his cycle at about 4 p.m. but returned alone at
5 p.m. He confessed to have murdered the deceased before
Mulia Bhoi (PW-5). On the basis of the statement of the
accused recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the
I.O. discovered the dead body; the opion of the Doctor was
that
the
deceased
was
raped
and
murdered.
The
Doctor
examined the accused and found seminal fluid marks on his
pant. The accused gave false statement that the deceased
went with a woman of Ranibandha. Paramla Nahak (PW-1) and
Pechi
@
Bilas
Bhoi
(PW-2)saw
the
accused
carried
the
deceased on a cycle at about 4 p.m. and returned alone one
hour thereafter. Thus, the accused was last seen with the
deceased. There is nothing to indicate that within one hour,
there was any scope for anybody else, other than the accused
to commit rape and murder of the deceased. The chain of
circumstances of the case thereby leads to the hypothesis
that the accused and the accused alone was the author of the
crime, and therefore, the Trial Court rightly convicted the
accused under Sections 376(f)/302/201 IPC.
10.
During the arguments, learned counsel for the appellant
mainly argued on the question of consecutive sentence as
passed by the Trial Court and upheld by the High Court. It
Page 7
8
was contended that Trial Court and the High Court wrongly
held that the sentences under Sections 376(f)/302/201 IPC to
run consecutively.
11.
The question arises whether the judgment passed by the
Trial
Court
sentences
as affirmed by
the
High
under Sections
Court,
376(f)/302/201
IPC
that
are
the
to
run
consecutively is contrary to the proviso to sub Section (2)
of
Section
31
of
the
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure,
1973
(hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”).
12.
According to the learned Counsel for the respondent-
State of Orissa proviso to Sub Section (2) of Section 31 of
the Cr.P.C. cannot be made applicable to a conviction for
life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC.
13.
It was submitted that imprisonment can be rigorous or
simple (Section 60 of the Indian Penal Code). As far as life
imprisonment is concerned, there is no such classification.
The first classification was attempted by the Law Commission
of India through its 39th report to qualify it as rigorous
but the same was never translated into legislation. But such
submission is not based on any reasoning.
14.
In order to fully appreciate the question involved in
the present case it is desirable to notice the relevant
provisions of Criminal Procedure Code and Indian Penal Code.
15.
of
Section 31 of the Cr.P.C. relates to sentences in cases
conviction
of
several
offences
at
one
trial.
Under
Page 8
9
proviso to Sub Section (2) of Section 31 of Cr.P.C. in no
case a person can be sentenced to imprisonment for a period
longer
than
fourteen
years
and
the
aggregate
punishment
shall not exceed twice the amount of punishment which the
Court is competent to inflict for a single offence. Section
31 of Cr.P.C. reads as follows:
“31. Sentences in cases of conviction of sev-
eral offences at one trial.
(1) When a person is convicted at one trial
of two or more offences, the Court may, sub-
ject to the provisions of section 71 of the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860 ), sentence him
for such offences, to the several punishments
prescribed therefor which such Court is com-
petent to inflict; such punishments when con-
sisting of imprisonment to commence the one
after
the expiration of the other in such order as
the Court may direct, unless the Court di-
rects that such punishments shall run con-
currently.
(2) In the case of consecutive sentences, it
shall not be necessary for the Court by rea-
son only of the aggregate punishment for the
several offences being in excess of the pun-
ishment which it is competent to inflict on
conviction of a single offence, to send the
offender for trial before a higher Court:
Provided that-
(a) in no case shall such person be
sentenced to imprisonment for longer pe-
riod than fourteen years;
(b) the aggregate punishment shall not
exceed twice the amount of punishment
which the Court is competent to inflict
for a single offence.
Page 9
10
(3) For the purpose of appeal by a convicted
person, the aggregate of the consecutive
sentences passed against him under this sec-
tion shall be deemed to be a single sen-
tence.”
16.
Section 45 of the Indian Penal Code defines life as
“The word “life” denotes the life of a human being, unless
the contrary appears from the context”.
The word “imprisonment” has not been defined either in
the Code of Criminal Procedure or in the Indian Penal Code.
As per the General Clauses Act, 1897 under Section
3(27) – “imprisonment” shall mean imprisonment of either
description
as
defined
in
the
Indian
Penal
Code.
The
definition of imprisonment under the General Clauses Act
would,
therefore,
in
case
of
life
imprisonment
mean
imprisonment for life/imprisonment for the remainder of the
convict’s life.
We are not in agreement with submission made on behalf
of
the
State
included
in
that
the
imprisonment
definition
of
for
term
life
has
not
‘imprisonment’
been
under
Section 3(27) of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
17.
Imprisonment for life is not confined to 14 years of
imprisonment. A reading of Section 55 IPC and Section 433
and 433A Cr.P.C. would indicate that only the appropriate
Government can commute the sentence for imprisonment of life
for
a
term
not
exceeding
fourteen
years
or
exceeds
the
Page 10
11
release
for
such
person
unless
he
has
served
at
least
fourteen years of imprisonment.
Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code merely relates to
calculating fractions of terms of punishment by providing a
numerical value of 20 years to life imprisonment.
Section
53
of
the
Indian
Penal
Code
lists
the
punishments to which offenders are liable under the Code
which reads as follows:
“First-Death;
Secondly-Imprisonment for life;
Fourthly-Imprisonment, which is of two
Descriptions, namely:-
(1)Rigorous, that is, with hard labour;
(2)Simple
Fifty-Forfeiture of property;
Sixthly-Fine.”
Therefore, a person sentenced to life imprisonment is
bound to serve the remainder of his life in prison unless
the sentence is commuted by the appropriate Government in
terms
of
the
Section
55,
433
and
433A
of
the
Code
of
Criminal Procedure.
18.
In Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. The State of Maharashtra &
Ors., AIR 1961 SC 600, the Constitution Bench of this Court
while dealing with the question as to whether there is any
provision
of
imprisonment,
law
whereunder
without
any
a
formal
sentence
remission
for
life
by
the
Page 11
12
appropriate Government can be automatically treated as one
for a definite period. In the said case this Court held:
“5. If so, the next question is whether
there is any provision of law where under a
sentence for life imprisonment, without any
formal remission by appropriate Government,
can be automatically treated as one for a
definite period. No such provision is found
in the Indian Penal Code, Code of Criminal
Procedure or the Prisons Act. Though the Gov-
ernment of India stated before the Judicial
Committee in the case cited supra that, hav-
ing regard to Section 57 of the Indian Penal
Code, 20 years' imprisonment was equivalent
to a sentence of transportation for life, the
Judicial Committee did not express its final
opinion on that question. The Judicial Com-
mittee observed in that case thus at p. 10:
“Assuming that the sentence is to be
regarded as one of twenty years, and
subject to remission for good conduct,
he had not earned remission sufficient
to entitle him to discharge at the time
of his application, and it was there-
fore rightly dismissed, but in saying
this, Their Lordships are not to be
taken as meaning that a life sentence
must in all cases be treated as one of
not more than twenty years, or that the
convict is necessarily entitled to re-
mission.”
Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code has no
real bearing on the question raised before
us. For calculating fractions of terms of
punishment the section provides that trans-
portation for life shall be regarded as
equivalent to imprisonment for twenty years.
It does not say that transportation for life
shall be deemed to be transportation for
twenty years for all purposes; nor does the
amended section which substitutes the words
“imprisonment for life” for “transportation
for life” enable the drawing of any such all
embracing fiction. A sentence of transporta-
Page 12
13
tion for life or imprisonment for life must
prima facie be treated as transportation or
imprisonment for the whole of the remaining
period of the convicted person's natural
life.”
19.
In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Ratan Singh & Ors.,
(1976)
3
SCC
470,
this
Court
held
that
sentence
of
imprisonment for life does not automatically expire at the
end of 20 years. This Court held:
“9. From a review of the authorities and
the statutory provisions of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure the following propositions
emerge:
“(1) that a sentence of imprisonment for
life does not automatically expire at the end
of 20 years including the remissions, because
the administrative rules framed under the
various Jail Manuals or under the Prisons Act
cannot supersede the statutory provisions of
the Indian Penal Code. A sentence of impris-
onment for life means a sentence for the en-
tire life of the prisoner unless the appro-
priate Government chooses to exercise its
discretion to remit either the whole or a
part of the sentence under Section 401 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure;”
20.
This Court in Naib Singh vs. State of Punbaj & Ors.,
(1983) 2 SCC 454, relying upon the judgment made by the
Privy
Council
in
‘Kishor
Lal’
and
Constitution
Bench
decision of this Court in ‘Gopal Vinayak Godse’ held that
the appellant in the said case was liable to serve the
sentence until the remainder of his life in prison.
21.
In Ashok Kumar vs. Union of India & Ors., (1991) 3 SCC
498, this Court held that the expression “life imprisonment”
Page 13
14
must be read in the context of Section 45 of the Indian
Penal Code which would mean imprisonment for the full or
complete span of life. This Court further held that the
provisions in Section 57 that imprisonment for life shall be
reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for 20 years is for
the purpose of working out the fraction of the terms of
punishment.
22.
This Court endorsed the view taken by this Court in the
case of Niab Singh, the Privy Council judgment in Kishori
Lal and the judgment in the case of Gopal Vinayak Godse in
Satpal vs. State of Haryana & Anr., (1992) 4 SCC 172.
23.
In Subash Chander vs. Krishan Lal & Ors., (2001) 4 SCC
458,
this
Court
held
that
life
imprisonment
means
imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the
convicted
Government
person’s
chooses
natural
to
life
exercise
unless
its
the
appropriate
discretion
to
remit
either the whole or a part of the sentence under Section 401
Cr.P.C.
Similar
was
the
view
taken
by
this
Court
in
Shri
Bhagwan vs. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 6 SCC 296.
24.
This Court reiterated that life imprisonment was not
equivalent to imprisonment for 14 years or 20 years in Mohd.
Munna vs. Union of India & Ors., (2005) 7 SCC 417. The Court
held that the life imprisonment means imprisonment for whole
of the remaining period of the convicted person’s natural
Page 14
15
life. There is no provision either in the Indian Penal Code
or in the Criminal Procedure Code, whereby life imprisonment
could be treated as either 14 years or 20 years without
there
being
of
formal
remission
by
the
appropriate
Government.
25.
In Swamy Shraddananda vs.State of Karnataka, (2008) 13
SCC 767, this Court while substituting the sentence of death
to life imprisonment held that the prisoner shall not be
released from prison till the rest of his life.
Similar view was taken by this Court in Sangeet & Anr.
vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452. In the said case
this Court held that a prisoner serving a life sentence has
no indefeasible right to release on completion of either 14
years or 20 years imprisonment. A convict undergoing life
imprisonment is expected to remain in custody till the end
of
his
life
subject
to
any
remission
granted
by
the
appropriate Government under Section 432 Cr.P.C.
26.
From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court,
it is
a
clear that a sentence of imprisonment for life means
sentence
for
entire
life
of
the
prisoner
unless
the
appropriate Government chooses to exercise its discretion to
remit either the whole or a part of the sentence under the
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.
27.
Section 31 of Cr.P.C. relates to sentence in cases of
conviction of several offences at one trial. Proviso to Sub
Page 15
16
Section (2) to Section 31 lays down the embargo whether the
aggregate punishment of prisoner is for a period of longer
than 14 years. In view of the fact that life imprisonment
means imprisonment for full and complete span of life, the
question of consecutive sentences in case of conviction for
several offences at one trial does not arise. Therefore, in
case
a
offences,
proviso
person
is
including
to
Section
sentenced of conviction
one of life
that
31(2)
shall
come
of
several
imprisonment,
into
play
and
the
no
consecutive sentence can be imposed.
28.
In the case of Kamalanantha and others vs. State of
T.N., (2005) 5 SCC 194, this Court held:
“75. Regarding the sentence, the trial court
resorted to Section 31 CrPC and ordered the sen-
tence to run consecutively, subject to proviso (a)
of the said section.
76. The contention of Mr Jethmalani that the
term “imprisonment” enjoined in Section 31 CrPC
does not include imprisonment for life is unac-
ceptable. The term “imprisonment” is not defined
under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 31
of the Code falls under Chapter III of the Code
which deals with power of courts. Section 28 of
the Code empowers the High Court to pass any sen-
tence authorised by law. Similarly, the Sessions
Judge and Additional Sessions Judge may pass any
sentence authorised by law, except the sentence of
death which shall be subject to confirmation by
the High Court. In our opinion the term “impris-
onment” would include the sentence of imprison-
ment for life.”
29.
The aforesaid judgment was relied upon by this Court in
Chatar Singh vs. State of M.P., (2006) 12 SCC 37, and held:
Page 16
17
“9. Although, the power of the court to impose
consecutive sentence under Section 31 of the
Criminal Procedure Code was also noticed by a
Constitution Bench of this Court in K. Prab-
hakaran v. P. Jayarajan2, but, therein the ques-
tion of construing proviso appended thereto did
not and could not have fallen for consideration.
10. The question, however, came up for consid-
eration in Zulfiwar Ali v. State of U.P.3 wherein
it was held: (All LJ p. 1181, para 25)
“25. The opening words ‘In the case of con-
secutive sentences’ in sub-section (2) of
Section 31 make it clear that this sub-sec-
tion refers to a case in which ‘consecutive
sentences’ are ordered. After providing
that in such a case if an aggregate of pun-
ishment for several offences is found to be
in excess of punishment which the court is
competent to inflict on a conviction of
single offence, it shall not be necessary
for the court to send the offender for trial
before a higher court. After making such a
provision, proviso (a) is added to this
sub-section to limit the aggregate of sen-
tences which such a court pass while making
the sentences consecutive. That is this
proviso has provided that in no case the
aggregate of consecutive sentences passed
against an accused shall exceed 14 years.
In the instant case the aggregate of the
two sentences passed against the appellant
being 28 years clearly infringes the above
proviso. It is accordingly not liable to be
sustained.”
11. In view of the proviso appended to Section
31 of the Criminal Procedure Code, we are of the
opinion that the High Court committed a manifest
error in sentencing the appellant for 20 years’
rigorous imprisonment. The maximum sentence im-
posable being 14 years and having regard to the
fact that the appellant is in custody for more
than 12 years. Now, we are of the opinion that
interest of justice would be subserved if the ap-
pellant is directed to be sentenced to the period
already undergone.”
Page 17
18
30.
In
the
recent
judgment
in
Ramesh
Chilwal
Bambayya vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2012) 11 SCC
alias
629, this
Court held:
“4. Since this Court issued notice only to
clarify the sentence awarded by the trial
Judge, there is no need to go into all the
factual details. We are not inclined to mod-
ify the sentence. However, considering the
fact that the trial Judge has awarded life
sentence for an offence under Section 302, in
view of Section 31 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, we make it clear that all
the sentences imposed under IPC, the Gang-
sters Act and the Arms Act are to run concur-
rently.”
31.
In
view
of
the
aforesaid
discussions
and
decisions
rendered by this Court, we hold that the Trial Court was not
justified
in
376(f)/302/201
imposing
IPC
to
run
the
sentence
consecutively.
under
The
Section
High
court
failed to address the said issue.
32.
For the reasons stated above, while we are not inclined
to interfere with the order of conviction and the sentence,
considering the fact that the accused has been awarded life
imprisonment for the offence under Section 302, we direct
that all the sentences imposed under Indian Penal Code are
to run
concurrently. The
judgment
passed
by the
Session
Judge as affirmed by the High Court stands modified to the
extent above. The appeals are allowed in part
with the
aforesaid observations.
Page 18
19
.......................................................................................J.
(SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
.......................................................................................J.
(DIPAK MISRA)
NEW DELHI,
JULY 01, 2014.
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