Thursday 5 February 2015

What is meant by sufficient cause for setting aside exparte decree?

As   held   by   the   Apex   Court   in   Parimal   Vs.   Veena   Bharti 
(supra)  sufficient means adequate or enough and the same has to be 
viewed in the facts & circumstances   existing in the case and duly 

examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious 
man.  It also means that the party has not acted in negligent manner 
or  there   was  want   of  bonafide  on  its part  or   the  party  cannot  be 
alleged to have been not acting diligently or remaining inactive.  The 
test to be applied is whether the defendant honestly and sincerely 
intended to remain present when the suit was called out for hearing 
and did its best to do so.  Sufficient cause as held by the Apex court is 
thus the cause of which the defendant could not be blamed for his 
absence   and   the   applicant   himself   approached   the   court   with   a 
reasonable defence.

HDFC Bank Ltd. 
V/s
New India Assurance Co. Limited
NOTICE OF MOTION (L) NO.1835 OF 2014 
IN
SUIT NO.2350 OF 2009  
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

HDFC Bank Ltd. 
V/s
New India Assurance Co. Limited

CORAM: K.R.SHRIRAM, J.
DATED: 9th September 2014.



The   plaintiff   is   a   private   bank   registered   under   the 
provisions of the Companies Act 1956.   The defendant is a public 
sector   insurance   company   engaged   in   the   business   of   general 
insurance.  Among the various insurance covers the defendants issue 
one such cover is Bankers Indemnity Insurance.
2
The   defendants   had   issued   one   such   Bankers   Indemnity 
Insurance   Policy   to   the   plaintiff.     Fraud   was   committed   in   the 
plaintiff's branch office situated at Ravipuram Desam Kochi, Kerala 
by its employee one   T.M. Prajeeth who was the then Manager and 

in­charge of the extension counter of the said branch.   The modus 
operandi adopted by the said T.M. Prajeeth was to   debit, without 
authorization,   the   account   of   certain   corporate   customers   of   the 
plaintiff and utilize those amounts to make payment to certain stock 
exchange   brokers   for   the   settlement   of   the   said   employee   T.M. 
Prajeeth's personal share transactions. After lodging FIR against the 
said   T.M.Prajeeth,   the   plaintiff   made   a   claim   under   the   insurance 
policy from the defendant in the sum of Rs.1,01,03,000/­.  The claim 
was lodged by the plaintiff on 30.10.2002.  No action was taken by 

the defendant on the claim though some meetings and exchange of 
correspondence   happened.     The   defendant   finally   rejected   the 
plaintiff's claim under the Insurance Policy by letter dated 29.4.2006. 
The   suit   was   filed   on   10.4.2009,   i.e.,   within   3   years   from   the 
rejection letter.   Admittedly, the writ of summons was served upon 
the defendant on or about 29.10.2009.  As no written statement was 
filed,   by   an   order   dated   17.6.2010   of   the   Prothonotary   &   Senior 
Master, the suit was transferred to the list of undefended suits.  The 
suit got called out for ex­parte decree on 16.12.2013 and was stood 
over   to   6.1.2014   at   the   request   of   the   plaintiff   to   file  affidavit   of 
evidence   and   compilation   of   documents.     On   20.1.2014,   over   13 
years after the claim was first lodged on the defendant, an ex­parte 
decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant in 
terms of prayer clause­(a). 
3
The present Notice of Motion is taken out by the defendant 

It is also necessary to state that the office of the Sheriff of 
4
to set aside the ex­parte decree dated 20.1.2014.
Mumbai had issued warrant of attachment of the defendant’s assets 
and   in   view   thereof,   the   defendant   has   also   furnished   a   bank 
guarantee   in   favour   of   Prothonotary   &   Senior   Master   at   the   ad­
interim   stage   to   secure   the   plaintiff's   claim   in   the   sum   of 
Rs.2,41,30,271/­ with further interest @ 12% p.a. on the principal 
amount   of   Rs.1,01,03,000/­   from   12.6.2014   till   payment   and/or 

realization.  The bank guarantee is issued by Corporation Bank, Fort 
Branch on 28.8.2014 and is valid for one year with an undertaking to 
renew the bank guarantee from year to year until the disposal of this 
Notice of Motion and for a further period of six months thereafter.
5
The cause shown by the defendant for not filing the written 
statement     defending   the   suit   is   very   short.     According   to   the 
defendant, when the writ of summons was served on 29.10.2009, as 
is then general practice followed by the defendant, once the writ of 
summons is received by the defendant's registered office, the same is 
forwarded to the concerned office which had issued the policy and 
the policy in the present case was issued by Mumbai Regional office­
1 (MRO­1).  It appears that the said writ of summons was misplaced 
and/or was not received by the Regional office of the defendant and 
hence   Regional   office   could   not   take   steps  to   file   appearance   and 
defend the suit.

Though to consider an application to set aside the ex­parte 
6
decree does not require going into the merits of the case, the counsel 
for the defendant also submitted that the claim of the plaintiff was 
time barred in as much as clause­12 of the terms and conditions of 
the policy required the plaintiff to file the suit within 12 calendar 
months from the date of rejection of the claim and if such claim has 
not been made subject matter of the suit in a court of law within 12 
been abandoned.  

calendar months, the claim shall for all purposes be deemed to have 
He also submitted that the risk was not covered and even if 
it   was   covered   the   cover   was   only   for   Rs.50   lakhs   whereas   the 
principal amount of the claim itself is in excess of Rs.1 crore.  
He also submitted that the claim would also fall under the 
exceptions   in   the   policy   and   the   above   3   points   have   not   been 
brought to the notice of the court. He submitted that the plaintiff has 
suppressed these facts from the court and on that ground itself the 
plaintiff should have been shown the door. 
He also submitted that the fraud claimed happened over a 
period between 11.5.2001 to 1.10.2002 and as the plaintiff bank has 
quarterly audits, the bank should have detected during the audit that 
something was amiss. Moreover, the claim was that the accounts of 
corporate   clients   were   being   used   for   illegal   transactions   and 
certainly corporate clients would have brought the same to the notice 
of  the  plaintiff and the  plaintiff's therefore  should have found out 

about the fraud allegedly purported by the plaintiff’s manager.   He 
matter and they have an excellent defence.  
submitted   that   these   facts   are   necessary   to   be   considered   in   the 
He   also   submitted   that   the   courts   should   be   liberal   in 
granting application for setting aside an ex­parte decree.  For this, he 
relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Parimal 
V/s. Veena Bharti.1  As the plaintiffs have not come with clean hands 
and disclose all the documents, ex­parte decree should be set aside. 
For   this   he   relied   upon   the   Apex   Court's   Judgment   of 

S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jagannath.2  
He submitted that under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of 
Civil   Procedure,   the   defendant   has   to   only   show   that   he   was 
prevented   by   any   sufficient   cause   and   sufficient   cause   is   that   the 
party   had   not   acted   in   a   negligent   manner   or   there   was   want   of 
bonafide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of the 
case.  
He also submitted relying on the Apex Court's Judgment in 
the   case   of   National   Insurance   Company   Limited   Vs.Sujir   Ganesh 
Nayak & Co.3  to submit that clause­12 in the policy which provides 
for 12 months outer limit to file a claim against the defendants was 
valid in law.
7
Per   contra,   Mr.Tulzapurkar   counsel   for   the   plaintiff 
submitted that the Notice of Motion was time barred.  He submitted 
1 2011 Law Suit (SC) 82 = 2011 (3) SCC 545
2 1993 Law Suit (SC) 908 =  1994(1) SCC 1
3 1997 Law Suit (SC) 522 = 1997 (4) SCC 366

that under Article­123 of the schedule to the Limitation Act, the time 
provided to apply to set aside an ex­parte decree was 30 days from 
the date of decree since the defendants had been served the writ of 
summons.   He submitted that 30 days period expired in February­
2014 whereas the Notice of Motion has been taken out in August­
2014 and no justification for extension of time or for condoning the 
delay has been made out in the Notice of Motion.  He also submitted 
that   under   this   application,   the   court   has   to   only   see   whether   a 
sufficient cause has been made out while setting aside the ex­parte 

decree and a court cannot and should not go into the merits of the 
8
case.
Mr.   Tulzapurkar   also   submitted   that   the   reason   for   not 
entering appearance and for filing written statement as claimed in 
the affidavit in support is that the defendant when it received the 
writ   of   summons,   forwarded   the   same   to   MRO­1   but   plaintiff's 
Advocates’ letter dated 4.4.2014 was also received at the registered 
office   but   they   acted   immediately.     He   also   submitted   that   no 
explanation has been put forth or sufficient cause is shown in the 
affidavit in support.
9
On  the   merits, without  prejudice to his submissions that 
the   court   should   not   go   into   it   for   deciding   this   application, 
Mr.Tulzapurkar   submitted   that   the   defendant's   reliance   on   the 
National Insurance Company Limited (supra) is misplaced since that 

was pre­amendment of Section 28 of the Contract Act. He submitted 
that in view of the amendment to the Contract Act that clause which 
states that if a suit is not filed within a particular period, the claim is 
deemed to have been waived, has been held to be void to that extent. 
He relied upon an unreported judgment of the Delhi High Court in 
the matter of M/s.Chander Kant & Co. v. The Vice Chairman DDA & 
Ors.4 and an unreported judgment of our court in the matter of JSW 
Steel Ltd. Vs. AL Ghurair Iron & Steel LLC. 5   He also submitted that 
the   risk  covered  under the  policy  also includes dishonesty, loss  of 

money and on security sustained by risk of the dishonest or criminal 
act of the employee or the insured with respect to the loss of money 
and/or security wherever committed and whether committed singly 
or in connivance with others and that the same was committed in the 
premises of the plaintiff's branch and the plaintiff had paid additional 
premium of Rs.3,00,000/­ and increased the amount insured to Rs.4 
crores.       He further submitted that none of the exceptions to the 
policy   are   applicable   and   in   any   event   those   exceptions   are   even 
mentioned in the repudiation letter of the defendant.
10
Before   Mr.Tulzapurkar   concluded,   he   submitted   without 
prejudice to his earlier submissions, if the court was inclined to allow 
the   Notice   of   Motion   then   the   defendant   should   be   permitted   to 
withdraw   the   amount   by   directing   the   Prothonotary   and   Senior 
Master   to   encash   the   bank   guarantee   with   liberty   to   secure   the 
4 Arbitration Petition No.246 of 2005 dated 26.5.2009
5 Arbitration Petition No.398 of 2014 dated 20.8.2014

defendant's claim particularly in view of the fact that the plaintiff has 
11
a decree in their favour.
Before   we   proceed   further,   let   us   examine   whether   this 
application   is   within   time.   Article   123   in   the   Schedule   to   the 
Limitation Act, provides that an application to set aside an ex­parte 
decree, where writ of summons has been served, has to be filed in 30 
days   from   the   date   of   the   decree.     Certainly   this   has   not   been 
accomplished.   But then should I condone the delay, if any, though 

there is no such prayer?  In my view even if there is no such prayer, if 
the time lag between the date of decree and date of application is 
explained the court should not be pedantic about it. Now has the 
defendant so explained? I feel yes.
12
The   counsel   for   the   defendant   submitted   that   the 
defendant came to know about the ex­parte decree dated  20.1.2014 
only when they received the letter dated 4.4.2014 from the plaintiff's 
advocates, almost 2 & 1⁄2 months later.  He could not have taken out 
the   present   application   without   all   the   pleadings   and   other 
proceedings in the matter. Immediately the defendant issued a letter 
of authority dated 15.4.2014 to their advocate and by a letter dated 
29.4.2014 the defendant's Advocate applied to the Prothonotary & 
Senior Master to permit him to take inspection of the original court 
papers.  The Advocate went to take inspection.  He was informed by 
the inspection department that the said papers were not traceable 

and   no   updates   regarding   the   movement   of   the   papers   between 
various departments have been found in the computer system and 
whereabouts of the original papers were not known.   He therefore, 
applied once again to the Prothonotary & Senior Master by a search 
praecipe   dated   11.6.2014,   copy   whereof   was   served   upon   the 
plaintiff's Advocates, requesting the Prothonotary & Senior Master to 
13
give inspection/search of the original papers.
On   11.6.2014   inspection   was   not   granted   because   the 

concerned person was on leave but on 13.6.2014 the Advocate was 
informed that the papers were found and he could take inspection in 
the record department. Therefore, on 13.6.2014 after notice to the 
plaintiff’s advocates, the Advocate of the defendant took inspection 
on 13.6.2014 at 12.00 noon when only some documents filed by the 
plaintiff were found but the affidavit of evidence was not found in 
the   record.     Therefore,   once   again   defendant's   Advocate   made 
inquiry on 17.6.2014 and on 18.6.2014 he was   informed that the 
plaint, affidavit of service etc. were still not traceable.
14
Thereafter by a letter dated 20.6.2014, the Advocate for 
defendant requested the plaintiff's Advocate to provide a copy of the 
entire compilation of documents pertaining to the said suit including 
the plaint, affidavit of service, summons, documents, evidence etc. In 
the said letter, the fact that the plaintiff’s representatives were also 
present when the defendant's Advocate tried to take inspection of the 

record   &   proceedings   is   recorded.     As   there   was   no   reply,   the 
defendant’s   advocate   sent   another   letter   dated   30.6.2014   to   the 
plaintiff's Advocate followed by another letter dated 2.7.2014.  There 
was no response from the plaintiff's Advocate.
15
It   appears   that   finally   the   documents   were   traced   on   or 
about   2.7.2014   and   the   Advocate   for   the   defendant   applied   for 
certified   copy   of   the   record   &   proceedings   on   9.7.2014.     The 
defendant's   Advocate   received   certified   copy   on   7.8.2014   and   the 

present Notice of Motion was filed on 9.8.2014.   It is indisputable 
papers.
With   these   explanations,   I   am   satisfied   that   sufficient   / 
16
that this application could not have been filed without receiving the 
good cause is shown explaining the delay, if any, and in the interest 
of justice the delay should be condoned.
17
Now moving forward, let us reproduce order IX Rule 13 of 
CPC which reads as under:­
“Setting aside decree ex­parte against defendant­ In any 
case   in   which   a   decree   is   passed   ex­parte   against   a 
defendant, he may apply to the Court by which the decree 
was passed for an order to set it aside; and if he satisfies 
the court that the summons was not duly served, or that 

he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing 
when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall 
make   an   order   setting   aside   the   decree   as   against   him 
upon   such   terms   as   to   costs,   payment   into   Court   or 
otherwise   as   it   thinks   fit,   and   shall   appoint   a   day   for 
proceeding with the suit:
Provided   that  where   the   decree   is  of   such   a  nature 
that it cannot be set aside as against such defendant only 
defendants also :

it   may   be   set   aside   as   against   all   or   any   of   the   other 
[Provided   further   that   no   Court   shall   set   aside   a 
decree passed ex parte merely on the ground that there 
has been an irregularity in the service of summons, if it is 
satisfied   that   the   defendant   had   notice   of   the   date   of 
hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer the 
plaintiff's claim]”
18
Therefore, the court shall set aside an ex­parte decree only 
when   the   defendant  satisfies the  court   that  (a)  summons was not 
duly   served   or;   (b)   he   was   prevented   by   any   sufficient   cause   for 
appearing when the suit was called  for hearing.
19
At the same time the Code is also very particular to state 
that the court shall not set aside an ex­parte decree merely because 
there has been some irregularity in the service of summons, if the 

court is satisfied that the defendant had notice of the date of hearing 
and had sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiff’s claim. 
Therefore,   even   if   the   summons   served   was   irregular,   if   the 
defendant   had   noticed   the   date   of   hearing   and   sufficient   time   to 
appear and answer the plaint, the court shall not set aside a decree 
passed ex­parte.  Admittedly, writ of summons has been served and 
there is no grievance about the irregularity of service in the service of 
summons.  Therefore, what we have to see is whether the defendant 

was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing.
20
  In   the   matter   of  Parimal  V/s.  Veena  Bharti  (supra)   the 
under :­
Apex   court   has   in   paragraph   nos.8,   9,   10,   11   &  12   has   stated   as 
8.   It   is  evident  from  the   above  that   an  ex­parte  decree 
against   a   defendant   has   to   be   set   aside   if   the   party 
satisfies   the   Court   that   summons   had   not   been   duly 
served   or   he   was   prevented   by   sufficient   cause   from 
appearing   when   the   suit   was   called   on   for   hearing. 
However, the court shall not set aside the said decree on 
mere irregularity in the service of summons or in a case 
where the defendant had notice of the date and sufficient 
time to appear in the court. 
The   legislature   in   its   wisdom,   made   the   second 
proviso, mandatory in nature. Thus, it is not permissible 

for the court to allow the application in utter disregard of 
the   terms   and   conditions   incorporated   in   the   second 
9.
proviso herein. 
"Sufficient   Cause"   is   an   expression   which   has   been 
used   in   large   number   of   Statutes.   The   meaning   of   the 
word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", in as much as 
may   be   necessary   to   answer   the   purpose   intended. 

Therefore, word "sufficient" embraces no more than that 
which   provides   a   platitude   which   when   the   act   done 
suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts 
and circumstances existing in a case and duly examined 
from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious 
man. In this context,  "sufficient cause" means that party 
had not acted in a negligent manner or there was a want 
of   bona   fide   on   its   part   in   view   of   the   facts   and 
circumstances of a case or the party cannot be alleged to 
have been "not acting diligently" or "remaining inactive". 
However, the facts and circumstances of each case must 
afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to 
exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court 
exercises   discretion,   it   has   to   be   exercised   judiciously. 
(Vide: Ramlal & Ors. v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 
361; Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi 
& Anr., AIR  1968 SC 222;  Surinder Singh Sibia v. Vijay 

Kumar   Sood,   AIR  1992   SC   1540;   and   Oriental   Aroma 
Chemical   Industries   Limited   v.   Gujarat   Industrial 
Development Corporation & Another, (2010) 5 SCC 459).
10.  
In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar & Ors., AIR
  1964 
SC 993, this Court observed that  every good cause is a 
sufficient   cause  and must  offer an explanation  for  non­
appearance. The only difference between a "good cause" 

and "sufficient cause" is that the requirement of a good 
cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than 
that of a "sufficient cause".  (See also: Brij Indar Singh v. 
Lala  Kanshi  Ram & Ors., AIR 1917 P.C. 156;  Manindra 
Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee 
&   Ors.,   AIR  81964   SC   1336;   and  Mata   Din   v.   A. 
Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953).
11. While deciding whether there is a sufficient cause or 
not,   the   court   must   bear   in   mind   the   object   of   doing 
substantial   justice   to all  the  parties  concerned  and  that 
the technicalities of the law should not prevent the court 
from   doing   substantial   justice   and   doing   away   the 
illegality   perpetuated   on   the   basis   of   the   judgment 
impugned   before   it.   (Vide:  State   of   Bihar   &   Ors.   v. 
Kameshwar   Prasad   Singh   &   Anr.,   AIR  2000   SC   2306; 

Madanlal   v.   Shyamlal,   AIR  2002   SC   100;  Davinder   Pal 
Sehgal & Anr. v. M/s. Partap Steel Rolling Mills (P) Ltd. & 
Ors., AIR 2002 SC 451; Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sao 
&   Ors.   v.   Gobardhan   Sao   &   Ors.,   AIR  2002   SC   1201; 
Kaushalya   Devi   v.   Prem   Chand   &   Anr.   (2005)   10   SCC 
127;   Srei   International   Finance   Ltd.,   v.   Fair   growth 
Financial   Services   Ltd.  &   Anr.,  (2005)  13  SCC   95;   and
Reena Sadh v. Anjana Enterprises, AIR 2008 SC 2054).
12. In order to determine the application under Order IX, 
Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure 1908,  the test has to be 
applied is whether the defendant honestly and sincerely 
intended to remain present when the suit was called on 
for hearing and did his best to do so. Sufficient cause is 
thus   the   cause   for   which   the   defendant   could   not   be 
blamed   for   his   absence.   Therefore,   the   applicant   must 
approach the court with a reasonable defence.  Sufficient 
cause is a question of fact and the court has to exercise its 
discretion in the varied and special circumstances in the 
case at hand. There cannot be a strait­jacket formula of 
universal application.”

21
(emphasis supplied)
Would I looking at the conduct of the defendant endorse 

that the defendant had acted diligently or remained active or show 
that   they   exercised   reasonable   standard   of   a   cautious   man   or 
honestly and sincerely intended to remain present or did its best to 
do so or the defendant could not be blamed for its absence ?   The 
answer to each of this is no.
22
As   held   by   the   Apex   Court   in   Parimal   Vs.   Veena   Bharti 
(supra)  sufficient means adequate or enough and the same has to be 
viewed in the facts & circumstances   existing in the case and duly 

examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious 
man.  It also means that the party has not acted in negligent manner 
or  there   was  want   of  bonafide  on  its part  or   the  party  cannot  be 
alleged to have been not acting diligently or remaining inactive.  The 
test to be applied is whether the defendant honestly and sincerely 
intended to remain present when the suit was called out for hearing 
and did its best to do so.  Sufficient cause as held by the Apex court is 
thus the cause of which the defendant could not be blamed for his 
absence   and   the   applicant   himself   approached   the   court   with   a 
reasonable defence.
23
Let   us   examine   the   affidavit  in   support   of   the   Notice   of 
Motion   to   see   whether   the   defendant   has   laid   down   a   sufficient 
cause.     The   only   cause   shown   is   in   paragraph   nos.3   &   4   of   the 
affidavit in support of one Jawahar S.Tonk, Regional Manager of the 
defendant dated 9.8.2014 which read as under :­

“3     I   say   that   sometime   in   October   2009   the   writ   of 
summons was served upon the defendants at their Head 
office.  I say that it is the general practice followed by the 
defendants that once a writ of summons is received by the 
defendant's office the same is forwarded to the concerned 
office which had issued the policy.  In the present case the 
concerned office, which issued the policy was under MRO 
1(Mumbai   Regional   Office­1)   and   accordingly   the 

defendants   forwarded   the   said   writ   of   summons   to   the 
said office.
4  However, it appears that the said writ of summons was 
misplaced   /   lost  in  transit  and  was not   received  by  the 
Regional office of the defendants.  Therefore, the Regional 
Office   could   not   file   their   appearance   and   consequently 
the written statement to oppose the said claim.   I crave 
leave to refer to and rely upon the Inward Register of the 
Regional   Office   for   the   period   1st  May   2009   to   31st 
December 2010 to show that the said Writ of Summons 
was   not   received   by   the   Regional   Office   of   the 
Defendants.”
24
The defendant simply states that it was a general practice 
followed by the defendant that when a writ of summons is received 

they   would   forward   it   to   the   office   that   issued   the   policy   and 
accordingly   the   defendant   forwarded   it.     The   defendant   is   also 
craving leave to refer to and rely upon the Inward Register of the 
Regional office viz. MRO­1 for the period 1.5.2009 to 31.12.2010 to 
show   that   the   said   writ   of   summons   was   not   received.   No   such 
Inward Register was shown to the court during the hearing. Even if 
the inward register was shown, it would not be of much help as it 
would show no entry.   What was required to be shown was that it 
was sent as averred in the affidavit.  At the same time I am not saying 

just forwarding to MRO­1 would have sufficed.   It is very necessary 
to observe that while the defendant craves leave to refer to and rely 
upon the Inward Register of MRO­1, there is not even a reference to 
or whisper about any Outward Register in the  office where the writ 
of   summons   was   served.   Moreover,   barring   a   bald   statement   of 
general practice nothing more is stated.   The defendant is a public 
sector undertaking.  Before such a general practice is adopted, it will 
not  be   incorrect   to expect that  they would have  issued a circular. 
Further when such general practice of forwarding such an important 
document   like   a   writ   of   summons   from   a   High   Court   is   adopted, 
there  would  be  some inward entry of receipt  or outward entry of 
dispatch.  Even if there is no Outward Register there is no evidence 
whatsoever or explanation whether the writ of summons was placed 
before the higher ups or not.  If MRO­1 could have an inward register 
certainly the registered office or the office that received the writ of 
summons   will   also   have.     If   entry   in   the   inward   register   of   the 

registered office is made before the writ of summons was dispatched 
to MRO­1, it will not be too much to expect that there would be an 
outward   register.     There   is   no   whisper   about   any   of   this   in   the 
affidavit. The Bailiff's affidavit states that the writ of summons was 
served upon one S.V. Sarvankar, Assistant from registry department 
of the  defendant.    In Exhibit­J to the affidavit in support  also the 
defendant admit that the writ of summons was received by one S.V. 
Sarvankar, Assistant from registry department.   No affidavit of said 
S.V. Sarvankar is filed to explain as to what he did after receipt of the 

writ of summons  and that he forwarded the same to MRO­1. The 
affidavit also does not explain why the affidavit of S.V. Sarvankar 
could not be or is not filed. No explanation as to how it was sent to 
MRO­1  or  whether  said S.V. Sarvankar or anybody else  follow up 
with MRO­1 as to whether they  received the writ of summons or any 
action   was   being   taken   in   connection   with   the   suit.     There   is   no 
explanation as to whether a noting was made in the registered office 
about   the   summons   having   been   received   and   the   same   was 
forwarded to MRO­1. At one point, an emotional pitch was made by 
the counsel for the defendant that the defendant is a public sector 
undertaking so show some leniency.   In my view, law is the same 
whether it is for public sector or private sector.   On the contrary a 
public sector undertaking and its employees should be over cautious 
to a fault.  What was received was a writ of summons from the High 
Court   to   answer   a   claim   in   excess   of   Rs.1   crore.   They   cannot   be 
casual. The defendant, a public sector undertaking has been grossly 

negligent and has not acted diligently.  The head office or registered 
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defendant has been unconcerned and casual.  
office of the defendant has behaved in a most cavalier manner.  The 
Reading the affidavit in support and the explanation given 
by   the   defendant   does   not   display   any   reasonable   standard   of   a 
cautious man has been exercised.   The explanation given does not 
show that the defendant acted diligently or remained active.   The 
explanation   given   does  not   show  that   the   defendant  honestly  and 

sincerely intended to remain present  when the suit was called for 
hearing or did its best to do so.  The defendant simply claim to have 
forwarded the writ of summons from the head office to MRO­1 and 
trying   to   show   that   the   MRO­1   did   not   receive   but   there   is   no 
evidence   to   show   that   the   defendant   even   forwarded   the   writ   of 
summons to MRO­1.
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In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the defendant 
has   shown   any   sufficient   cause   to   set   aside   the   ex­parte   decree. 
Notice of Motion is dismissed with cost. The defendant to pay sum of 
Rs.50,000/­ as costs to the plaintiff which cost also to be recovered, if 
not paid within two weeks, without interest together with and over 
and above the decretal amount.
     
  
     
(K.R.SHRIRAM, J.)


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