Saturday 22 August 2015

When proceeding under domestic violence Act is tenable against IN-Laws without making husband party to said proceeding ?

                                                
In the light of the above discussion, it is clear that a

proceeding against the relative of the husband is perfectly


maintainable without the husband being in the party array and

without any relief being sought against him, if it falls within

proviso of Section 2(q). Reference is answered accordingly.
               IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                PRESENT:


         THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE THOTTATHIL  B.RADHAKRISHNAN


                THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS


        WEDNESDAY, THE 5TH DAY OF AUGUST 2015


                    Crl.Rev.Pet.No. 328 of 2013 ()

                    
       KUNJATHIRI,AGED 82,
      Vs

          STATE OF KERALA,

       
     

     This revision arises from an order passed by the Sessions

Judge, Thrissur in Crl.Appeal No.752/2010 in a proceeding


under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act


2005 (Act 43 of 2005) (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for


short).


        2. A married woman sought protection order under


Section 12 of the Act against her mother-in-law and sister-in-


law. It was alleged that the above persons had subjected her


to domestic violence at the matrimonial home. The husband of


the above married woman was in Gulf country and apparently


she had no grievance against the husband. The trial court


granted the protection order under the Act, which was



confirmed in appeal preferred at the instance of the mother-in-

law. This is challenged in this revision by the mother-in-law.


      3. One of the ground of challenge raised specifically in the


revision was that without the husband of the married woman in


the party array, an application under the Act was not


maintainable and no relief can be granted. The learned single


Judge, before whom the matter came up for hearing, noted the


decision of this Court in Bismi Sainudheen v. P.K.Nabeesa


Beevi and Others(2013(4) KLT 377).          After referring to the


relevant provisions involved in the matter, the learned single


Judge doubted the ratio laid down in the above case and


expressed the view that the proviso to Section 2(a) can only


mean that, when the husband, to whom only the wife is related


by marriage, is a respondent, his relatives, male or female also


may be made respondents in the case. Hence, the learned single


Judge thought it fit to refer the matter to the Division Bench for


consideration.    The   question    that   was   formulated    for


consideration is


              "whether a petition filed by a wife against her


     husband's relatives alone without making him        a co-




     respondent is maintainable"?


The matter is thus placed before this Bench for consideration.


      4. Heard both sides and examined the records.


      5. The statement of objects and reasons of the Act 43 of


2005 declares that domestic violence is a human rights issue


and a serious deterrent to development. Vienna Accord of 1994


and the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action (1995)


have acknowledged it. The        United Nations Committee on


Convention on Elimination of All Forms of        Discrimination


Against Woman (CEDAW) in its General Recommendation No.


XII (1989) has recommended that the State parties should act to


protect women against violence of any kind, especially that


occurring within the family. Parliament was of the view that the


phenomenon of domestic violence in India was widely prevalent,


but has remained largely invisible in the public domain. It was


felt that the civil law did not address this phenomenon in its


entirety.     Where a woman was subjected to cruelty by her


husband or relatives it was an offence under Section 498A of


IPC. There was no remedy in the civil law for the protection of


the women from being victims of domestic violence.   Hence, the




Act was brought into force in accordance with the above object


and keeping in view the rights guaranteed under Articles,14,15


and 21 of the Constitution to provide for a remedy under the civil


law,which was intended to protect the women from being victims


of domestic violence and to prevent the occurrence of domestic


violence in the society.


      6. Evidently, the Act was intended to ensure effective


protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the


Constitution, who were victims of violence of any kind, occurring


within the family and to deal with matters connected therewith


and incidental thereto. This being the object of the statute,


evidently, the statute cover a large group of the society with


rights conferred not only to the aggrieved wife in relation to


her dispute with the husband, but to cover any type of violence


against woman that occurs in any domestic relationship.


      7. To answer the    question referred to this Bench, the


relevant provisions which are necessary for consideration are


the definitions of the words "aggrieved person", "domestic


relationship" and the "respondent".     The statute defines the


above as follows:




                  "2(a) " aggrieved person" means any woman


            who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with


            the respondent and who alleges to have been


            subjected to any act of domestic violence by the


            respondent;





                  2(f):  "domestic     relationship"  means     a


            relationship between two persons who live or have, at


            any point of time,lived together in a shared


            household, when they are related by consanguinity,


            marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of


            marriage, adoption or are family members living


            together as a joint family:





                  2(q): "respondent" means any adult male


            person who is or has been, in a domestic relationship


            with the aggrieved person and against whom the


            aggrieved person has sought any relief under this


            Act:


                  Provided that an aggrieved wife or female


            living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage


            may also file a complaint against a relative of the


            husband or the male partner. "


      8. Evidently, the above three definitions are inter-linked

and the interpretation of any of the three is not possible without


reference to the other two, as well as to the concept of 'shared


household' as defined under Section 2(s) and the definition of


'domestic violence' as defined under Section 3 of the Act. The


reference to the above three quoted definitions indicate that they


are of very wide connotation. Section 3 brings within its campus


any type of violence, including physical, sexual, verbal, emotional


and economic and arising in any domestic relationship, not


confined to matrimonial relationship alone. The long title of the


statute, the various definitions incorporated in the statute and


the object and reasons of the statute referred to above


cumulatively confirm that the statute is not confined to cruelties


against the wife alone, but is of a larger perspective, covering


any type of abuse against women, provided it arises out of a


domestic relationship.


      9. Section 2(a) and Section 12 indicates that a woman


alone can seek the relief, under the Act. The sine qua non for


seeking the relief is that the petitioner should be a woman, who


is or has been in a domestic relationship with the respondent




against whom there is an allegation of domestic violence. A co-


joint reading of Section 2(a), 2(f) and 2 (q) shows that, to seek


relief on ground of domestic violence, it is not necessary that


the woman should be related to the        person committing the


wrong by matrimony alone, but may be by a relationship in the


nature of the marriage or related by consanguinity, adoption or


are family members living together as a joint family. Evidently,


if a woman seeking relief had been subjected to any domestic


violence as defined under Section 3, by the      person against


whom relief is sought and they had, at any point of time, lived


together in a shared household and if they are related by any


relationship as mentioned above, she is entitled to seek the


benefit of the Act.


      10. Narrowing down to the issue as to whether the wife


can seek relief against the relatives of the husband without the


junction of the husband, or husband being in the party array,


without any allegation against him or without seeking any relief


against him is a vexed issue. It means whether the presence of


the husband in the party array, atleast as an informal party is


necessary. The concept of formal party is not unknown to




criminal jurisprudence.      The issue revolves on a question


whether the statute visualizes a situation of an abuse of wife by


in-laws of the husband, without the husband committing any act


of domestic violence.      It cannot be said that the Indian


Parliament was unaware of the Indian social reality wherein


thousands of husbands move to distant places in search of job,


leaving behind the wife at the matrimonial home and in several


of such cases "in-law syndrome" operating. Are they left out


without any remedy under the Act? One possible indication is


available in Section 3 of the Act     which    declares that any


omission,      commission or conduct of the respondent shall


constitute a domestic violence provided, it has the result


enumerated under (a) to (d) of Section 3. Evidently, an omission


by the     husband may also fall within the vice of a domestic


violence and it can possibly be argued that a passive conduct of


the husband or       even an inaction from the part of the


respondent, exposing his wife to be harassed or abused by the in-


laws, may fall within the definition of domestic violence. When


the wide definition takes in    various acts,  including even a


passive act or an inaction of the husband within the definition of



the domestic violence, can it be said that statute does not

contemplate a situation of domestic violence by the relatives


alone without the husband being guilty of even omission? Are


such women, merely for the reason that husband supports her,


or even not guilty of any laches, beyond the Protective Umbrella


of this Progressive statute ?


      11. The crucial Section to be considered herein is      the


definition of "Respondent" in section 2(q). 'Respondent' in a


proceeding under the Act means any adult male person who is,


or has been in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person


and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief


under the Act.     The proviso provides that in the case of an


aggrieved wife or a female living in a relationship in the nature


of marriage, she may file a complaint against a relative of the


husband or the male partner also.         Evidently, the proviso


enlarges the scope of the definition of 'respondent'. The Honble


Supreme Court in       Sandhya Manoj Wankhade v. Manoj


Bhimrao Wankhade and Others (2011 (2) KHC 515) has held


that the proviso widens the scope of definition of respondent by


including a relative of the husband or male partner, within the




scope of a complaint, which may be filed by an aggrieved wife or


a female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage. In


the above case, the Apex Court considered the question as to


whether the legislature intended to include the female relatives


of the husband or the male partner within the            ambit of


complaint. The Apex Court held that expression 'female' has not


been used in the proviso to Section 2(q), but on the other hand,


if the Legislature intended to exclude females from the ambit of


the complaint, which can be filed by an aggrieved wife, the


females would have been specifically excluded, instead of it


being provided in the proviso that a complaint could be filed


against a relative of the husband or the male partner.


      12. Evidently, proviso enables an aggrieved wife to proceed


against any relative of the husband or the male partner, as the


case may be. It is pertinent to note that in the body of Section 2


(q), it is provided that respondent shall be a male person, who


has committed the domestic violence and against whom, the


aggrieved wife has sought relief. It eminently shows that in


cases other than covered by the proviso, the respondent shall be


a male, with whom aggrieved person has a domestic relationship




and against whom she has sought any relief under the Act.


However, the proviso does not make any distinction as to


whether relative proceeded against is a male or female, by


specifically denoting them as 'relative'. Evidently, proviso


throws     open the scope of the Act, as against any relative,


whether male or female.


      13. The body of section 2(q) enables an aggrieved person


to   proceed against the respondent who commits domestic


violence.     It is clear from a joint reading of Section 2(q) with


Section 2 (a), that the person who can initiate the proceedings is


denoted by the term 'woman'.           However, in the proviso to


Section 2(q), the expression has been carefully        used as an


aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of


a marriage'. A combined reading of Section 2(a) and 2(q) shows


that though it enables any "woman" to proceed against any male


or relative in a domestic relationship, in the proviso the word


used is ' an aggrieved wife'. Evidently, the provision is a special


provision carved out of the general provision for the benefit of


an 'aggrieved wife' or a female living in a relationship in the


nature of marriage.       As distinct from the body of Section 2(a),





which refers to a 'woman', proviso to Section 2 (q) is an extended


provision      and therein specific provision     is made to 'an


aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of


a marriage'. It is clear that this specific proviso is to protect an


aggrieved wife or female who is living in a relationship in the


nature of a marriage.


      14. A careful reading of the second limb of the proviso


further clarifies the scope of it. It provides that such a person


" may also file a complaint" (emphasis supplied). This provision


appears to have been very carefully drafted, which enables such


person to file "a complaint" and not merely to seek a relief.


Emphasis has to be made to the word 'may' 'also' as well as to


'complaint'.     It provides that she may, in addition to other


remedies, file a complaint also against a relative of the husband


or male partner. It is clear that an aggrieved wife or a female


in a relationship in the nature of marriage, may, in addition to


other reliefs "may also"    independently file a complaint.       It


enables the wife to file a complaint against a relative of the


husband also . It is evident that it is not worded as if she may


file a complaint against the husband and his relatives or seek a



relief against the husband along with his relatives. It is not also

worded as to enable the       wife to seek a relief against the


relatives also. On the other hand, it specifically, categorically


and unambiguously permits her, apart from her all other


remedies, to file a complaint against the relatives of the husband


also, if they are the wrong doers. Evidently, wording is so clear


that it enables the wife to proceed against the relatives also,


without proceeding against the husband.       It does not in any


manner indicate that the husband should also be party. On the


other hand, it clearly shows that the husband need not be a party


to the proceedings in appropriate cases.


      15. Now, it has to be       examined whether the above


interpretation to the proviso is in conformity with the other


relevant provisions of the Act and the general scheme of the Act.


The above interpretation naturally give rise to a question as to


how a complaint can lie against relatives alone when there is no


domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the


wrong doer.     Conversely, when    a petition is filed against a


relative without arraying the husband,      how wife can be an


aggrieved person.     Section 2 (a) independently will give an



impression that the person against whom she alleges domestic

violence must be a person with whom the aggrieved person has a


matrimonial relationship.     The above doubt also arises out of


mistaken notion that the aggrieved person       in a matrimonial


violence should    always be linked directly to the respondent


through a       domestic relationship and that invariably     the


husband is      the abuser. This appears to be a narrow and


pedantic view without having regard to the statutory provision


and the social realities.   The proviso to Section 2(q) enlarges


the scope of respondent to include any relative also.         The


husband is not always      the abuser and there may be cases


wherein the relative is the wrong doer. It is also not as if, the


husband along with the relatives should be the wrong doers and


then alone it will constitute a domestic violence. The view, that


only if the husband, either independently or in combination with


relatives commit violence, it will fall within the vice of Section


3, has no statutory backing.


      16. Another reason is that the term "aggrieved person" is


conceptually always be linked to the respondent,       through a


domestic relationship. In other words, aggrieved person as well



abuser shall always be linked through a domestic relationship.

This arises because of Section 2(a) which defines 'aggrieved


person' as a person who is, or has been, in a domestic


relationship with the respondent, which in the case of a


matrimonial relationship is the husband and wife.    However,


proviso to Section 2 (q) enlarges the scope and contours of the


definition of the respondent to include the relatives of the


husband also.


      17. The wrong doer is brought under a strange definition


of 'respondent' which appears to be a wrong phraseology, since


it is the nomenclature used to denote the opposite party in a


legal proceedings. By adopting the same nomenclature for the


wrong doer also,     it conveys a wrong impression that the


respondent in the petition under the Act is always the wrong


doer and should also be a party to domestic relationship with


the petitioner and vice versa also.     The Supreme Court in


S.R.Batra and Another v. Smt.Taruna Batra (2007 (3) SCC


169), which had occasion to interpret the scope and ambit of


definition of "shared household" had opined that definition of


shared household in Section 2(s) of the Act is not very happily



worded, and appears to be the result of clumsy drafting.     The


apparent doubt that arise while interpreting Section 2 (a) and 2


(b) along with proviso to Section 2 (q) is also partly due to the


improper terminology of the 'respondent'. However, in the light


of the object of the statute and the clear intention of the


Parliament in incorporating the proviso to Section 2 (q), all


provisions will have to be harmoniously interpreted to advance


the object of the statute.


      18. Though it may appear that an aggrieved wife can


proceed against any relative of the husband even if they have


never shared a household, it is not correct. Proviso to Section


2(q), has to be read as an enlargement of the body of Section 2


(q)   and    read along with  Sections 2(a),   2(f) and 2 (s) in


conjunction with the definition of 'domestic violence', as


contemplated under Section 3. It would indicate that even if


the husband is not a party to the proceedings, the respondent


should be one related to the aggrieved person through the


husband, by matrimonial relationship or a relationship in the


nature of marriage, must have shared a household at any point


of time and has committed the domestic violence.



      19. Evidently, proviso to Section 2(q) is of wide sweep, to

take in matrimonial violence of any nature, provided, both the


parties are connected by a matrimonial relationship or


relationship in the nature of matrimony, however distant, the


relation may be. Evidently the right conferred on an aggrieved


wife or a woman involved in a relation similar to that of a


marriage, is against relatives of her husband or partner only


and not against her own relatives sharing the same house.


Obviously, latter disputes are not presumed to be matrimonial


dispute and hence outside the scope of the proviso.       Bismi


Sainudheen v. P.K.Nabeesa Beevi and Others (2013 (4) KHC


245), was a case in which an aged lady filed M.C proceedings


under Section 12 of the Act, against her son.        Pending the


proceedings, she filed an application to implead the daughter-in-


law, which was opposed by the daughter in-law on the ground


that she will not fall within the definition of respondents.


Ultimately, when the matter came up before this Court, the


question that was considered by this Court was whether the


daughter-in-law will fall within the sweep of Section 2(q). The


court, relying on the various authorities and the concept


involved, held that the daughter-in-law will also fall under the

sweep of Section 2 (q). It is true that in that case, the husband


of the aggrieved person was not a party, he being no more.


Further it was not a proceeding arising out of a matrimonial


dispute, but was dispute by a woman against her son and


daughter-in-law. Hence, the law involved in that case was not


one involved in the present case. Though the Court, in that


case relied on the decision laid down in Sandhya Manoj's case


(supra), Supreme Court in that case was considering the


question whether the term relatives referred to in the proviso to


Section 2 (q) includes females also. The proviso, pre supposes


that the action is initiated either by the aggrieved wife or a


female in a relationship in the nature of a marriage and in such


a situation alone she can proceed against the relatives of the


husband or the partner, as the case may be, irrespective of


whether the relative is male or female.      However, in Bismi's


case, court was not dealing with a situation similar to that of


Sandya Manoj's case.


      20.In the light of the above discussion, it is clear that a


proceeding against the relative of the husband is perfectly



maintainable without the husband being in the party array and

without any relief being sought against him, if it falls within


proviso of Section 2(q). Reference is answered accordingly.


      Matter may be placed before the learned Single Judge for


consideration of the issue involved, in accordance    with the


above findings.


                                     Sd/-


                     THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN

                                   Judge


                                     Sd/-

                               SUNIL THOMAS
                                    Judge

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