Section 15 of the Act. Relevant portion of Section 15 reads
as under :
“15. Cognizance of criminal contempt in other
cases. - (1) In the case of a criminal contempt,
other than a contempt referred to in section 14,
the Supreme Court or the High Court may take
action on its own motion or on a motion made by
—
(a) the Advocate-General, or
(b) any other person, with the consent in writing
to the Advocate-General, or
(c) in relation to the High Court for the Union
territory of Delhi, such Law Officer as the Central
Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify in this behalf, or any other
person, with the consent in writing of such Law
Officer.
(2) In the case of any criminal contempt of a
subordinate court, the High Court may take
action on a reference made to it by the
subordinate court or on a motion made by the
Advocate-General or, in relation to a Union
territory, by such Law Officer as the Central
Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify in this behalf.
(3) xxx xxx xxx.”
In the instant case, the alleged criminal contempt was
of a subordinate Court and therefore, the action could have
been taken on a reference made to the High Court by the
subordinate Court or on a Motion made by the Advocate
General, but the proceedings had been initiated in
pursuance of an application submitted by Respondent No.1.
From the record, we do not find that the learned Advocate
General had ever given his consent for initiation of the said
proceedings.
Without going into the facts of the case, only on this
limited ground that the criminal contempt proceedings had
not been initiated as per the provisions of Section 15 of the
Act, in our opinion, the proceedings are vitiated and
therefore, the impugned order passed by the High Court is
neither just nor legal and therefore, we set aside the
impugned order.
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.181 OF 1998
VILAS V. SANGHAI …
V
SUMERMAL MISHRIMAL BAFNA
& ANR.
Dated:SEPTEMBER 30, 2016.
Citation:AIR 2016 SC4651
1. Being aggrieved by the judgment dated 22nd December,
1997 delivered by the High Court of Judicature at BombayPage 2
2
in Criminal Writ Petition No.22 of 1994, Criminal Appeal
No.181 of 1998 has been filed by Vilas V. Sanghai against
the order of punishment imposed upon him under the
provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Act”) and Criminal Appeal No.210 of
1998 has been filed by the State of Maharashtra for setting
aside the said judgment.
2. The facts giving rise to the present litigation in a
nutshell are as under :-
As two appeals have been filed against the same
judgment, for narration of the facts, we have referred to the
facts from Criminal Appeal No.181 of 1998, which has been
filed by Vilas V. Sanghai, a Police Inspector, who was
entrusted with investigation of a case filed against
Respondent No.1, Sumermal Mishrimal Bafna, a Trustee of
Bafna Charitable Trust. Respondent no.1, who is aged
about 64 years and is having some heart ailment, claims to
be a man with good reputation. A private complaint was
filed against Respondent No.1 by Shri Umesh Karia to the
effect that Respondent No.1 had committed an offencePage 3
3
punishable under the provisions of Section 420 read with
Sections 120-B and 109 of the Indian Penal Code.
Investigation in relation to the said complaint had been
entrusted to the Appellant, who was attached to the Crime
Branch at the relevant time.
3. Respondent No.1 had an apprehension that he might
be arrested in the course of investigation and therefore, he
had filed an application for anticipatory bail. During the
pendency of the said anticipatory bail application, the
Appellant used to remain present to brief the learned Public
Prosecutor, who was opposing the said application. No
interim order was passed in the said application when the
application was being heard but in the presence of the
Appellant and in pursuance of the instructions given by the
Appellant, the learned Public Prosecutor had made a
statement that during the pendency of the said application,
Respondent No.1 would not be arrested, provided
Respondent No.1 would cooperate with the Police in the
investigation.
4
4. In spite of the aforestated assurance given to the Court
by the learned Public Prosecutor in pursuance of the
instructions given by the Appellant, Respondent No.1 was
arrested on 21st September, 1993, though hearing of the
anticipatory bail application was fixed on 22nd September,
1993. The case made out against the Appellant was that
after the arrest, Respondent No.1 was handcuffed and was
photographed in handcuffed condition and the said
photograph had been published in local newspapers.
Publication of such a photograph adversely affected
reputation of Respondent No.1.
5. In the aforestated circumstances, Respondent No.1
had initiated contempt proceedings against the Appellant as
the Appellant had committed breach of an assurance given
to the Court through the learned Public Prosecutor that
Respondent No.1 would not be arrested during the
pendency of the anticipatory bail application.
6. In the aforestated contempt proceedings, defence of
the Appellant was that the assurance or undertaking which
had been given to the Court was conditional. The condition
was that Respondent No.1 would extend his cooperation in
the investigation, but as Respondent No.1 was not
cooperative and was deliberately trying to create hurdles in
the investigation, the Appellant was constrained to arrest
Respondent No.1 on 21st September, 1993.
7. After hearing the concerned parties and looking at the
record, the High Court came to the conclusion that the
Appellant was guilty of committing contempt of Court and
was, therefore, sentenced to simple imprisonment for 7 days
with a fine of Rs.2,000/-.
8. The learned counsel appearing for the Appellant
submitted that the Appellant had not committed criminal
contempt, as alleged or otherwise. The main thrust of the
argument of the learned counsel was that the provisions of
Section 15 of the Act had not been complied with before
passing the impugned order punishing the Appellant for
committing criminal contempt of Court. He also submitted
that there was no breach of any undertaking or assurance
given to the Court as the assurance given on behalf of the
Appellant was conditional. By not extending cooperation toPage 6
6
the investigating agency, Respondent No.1 had committed
breach of his assurance and therefore, undertaking given by
the Appellant had also come to an end.
9. So far as the legal provisions are concerned, he
submitted that the provisions of Section 15 of the Act ought
to have been complied with for initiating proceedings for
punishing the Appellant for criminal contempt. In the
instant case, the action was not initiated on a Motion made
by the Advocate General or on a reference made by the
subordinate Court concerned as per the provisions of
Section 15 of the Act. For the aforestated reason, the entire
proceedings were vitiated.
10. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for
Respondent No.1 supported the order passed by the High
Court and submitted that there was clear violation of the
undertaking given by the Appellant to the Court. He
stressed on the fact that the application for anticipatory bail
was to be heard on 22nd September, 1993 and Respondent
No.1 was arrested on 21st September, 1993. There was no
justifiable reason for arresting Respondent No.1 a dayPage 7
7
before the date of hearing. The Appellant could have very
well waited for a day and could have made the grievance
before the Court that Respondent No.1 was not cooperative
and therefore, the investigation was adversely affected, if
the averment with regard to non-cooperation of the
Appellant was correct. Instead of waiting for a day, in a hot
haste, the Appellant arrested Respondent No.1 on 21st
September, 1993 and the said fact clearly denotes that the
Appellant had very scant respect for the assurance given by
him to the Court. He, therefore, submitted that the
impugned order is just and proper and therefore, the Appeal
deserved dismissal.
11. We have heard the learned counsel and have recorded
the facts of the case.
12. We find substance in what has been submitted by the
learned counsel appearing for the Appellant.
13. The impugned order is in violation of the provisions of
Section 15 of the Act. Relevant portion of Section 15 reads
as under :
“15. Cognizance of criminal contempt in other
cases. - (1) In the case of a criminal contempt,
other than a contempt referred to in section 14,
the Supreme Court or the High Court may take
action on its own motion or on a motion made by
—
(a) the Advocate-General, or
(b) any other person, with the consent in writing
to the Advocate-General, or
(c) in relation to the High Court for the Union
territory of Delhi, such Law Officer as the Central
Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify in this behalf, or any other
person, with the consent in writing of such Law
Officer.
(2) In the case of any criminal contempt of a
subordinate court, the High Court may take
action on a reference made to it by the
subordinate court or on a motion made by the
Advocate-General or, in relation to a Union
territory, by such Law Officer as the Central
Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify in this behalf.
(3) xxx xxx xxx.”
14. In the instant case, the alleged criminal contempt was
of a subordinate Court and therefore, the action could have
been taken on a reference made to the High Court by the
subordinate Court or on a Motion made by the Advocate
General, but the proceedings had been initiated in
pursuance of an application submitted by Respondent No.1.
From the record, we do not find that the learned Advocate
General had ever given his consent for initiation of the said
proceedings.
15. Without going into the facts of the case, only on this
limited ground that the criminal contempt proceedings had
not been initiated as per the provisions of Section 15 of the
Act, in our opinion, the proceedings are vitiated and
therefore, the impugned order passed by the High Court is
neither just nor legal and therefore, we set aside the
impugned order.
16. The appeals are accordingly disposed of as allowed.
.…………………………….J.
(ANIL R. DAVE)
……………………………..J.
(L. NAGESWARA RAO)
NEW DELHI
SEPTEMBER 30, 2016.
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