From the perusal of the above decisions, it is clear that
a fresh suit for partition by the same plaintiff in respect of the
same subject matter is not barred under Order 23 Rule1 (3) as the
cause of action for partition is recurring one. In the instant case, it
is seen from the stand taken by respondents in the written
statement dated 08.09.1986 that there is no assertion of giving
any share to the plaintiff post withdrawal of the earlier suit as
aforesaid but the opposition to the suit was mainly based on Order
23 Rule 1 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR
Second Appeal No.204/2000
Laxmanrao Mahadeo Nikose, Vs Narayan Mahadeo Nikose,
CORAM:
A.
B. CHAUDHARI, J.
DATED :08.07.2014
Citation; 2015(1) ALLMR 278
1. Being aggrieved by judgment and decree dated
24.04.1992 passed by Civil Judge Jr. Dn., Saoner, dismissing the
suit filed by the appellantplaintiff
and confirmed in Reg. C. A.
No.197/1992 passed by 2nd Addl. District Judge, Nagpur on
06.03.2000, the unsuccessful plaintiff had filed the instant second
appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant, assailing the
impugned judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate
Court submitted that the lower appellate court has considered only
the point of maintainability of second civil suit holding that the
second civil suit in the same subject matter was not maintainable
and thus dismissed the appeal preferred by the present appellant.
She thus submitted that the lower appellate court did not discuss
the single point on merits of the suit and dismissed the appeal on
the sole ground. According to her, the lower appellate Court being
the court of facts and the said appeal being one of right, the lower
appellate court was under a duty to decide the suit on merits.
Even otherwise, according to her the second suit was maintainable
in the light of law in relation to such type of suits.
2. Per contra, Mr. Zoting learned counsel for the
respondents, supported the impugned judgment and decree and
argued that there are concurrent findings of facts as well as
question of law recorded by both the courts and even if the lower
appellate court has not discussed about merits of the matter, the
learned trial Judge has recorded a detailed judgment on the merits
of the matter and, therefore, the judgments recorded by both the
courts below can well be supported and consequently there is no
need to interfere in the matter in the second appellate jurisdiction.
He, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the suit.
An interesting question of law has arisen in this matter
and, therefore, it is imperative to notice certain facts.
3. The present appellantplaintiff
had filed Reg. C. S. No.
131/1974 in the same subject matter about partition of the suit
property. During the pendency of the said suit, the present
appellantplaintiff
had filed application Exh.77
for withdrawal of
the said Reg.C.S. No. 131/1974 stating therein that the dispute in
the suit was settled out of the Court between the parties who are
closely related and, therefore, there was a compromise and the
plaintiff did not want to prosecute the suit against the defendants.
It was also stated that nothing remained to be received from the
defendants. It is an admitted fact that the said suit was withdrawn
without any liberty for filing the second suit. The appellantplaintiff
then filed second suit i.e. the present suit being
Reg.C.S.No.159/1985. In the second suit, the plaintiffs averred
that Panchayat was held on 10.06.1984 at Mouja Malegaon after
death of Mahadeo Nikose all the more so because the partition
was never made before or after the death of Mahadeo despite the
withdrawal of the earlier Reg.C.S. No. 131/1974 and, therefore,
the cause of action arose on 10.06.1984 when the defendants
refused to give partition. It is in this background the question
arose; whether the second suit filed by the appellantplaintiff
after
withdrawing the first suit without any liberty from the court, in
relation to the partition of the same suit properties was
maintainable or not? The learned appellate Court has held that
the said suit was not maintainable and would be hit by principles
of Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure namely;
withdrawal of the suit without any liberty.
4. Upon hearing, learned counsel for the rival parties and
upon considering various decisions cited by learned counsel for the
appellant, following substantial question of law arises for my
consideration:
“(i) Whether after withdrawal of the first
suit Reg. C. S. No. 131/1974 unconditionally or
without any liberty from the court in the matter of
partition of the suit properties, the appellantplaintiff
could file second Reg. C. S. No.159/1985
for partition on the ground that in fact the partition
was not made and Mahadeo Nikose had also
expired?
Answer : Yes.
(ii) What order?
Answer : Reg. C. A. No. 197/1992 is remitted to the
lower appellate court for fresh hearing on merits
and disposal in accordance with law.”
5. The aforesaid question fell for consideration in the case
of Bisheshar Das & anr. ..vs.. Ram Prasad & anr.; (1) (1891)
I.L.R. 13 All, 309 and in relation to above question, the Full
Bench of Allahabad High Court Held thus:
“The principle laid down in the case of Nasratullah
v. Mujibullah
and others appears to us to govern
this case. In that case it was held that where a
decree declaring a right to partition has not been
given effect to by the parties and the decree has
become by lapse of time or otherwise unenforceable,
it is competent to the parties, or any of them, if they
continue still to be interested in the joint property,
to bring a fresh suit for a declaration of their right
to partition. In the course of their judgment the
learned Chief Justice, Sir John Edge, and one of us
stated as follows :“
It has not been given effect to by
the parties proceeding to partition in accordance
with it, it is competent to the parties or any of them,
if they still continue to be interested in the joint
property, to bring another suit for a declaration of a
right to a partition in case their right to partition is
called in question at a time when by reason of
limitation or otherwise they cannot put into effect
the decree first obtained. In this respect suits for
declaration of right to partition differ from most
other suit. So long as the property is jointly held so
long does a right to partition continue. When a
person having a right to partition and desiring to
partition, has his right challenged, it appears to us
he can maintain a suit for a declaration, provided
his prior decree is not still enforceable.” As it
appears to us, the right to enforce partition is a
legal incident of a joint tenancy, and so long as such
tenancy subsists so long may any of the joint
tenants apply to the Court for partition of the joint
property. For these reasons the Courts below have
erred in dismissing the suit...”
In Madan Mohan Mondul and ors...vs..Baikanta
Nath Mondul and anr.; Vol. X The Calcutta Weekly Notes 839,
the Calcutta High Court held thus:
“Moreover, as pointed out in the case of Nasratullah
v. Mujibullah (1) “When a decree declaring a
right to partition has not been given effect to by the
parties proceeding to partition in accordance with
it, it is competent for the parties or any of them, if
they still continue to be interested in the joint
property, to bring another suit for a declaration of a
right to partition in case their right to partition is
called in question at a time when by reason of
limitation or otherwise, they cannot put into effect
the decree first obtained. In this respect, suits for
declaration of right to partition differ from most
other suits. So long as the property is jointly held,
so long does a right to partition continue.”
The Nagpur High Court in the case of Abdul Majid
Kha s/o Mahebubkha ..vs.. Mahmudabi w/o Bahadurkha; AIR
(36) 1949 Nagpur 366 also held thus:
7. There would seem to be no doubt about
the plaintiff's remedy by a separate suit against
defendant 11. If she had not included in the present
suit her claim for share in the lands in possession of
the applicant (defendant 11) and had reserved it for
a separate suit, there would not have been a bar of
O. 2 R.2, Civil P. C., because the claim against
defendant 11 is on a separate cause of action from
the claims against the other defendants in the suit.
That being so, how did the plaintiff destroy her right
of separate suit by telling the Court that she did not
want to proceed in this suit the cause of action
against defendant 11? The application was not for
recording a compromise and the order, dated 2nd
April 1946, cannot operate as a consent decree. It
amounts only to a dismissal of the plaintiff's claim
for want of prosecution so far as the applicant was
concerned. This did not involve any decision on
merits that the plaintiff did not have any right to
the lands in suit alleged to be in possession of
defendant 11. Though she stated in the application
that she abandoned her claim to the lands in his
possession, that could not extinguish her rights
without a formal deed executed by her and
registered or without a decree of the Court. Her
right to a share, if any, of the lands has not been
lost. The right to demand partition and separate
possession is a recurring right. If the plaintiff, for
any reason, decided on 2nd April 1946 not to enforce
the right immediately, she should be deemed to have
chosen to continue the tenancy in common for some
time ore till she would find it necessary to seek its
termination. A suit which is barred by withdrawal
of the claim under O. 23 R 1(3) is one which is
based on the same cause of action but a suit for
partition and separate possession of the share which
may now be brought will be on a cause of action
arising upon a demand now made and refused:
Radhe Lal v. Mulchand, 46 ALL. 820 : (A. I. R. (11)
1924 ALL. 905). If defendant 11 made a promise to
give an equal area out of his other lands and if that
is enforceable in law, the plaintiff can sue for specific
performance of that contract and, in the alternative,
make a claim on the original cause The right to demand partition and separate
possession is a recurring right. If the plaintiff, for
any reason, decided on 2nd April 1946 not to enforce
the right immediately, she should be deemed to have
chosen to continue the tenancy in common for some
time ore till she would find it necessary to seek its
termination. A suit which is barred by withdrawal
of the claim under O. 23 R 1(3) is one which is
based on the same cause of action but a suit for
partition and separate possession of the share which
may now be brought will be on a cause of action
arising upon a demand now made and refused: of action for
share in the lands of her father.
(8) The remedy of a suit being open to the
plaintiff against defendant 11 she has a chance of
getting justice as she may be entitled to and there
would be no justification for invoking the inherent
powers of the Court under S. 151, Civil P. C. in her
aid.”
6. From the perusal of the above decisions, it is clear that
a fresh suit for partition by the same plaintiff in respect of the
same subject matter is not barred under Order 23 Rule1 (3) as the
cause of action for partition is recurring one. In the instant case, it
is seen from the stand taken by respondents in the written
statement dated 08.09.1986 that there is no assertion of giving
any share to the plaintiff post withdrawal of the earlier suit as
aforesaid but the opposition to the suit was mainly based on Order
23 Rule 1 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
7. In the light of the law laid down by various High Courts
and the Nagpur High Court in the aforesaid case, this Court would
respectfully follow the dictum laid down above and as a result, it
will have to be held that the second suit filed by the appellantplaintiff
was maintainable and consequently the finding recorded
by lower appellate court that the suit was not maintainable will
have to be set aside. Though, the principles of res judicata may
not have any application in the facts of the present case, the
learned counsel for the appellant has cited a decision in the case of
Sheodan Singh ..vs.. Daryao Kunwar; AIR 1966 SC 1331 (1). In
para 13, it has been held that in the absence of decision on merits
in the former suit, the principles enunciated under Section 11 of
the Code of Civil Procedure are not attracted. I quote following
portion of the said judgment thus:
“13. Reliance in this connection is placed on
the wellsettled
principle that in order that a matter
may be said to have been heard and finally decided,
the decision in the former suit must have been on
the merits. Where, for example, the former suit was
dismissed by the trial court for want of jurisdiction,
or for default of plaintiff 's appearance, or on the
ground of nonjoinder
of parties or misjoinder of
parties or multifariousness, or on the ground that
the suit was badly framed, or on the ground of a
technical mistake, or for failure on the part of the
plaintiff to produce probate or letters of
administration or succession certificate when the
same is required by law to entitle the plaintiff to a
decree, or for failure to furnish security for costs, or
on the ground of improper valuation or for failure
to pay additional court fee on a plaint which was
undervalued or for want of cause of action or on
the ground that it is premature and the dismissal is
confirmed in appeal (if any), the decision not being
on the merits would not be res judicata in a
subsequent suit.”
Though as contended by Mr. Zoting, learned counsel
for the respondents, the trial Court has examined the matter on
merits, the lower appellate court has, however, not decided the
first appeal on merits but has dismissed the appeal only on the
ground that it was not maintainable as aforesaid.
8. In my opinion, the first appellate court namely; lower
appellate Court being the court of facts ought to decide the appeal
on facts and evidence of the matter again and hence in my
opinion, following order would subserve the interest of justice.
ORDER
(i) Second Appeal No. 204/2000 is partly
allowed.
(ii) The impugned judgment and decree
dated 06.03.2000 passed by 2nd Addl. District
Judge, Nagpur in Reg. C. A. No. 197/1992 is set
aside. Proceedings of Reg. C. A. No.197/1992 are
remitted to the lower appellate court for hearing of
the said appeal on merits.
(iii) All the questions of facts as well as law
other than the one decided by me, are kept open.
The lower appellate court shall now take up the
appeal and dispose it of on merits upon hearing
both the sides.
(iv) Parties to this appeal shall appear
before lower appellate Court on 19.08.2014. The
lower appellate Court shall decide the appeal as
expeditiously as possible and in any case within a
period of 10 months from the date of first
appearance before the lower appellate Court.
No order as to costs.
Print Page
a fresh suit for partition by the same plaintiff in respect of the
same subject matter is not barred under Order 23 Rule1 (3) as the
cause of action for partition is recurring one. In the instant case, it
is seen from the stand taken by respondents in the written
statement dated 08.09.1986 that there is no assertion of giving
any share to the plaintiff post withdrawal of the earlier suit as
aforesaid but the opposition to the suit was mainly based on Order
23 Rule 1 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR
Second Appeal No.204/2000
Laxmanrao Mahadeo Nikose, Vs Narayan Mahadeo Nikose,
CORAM:
A.
B. CHAUDHARI, J.
DATED :08.07.2014
Citation; 2015(1) ALLMR 278
24.04.1992 passed by Civil Judge Jr. Dn., Saoner, dismissing the
suit filed by the appellantplaintiff
and confirmed in Reg. C. A.
No.197/1992 passed by 2nd Addl. District Judge, Nagpur on
06.03.2000, the unsuccessful plaintiff had filed the instant second
appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant, assailing the
impugned judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate
Court submitted that the lower appellate court has considered only
the point of maintainability of second civil suit holding that the
second civil suit in the same subject matter was not maintainable
and thus dismissed the appeal preferred by the present appellant.
She thus submitted that the lower appellate court did not discuss
the single point on merits of the suit and dismissed the appeal on
the sole ground. According to her, the lower appellate Court being
the court of facts and the said appeal being one of right, the lower
appellate court was under a duty to decide the suit on merits.
Even otherwise, according to her the second suit was maintainable
in the light of law in relation to such type of suits.
2. Per contra, Mr. Zoting learned counsel for the
respondents, supported the impugned judgment and decree and
argued that there are concurrent findings of facts as well as
question of law recorded by both the courts and even if the lower
appellate court has not discussed about merits of the matter, the
learned trial Judge has recorded a detailed judgment on the merits
of the matter and, therefore, the judgments recorded by both the
courts below can well be supported and consequently there is no
need to interfere in the matter in the second appellate jurisdiction.
He, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the suit.
An interesting question of law has arisen in this matter
and, therefore, it is imperative to notice certain facts.
3. The present appellantplaintiff
had filed Reg. C. S. No.
131/1974 in the same subject matter about partition of the suit
property. During the pendency of the said suit, the present
appellantplaintiff
had filed application Exh.77
for withdrawal of
the said Reg.C.S. No. 131/1974 stating therein that the dispute in
the suit was settled out of the Court between the parties who are
closely related and, therefore, there was a compromise and the
plaintiff did not want to prosecute the suit against the defendants.
It was also stated that nothing remained to be received from the
defendants. It is an admitted fact that the said suit was withdrawn
without any liberty for filing the second suit. The appellantplaintiff
then filed second suit i.e. the present suit being
Reg.C.S.No.159/1985. In the second suit, the plaintiffs averred
that Panchayat was held on 10.06.1984 at Mouja Malegaon after
death of Mahadeo Nikose all the more so because the partition
was never made before or after the death of Mahadeo despite the
withdrawal of the earlier Reg.C.S. No. 131/1974 and, therefore,
the cause of action arose on 10.06.1984 when the defendants
refused to give partition. It is in this background the question
arose; whether the second suit filed by the appellantplaintiff
after
withdrawing the first suit without any liberty from the court, in
relation to the partition of the same suit properties was
maintainable or not? The learned appellate Court has held that
the said suit was not maintainable and would be hit by principles
of Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure namely;
withdrawal of the suit without any liberty.
4. Upon hearing, learned counsel for the rival parties and
upon considering various decisions cited by learned counsel for the
appellant, following substantial question of law arises for my
consideration:
“(i) Whether after withdrawal of the first
suit Reg. C. S. No. 131/1974 unconditionally or
without any liberty from the court in the matter of
partition of the suit properties, the appellantplaintiff
could file second Reg. C. S. No.159/1985
for partition on the ground that in fact the partition
was not made and Mahadeo Nikose had also
expired?
Answer : Yes.
(ii) What order?
Answer : Reg. C. A. No. 197/1992 is remitted to the
lower appellate court for fresh hearing on merits
and disposal in accordance with law.”
5. The aforesaid question fell for consideration in the case
of Bisheshar Das & anr. ..vs.. Ram Prasad & anr.; (1) (1891)
I.L.R. 13 All, 309 and in relation to above question, the Full
Bench of Allahabad High Court Held thus:
“The principle laid down in the case of Nasratullah
v. Mujibullah
and others appears to us to govern
this case. In that case it was held that where a
decree declaring a right to partition has not been
given effect to by the parties and the decree has
become by lapse of time or otherwise unenforceable,
it is competent to the parties, or any of them, if they
continue still to be interested in the joint property,
to bring a fresh suit for a declaration of their right
to partition. In the course of their judgment the
learned Chief Justice, Sir John Edge, and one of us
stated as follows :“
It has not been given effect to by
the parties proceeding to partition in accordance
with it, it is competent to the parties or any of them,
if they still continue to be interested in the joint
property, to bring another suit for a declaration of a
right to a partition in case their right to partition is
called in question at a time when by reason of
limitation or otherwise they cannot put into effect
the decree first obtained. In this respect suits for
declaration of right to partition differ from most
other suit. So long as the property is jointly held so
long does a right to partition continue. When a
person having a right to partition and desiring to
partition, has his right challenged, it appears to us
he can maintain a suit for a declaration, provided
his prior decree is not still enforceable.” As it
appears to us, the right to enforce partition is a
legal incident of a joint tenancy, and so long as such
tenancy subsists so long may any of the joint
tenants apply to the Court for partition of the joint
property. For these reasons the Courts below have
erred in dismissing the suit...”
In Madan Mohan Mondul and ors...vs..Baikanta
Nath Mondul and anr.; Vol. X The Calcutta Weekly Notes 839,
the Calcutta High Court held thus:
“Moreover, as pointed out in the case of Nasratullah
v. Mujibullah (1) “When a decree declaring a
right to partition has not been given effect to by the
parties proceeding to partition in accordance with
it, it is competent for the parties or any of them, if
they still continue to be interested in the joint
property, to bring another suit for a declaration of a
right to partition in case their right to partition is
called in question at a time when by reason of
limitation or otherwise, they cannot put into effect
the decree first obtained. In this respect, suits for
declaration of right to partition differ from most
other suits. So long as the property is jointly held,
so long does a right to partition continue.”
The Nagpur High Court in the case of Abdul Majid
Kha s/o Mahebubkha ..vs.. Mahmudabi w/o Bahadurkha; AIR
(36) 1949 Nagpur 366 also held thus:
7. There would seem to be no doubt about
the plaintiff's remedy by a separate suit against
defendant 11. If she had not included in the present
suit her claim for share in the lands in possession of
the applicant (defendant 11) and had reserved it for
a separate suit, there would not have been a bar of
O. 2 R.2, Civil P. C., because the claim against
defendant 11 is on a separate cause of action from
the claims against the other defendants in the suit.
That being so, how did the plaintiff destroy her right
of separate suit by telling the Court that she did not
want to proceed in this suit the cause of action
against defendant 11? The application was not for
recording a compromise and the order, dated 2nd
April 1946, cannot operate as a consent decree. It
amounts only to a dismissal of the plaintiff's claim
for want of prosecution so far as the applicant was
concerned. This did not involve any decision on
merits that the plaintiff did not have any right to
the lands in suit alleged to be in possession of
defendant 11. Though she stated in the application
that she abandoned her claim to the lands in his
possession, that could not extinguish her rights
without a formal deed executed by her and
registered or without a decree of the Court. Her
right to a share, if any, of the lands has not been
lost. The right to demand partition and separate
possession is a recurring right. If the plaintiff, for
any reason, decided on 2nd April 1946 not to enforce
the right immediately, she should be deemed to have
chosen to continue the tenancy in common for some
time ore till she would find it necessary to seek its
termination. A suit which is barred by withdrawal
of the claim under O. 23 R 1(3) is one which is
based on the same cause of action but a suit for
partition and separate possession of the share which
may now be brought will be on a cause of action
arising upon a demand now made and refused:
Radhe Lal v. Mulchand, 46 ALL. 820 : (A. I. R. (11)
1924 ALL. 905). If defendant 11 made a promise to
give an equal area out of his other lands and if that
is enforceable in law, the plaintiff can sue for specific
performance of that contract and, in the alternative,
make a claim on the original cause The right to demand partition and separate
possession is a recurring right. If the plaintiff, for
any reason, decided on 2nd April 1946 not to enforce
the right immediately, she should be deemed to have
chosen to continue the tenancy in common for some
time ore till she would find it necessary to seek its
termination. A suit which is barred by withdrawal
of the claim under O. 23 R 1(3) is one which is
based on the same cause of action but a suit for
partition and separate possession of the share which
may now be brought will be on a cause of action
arising upon a demand now made and refused: of action for
share in the lands of her father.
(8) The remedy of a suit being open to the
plaintiff against defendant 11 she has a chance of
getting justice as she may be entitled to and there
would be no justification for invoking the inherent
powers of the Court under S. 151, Civil P. C. in her
aid.”
6. From the perusal of the above decisions, it is clear that
a fresh suit for partition by the same plaintiff in respect of the
same subject matter is not barred under Order 23 Rule1 (3) as the
cause of action for partition is recurring one. In the instant case, it
is seen from the stand taken by respondents in the written
statement dated 08.09.1986 that there is no assertion of giving
any share to the plaintiff post withdrawal of the earlier suit as
aforesaid but the opposition to the suit was mainly based on Order
23 Rule 1 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
7. In the light of the law laid down by various High Courts
and the Nagpur High Court in the aforesaid case, this Court would
respectfully follow the dictum laid down above and as a result, it
will have to be held that the second suit filed by the appellantplaintiff
was maintainable and consequently the finding recorded
by lower appellate court that the suit was not maintainable will
have to be set aside. Though, the principles of res judicata may
not have any application in the facts of the present case, the
learned counsel for the appellant has cited a decision in the case of
Sheodan Singh ..vs.. Daryao Kunwar; AIR 1966 SC 1331 (1). In
para 13, it has been held that in the absence of decision on merits
in the former suit, the principles enunciated under Section 11 of
the Code of Civil Procedure are not attracted. I quote following
portion of the said judgment thus:
“13. Reliance in this connection is placed on
the wellsettled
principle that in order that a matter
may be said to have been heard and finally decided,
the decision in the former suit must have been on
the merits. Where, for example, the former suit was
dismissed by the trial court for want of jurisdiction,
or for default of plaintiff 's appearance, or on the
ground of nonjoinder
of parties or misjoinder of
parties or multifariousness, or on the ground that
the suit was badly framed, or on the ground of a
technical mistake, or for failure on the part of the
plaintiff to produce probate or letters of
administration or succession certificate when the
same is required by law to entitle the plaintiff to a
decree, or for failure to furnish security for costs, or
on the ground of improper valuation or for failure
to pay additional court fee on a plaint which was
undervalued or for want of cause of action or on
the ground that it is premature and the dismissal is
confirmed in appeal (if any), the decision not being
on the merits would not be res judicata in a
subsequent suit.”
Though as contended by Mr. Zoting, learned counsel
for the respondents, the trial Court has examined the matter on
merits, the lower appellate court has, however, not decided the
first appeal on merits but has dismissed the appeal only on the
ground that it was not maintainable as aforesaid.
8. In my opinion, the first appellate court namely; lower
appellate Court being the court of facts ought to decide the appeal
on facts and evidence of the matter again and hence in my
opinion, following order would subserve the interest of justice.
ORDER
(i) Second Appeal No. 204/2000 is partly
allowed.
(ii) The impugned judgment and decree
dated 06.03.2000 passed by 2nd Addl. District
Judge, Nagpur in Reg. C. A. No. 197/1992 is set
aside. Proceedings of Reg. C. A. No.197/1992 are
remitted to the lower appellate court for hearing of
the said appeal on merits.
(iii) All the questions of facts as well as law
other than the one decided by me, are kept open.
The lower appellate court shall now take up the
appeal and dispose it of on merits upon hearing
both the sides.
(iv) Parties to this appeal shall appear
before lower appellate Court on 19.08.2014. The
lower appellate Court shall decide the appeal as
expeditiously as possible and in any case within a
period of 10 months from the date of first
appearance before the lower appellate Court.
No order as to costs.
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