While coming to this conclusion, even the recent law
laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court can also be taken
for assistance which is reported in (2015)11 SCC page
145 in the case of Kamla Kant Dubey Vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh and Others wherein it has been
specifically laid down that FIR need not contain
every single detail and every part of the prosecution
case and therefore, when main substratum is forming
part of the FIR, it is left to the investigating
authority to investigate in detail and therefore,
stray observations made in paragraph No.18 would
definitely lead to a situation that basic substratum
of the matter is already contained in the FIR. In the
present case on hand, simply because further
information are not contained as part of first FIR
thereof would not permit respondent No.2 to lodge the
second complaint with respect to very same
controversy. Consequential steps generated by
petitioner No.1 can well be examined during the
course of investigation and therefore, it seems that
this second complaint tantamount to have been used as
a lever to pressurise the petitioners which in no
circumstances can be permitted by this Court. The
Court is sufficiently empowered under section 482 of
Cr.P.C. to embark upon such an attempt if made to
misuse the process of law. Therefore, the background
of fact is sufficient enough to hold that second
complaint is required to be quashed in the interest
of justice.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION NO. 14624 of 2007
VIJAYCHANDRA PRAKASH SHUKLA & 2.
V
STATE OF GUJARAT & 1.
CORAM: MR.JUSTICE A.J. SHASTRI
Date : 27/01/2017
1. The petitioners have filed this petition for the
purpose of quashing of the complaint filed by
respondent No.2 being Crime Register No.I-284 of 2007
before J.P. Road Police Station, Vadodara, and also
the proceedings arising out of the said complaint.
2. The brief facts leading to the rise of present
petition are as under:
2.1 M/s SCI International Securities Ltd. was established
by one Sureshchandra Shukla, brother of petitioner
No.1. In the said company, petitioner No.1 and four
other persons were appointed as Directors. Marriage
of Sureshchandra Shukla was solemnized at Uttar
Pradesh on 10.3.1977 with one Hira Rani and a child
named Vilaspati (Pinki) was born out of said wedlock.
Said Sureshchandra Shukla passed away on 12.5.2004.
Respondent No.2, who claiming herself to be the
second wife of Sureshchandra Shukla, stated that she
was appointed as Managing Director in M/s SCI
International Securities Ltd. by passing a resolution
on the day before passing away of Sureshchandra
Shukla.
2.2 On 9.3.2005, a complaint came to be filed by
respondent No.2 against petitioner No.1 being
C.R.No.I-89 of 2005 before J.P. Road Police Station,
Vadodara, alleging that petitioner No.1 was appointed
as Joint Managing Director with the help of bogus
documents and in fact, she is the Managing Director.
2.3 Petitioner No.1 also filed criminal case being
Criminal Inquiry Case No.9 of 2006 before the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad, alleging
commission offences punishable under sections 406,
420, 467, 468, 471 read with section 120B of Indian
Penal Code against three persons including respondent
No.2 alleging that appointment of respondent No.2 as
Managing Director is based on fraud and concocted
documents. It was alleged that Form Nos.22, 32 and
25C were created by respondent No.2 by putting
signature on behalf of the person who was in ICCU
ward of the hospital and it was sent to Registrar of
Companies. Said complaint was sent for inquiry under
section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.” for short) and
it is pending for consideration.
2.4 As a counterblast, respondent no.2 filed a complaint
being C.R.No.I-284 of 2007 before J.P.Police Station
implicating other members including petitioner No.1
making almost same grievance which was made in her
earlier complaint.
2.5 It is this complaint which is made the subject of
present petition filed under section 482 of Cr.P.C.
for seeking quashment of the complaint.
2.6 The petition originally came up for hearing before
the Court on 6th December, 2007 whereupon the Court
issued notice and granted ad-interim relief in terms
of paragraph 7(C). Thereafter, the matter was being
listed from time to time. The Court vide order dated
10.7.2015 admitted the matter by issuing rule and
confirmed the interim relief granted vide order dated
6.12.2007. Resultantly, the proceedings of the
complaint do not appear to have been processed any
further. In the light of aforesaid situation, the
petition has now come up for final hearing before
this Court.
3. Mr. Ashish Dagli, appearing for the petitioners, has
contended that the complaint ex-facie is not
maintainable and the same is nothing but a clear
example of abuse of the process of law. He has
further contended that before filing of the present
complaint, there was one another complaint lodged on
9
th of March, 2005 being C.R.No.I-89 of 2005 against
petitioner No.1 alleging that with the help of bogus
documents, petitioner No.1 got himself appointed as
Director and the complainant is running Security
Services as Managing Director and the date of her
appointment was shown as 10th May, 2004 and therefore,
the documents appear to have been concocted. He has
further contended that petitioner No.1 simultaneously
has filed criminal case against three persons
including respondent No.2 for the offences punishable
under sections 46, 420, 467, 468, 471 read with
section 120B of IPC alleging that appointment of
respondent No.2 as Managing Director is based upon
fraud and concocted documents created by respondent
No.2 and Form Nos.23, 32 and 25 C were got signed on
behalf of the person, who was in ICCU ward at the
hospital. Based upon which, the said complaint was
processed and when the case was investigated before
the very same Police Station, this second complaint
came to be filed by respondent No.2 implicating other
members as accused including petitioner No.1 making
almost similar grievance for which, an appropriate
remedy before the civil forum is very much available.
He has drawn the attention of this Court that before
filing the complaint by respondent No.2, petitioner
No.1 had filed detailed representations before the
authority including police, Home Department and
Police Commissioner and by referring to these
representations, it has been contended that the
apprehension which was voiced out against respondent
No.2 has come true and this complaint is an outburst
of the proceedings initiated by petitioner No.1 and
therefore, apparently, the complaint in question is
nothing but a clear example of the abuse of the
process of law. He has further contended that way
back in the year 2005, even a legal notice was also
given to State Bank of Saurashtra, Baroda, whereby
petitioner No.1 has requested his pleader to intimate
not to permit respondent No.2 and his associates to
operate the bank account of SCI International
Securities Limited and therefore, entire chronology
of events and the grievance which is voiced out is
nothing but a clear example of civil dispute and
without resorting to appropriate forum, with a view
to put pressure upon petitioner No.1, this complaint
came to be filed. Mr. Dagli has further contended
that it is seriously in dispute how the signature of
brother of petitioner No.1 of a meeting dated 10th
May, 2004 was secured particularly when his brother
was suffering from the disease and was actually
admitted in ICCU Ward of Medi Surge Hospital and
passed away on 12th of May, 2004. He has further
contended that, in fact, the sister-in-law of the
petitioner i.e. wife of Sureshchandra Shukla was
residing at Uttar Pradesh and number of documentary
evidences were produced before the investigating
agency when the earlier complaint was made that she
is the legally wedded wife and Vilaspati is the
daughter out of wedlock of the deceased with Hira
Rani and therefore, the situation is such where
respondent No.2 found herself in helpless condition
and when she is not likely to succeed as per her
wishes in the first complaint and therefore, this
present complaint in question is filed as a
counterblast to the complaint filed by petitioner
No.1 which is with a view to divert the attention
from the core issue. According to him, second
complaint ought not to have been registered at all as
substantially the allegations are part and parcel of
the earlier complaint and grievance in which, father
of the petitioner has also been implicated and
arraigned as an accused person which indicates the
sole purpose of respondent No.2 in filing such false
and frivolous complaint and therefore, by referring
to this factual data, he has contended that
background of facts are such wherein the entire
second complaint is required to be held as not
maintainable and therefore, requested the Court to
grand the relief as prayed for in the petition. To
substantiate his contentions, he has referred to
following decisions which are to be dealt with in
this judgment at an appropriate stage:
i. (2001)6 SCC page 181 reported in T.T.Antony Vs.
State of Kerala and Others.
ii. (2009)1 SCC 441 in the case of Nirmal Singh
Kahlon Vs. State of Punjab and Others.
iii. (2010)12 SCC 254 in the case of Babubhai Vs.
State of Gujarat and others.
iv. (2013)6 SCC 348 in the case of Amitbhai
Anilchandra Shah Vs. Central Bureau of
Investigation and another.
4. To oppose the stand taken by Mr. Dagli in the present
proceedings, Mr. M.M.Saiyed, learned advocate for the
original complainant i.e. respondent No.2, has
contended that the complaint in substantive form is
very much maintainable and no hyper-technical view
be taken. He has further contended that when in the
first complaint the documents have been surfaced,
there arose the need for filing the complaint by
respondent No.2 and therefore, he has denied that it
is not a counterblast of the first complaint filed by
petitioner No.1. In fact, Mr. Saiyed has contended
that respondent No.2 is very much appointed as
Managing Director and her appointment is not based
upon any concoction or fraudulent act. In fact, the
allegations, which are levelled in the complaint
which is sought to be quashed, are requiring a
thorough investigation and therefore, just because
the petitioner has filed the first complaint, it
cannot be said that subsequent complaint is not
maintainable. A proper resolution came to be passed
in the company and complete procedural formalities
have been completed and only thereafter, appointment
has taken place and therefore, it cannot be said in
any way that simply because the appointment has taken
place prior to couple of days of the death of the
deceased, the same is questionable. In fact, no
inference can be drawn more particularly when a
specific process is undertaken on 10th May, 2004.
There is no concoction or fraud and nothing of that
nature which would permit the authority to raise any
question with respect to her complaint being
maintainable. He has further contended that simply
because the suit is pending, it cannot be said that
no criminal act is ever done by the petitioner and in
fact, civil proceedings have got its own different
impact and therefore, simply because civil suit can
lie, it cannot be said that present complaint is not
maintainable. In fact, there are series of decisions
whereby it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
that both can go on parallel and therefore, simply
because civil proceedings are pending, the
petitioners cannot avoid criminal liability which is
likely to generate out of the complaint filed by
her. Ultimately, Mr. Saiyed has contended and
requested the Court that instead of taking a hypertechnical
view of the matter, the complaint filed by
respondent No.2 deserves to be thoroughly
investigated and therefore, ultimately requested the
Court to dismiss the petition.
4.1 To substantiate aforesaid contentions, Mr. Saiyed has
relied upon following decisions of the Hon’ble Apex
Court on the issue whether second complaint is
maintainable or not:
i) Ram Lal Narang Vs. State (Delhi Administration)
reported in AIR 1979 SC 1791.
ii) Kari Chaudhary Vs. Most. Sita Devi and others
reported in AIR 2002 SC 441.
iii) Upkar Singh Vs. Ved Prakash and others reported
in AIR 2004 SC 4320.
iv) Nirmal Singh Kahlon Vs. State of Punjab and
Ors. reported in AIR 2009 SC page 984.
v) Amitabhai Anilchandra Shah Vs. Central Bureau
of Investigation and another reported in
(2013)6 SCC page 348, 2013.
vi) Anju Chaudhary Vs. State of U.P. And Anr.
reported in AIR 2013 SCW page 245.
These decisions would be discussed in the present
judgment at an appropriate stage hereinafter.
5. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the
respective parties and having gone through the
contents of the materials produced before the Court,
to understand the controversy whether second
complaint is maintainable or not, first of all, the
gist of first complaint is required to be analysed.
6. A perusal of the first complaint being C.R.No.I-89 of
2005 filed by one Varshaben against Vijaychandra
Shukla indicates that it was filed on 9.3.2005 for
the offences alleged to have committed any time prior
to 7.7.2004 punishable under sections 429, 467, 468
and 471 of IPC. The assertion of the said complaint
indicates that Varshaben, widow of Sureshkumar Shukla
residing with son Vikrant, is alleged to have
conducted the affairs of International Securities
Limited which company is essentially dealing in
security services since the last 11 years and she is
a Managing Director of the Company with effect from
10th of May, 2004. She has also asserted in the
complaint that the said company was floated in 1994
from where she was acting as a Director till she was
appointed as Managing Director. Her husband has
expired on 12th of May, 2004, but during the process,
unanimously on 10th of May, 2004, she was nominated as
Managing Director of SCI International Securities
Limited. She has further asserted that due process of
passing resolution in the Board meeting like filling
up necessary forms before the Registrar of Companies
(ROC) was also duly completed and said to have been
sent through their Chartered Accountant, Shri
K.G.Agrawal. It has also been stated in the complaint
that while filling up the forms in ROC, it was learnt
that somebody else has also filled in the form for
being the Director. However, she has emphatically
stated in the complaint that prior to passing of
resolution unanimously appointing herself as Managing
Director, no such resolution has ever been passed.
Subsequently, it has also been learnt that through
the Branch Manager of State Bank of Saurashtra that
Director’s position is altered which is being
informed to them with respect to SCI International
Securities Limited and therefore, informing the
Company of the said bank that there must be a
signature of Managing Director, Vijaychandra Shukla
to conduct the affairs of the bank. At that point of
time, it has been learnt by the complainant that some
fictitious documents have been prepared, concocted
and utilised for the purpose of acting as Managing
Director of the Company and thereby an attempt has
been made to thwart the dealings of the Company and
these averments have been alleged specifically in the
complaint filed on 9th of March, 2005.
7. The record of the case further indicates that
Vijaychandra Shukla, i.e. the petitioner has filed
one proceeding on 13th March, 2006 in the Court of
learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad, being
Criminal Misc. Application numbered as Inquiry Case
No.9 of 2006 for the offence punishable under
sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of IPC
alleging against respondent No.2 that there was
absolutely no incident which took place in the
Company to nominate respondent No.2 as its Managing
Director. On the contrary, it has been alleged that
brother, who was the Managing Director, has never
resigned as he was in the hospital and was not in a
position to put any signature and the factum of
passing of a resolution on 10th May, 2004 was never
happened in the Company. In fact, a collusion was
alleged in the complaint being Inquiry Case No.9 of
2006 amongst the accused persons of that case, which
is at page 23 of the petition compilation and
therefore, from the record, it appears that
allegations and counter allegations are levelled in
the complaints interse between petitioner No.1 and
respondent No.2 with respect to passing of
resolution dated 10th May, 2004 whereby respondent
No.2 is said to have emerged as Managing Director of
the Company in question. Now this complaint was put
to motion and section 202 of Cr.P.C. Process was also
ordered as is reflecting from the Inquiry Case No.9
of 2006 on page 28 of the petition compilation.
8. The first complaint, which is filed by the respondent
No.2 as well as by the petitioner with respect to
very same crucial question, is centering around the
appointment/nomination of respondent No.2 as Managing
Director in the Company and Joint Managing Director
of petitioner No.1. This center of controversy
between the parties was sent by the respective
authorities for further inquiry. Pending this, on 1st
September, 2007, another complaint came to be filed
by the very respondent No.2 before the very same
Police Station i.e. J.P. Road Police Station,
Vadodara, essentially against the present petitioner
No.1 by joining other persons as accused and this
complaint appears to have been filed for the incident
which is alleged to have taken place any time after
12th May 2004 and therefore, question arose whether in
the background of aforesaid circumstances, this
subsequent complaint with this slight modification
is maintainable or not and to make scrutiny on this
legal issue, the averments of the subsequent second
complaint are required to be analysed.
9. A bare look at the said complaint prima facie gives
an impression that this is a substantive second
complaint in which not only the attempt of the
alleged incident is figuring differently but some
more accused persons are added with a specific role
alleged against them and this complaint also came to
be filed for the offence punishable under sections
419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 472 and 474 read with
section 120B of IPC. In this complaint, it is alleged
and stated in paragraph No.4 that on 24/11/2006, one
bogus and fraudulent document came to be prepared in
collusion with each other by the accused persons and
though the Company’s office actually is situated at
501 Windsor Plaza, R.C.Dutt Road, Vadodara, the same
was shown wrongly at 18, Vijas Park Society,
Navrangpura, Ahmedabad, and thereby the office
address has been shifted at Ghodasar, Ahmedabad and
for that purpose, accused Nos.6 and 8 have played
role for preparation of said bogus documents. As per
the complaint, accused No.6 has signed as authorised
officer of the Company whereas accused No.8 has
certified and put the signature and thereby knowing
fully well that this bogus document is forged one,
the same is filed along with ROC Form No.18. This
complaint is further alleging that accused Nos.2 and
4, though not Directors of the Company, have been
appointed as Directors on 24th November, 2006 and for
that purpose, the Company’s documents have been
prepared. It is also alleged in this complaint that
though accused No.7 was never the Director in the
Company, still however, he has been shown as Director
and has resigned on 23rd November, 2006 and accused
No.6 though was never authorised by the Company has
certified and therefore, in collusion with each
other, this resignation of accused No.7 as Director
was got prepared, concocted and filed along with ROC
office in Form No.32. It has also been alleged in
this second complaint that similarly accused Nos.1
and 5 were never appointed as Directors but were
acting as Directors of the Company and their
resignation documents have also been prepared and in
turn, the Company has accepted and thereby created a
fabricated record in the Company itself and this has
also been certified by accused Nos.6 and 8 as well
and it has also been submitted before ROC in Form
No.32 (addendum). So much so that it is also alleged
in the second complaint that accused No.2 who was
never appointed as Managing Director but solely with
a view to grab funds of the Company got himself
appointed as Managing Director on 23/11/2006 and for
that purpose, again accused Nos.6 and 8 have
certified and filled in ROC Form Nos.23 and 25
respectively and the same were filled in before ROC
with the signature of accused Nos.6 and 8. This
indicates that if the Board of Directors meeting was
convened on 23/11/2006, then, how Hira Rani can act
as Managing Director on 22/10/2006. This itself is a
clear example of fraudulent act on the part of
respondents accused of this complaint. It is further
specifically alleged in the complaint that accused No.3
is not a Director of the Company at any point of
time. Still, his resignation as a Director came to be
created and again accused Nos.6 and 7 have certified
the same i.e. later on resignation dated 24/11/2006
was again submitted before ROC vide Form No.32. It
has also been specifically alleged that accused No.6,
who is said to be authorised signatory of the
Company, the document of electronic signature came to
be created for the purpose of certification and all
these documents have been certified by accused No.8,
which is nothing but a clear case of conspiracy and
by alleging this, this second complaint came to be
filed on 1st September, 2007.
10. The record of the case further indicates that this
second complaint came to be filed during which the
first complaint was appeared to have been processed
to some extent in which statements of present
petitioner have been recorded and thereafter, it
appears that before various authorities including
Chief Minister, the present petitioner has filed
detailed representations to independently inquire. In
this representative form of grievance raised by the
petitioner, there appears to be a reference to a
notice given to the bank dated 14.3.2005 submitted by
the petitioner and there also appears to be a
reference to the police complaint filed by the
respondent No.2. Now these disputed versions of both
the sides are pending before appropriate authorities
and upon an inquiry by the Court, both the learned
advocates have stated that the issues are pending
before appropriate authorities and in the meantime,
in the month of October, 2007, the petitioner i.e.
Vijaychandra Shukla has come up with this petition
for quashing the second complaint filed by the
respondent No.2 being C.R.No.284 of 2007 before J.P.
Road Police Station, Baroda, and essentially the
contention is raised that this second complaint in
the background of these facts is not maintainable and
therefore, the jurisdiction of this Court under
section 482 of Cr.P.C. is invoked.
11. In the background of aforesaid analysis of three
complaints, one filed by respondent No.2 on 9/3/2005
before J.P. Road Police Station, Baroda, another
filed in the form of Inquiry Application No.9 of 2006
filed by petitioner No.1 and the impugned complaint
which has been filed on 1/9/2007 by respondent No.2
again before very same J.P. Road Police Station being
C.R.No.I-284 of 2007, it appears that in the
complaint in question which has been filed by the
respondent No.2, there appears to be a time
difference of alleged commission of crime. It also
transpires from the said complaint filed by
respondent No.2 that there are some other accused
persons added whereas in the first complaint, it was
filed only against petitioner No.1 i.e. Vijaychandra
Shukla. In addition thereto, from the averments of
the complaint, there appears to be a crucial date of
reference of 10/5/2004 and also appears to be an
allegation of conspiracy, collusion and role of each
accused person asserted.
12. If averments of first complaint are to be looked into
on page 18, there appears to be a reference of
offences punishable under sections 429 and 467 i.e.
forging of valuable security, will etc., section 468
i.e. forgery for the purpose of cheating and section
472 i.e. using as a genuine a forged document or
electronic record. If the second complaint is to be
looked into, the same is filed under sections 419 and
420 and also under section 120B of IPC which has the
allegation of criminal conspiracy amongst eight
accused persons including present petitioner No.1
which element was not there in the first complaint.
The grievance which has been voiced out in the first
complaint and which has been mentioned in the second
complaint has a little different version and how
conspiracy has been hatched is narrated in detail
and therefore, a bare look at the said complaint
appears to be little different. Of course, it may
have different averments and allegations but the same
are to be viewed in the context of main allegations
levelled in the first complaint. Thus, prima facie,
the issue whether the second complaint is to be held
maintainable or not is to be judged in the context of
the scheme of the Act. Therefore, considering this
peculiar set of circumstances, now if the law on the
subject is to be viewed and analyzed, following
circumstances and propositions are worth to be taken
care of before coming to any conclusion in this
regard and hence, the same as such are hereinafter
referred to and considered.
13. Under the scheme of Cr.P.C., if FIR under section 154
of Cr.P.C. is seen, it is a very important piece of
document which sets the machinery of criminal law in
motion and marks the commencement of investigation
which ends with the formation of opinion under
section 169 or section 170 of Cr.P.C., as the case
may be, and forwarding of a police report under
section 173 of Cr.P.C. Further, an FIR which is
recorded under section 154 of the Cr.P.C. is not a
substantive piece of evidence. Its only use is to
contradict or corroborate the matter thereof. The FIR
need not contain the minutest details as to how the
offence had taken place nor it is required to contain
the names of offenders or witnesses. But it must
atleast contain some information about crime being
committed as also some information about the manner
in which the cognizable offence has been committed.
The reading of the provisions of section 154 Cr.P.C.
therefore postulates that it is an information about
the manner in which cognizable offence has been
committed which, after registration, sets the
machinery of criminal law in motion. Similarly, if
other provisions are to be looked into, the detailed
procedure for investigation is spelt out in section
157 and how the report is to be submitted upon an
investigation is also enumerated in later provisions
of Chapter XII of Cr.P.C. Chapter XIII of Cr.P.C.
which has also postulated the place of inquiry
ordinarily and therefore, the complaint need not
contain every details about commission of offence and
the detection thereof along with all information and
inquiry is the bounden duty of investigating
machinery. The investigating machinery is also
couched with the power specifically that if during
the course of investigation any incriminating further
material against any person is discovered, the
authority has got the power to proceed in accordance
with law and therefore, every information connected
with the main offence including every person
connected with it found by investigating machinery
can form the part and subject matter of report being
supplied and submitted by the authority. Even if
after conclusion of investigation in response to the
filing of FIR and submission of report under section
173(2) of Cr.P.C. the Officer in charge of Police
Station comes across any further information
pertaining to centering around the main issue, he can
make further investigation normally with the leave
of the Court and forward further evidence, if
collected, with further report or reports under
section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. and therefore, ample power
is invested under Cr.P.C. in the investigating
machinery to look into in detail, inquire and
investigate all the circumstances encircling the main
offence which is alleged to have been committed and
therefore, in view of aforesaid circumstances, if we
look at the tenability of the second complaint, the
concept of ‘sameness’ is required to be pressed into
service. The test of ‘sameness’ is to be applied to
find out whether both the FIRs relate to the same
incident in respect of same occurrence or are in
regard to altogether different incident and
therefore, under the normal circumstance, there can
be no second FIR and no fresh investigation on
receipt of every subsequent information in respect of
same cognizable offence or same occurrence giving
rise to one or more cognizable offence and all
subsequent information will be covered by section 172
of Cr.P.C. and Officer in charge of Police Station
has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence
reported in FIR but also all other connected offences
found to have been committed in the course of same
transaction or same occurrence and file one or more
reports as provided under section 173 of Cr.P.C. and
therefore, in the light of the scheme of sections
154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 of Cr.P.C.,
the normal analysis which is emerging is that there
can be no second FIR and no fresh investigation.
14. A further fact also to be considered is that
administering criminal justice is a two end process
where guarding the ensured rights of the accused
under the Constitution is as imperative as ensuring
justice to the victim. Thus, a just balance between
fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed under
the Constitution and expansive power of police to
investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by
the Court. Accordingly, this sweeping power of
investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen
each time to fresh investigation by the police in
respect of same incident giving rise to one or more
cognizable offences and therefore, the investigating
officers are bestowed with dual duties i.e.
investigating the matter extensively and subsequently
collect the reliable evidence to establish the same
and therefore, the scheme of the Act has empowered
the investigating machinery that even after filing a
report, if the investigating officer comes to
possession of further information or material, there
is no need to register a fresh FIR as he is empowered
to make further investigation of course with the
leave of the Court and can form and submit further
report and therefore, under the scheme of the
provisions contained under section 154 onwards of
Cr.P.C., the earliest or the first information in
regard to commission of cognizable offence satisfies
the requirement of section 154 of Cr.P.C. and
therefore, there can be no need to entertain the
second FIR almost on a similar set of circumstance.
15. Now in the light of aforesaid position prevailing
under Cr.P.C., the Court has to evaluate both the
FIRs whether it contains and satisfies the test of
‘sameness’ or not. Thus, if we look at the first
complaint which is lodged on 9/3/2005 and the second
complaint which is lodged on 1/9/2007, the following
are the circumstances which are the yardsticks to
take a just decision whether subsequent FIR is
tenable or not.
16. As stated earlier, in the first complaint which has
been filed by respondent No.2 before J.P. Road Police
Station in the month of March, 2005, the main
allegation is centering around the controversy about
appointment of respondent No.2 as Managing Director
on 10.5.2004 in the Company known as SCI
International Securities Limited. It is also
specifically averred in the said complaint that
necessary forms for sending to Registrar of Companies
are filled in through Chartered Accountant, Shri
K.G.Agrawal. In the later portion of the complaint,
it is mentioned that State Bank of Saurashtra has
informed about new Directors, who are altered in the
Company and further it has been informed by the bank
that Joint Managing Director, Shri Vijaychandra
Shukla is said to have been in charge and therefore,
compulsorily his signature is to be taken. In the
last paragraph of the said complaint, it is clearly
emerging that this petitioner No.1 Shri Vijaychandra
Shukla has fabricated the signature of respondent
No.2’s husband, Shri Sureshchandra Shukla and got his
name joined as Managing Director of the Company and
therefore, in the last line of the said complaint, it
is specifically averred that against all responsible
persons including petitioner No.1, old Directors and
Officers of the Company as well as Officers of State
Bank of Saurashtra, the complaint appears to have
been lodged and therefore, essentially the dispute is
centering around the placement of Managing Director
and in furtherance, every step found to have been
taken in connivance may surface during the course of
investigation and therefore, attributed against all
Directors, Officers of the Company as well as State
Bank of Saurashtra. Now this complaint is set to
motion by lodging before J.P. Road Police Station,
Vadodara.
17. Now comparing with this, if the second complaint
which is the subject matter of present proceeding is
to be looked into which is lodged on 1.9.2007, the
controversy reflects around the main dispute of the
placement of Managing Director on 10.5.2004. What has
been additionally asserted is that as a consequence
of that appointment as Managing Director, petitioner
No.1 in connivance with other Directors, has changed
the place of registration office of the Company and
has altered the Directors in the Company and
therefore, these are the additional conduct alleged
in the complaint which took place pursuant to
petitioner No.1 being in charge of the Company as
Managing Director which is seriously opposed by
respondent No.2 and therefore, the grievances voiced
out in both the complaints appear to be almost
similar and the additional information and the
accused persons who are added by alleging
specifically are forming part of investigation of the
very first complaint which was already put to motion
by respondent No.2. This subsequent complaint which
has been filed before the very same Police Station is
merely an additional information which can be gone
into during the course of process of first complaint.
Had there been any substantive distinct offence being
made out, possibly the second complaint could have a
different connotation altogether. But, it appears
that these allegations, which are levelled in the
second complaint, are centering around the grievance
of the main first complaint and all the persons, who
took part in the commission of this main complaint,
can be dealt with by the investigating machinery
while conducting investigation of the original
complaint. In light of this factual data available on
record, it transpires that the subsequent complaint
has got only an additional figure of collusion and
conspiracy between petitioner No.1 and other
Directors and officers of the Company which is
incidental and consequential to the commission of
main offence alleged in the first complaint. In light
of this circumstance, if the Court analyses the
position of law prevailing at present, it appears
that the second complaint would not be maintainable
and fact remains that it is not a cross case but
additional entries which are alleged in response to
the first complaint and therefore, in the background
of this factual scenario, the Court has to deal with
the points which have been raised by learned
advocates representing the parties on the issue of
maintainability of second complaint under the law.
18. As stated earlier, it emerges that under the Scheme
of the provisions contained under Cr.P.C. more
particularly sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169,
170 and 173, there can be no second FIR to be
entertained at the instance of respondent No.2 and
every subsequent information in respect of the main
offence or occurrence even if raising one or more
cognizable offence, no fresh investigation deserves
to be undertaken. All such subsequent information,
which are contained in the second complaint, will be
covered by section 162 of Cr.P.C. and officer in
charge of Police Station is under a legal obligation
to investigate not merely the cognizable complaint
reported in the FIR, but has also to consider other
connected offences found to have been committed in
the course of same transaction or the same occurrence
and has to file one or more reports as provided under
section 173 of Cr.P.C. Since the main offence which
has been alleged on 10.5.2004 by virtue of which
petitioner No.1 is said to have controlled the
Company in the capacity as Managing Director, all
consequential steps taken by him can form a part of
investigation of the first complaint which is
substantially alleging and as we have analysed the
factual data of both the complaints, every subsequent
information can be covered by investigating machinery
while submitting the report.
19. The law has amply entrusted power with the
investigating agency that even if after conclusion of
investigation pursuant to filing of the first FIR and
even after submission of report under section 173(2)
of Cr.P.C., the officer in charge of Police Station
comes across any further information pertaining to
the same incident, he can make further investigation
normally with the leave of the Court and forward
further evidence, if collected, and therefore, for
the allegation made in the second complaint filed by
respondent No.2 before the very same Police Station,
there need not be any fresh investigation or
registering of a second FIR.
20. In the light of aforesaid circumstances, if the test
of ‘sameness’ is applied to find out whether both the
FIRs relate to the same incident in respect to same
occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which
are in two or more parts of the very same
transaction, it would be seen that the answer is
clearly in affirmative as the consequential steps
which are alleged in the second complaint are having
a direct co-relation and connection with the
original offence which has been alleged against
petitioner No.1 having fraudulently secured the
position as Managing Director of the Company and
therefore, it appears that merely because some more
accused persons are added in the second complaint and
some subsequent information is said to have been
executed would not alter the situation as it is well
within the competence of investigating machinery to
consider during the course of investigation of the
original complaint while submitting the report and
therefore, considering this set of circumstances,
this Court is of the opinion that second complaint is
not maintainable and this is because of the fact that
not only a fair trial is envisaged under the
constitutional rights of a citizen, but a fair
investigation is also a part and parcel of
constitutional rights guaranteed under Articles 20
and 21 of the Constitution of India and therefore,
investigation also must be in fair, transparent and
judicious manner as it is the minimum requirement of
rule of law. It is the duty of Investigating Officer
to conduct the investigation and avoid any kind of
mischief or harassment even to the accused persons as
well. As appearing from the record, to continue with
the fresh investigation of the second complaint may
turn out to be a mischief, coercion or harassment as
well since substantially the first complaint is
covering almost every part of grievance consequently
voiced out in the second complaint. On the contrary,
petitioner No.1 has also tried to ventilate his
grievance by lodging Criminal Inquiry Case No.9 of
2006 before learned Metropolitan Magistrate,
Ahmedabad, and therefore, when substantially the
grievance of second complaint is already ceased by
the investigating machinery, there is no reason to
allow subsequent complaint being investigated
separately. The Court cannot presume that
investigating machinery will not conduct free and
fair investigation in response to the complaint which
is very much before it in the form of first
complaint. Of course, either side has not projected
as to what has happened to the proceedings of the
first complaint which has already been lodged.
Nevertheless, it appears that the second complaint
by virtue of the order of this Court has not been
processed any further as the interim relief is
already operative in the present proceeding. Be that
as it may, the Court is of the clear opinion that
looking to the factual situation prevailing on
record, the second complaint is not maintainable.
Even additional charge of conspiracy which is part
and parcel of the act of petitioner No.1 which is
alleged in the first complaint can also be gone into
by the authority and therefore, the second complaint
is not possible to be held as maintainable in law and
if it is allowed to be maintainable, the same would
frustrate the very scheme for which the statutory
provisions have been enacted under Cr.P.C.
21. The second complaint would be maintainable only in
case where there are altogether different versions,
different discovery of factual foundations and
altogether new offence is said to have been committed
which has no nexus with the main offence contained
in the first complaint. A perusal of both the FIRs
indicate that allegations are centering around the
very same act of petitioner No.1 of becoming Managing
Director fraudulently in the Company and therefore,
subsequent acts which are alleged in the second
complaint are part of the very same transaction of
becoming Managing Director by petitioner No.1
fraudulently in the Company. Therefore, looking to
the close proximity of the act and the time centering
around the main grievance of the first complaint, the
second complaint lodged appears to be a step
impermissible in law. The Court has to maintain a
just balance between the fundamental rights of the
accused guaranteed under the Constitution of India
and the expansive power of the police to investigate
the cognizable offence has to be struck and this
sweeping power of investigation does not warrant
subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation
by the police in respect of same incident giving rise
to one or more cognizable offences and therefore, it
appears to this Court that this is a fit case in
which the second complaint deserves to be quashed
which could meet the ends of justice.
22. Aforesaid conclusion is substantiated and backed by
series of pronouncements of the Hon’ble Apex Court on
the issue and the same are as such referred to for
the purpose of consideration. The Court has
considered the aforesaid aspect in light of the
proposition of law laid down by series of decisions
right from T.T.Antony’s (supra) case and the
following decisions which are supporting the
conclusion arrived at by this Court. The said
decisions are, therefore, taken in aid for the
purpose of arriving at the present decision:
22.1 In the case of T.T.Antony Vs. State of Kerala and
Others reported in (2001)6 SCC page 181, the relevant
extracts of propositions are contained in paragraph
Nos.18, 19, 22, 25, 27 and 35, which are not being
reproduced here to avoid burden of the judgment.
However, the same has been taken in assistance while
coming to the aforesaid conclusion.
22.2 Similarly, the case of Babubhai Vs. State of Gujarat
and others reported in (2010)12 SCC 254 is also taken
in assistance by the Court more particularly the
relevant extract of the said decision contained in
paragraph No.21 on the issue of test of ‘sameness’
and also on the issue of free and fair investigation
envisaged under Articles 20 and 21 of the
Constitution of India. Paragraph No.21 reads thus:
“ In such a case the court has to examine the
facts and circumstances giving rise to both
the FIRs and the test of sameness is to be
applied to find out whether both the FIRs relate
to the same incident in respect of the same
occurrence or are in regard to the incidents
which are two or more parts of the same
transaction. If the answer is affirmative, the
second FIR is liable to be
quashed. However, in case, the contrary is
proved, where the version in the second FIR
is different and they are in respect of the two
different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is
permissible. In case in respect of the same
incident the accused in the first FIR comes
forward with a different version or counter
claim, investigation on both the FIRs has to be
conducted.”
22.3 Likewise, another decision on the issue is delivered
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Amitbhai
Anilchandra Shah Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation
and another reported in (2013)6 SCC 348 in which,
upon an analysis, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held the
second complaint as being not maintainable and the
relevant extracts of the said decision contained in
paragraph Nos.58.2, 58.3, 58.4, 58.5, 58.9 and 5.10
are worth to be taken note of and hence are
reproduced hereunder:
“58.2 The various provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure clearly show that an officerin-charge
of a police station has to commence
investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157
of the Code on the basis of entry of the First
Information Report, on coming to know of the
commission of cognizable offence. On completion
of investigation and on the basis of evidence
collected, Investigating Officer has to form an
opinion under Section 169 or 170 of the Code and
forward his report to the concerned Magistrate
under Section 173(2) of the Code.
58.3 Even after filing of such a report, if
he comes into possession of further information
or material, there is no need to register a
fresh FIR, he is empowered to make further
investigation normally with the leave of the
Court and where during further investigation, he
collects further evidence, oral or documentary,
he is obliged to forward the same with one or
more further reports which is evident from subsection
(8) of Section 173 of the Code. Under
the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154,
155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 of the
Code, only the earliest or the first information
in regard to the commission of a cognizable
offence satisfies the requirements of Section
154 of the Code. Thus, there can be no second
FIR and, consequently, there can be no fresh
investigation on receipt of every subsequent
information in respect of the same cognizable
offence or the same occurrence or incident
giving rise to one or more cognizable offences.
58.4 Further, on receipt of information
about a cognizable offence or an incident giving
rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on
entering FIR in the Station House Diary, the
officer-in-charge of the police station has to
investigate not merely the cognizable offence
reported in the FIR but also other connected
offences found to have been committed in the
course of the same transaction or the same
occurrence and file one or more reports as
provided in Section 173 of the Code. Sub-section
(8) of Section 173 of the Code empowers the
police to make further investigation, obtain
further evidence (both oral and documentary) and
forward a further report(s) to the Magistrate. A
case of fresh investigation based on the second
or successive FIRs not being a counter case,
filed in connection with the same or connected
cognizable offence alleged to have been
committed in the course of the same transaction
and in respect of which pursuant to the first
FIR either investigation is underway or final
report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded
to the Magistrate, is liable to be interfered
with by the High Court by exercise of power
under Section 482 of the Code or under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution.
58.5 First Information Report is a report
which gives first information with regard to any
offence. There cannot be second FIR in respect
of the same offence/event because whenever any
further information is received by the
investigating agency, it is always in
furtherance of the first FIR.
58.6. ….
58.7. ….
58.8. ….
58.9. Administering criminal justice is a
two-end process, where guarding the ensured
rights of the accused under Constitution is as
imperative as ensuring justice to the victim. It
is definitely a daunting task but equally a
compelling responsibility vested on the court of
law to protect and shield the rights of both.
Thus, a just balance between the fundamental
rights of the accused guaranteed under the
Constitution and the expansive power of the
police to investigate a cognizable offence has
to be struck by the court. Accordingly, the
sweeping power of investigation does not warrant
subjecting a citizen each time to fresh
investigation by the police in respect of the
same incident, giving rise to one or more
cognizable offences. As a consequence, in our
view this is a fit case for quashing the second
F.I.R to meet the ends of justice.
58.10. The investigating officers are the
kingpins in the criminal justice system. Their
reliable investigation is the leading step
towards affirming complete justice to the
victims of the case. Hence they are bestowed
with dual duties i.e. to investigate the matter
exhaustively and subsequently collect reliable
evidences to establish the same.”
23. The contrary decisions, which are pressed into
service by learned advocate, Mr. M.M.Saiyed, learned
advocate for respondent No.2 and which are referred,
if are to be considered in light of factual data
prevailing on the record, it appears to the Court
that since the factual background of those cases are
altogether different, the principle cannot be applied
as a strait-jacket formula as covering different set
of circumstances and therefore, are not possible to
be applied in the background of present facts and
circumstances. However, the Court being duty bound to
consider the same are dealt with hereafter.
23.1 The first judgment which has been tried to be relied
upon by learned advocate, Mr. Saiyed, is the case of
Ram Lal Narang Vs. State (Delhi Administration)
reported in AIR 1979 SC 1791. The proposition laid
down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the said case is
not possible to be adopted here as the situation is
altogether different since in that case, the second
case was filed of conspiracy initiated in a different
Court altogether and the earlier conspiracy case was
already withdrawn. The situation over here is not
comparable to that of aforesaid decision and
therefore, the citation pressed into service is of no
avail.
23.2 Another decision which is tried to be pressed into
service by Mr. Saiyed is the case of Kari Chaudhary
Vs. Most. Sita Devi and others reported in AIR 2002
SC 441. In the said case, the complaint about the
murder of deceased was filed by her mother-in-law and
pursuant to registration of FIR, the investigation
was undertaken. The police during investigation found
that FIR lodged by mother-in-law was false and on the
contrary found that mother-in-law might have
conspired to the murder and in the background of that
fact, the final report was already submitted by the
police in response to which, the complaint lodged by
mother-in-law was quashed and therefore, in the
background of that fact, the second complaint was
filed and the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph No.11
of the said decision found that the final report
cannot be filed by the police albeit against other
accused or that once the proceedings initiated under
FIR lodged by mother-in-law ended in a final report,
the police had no authority to register a second FDIR
and therefore, in light of aforesaid circumstances,
the Hon’ble Apex Court found that it was too
technical a ground to quash the charge whereas the
background of present facts on hand is altogether
different and therefore, it is not possible for this
Court to adopt such course of action as has been held
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above referred case.
23.3 Mr. Saiyed has then cited a decision of the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of Upkar Singh Vs. Ved
Prakash and others reported in AIR 2004 SC 4320 in
which also, the situation was that concerned police
at the relevant point of time was not accepting to
register a counter complaint and therefore, the
Hon’ble Apex Court found that the decision delivered
in the case of T.T.Antony(supra) would not ipso
facto be made applicable to hold that a second
complaint in regard to the same incident filed as a
counter complaint is prohibited and the said
conclusion would lead to serious consequences. Now if
the background of that case is co-related to the
present case on hand, here, there is no question of
any counter complaint, but on the contrary, the first
complaint has the direct bearing on the allegations
which are already levelled in the second complaint
and therefore, it was well within the power of
investigating officer to go into the aspects in
continuance of investigation of first complaint and
therefore, this judgment is of no avail to respondent
No.2 though an attempt is made by their learned
advocate Mr.Saiyed.
23.4 Similarly is the case of Nirmal Singh Kahlon Vs.
State of Punjab and Ors. reported in AIR 2009 SC
page 984. In this case also, the facts are again
quite distinct and on the contrary, in that case, the
High Court in writ petition by candidates against
scam in recruitment has held that there can be an
investigation to be made by Central Bureau of
Investigation and thereupon Central Bureau of
Investigation lodged the second FIR and therefore,
the canvass of two FIRs in that case was altogether
different and therefore, in the background of that
case, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that second FIR
would be maintainable. We are afraid to adopt such
course of action when the facts of the present case
are totally different and therefore, the said
judgment cannot be applied as a strait-jacket formula
in respectful consideration of the same.
23.5 Mr. Saiyed has further drawn the attention to another
decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Anju
Chaudhary Vs. State of U.P. and Anr. reported in AIR
2013 SCW page 245 wherein also, the facts are
altogether different. The said case was pertaining to
FIR related to incident of burning of shop which was
lodged against unknown persons and the subsequent FIR
related to meeting but after the incident of shop
burning and therefore, the FIR was lodged by
different persons, related to distinct occurrences at
a different place and against different persons and
therefore, in the absence of proximity of time,
unity, proximity of place, continuity of action,
commonality of purpose or design, it cannot be held
that second complaint is maintainable and therefore,
this case is also not in any way helpful to
Mr.Saiyed. At this stage, at pains, we have to
mention that there is a tendency of citing judgments
in numbers without examining whether the facts are
identically situated or not and ratio can be applied
or not and therefore, the Courts are unduly burdened
with dealing with the cases where there appears to
be no applicability. However, since it has already
been cited, the Court has to deal with the same.
23.6 The last judgment cited by Mr. Saiyed is the case of
Amitabhai Anilchandra Shah Vs. Central Bureau of
Investigation and another reported in (2013)6 SCC
page 348, 2013 wherein also, relying upon the facts,
the Hon’ble Apex Court has propounded a proposition
that second FIR in case of offence relating to same
transaction is impermissible as laid down in
T.T.Antony’s case. The said ratio is to be understood
in the context of situation prevailing on record and
therefore, by analysing, the Hon’ble Apex Court has
propounded that the situations are not covered
whether a second FIR is permissible in cross case if
the offences disclosed are not part of first FIR nor
can they be said to form part of same transaction nor
can they be said to be arising as a consequence of
the offences covered by the first FIR. In that
background only, the second FIR can be examined.
However, in the present case on hand, the facts are
such which clearly indicate that there is no question
of any cross case contained in the second complaint
nor it has got a different transaction altogether
which has no nexus with main act as, what has been
alleged in the second FIR is not only forming part of
first FIR but the same are as a consequence of first
FIR in which allegations are levelled and therefore,
this proposition is laid down. However, it is
difficult for this Court to straightaway apply said
proposition to the present background and therefore,
since the judgments cited by Mr. Saiyed have no
applicability in view of present peculiar set of
circumstances, the same cannot be resorted to for the
purpose of arriving at a conclusion and therefore,
considering this set of circumstances, the Court is
of the opinion that subsequent complaint is not
possible to be held as maintainable in view of the
Scheme of the Act.
24. In view of the aforesaid situation prevailing on
record and in view of the proposition of law laid
down by series of decisions which have been dealt
with by this Court, now the further question posed
before the Court is whether background of these facts
warrants interference by the Court in exercise of
inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of Cr.P.C.
considering the well defined proposition on exercise
of such jurisdiction or not. The Court is of the
considered opinion that the second complaint which
has been filed by the very same complainant before
the very same Police Station has got the direct
effect on the first complaint and the allegations are
forming part of the main act and allegation levelled
in the first complaint and the steps alleged in the
second complaint are consequences of the act alleged
in the first FIR and therefore, the same is not
acceptable as maintainable in law and therefore, to
permit such complaint to be processed any further
would be travesty of justice. Thus, this is a fit
case in which the Court deems it proper to exercise
inherent jurisdiction as steps against the accused
cannot be allowed to squeeze them again and again
almost on similar situation and same is also not
conceptually permitted in the fundamental rights
guaranteed under the the Constitution of India even
to the accused as stated above.
25. While coming to this conclusion, even the recent law
laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court can also be taken
for assistance which is reported in (2015)11 SCC page
145 in the case of Kamla Kant Dubey Vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh and Others wherein it has been
specifically laid down that FIR need not contain
every single detail and every part of the prosecution
case and therefore, when main substratum is forming
part of the FIR, it is left to the investigating
authority to investigate in detail and therefore,
stray observations made in paragraph No.18 would
definitely lead to a situation that basic substratum
of the matter is already contained in the FIR. In the
present case on hand, simply because further
information are not contained as part of first FIR
thereof would not permit respondent No.2 to lodge the
second complaint with respect to very same
controversy. Consequential steps generated by
petitioner No.1 can well be examined during the
course of investigation and therefore, it seems that
this second complaint tantamount to have been used as
a lever to pressurise the petitioners which in no
circumstances can be permitted by this Court. The
Court is sufficiently empowered under section 482 of
Cr.P.C. to embark upon such an attempt if made to
misuse the process of law. Therefore, the background
of fact is sufficient enough to hold that second
complaint is required to be quashed in the interest
of justice.
26. Yet in another case of D.P. Gulati, Manager Accounts,
Jetking Infotrain Limited Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
and Another reported in (2015)11 SCC page 730, the
Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with an issue of
exercise of power under section 482 of Cr.P.C. has
specifically held that object of exercise of power
under section 482 of Cr.P.C. is to prevent abuse of
process of law and to secure the ends of justice. If
at any point of time, the Court feels that there are
all possible chances that the complainant has
resorted to abuse of the process of law, the Court
can intervene in exercise of power under section 482
of Cr.P.C. The relevant extracts contained in
paragraph Nos.7 and 8 of the said decision deserve to
be reproduced hereinafter to substantiate the
conclusion:
“We have carefully considered the rival
submissions made before us. From bare perusal of
Section 482 of the Code, it is clear that the
object of exercise of power under the Section is
to prevent abuse of process of law, and to
secure ends of justice. In Rajiv Thapar and
others v. Madan Lal Kapoor1, this Court has
enumerated the steps required to be followed
before invoking inherent jurisdiction by the
High Court under Section 482 of the Code as
under:-(2013) 3 SCC 330 : (AIR 2013 SC (Supp)
1056).
"30. Based on the factors canvassed in the
foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate
the following steps to determine the
veracity of a prayer for quashment raised
by an accused by invoking the power vested
in the High Court under Section 482, Cr P
C:
30.1. Step one : whether the material relied
upon by the accused is sound, reasonable,
and indubitable i.e. the material is of
sterling and impeccable quality?
30.2. Step two : whether the material
relied upon by the accused would rule out
the assertions contained in the charges
levelled against the accused i.e. the
material is sufficient to reject and
overrule the factual assertions contained
in the complaint i.e. the material is such
as would persuade a reasonable person to
dismiss and condemn the factual basis of
the accusations as false?
30.4. Step four whether proceeding with the
trial would result in an abuse of process
of the court, and would not serve the ends
of justice?
30.4. Step four whether proceeding with the
trial would result in an abuse of process
of the court, and would not serve the ends
of justice?
30.5. If the answer to all the steps is in
the affirmative, the judicial conscience of
the High Court should persuade it to quash
such criminal proceedings in exercise of
power vested in it under Section 482. CrPC.
Such exercise of power, besides doing
justice to the accused, would save precious
court time, which would otherwise be wasted
in holding such a trial (as well as
proceedings arising therefrom) specially
when it is clear that the same would not
conclude in the conviction of the accused."
8. In Rishipal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh
and another2, explaining the law in the similar
circumstances, as in the present case, this
Court observed, in paragraph 17, as under:-
(2014) 7 SCC 215 : (AIR 2014 SC 2567).
"It is no doubt true that the courts have
to be very careful while exercising the
power under Section 482, CrPC. At the same
time we should not allow a litigant to file
vexatious complaints to otherwise settle
their scores by setting the criminal law
into motion, which is a pure abuse of
process of law and it has to be interdicted
at the threshold."
In Rishipal Singh (supra), the complainant, who
was an accused in connection with an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the Act, had
filed a criminal complaint relating to offences
punishable under Sections 34, 379, 411, 417,
418, 467, 468, 471 and 477, IPC.”
27. In view of the aforesaid proposition of law, which is
well defined by catena of decisions, the background
of these facts require the Court to intervene and
exercise inherent jurisdiction and accordingly, the
second complaint is not only non-maintainable but has
the colour of abuse of process of law at the
instance of respondent No.2 and therefore, the Court
deems it proper to quash the same.
28. Thus, complaint filed by respondent No.2 being Crime
Register No.I-284 of 2007 before J.P. Road Police
Station, Vadodara, against the petitioners and also
the proceedings arising out of the said complaint
are quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute.
While coming to this conclusion, the word of caution
to be maintained is that in view of aforesaid
position prevailing on record, the Court has deemed
it proper to quash the second complaint. However,
quashing of this complaint would not preclude or
relieve the Investigating Officer from examining the
first complaint in detail and taking every step to
bring home the crime which is alleged in the said
complaint. With these observations, the petition is
allowed in aforesaid terms.
(A.J. SHASTRI, J.)
RADHAN
Print Page
laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court can also be taken
for assistance which is reported in (2015)11 SCC page
145 in the case of Kamla Kant Dubey Vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh and Others wherein it has been
specifically laid down that FIR need not contain
every single detail and every part of the prosecution
case and therefore, when main substratum is forming
part of the FIR, it is left to the investigating
authority to investigate in detail and therefore,
stray observations made in paragraph No.18 would
definitely lead to a situation that basic substratum
of the matter is already contained in the FIR. In the
present case on hand, simply because further
information are not contained as part of first FIR
thereof would not permit respondent No.2 to lodge the
second complaint with respect to very same
controversy. Consequential steps generated by
petitioner No.1 can well be examined during the
course of investigation and therefore, it seems that
this second complaint tantamount to have been used as
a lever to pressurise the petitioners which in no
circumstances can be permitted by this Court. The
Court is sufficiently empowered under section 482 of
Cr.P.C. to embark upon such an attempt if made to
misuse the process of law. Therefore, the background
of fact is sufficient enough to hold that second
complaint is required to be quashed in the interest
of justice.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION NO. 14624 of 2007
VIJAYCHANDRA PRAKASH SHUKLA & 2.
V
STATE OF GUJARAT & 1.
CORAM: MR.JUSTICE A.J. SHASTRI
Date : 27/01/2017
1. The petitioners have filed this petition for the
purpose of quashing of the complaint filed by
respondent No.2 being Crime Register No.I-284 of 2007
before J.P. Road Police Station, Vadodara, and also
the proceedings arising out of the said complaint.
2. The brief facts leading to the rise of present
petition are as under:
2.1 M/s SCI International Securities Ltd. was established
by one Sureshchandra Shukla, brother of petitioner
No.1. In the said company, petitioner No.1 and four
other persons were appointed as Directors. Marriage
of Sureshchandra Shukla was solemnized at Uttar
Pradesh on 10.3.1977 with one Hira Rani and a child
named Vilaspati (Pinki) was born out of said wedlock.
Said Sureshchandra Shukla passed away on 12.5.2004.
Respondent No.2, who claiming herself to be the
second wife of Sureshchandra Shukla, stated that she
was appointed as Managing Director in M/s SCI
International Securities Ltd. by passing a resolution
on the day before passing away of Sureshchandra
Shukla.
2.2 On 9.3.2005, a complaint came to be filed by
respondent No.2 against petitioner No.1 being
C.R.No.I-89 of 2005 before J.P. Road Police Station,
Vadodara, alleging that petitioner No.1 was appointed
as Joint Managing Director with the help of bogus
documents and in fact, she is the Managing Director.
2.3 Petitioner No.1 also filed criminal case being
Criminal Inquiry Case No.9 of 2006 before the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad, alleging
commission offences punishable under sections 406,
420, 467, 468, 471 read with section 120B of Indian
Penal Code against three persons including respondent
No.2 alleging that appointment of respondent No.2 as
Managing Director is based on fraud and concocted
documents. It was alleged that Form Nos.22, 32 and
25C were created by respondent No.2 by putting
signature on behalf of the person who was in ICCU
ward of the hospital and it was sent to Registrar of
Companies. Said complaint was sent for inquiry under
section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.” for short) and
it is pending for consideration.
2.4 As a counterblast, respondent no.2 filed a complaint
being C.R.No.I-284 of 2007 before J.P.Police Station
implicating other members including petitioner No.1
making almost same grievance which was made in her
earlier complaint.
2.5 It is this complaint which is made the subject of
present petition filed under section 482 of Cr.P.C.
for seeking quashment of the complaint.
2.6 The petition originally came up for hearing before
the Court on 6th December, 2007 whereupon the Court
issued notice and granted ad-interim relief in terms
of paragraph 7(C). Thereafter, the matter was being
listed from time to time. The Court vide order dated
10.7.2015 admitted the matter by issuing rule and
confirmed the interim relief granted vide order dated
6.12.2007. Resultantly, the proceedings of the
complaint do not appear to have been processed any
further. In the light of aforesaid situation, the
petition has now come up for final hearing before
this Court.
3. Mr. Ashish Dagli, appearing for the petitioners, has
contended that the complaint ex-facie is not
maintainable and the same is nothing but a clear
example of abuse of the process of law. He has
further contended that before filing of the present
complaint, there was one another complaint lodged on
9
th of March, 2005 being C.R.No.I-89 of 2005 against
petitioner No.1 alleging that with the help of bogus
documents, petitioner No.1 got himself appointed as
Director and the complainant is running Security
Services as Managing Director and the date of her
appointment was shown as 10th May, 2004 and therefore,
the documents appear to have been concocted. He has
further contended that petitioner No.1 simultaneously
has filed criminal case against three persons
including respondent No.2 for the offences punishable
under sections 46, 420, 467, 468, 471 read with
section 120B of IPC alleging that appointment of
respondent No.2 as Managing Director is based upon
fraud and concocted documents created by respondent
No.2 and Form Nos.23, 32 and 25 C were got signed on
behalf of the person, who was in ICCU ward at the
hospital. Based upon which, the said complaint was
processed and when the case was investigated before
the very same Police Station, this second complaint
came to be filed by respondent No.2 implicating other
members as accused including petitioner No.1 making
almost similar grievance for which, an appropriate
remedy before the civil forum is very much available.
He has drawn the attention of this Court that before
filing the complaint by respondent No.2, petitioner
No.1 had filed detailed representations before the
authority including police, Home Department and
Police Commissioner and by referring to these
representations, it has been contended that the
apprehension which was voiced out against respondent
No.2 has come true and this complaint is an outburst
of the proceedings initiated by petitioner No.1 and
therefore, apparently, the complaint in question is
nothing but a clear example of the abuse of the
process of law. He has further contended that way
back in the year 2005, even a legal notice was also
given to State Bank of Saurashtra, Baroda, whereby
petitioner No.1 has requested his pleader to intimate
not to permit respondent No.2 and his associates to
operate the bank account of SCI International
Securities Limited and therefore, entire chronology
of events and the grievance which is voiced out is
nothing but a clear example of civil dispute and
without resorting to appropriate forum, with a view
to put pressure upon petitioner No.1, this complaint
came to be filed. Mr. Dagli has further contended
that it is seriously in dispute how the signature of
brother of petitioner No.1 of a meeting dated 10th
May, 2004 was secured particularly when his brother
was suffering from the disease and was actually
admitted in ICCU Ward of Medi Surge Hospital and
passed away on 12th of May, 2004. He has further
contended that, in fact, the sister-in-law of the
petitioner i.e. wife of Sureshchandra Shukla was
residing at Uttar Pradesh and number of documentary
evidences were produced before the investigating
agency when the earlier complaint was made that she
is the legally wedded wife and Vilaspati is the
daughter out of wedlock of the deceased with Hira
Rani and therefore, the situation is such where
respondent No.2 found herself in helpless condition
and when she is not likely to succeed as per her
wishes in the first complaint and therefore, this
present complaint in question is filed as a
counterblast to the complaint filed by petitioner
No.1 which is with a view to divert the attention
from the core issue. According to him, second
complaint ought not to have been registered at all as
substantially the allegations are part and parcel of
the earlier complaint and grievance in which, father
of the petitioner has also been implicated and
arraigned as an accused person which indicates the
sole purpose of respondent No.2 in filing such false
and frivolous complaint and therefore, by referring
to this factual data, he has contended that
background of facts are such wherein the entire
second complaint is required to be held as not
maintainable and therefore, requested the Court to
grand the relief as prayed for in the petition. To
substantiate his contentions, he has referred to
following decisions which are to be dealt with in
this judgment at an appropriate stage:
i. (2001)6 SCC page 181 reported in T.T.Antony Vs.
State of Kerala and Others.
ii. (2009)1 SCC 441 in the case of Nirmal Singh
Kahlon Vs. State of Punjab and Others.
iii. (2010)12 SCC 254 in the case of Babubhai Vs.
State of Gujarat and others.
iv. (2013)6 SCC 348 in the case of Amitbhai
Anilchandra Shah Vs. Central Bureau of
Investigation and another.
4. To oppose the stand taken by Mr. Dagli in the present
proceedings, Mr. M.M.Saiyed, learned advocate for the
original complainant i.e. respondent No.2, has
contended that the complaint in substantive form is
very much maintainable and no hyper-technical view
be taken. He has further contended that when in the
first complaint the documents have been surfaced,
there arose the need for filing the complaint by
respondent No.2 and therefore, he has denied that it
is not a counterblast of the first complaint filed by
petitioner No.1. In fact, Mr. Saiyed has contended
that respondent No.2 is very much appointed as
Managing Director and her appointment is not based
upon any concoction or fraudulent act. In fact, the
allegations, which are levelled in the complaint
which is sought to be quashed, are requiring a
thorough investigation and therefore, just because
the petitioner has filed the first complaint, it
cannot be said that subsequent complaint is not
maintainable. A proper resolution came to be passed
in the company and complete procedural formalities
have been completed and only thereafter, appointment
has taken place and therefore, it cannot be said in
any way that simply because the appointment has taken
place prior to couple of days of the death of the
deceased, the same is questionable. In fact, no
inference can be drawn more particularly when a
specific process is undertaken on 10th May, 2004.
There is no concoction or fraud and nothing of that
nature which would permit the authority to raise any
question with respect to her complaint being
maintainable. He has further contended that simply
because the suit is pending, it cannot be said that
no criminal act is ever done by the petitioner and in
fact, civil proceedings have got its own different
impact and therefore, simply because civil suit can
lie, it cannot be said that present complaint is not
maintainable. In fact, there are series of decisions
whereby it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
that both can go on parallel and therefore, simply
because civil proceedings are pending, the
petitioners cannot avoid criminal liability which is
likely to generate out of the complaint filed by
her. Ultimately, Mr. Saiyed has contended and
requested the Court that instead of taking a hypertechnical
view of the matter, the complaint filed by
respondent No.2 deserves to be thoroughly
investigated and therefore, ultimately requested the
Court to dismiss the petition.
4.1 To substantiate aforesaid contentions, Mr. Saiyed has
relied upon following decisions of the Hon’ble Apex
Court on the issue whether second complaint is
maintainable or not:
i) Ram Lal Narang Vs. State (Delhi Administration)
reported in AIR 1979 SC 1791.
ii) Kari Chaudhary Vs. Most. Sita Devi and others
reported in AIR 2002 SC 441.
iii) Upkar Singh Vs. Ved Prakash and others reported
in AIR 2004 SC 4320.
iv) Nirmal Singh Kahlon Vs. State of Punjab and
Ors. reported in AIR 2009 SC page 984.
v) Amitabhai Anilchandra Shah Vs. Central Bureau
of Investigation and another reported in
(2013)6 SCC page 348, 2013.
vi) Anju Chaudhary Vs. State of U.P. And Anr.
reported in AIR 2013 SCW page 245.
These decisions would be discussed in the present
judgment at an appropriate stage hereinafter.
5. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the
respective parties and having gone through the
contents of the materials produced before the Court,
to understand the controversy whether second
complaint is maintainable or not, first of all, the
gist of first complaint is required to be analysed.
6. A perusal of the first complaint being C.R.No.I-89 of
2005 filed by one Varshaben against Vijaychandra
Shukla indicates that it was filed on 9.3.2005 for
the offences alleged to have committed any time prior
to 7.7.2004 punishable under sections 429, 467, 468
and 471 of IPC. The assertion of the said complaint
indicates that Varshaben, widow of Sureshkumar Shukla
residing with son Vikrant, is alleged to have
conducted the affairs of International Securities
Limited which company is essentially dealing in
security services since the last 11 years and she is
a Managing Director of the Company with effect from
10th of May, 2004. She has also asserted in the
complaint that the said company was floated in 1994
from where she was acting as a Director till she was
appointed as Managing Director. Her husband has
expired on 12th of May, 2004, but during the process,
unanimously on 10th of May, 2004, she was nominated as
Managing Director of SCI International Securities
Limited. She has further asserted that due process of
passing resolution in the Board meeting like filling
up necessary forms before the Registrar of Companies
(ROC) was also duly completed and said to have been
sent through their Chartered Accountant, Shri
K.G.Agrawal. It has also been stated in the complaint
that while filling up the forms in ROC, it was learnt
that somebody else has also filled in the form for
being the Director. However, she has emphatically
stated in the complaint that prior to passing of
resolution unanimously appointing herself as Managing
Director, no such resolution has ever been passed.
Subsequently, it has also been learnt that through
the Branch Manager of State Bank of Saurashtra that
Director’s position is altered which is being
informed to them with respect to SCI International
Securities Limited and therefore, informing the
Company of the said bank that there must be a
signature of Managing Director, Vijaychandra Shukla
to conduct the affairs of the bank. At that point of
time, it has been learnt by the complainant that some
fictitious documents have been prepared, concocted
and utilised for the purpose of acting as Managing
Director of the Company and thereby an attempt has
been made to thwart the dealings of the Company and
these averments have been alleged specifically in the
complaint filed on 9th of March, 2005.
7. The record of the case further indicates that
Vijaychandra Shukla, i.e. the petitioner has filed
one proceeding on 13th March, 2006 in the Court of
learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad, being
Criminal Misc. Application numbered as Inquiry Case
No.9 of 2006 for the offence punishable under
sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of IPC
alleging against respondent No.2 that there was
absolutely no incident which took place in the
Company to nominate respondent No.2 as its Managing
Director. On the contrary, it has been alleged that
brother, who was the Managing Director, has never
resigned as he was in the hospital and was not in a
position to put any signature and the factum of
passing of a resolution on 10th May, 2004 was never
happened in the Company. In fact, a collusion was
alleged in the complaint being Inquiry Case No.9 of
2006 amongst the accused persons of that case, which
is at page 23 of the petition compilation and
therefore, from the record, it appears that
allegations and counter allegations are levelled in
the complaints interse between petitioner No.1 and
respondent No.2 with respect to passing of
resolution dated 10th May, 2004 whereby respondent
No.2 is said to have emerged as Managing Director of
the Company in question. Now this complaint was put
to motion and section 202 of Cr.P.C. Process was also
ordered as is reflecting from the Inquiry Case No.9
of 2006 on page 28 of the petition compilation.
8. The first complaint, which is filed by the respondent
No.2 as well as by the petitioner with respect to
very same crucial question, is centering around the
appointment/nomination of respondent No.2 as Managing
Director in the Company and Joint Managing Director
of petitioner No.1. This center of controversy
between the parties was sent by the respective
authorities for further inquiry. Pending this, on 1st
September, 2007, another complaint came to be filed
by the very respondent No.2 before the very same
Police Station i.e. J.P. Road Police Station,
Vadodara, essentially against the present petitioner
No.1 by joining other persons as accused and this
complaint appears to have been filed for the incident
which is alleged to have taken place any time after
12th May 2004 and therefore, question arose whether in
the background of aforesaid circumstances, this
subsequent complaint with this slight modification
is maintainable or not and to make scrutiny on this
legal issue, the averments of the subsequent second
complaint are required to be analysed.
9. A bare look at the said complaint prima facie gives
an impression that this is a substantive second
complaint in which not only the attempt of the
alleged incident is figuring differently but some
more accused persons are added with a specific role
alleged against them and this complaint also came to
be filed for the offence punishable under sections
419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 472 and 474 read with
section 120B of IPC. In this complaint, it is alleged
and stated in paragraph No.4 that on 24/11/2006, one
bogus and fraudulent document came to be prepared in
collusion with each other by the accused persons and
though the Company’s office actually is situated at
501 Windsor Plaza, R.C.Dutt Road, Vadodara, the same
was shown wrongly at 18, Vijas Park Society,
Navrangpura, Ahmedabad, and thereby the office
address has been shifted at Ghodasar, Ahmedabad and
for that purpose, accused Nos.6 and 8 have played
role for preparation of said bogus documents. As per
the complaint, accused No.6 has signed as authorised
officer of the Company whereas accused No.8 has
certified and put the signature and thereby knowing
fully well that this bogus document is forged one,
the same is filed along with ROC Form No.18. This
complaint is further alleging that accused Nos.2 and
4, though not Directors of the Company, have been
appointed as Directors on 24th November, 2006 and for
that purpose, the Company’s documents have been
prepared. It is also alleged in this complaint that
though accused No.7 was never the Director in the
Company, still however, he has been shown as Director
and has resigned on 23rd November, 2006 and accused
No.6 though was never authorised by the Company has
certified and therefore, in collusion with each
other, this resignation of accused No.7 as Director
was got prepared, concocted and filed along with ROC
office in Form No.32. It has also been alleged in
this second complaint that similarly accused Nos.1
and 5 were never appointed as Directors but were
acting as Directors of the Company and their
resignation documents have also been prepared and in
turn, the Company has accepted and thereby created a
fabricated record in the Company itself and this has
also been certified by accused Nos.6 and 8 as well
and it has also been submitted before ROC in Form
No.32 (addendum). So much so that it is also alleged
in the second complaint that accused No.2 who was
never appointed as Managing Director but solely with
a view to grab funds of the Company got himself
appointed as Managing Director on 23/11/2006 and for
that purpose, again accused Nos.6 and 8 have
certified and filled in ROC Form Nos.23 and 25
respectively and the same were filled in before ROC
with the signature of accused Nos.6 and 8. This
indicates that if the Board of Directors meeting was
convened on 23/11/2006, then, how Hira Rani can act
as Managing Director on 22/10/2006. This itself is a
clear example of fraudulent act on the part of
respondents accused of this complaint. It is further
specifically alleged in the complaint that accused No.3
is not a Director of the Company at any point of
time. Still, his resignation as a Director came to be
created and again accused Nos.6 and 7 have certified
the same i.e. later on resignation dated 24/11/2006
was again submitted before ROC vide Form No.32. It
has also been specifically alleged that accused No.6,
who is said to be authorised signatory of the
Company, the document of electronic signature came to
be created for the purpose of certification and all
these documents have been certified by accused No.8,
which is nothing but a clear case of conspiracy and
by alleging this, this second complaint came to be
filed on 1st September, 2007.
10. The record of the case further indicates that this
second complaint came to be filed during which the
first complaint was appeared to have been processed
to some extent in which statements of present
petitioner have been recorded and thereafter, it
appears that before various authorities including
Chief Minister, the present petitioner has filed
detailed representations to independently inquire. In
this representative form of grievance raised by the
petitioner, there appears to be a reference to a
notice given to the bank dated 14.3.2005 submitted by
the petitioner and there also appears to be a
reference to the police complaint filed by the
respondent No.2. Now these disputed versions of both
the sides are pending before appropriate authorities
and upon an inquiry by the Court, both the learned
advocates have stated that the issues are pending
before appropriate authorities and in the meantime,
in the month of October, 2007, the petitioner i.e.
Vijaychandra Shukla has come up with this petition
for quashing the second complaint filed by the
respondent No.2 being C.R.No.284 of 2007 before J.P.
Road Police Station, Baroda, and essentially the
contention is raised that this second complaint in
the background of these facts is not maintainable and
therefore, the jurisdiction of this Court under
section 482 of Cr.P.C. is invoked.
11. In the background of aforesaid analysis of three
complaints, one filed by respondent No.2 on 9/3/2005
before J.P. Road Police Station, Baroda, another
filed in the form of Inquiry Application No.9 of 2006
filed by petitioner No.1 and the impugned complaint
which has been filed on 1/9/2007 by respondent No.2
again before very same J.P. Road Police Station being
C.R.No.I-284 of 2007, it appears that in the
complaint in question which has been filed by the
respondent No.2, there appears to be a time
difference of alleged commission of crime. It also
transpires from the said complaint filed by
respondent No.2 that there are some other accused
persons added whereas in the first complaint, it was
filed only against petitioner No.1 i.e. Vijaychandra
Shukla. In addition thereto, from the averments of
the complaint, there appears to be a crucial date of
reference of 10/5/2004 and also appears to be an
allegation of conspiracy, collusion and role of each
accused person asserted.
12. If averments of first complaint are to be looked into
on page 18, there appears to be a reference of
offences punishable under sections 429 and 467 i.e.
forging of valuable security, will etc., section 468
i.e. forgery for the purpose of cheating and section
472 i.e. using as a genuine a forged document or
electronic record. If the second complaint is to be
looked into, the same is filed under sections 419 and
420 and also under section 120B of IPC which has the
allegation of criminal conspiracy amongst eight
accused persons including present petitioner No.1
which element was not there in the first complaint.
The grievance which has been voiced out in the first
complaint and which has been mentioned in the second
complaint has a little different version and how
conspiracy has been hatched is narrated in detail
and therefore, a bare look at the said complaint
appears to be little different. Of course, it may
have different averments and allegations but the same
are to be viewed in the context of main allegations
levelled in the first complaint. Thus, prima facie,
the issue whether the second complaint is to be held
maintainable or not is to be judged in the context of
the scheme of the Act. Therefore, considering this
peculiar set of circumstances, now if the law on the
subject is to be viewed and analyzed, following
circumstances and propositions are worth to be taken
care of before coming to any conclusion in this
regard and hence, the same as such are hereinafter
referred to and considered.
13. Under the scheme of Cr.P.C., if FIR under section 154
of Cr.P.C. is seen, it is a very important piece of
document which sets the machinery of criminal law in
motion and marks the commencement of investigation
which ends with the formation of opinion under
section 169 or section 170 of Cr.P.C., as the case
may be, and forwarding of a police report under
section 173 of Cr.P.C. Further, an FIR which is
recorded under section 154 of the Cr.P.C. is not a
substantive piece of evidence. Its only use is to
contradict or corroborate the matter thereof. The FIR
need not contain the minutest details as to how the
offence had taken place nor it is required to contain
the names of offenders or witnesses. But it must
atleast contain some information about crime being
committed as also some information about the manner
in which the cognizable offence has been committed.
The reading of the provisions of section 154 Cr.P.C.
therefore postulates that it is an information about
the manner in which cognizable offence has been
committed which, after registration, sets the
machinery of criminal law in motion. Similarly, if
other provisions are to be looked into, the detailed
procedure for investigation is spelt out in section
157 and how the report is to be submitted upon an
investigation is also enumerated in later provisions
of Chapter XII of Cr.P.C. Chapter XIII of Cr.P.C.
which has also postulated the place of inquiry
ordinarily and therefore, the complaint need not
contain every details about commission of offence and
the detection thereof along with all information and
inquiry is the bounden duty of investigating
machinery. The investigating machinery is also
couched with the power specifically that if during
the course of investigation any incriminating further
material against any person is discovered, the
authority has got the power to proceed in accordance
with law and therefore, every information connected
with the main offence including every person
connected with it found by investigating machinery
can form the part and subject matter of report being
supplied and submitted by the authority. Even if
after conclusion of investigation in response to the
filing of FIR and submission of report under section
173(2) of Cr.P.C. the Officer in charge of Police
Station comes across any further information
pertaining to centering around the main issue, he can
make further investigation normally with the leave
of the Court and forward further evidence, if
collected, with further report or reports under
section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. and therefore, ample power
is invested under Cr.P.C. in the investigating
machinery to look into in detail, inquire and
investigate all the circumstances encircling the main
offence which is alleged to have been committed and
therefore, in view of aforesaid circumstances, if we
look at the tenability of the second complaint, the
concept of ‘sameness’ is required to be pressed into
service. The test of ‘sameness’ is to be applied to
find out whether both the FIRs relate to the same
incident in respect of same occurrence or are in
regard to altogether different incident and
therefore, under the normal circumstance, there can
be no second FIR and no fresh investigation on
receipt of every subsequent information in respect of
same cognizable offence or same occurrence giving
rise to one or more cognizable offence and all
subsequent information will be covered by section 172
of Cr.P.C. and Officer in charge of Police Station
has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence
reported in FIR but also all other connected offences
found to have been committed in the course of same
transaction or same occurrence and file one or more
reports as provided under section 173 of Cr.P.C. and
therefore, in the light of the scheme of sections
154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 of Cr.P.C.,
the normal analysis which is emerging is that there
can be no second FIR and no fresh investigation.
14. A further fact also to be considered is that
administering criminal justice is a two end process
where guarding the ensured rights of the accused
under the Constitution is as imperative as ensuring
justice to the victim. Thus, a just balance between
fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed under
the Constitution and expansive power of police to
investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by
the Court. Accordingly, this sweeping power of
investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen
each time to fresh investigation by the police in
respect of same incident giving rise to one or more
cognizable offences and therefore, the investigating
officers are bestowed with dual duties i.e.
investigating the matter extensively and subsequently
collect the reliable evidence to establish the same
and therefore, the scheme of the Act has empowered
the investigating machinery that even after filing a
report, if the investigating officer comes to
possession of further information or material, there
is no need to register a fresh FIR as he is empowered
to make further investigation of course with the
leave of the Court and can form and submit further
report and therefore, under the scheme of the
provisions contained under section 154 onwards of
Cr.P.C., the earliest or the first information in
regard to commission of cognizable offence satisfies
the requirement of section 154 of Cr.P.C. and
therefore, there can be no need to entertain the
second FIR almost on a similar set of circumstance.
15. Now in the light of aforesaid position prevailing
under Cr.P.C., the Court has to evaluate both the
FIRs whether it contains and satisfies the test of
‘sameness’ or not. Thus, if we look at the first
complaint which is lodged on 9/3/2005 and the second
complaint which is lodged on 1/9/2007, the following
are the circumstances which are the yardsticks to
take a just decision whether subsequent FIR is
tenable or not.
16. As stated earlier, in the first complaint which has
been filed by respondent No.2 before J.P. Road Police
Station in the month of March, 2005, the main
allegation is centering around the controversy about
appointment of respondent No.2 as Managing Director
on 10.5.2004 in the Company known as SCI
International Securities Limited. It is also
specifically averred in the said complaint that
necessary forms for sending to Registrar of Companies
are filled in through Chartered Accountant, Shri
K.G.Agrawal. In the later portion of the complaint,
it is mentioned that State Bank of Saurashtra has
informed about new Directors, who are altered in the
Company and further it has been informed by the bank
that Joint Managing Director, Shri Vijaychandra
Shukla is said to have been in charge and therefore,
compulsorily his signature is to be taken. In the
last paragraph of the said complaint, it is clearly
emerging that this petitioner No.1 Shri Vijaychandra
Shukla has fabricated the signature of respondent
No.2’s husband, Shri Sureshchandra Shukla and got his
name joined as Managing Director of the Company and
therefore, in the last line of the said complaint, it
is specifically averred that against all responsible
persons including petitioner No.1, old Directors and
Officers of the Company as well as Officers of State
Bank of Saurashtra, the complaint appears to have
been lodged and therefore, essentially the dispute is
centering around the placement of Managing Director
and in furtherance, every step found to have been
taken in connivance may surface during the course of
investigation and therefore, attributed against all
Directors, Officers of the Company as well as State
Bank of Saurashtra. Now this complaint is set to
motion by lodging before J.P. Road Police Station,
Vadodara.
17. Now comparing with this, if the second complaint
which is the subject matter of present proceeding is
to be looked into which is lodged on 1.9.2007, the
controversy reflects around the main dispute of the
placement of Managing Director on 10.5.2004. What has
been additionally asserted is that as a consequence
of that appointment as Managing Director, petitioner
No.1 in connivance with other Directors, has changed
the place of registration office of the Company and
has altered the Directors in the Company and
therefore, these are the additional conduct alleged
in the complaint which took place pursuant to
petitioner No.1 being in charge of the Company as
Managing Director which is seriously opposed by
respondent No.2 and therefore, the grievances voiced
out in both the complaints appear to be almost
similar and the additional information and the
accused persons who are added by alleging
specifically are forming part of investigation of the
very first complaint which was already put to motion
by respondent No.2. This subsequent complaint which
has been filed before the very same Police Station is
merely an additional information which can be gone
into during the course of process of first complaint.
Had there been any substantive distinct offence being
made out, possibly the second complaint could have a
different connotation altogether. But, it appears
that these allegations, which are levelled in the
second complaint, are centering around the grievance
of the main first complaint and all the persons, who
took part in the commission of this main complaint,
can be dealt with by the investigating machinery
while conducting investigation of the original
complaint. In light of this factual data available on
record, it transpires that the subsequent complaint
has got only an additional figure of collusion and
conspiracy between petitioner No.1 and other
Directors and officers of the Company which is
incidental and consequential to the commission of
main offence alleged in the first complaint. In light
of this circumstance, if the Court analyses the
position of law prevailing at present, it appears
that the second complaint would not be maintainable
and fact remains that it is not a cross case but
additional entries which are alleged in response to
the first complaint and therefore, in the background
of this factual scenario, the Court has to deal with
the points which have been raised by learned
advocates representing the parties on the issue of
maintainability of second complaint under the law.
18. As stated earlier, it emerges that under the Scheme
of the provisions contained under Cr.P.C. more
particularly sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169,
170 and 173, there can be no second FIR to be
entertained at the instance of respondent No.2 and
every subsequent information in respect of the main
offence or occurrence even if raising one or more
cognizable offence, no fresh investigation deserves
to be undertaken. All such subsequent information,
which are contained in the second complaint, will be
covered by section 162 of Cr.P.C. and officer in
charge of Police Station is under a legal obligation
to investigate not merely the cognizable complaint
reported in the FIR, but has also to consider other
connected offences found to have been committed in
the course of same transaction or the same occurrence
and has to file one or more reports as provided under
section 173 of Cr.P.C. Since the main offence which
has been alleged on 10.5.2004 by virtue of which
petitioner No.1 is said to have controlled the
Company in the capacity as Managing Director, all
consequential steps taken by him can form a part of
investigation of the first complaint which is
substantially alleging and as we have analysed the
factual data of both the complaints, every subsequent
information can be covered by investigating machinery
while submitting the report.
19. The law has amply entrusted power with the
investigating agency that even if after conclusion of
investigation pursuant to filing of the first FIR and
even after submission of report under section 173(2)
of Cr.P.C., the officer in charge of Police Station
comes across any further information pertaining to
the same incident, he can make further investigation
normally with the leave of the Court and forward
further evidence, if collected, and therefore, for
the allegation made in the second complaint filed by
respondent No.2 before the very same Police Station,
there need not be any fresh investigation or
registering of a second FIR.
20. In the light of aforesaid circumstances, if the test
of ‘sameness’ is applied to find out whether both the
FIRs relate to the same incident in respect to same
occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which
are in two or more parts of the very same
transaction, it would be seen that the answer is
clearly in affirmative as the consequential steps
which are alleged in the second complaint are having
a direct co-relation and connection with the
original offence which has been alleged against
petitioner No.1 having fraudulently secured the
position as Managing Director of the Company and
therefore, it appears that merely because some more
accused persons are added in the second complaint and
some subsequent information is said to have been
executed would not alter the situation as it is well
within the competence of investigating machinery to
consider during the course of investigation of the
original complaint while submitting the report and
therefore, considering this set of circumstances,
this Court is of the opinion that second complaint is
not maintainable and this is because of the fact that
not only a fair trial is envisaged under the
constitutional rights of a citizen, but a fair
investigation is also a part and parcel of
constitutional rights guaranteed under Articles 20
and 21 of the Constitution of India and therefore,
investigation also must be in fair, transparent and
judicious manner as it is the minimum requirement of
rule of law. It is the duty of Investigating Officer
to conduct the investigation and avoid any kind of
mischief or harassment even to the accused persons as
well. As appearing from the record, to continue with
the fresh investigation of the second complaint may
turn out to be a mischief, coercion or harassment as
well since substantially the first complaint is
covering almost every part of grievance consequently
voiced out in the second complaint. On the contrary,
petitioner No.1 has also tried to ventilate his
grievance by lodging Criminal Inquiry Case No.9 of
2006 before learned Metropolitan Magistrate,
Ahmedabad, and therefore, when substantially the
grievance of second complaint is already ceased by
the investigating machinery, there is no reason to
allow subsequent complaint being investigated
separately. The Court cannot presume that
investigating machinery will not conduct free and
fair investigation in response to the complaint which
is very much before it in the form of first
complaint. Of course, either side has not projected
as to what has happened to the proceedings of the
first complaint which has already been lodged.
Nevertheless, it appears that the second complaint
by virtue of the order of this Court has not been
processed any further as the interim relief is
already operative in the present proceeding. Be that
as it may, the Court is of the clear opinion that
looking to the factual situation prevailing on
record, the second complaint is not maintainable.
Even additional charge of conspiracy which is part
and parcel of the act of petitioner No.1 which is
alleged in the first complaint can also be gone into
by the authority and therefore, the second complaint
is not possible to be held as maintainable in law and
if it is allowed to be maintainable, the same would
frustrate the very scheme for which the statutory
provisions have been enacted under Cr.P.C.
21. The second complaint would be maintainable only in
case where there are altogether different versions,
different discovery of factual foundations and
altogether new offence is said to have been committed
which has no nexus with the main offence contained
in the first complaint. A perusal of both the FIRs
indicate that allegations are centering around the
very same act of petitioner No.1 of becoming Managing
Director fraudulently in the Company and therefore,
subsequent acts which are alleged in the second
complaint are part of the very same transaction of
becoming Managing Director by petitioner No.1
fraudulently in the Company. Therefore, looking to
the close proximity of the act and the time centering
around the main grievance of the first complaint, the
second complaint lodged appears to be a step
impermissible in law. The Court has to maintain a
just balance between the fundamental rights of the
accused guaranteed under the Constitution of India
and the expansive power of the police to investigate
the cognizable offence has to be struck and this
sweeping power of investigation does not warrant
subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation
by the police in respect of same incident giving rise
to one or more cognizable offences and therefore, it
appears to this Court that this is a fit case in
which the second complaint deserves to be quashed
which could meet the ends of justice.
22. Aforesaid conclusion is substantiated and backed by
series of pronouncements of the Hon’ble Apex Court on
the issue and the same are as such referred to for
the purpose of consideration. The Court has
considered the aforesaid aspect in light of the
proposition of law laid down by series of decisions
right from T.T.Antony’s (supra) case and the
following decisions which are supporting the
conclusion arrived at by this Court. The said
decisions are, therefore, taken in aid for the
purpose of arriving at the present decision:
22.1 In the case of T.T.Antony Vs. State of Kerala and
Others reported in (2001)6 SCC page 181, the relevant
extracts of propositions are contained in paragraph
Nos.18, 19, 22, 25, 27 and 35, which are not being
reproduced here to avoid burden of the judgment.
However, the same has been taken in assistance while
coming to the aforesaid conclusion.
22.2 Similarly, the case of Babubhai Vs. State of Gujarat
and others reported in (2010)12 SCC 254 is also taken
in assistance by the Court more particularly the
relevant extract of the said decision contained in
paragraph No.21 on the issue of test of ‘sameness’
and also on the issue of free and fair investigation
envisaged under Articles 20 and 21 of the
Constitution of India. Paragraph No.21 reads thus:
“ In such a case the court has to examine the
facts and circumstances giving rise to both
the FIRs and the test of sameness is to be
applied to find out whether both the FIRs relate
to the same incident in respect of the same
occurrence or are in regard to the incidents
which are two or more parts of the same
transaction. If the answer is affirmative, the
second FIR is liable to be
quashed. However, in case, the contrary is
proved, where the version in the second FIR
is different and they are in respect of the two
different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is
permissible. In case in respect of the same
incident the accused in the first FIR comes
forward with a different version or counter
claim, investigation on both the FIRs has to be
conducted.”
22.3 Likewise, another decision on the issue is delivered
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Amitbhai
Anilchandra Shah Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation
and another reported in (2013)6 SCC 348 in which,
upon an analysis, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held the
second complaint as being not maintainable and the
relevant extracts of the said decision contained in
paragraph Nos.58.2, 58.3, 58.4, 58.5, 58.9 and 5.10
are worth to be taken note of and hence are
reproduced hereunder:
“58.2 The various provisions of the Code of
Criminal Procedure clearly show that an officerin-charge
of a police station has to commence
investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157
of the Code on the basis of entry of the First
Information Report, on coming to know of the
commission of cognizable offence. On completion
of investigation and on the basis of evidence
collected, Investigating Officer has to form an
opinion under Section 169 or 170 of the Code and
forward his report to the concerned Magistrate
under Section 173(2) of the Code.
58.3 Even after filing of such a report, if
he comes into possession of further information
or material, there is no need to register a
fresh FIR, he is empowered to make further
investigation normally with the leave of the
Court and where during further investigation, he
collects further evidence, oral or documentary,
he is obliged to forward the same with one or
more further reports which is evident from subsection
(8) of Section 173 of the Code. Under
the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154,
155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 of the
Code, only the earliest or the first information
in regard to the commission of a cognizable
offence satisfies the requirements of Section
154 of the Code. Thus, there can be no second
FIR and, consequently, there can be no fresh
investigation on receipt of every subsequent
information in respect of the same cognizable
offence or the same occurrence or incident
giving rise to one or more cognizable offences.
58.4 Further, on receipt of information
about a cognizable offence or an incident giving
rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on
entering FIR in the Station House Diary, the
officer-in-charge of the police station has to
investigate not merely the cognizable offence
reported in the FIR but also other connected
offences found to have been committed in the
course of the same transaction or the same
occurrence and file one or more reports as
provided in Section 173 of the Code. Sub-section
(8) of Section 173 of the Code empowers the
police to make further investigation, obtain
further evidence (both oral and documentary) and
forward a further report(s) to the Magistrate. A
case of fresh investigation based on the second
or successive FIRs not being a counter case,
filed in connection with the same or connected
cognizable offence alleged to have been
committed in the course of the same transaction
and in respect of which pursuant to the first
FIR either investigation is underway or final
report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded
to the Magistrate, is liable to be interfered
with by the High Court by exercise of power
under Section 482 of the Code or under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution.
58.5 First Information Report is a report
which gives first information with regard to any
offence. There cannot be second FIR in respect
of the same offence/event because whenever any
further information is received by the
investigating agency, it is always in
furtherance of the first FIR.
58.6. ….
58.7. ….
58.8. ….
58.9. Administering criminal justice is a
two-end process, where guarding the ensured
rights of the accused under Constitution is as
imperative as ensuring justice to the victim. It
is definitely a daunting task but equally a
compelling responsibility vested on the court of
law to protect and shield the rights of both.
Thus, a just balance between the fundamental
rights of the accused guaranteed under the
Constitution and the expansive power of the
police to investigate a cognizable offence has
to be struck by the court. Accordingly, the
sweeping power of investigation does not warrant
subjecting a citizen each time to fresh
investigation by the police in respect of the
same incident, giving rise to one or more
cognizable offences. As a consequence, in our
view this is a fit case for quashing the second
F.I.R to meet the ends of justice.
58.10. The investigating officers are the
kingpins in the criminal justice system. Their
reliable investigation is the leading step
towards affirming complete justice to the
victims of the case. Hence they are bestowed
with dual duties i.e. to investigate the matter
exhaustively and subsequently collect reliable
evidences to establish the same.”
23. The contrary decisions, which are pressed into
service by learned advocate, Mr. M.M.Saiyed, learned
advocate for respondent No.2 and which are referred,
if are to be considered in light of factual data
prevailing on the record, it appears to the Court
that since the factual background of those cases are
altogether different, the principle cannot be applied
as a strait-jacket formula as covering different set
of circumstances and therefore, are not possible to
be applied in the background of present facts and
circumstances. However, the Court being duty bound to
consider the same are dealt with hereafter.
23.1 The first judgment which has been tried to be relied
upon by learned advocate, Mr. Saiyed, is the case of
Ram Lal Narang Vs. State (Delhi Administration)
reported in AIR 1979 SC 1791. The proposition laid
down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the said case is
not possible to be adopted here as the situation is
altogether different since in that case, the second
case was filed of conspiracy initiated in a different
Court altogether and the earlier conspiracy case was
already withdrawn. The situation over here is not
comparable to that of aforesaid decision and
therefore, the citation pressed into service is of no
avail.
23.2 Another decision which is tried to be pressed into
service by Mr. Saiyed is the case of Kari Chaudhary
Vs. Most. Sita Devi and others reported in AIR 2002
SC 441. In the said case, the complaint about the
murder of deceased was filed by her mother-in-law and
pursuant to registration of FIR, the investigation
was undertaken. The police during investigation found
that FIR lodged by mother-in-law was false and on the
contrary found that mother-in-law might have
conspired to the murder and in the background of that
fact, the final report was already submitted by the
police in response to which, the complaint lodged by
mother-in-law was quashed and therefore, in the
background of that fact, the second complaint was
filed and the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph No.11
of the said decision found that the final report
cannot be filed by the police albeit against other
accused or that once the proceedings initiated under
FIR lodged by mother-in-law ended in a final report,
the police had no authority to register a second FDIR
and therefore, in light of aforesaid circumstances,
the Hon’ble Apex Court found that it was too
technical a ground to quash the charge whereas the
background of present facts on hand is altogether
different and therefore, it is not possible for this
Court to adopt such course of action as has been held
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above referred case.
23.3 Mr. Saiyed has then cited a decision of the Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of Upkar Singh Vs. Ved
Prakash and others reported in AIR 2004 SC 4320 in
which also, the situation was that concerned police
at the relevant point of time was not accepting to
register a counter complaint and therefore, the
Hon’ble Apex Court found that the decision delivered
in the case of T.T.Antony(supra) would not ipso
facto be made applicable to hold that a second
complaint in regard to the same incident filed as a
counter complaint is prohibited and the said
conclusion would lead to serious consequences. Now if
the background of that case is co-related to the
present case on hand, here, there is no question of
any counter complaint, but on the contrary, the first
complaint has the direct bearing on the allegations
which are already levelled in the second complaint
and therefore, it was well within the power of
investigating officer to go into the aspects in
continuance of investigation of first complaint and
therefore, this judgment is of no avail to respondent
No.2 though an attempt is made by their learned
advocate Mr.Saiyed.
23.4 Similarly is the case of Nirmal Singh Kahlon Vs.
State of Punjab and Ors. reported in AIR 2009 SC
page 984. In this case also, the facts are again
quite distinct and on the contrary, in that case, the
High Court in writ petition by candidates against
scam in recruitment has held that there can be an
investigation to be made by Central Bureau of
Investigation and thereupon Central Bureau of
Investigation lodged the second FIR and therefore,
the canvass of two FIRs in that case was altogether
different and therefore, in the background of that
case, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that second FIR
would be maintainable. We are afraid to adopt such
course of action when the facts of the present case
are totally different and therefore, the said
judgment cannot be applied as a strait-jacket formula
in respectful consideration of the same.
23.5 Mr. Saiyed has further drawn the attention to another
decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Anju
Chaudhary Vs. State of U.P. and Anr. reported in AIR
2013 SCW page 245 wherein also, the facts are
altogether different. The said case was pertaining to
FIR related to incident of burning of shop which was
lodged against unknown persons and the subsequent FIR
related to meeting but after the incident of shop
burning and therefore, the FIR was lodged by
different persons, related to distinct occurrences at
a different place and against different persons and
therefore, in the absence of proximity of time,
unity, proximity of place, continuity of action,
commonality of purpose or design, it cannot be held
that second complaint is maintainable and therefore,
this case is also not in any way helpful to
Mr.Saiyed. At this stage, at pains, we have to
mention that there is a tendency of citing judgments
in numbers without examining whether the facts are
identically situated or not and ratio can be applied
or not and therefore, the Courts are unduly burdened
with dealing with the cases where there appears to
be no applicability. However, since it has already
been cited, the Court has to deal with the same.
23.6 The last judgment cited by Mr. Saiyed is the case of
Amitabhai Anilchandra Shah Vs. Central Bureau of
Investigation and another reported in (2013)6 SCC
page 348, 2013 wherein also, relying upon the facts,
the Hon’ble Apex Court has propounded a proposition
that second FIR in case of offence relating to same
transaction is impermissible as laid down in
T.T.Antony’s case. The said ratio is to be understood
in the context of situation prevailing on record and
therefore, by analysing, the Hon’ble Apex Court has
propounded that the situations are not covered
whether a second FIR is permissible in cross case if
the offences disclosed are not part of first FIR nor
can they be said to form part of same transaction nor
can they be said to be arising as a consequence of
the offences covered by the first FIR. In that
background only, the second FIR can be examined.
However, in the present case on hand, the facts are
such which clearly indicate that there is no question
of any cross case contained in the second complaint
nor it has got a different transaction altogether
which has no nexus with main act as, what has been
alleged in the second FIR is not only forming part of
first FIR but the same are as a consequence of first
FIR in which allegations are levelled and therefore,
this proposition is laid down. However, it is
difficult for this Court to straightaway apply said
proposition to the present background and therefore,
since the judgments cited by Mr. Saiyed have no
applicability in view of present peculiar set of
circumstances, the same cannot be resorted to for the
purpose of arriving at a conclusion and therefore,
considering this set of circumstances, the Court is
of the opinion that subsequent complaint is not
possible to be held as maintainable in view of the
Scheme of the Act.
24. In view of the aforesaid situation prevailing on
record and in view of the proposition of law laid
down by series of decisions which have been dealt
with by this Court, now the further question posed
before the Court is whether background of these facts
warrants interference by the Court in exercise of
inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of Cr.P.C.
considering the well defined proposition on exercise
of such jurisdiction or not. The Court is of the
considered opinion that the second complaint which
has been filed by the very same complainant before
the very same Police Station has got the direct
effect on the first complaint and the allegations are
forming part of the main act and allegation levelled
in the first complaint and the steps alleged in the
second complaint are consequences of the act alleged
in the first FIR and therefore, the same is not
acceptable as maintainable in law and therefore, to
permit such complaint to be processed any further
would be travesty of justice. Thus, this is a fit
case in which the Court deems it proper to exercise
inherent jurisdiction as steps against the accused
cannot be allowed to squeeze them again and again
almost on similar situation and same is also not
conceptually permitted in the fundamental rights
guaranteed under the the Constitution of India even
to the accused as stated above.
25. While coming to this conclusion, even the recent law
laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court can also be taken
for assistance which is reported in (2015)11 SCC page
145 in the case of Kamla Kant Dubey Vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh and Others wherein it has been
specifically laid down that FIR need not contain
every single detail and every part of the prosecution
case and therefore, when main substratum is forming
part of the FIR, it is left to the investigating
authority to investigate in detail and therefore,
stray observations made in paragraph No.18 would
definitely lead to a situation that basic substratum
of the matter is already contained in the FIR. In the
present case on hand, simply because further
information are not contained as part of first FIR
thereof would not permit respondent No.2 to lodge the
second complaint with respect to very same
controversy. Consequential steps generated by
petitioner No.1 can well be examined during the
course of investigation and therefore, it seems that
this second complaint tantamount to have been used as
a lever to pressurise the petitioners which in no
circumstances can be permitted by this Court. The
Court is sufficiently empowered under section 482 of
Cr.P.C. to embark upon such an attempt if made to
misuse the process of law. Therefore, the background
of fact is sufficient enough to hold that second
complaint is required to be quashed in the interest
of justice.
26. Yet in another case of D.P. Gulati, Manager Accounts,
Jetking Infotrain Limited Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
and Another reported in (2015)11 SCC page 730, the
Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with an issue of
exercise of power under section 482 of Cr.P.C. has
specifically held that object of exercise of power
under section 482 of Cr.P.C. is to prevent abuse of
process of law and to secure the ends of justice. If
at any point of time, the Court feels that there are
all possible chances that the complainant has
resorted to abuse of the process of law, the Court
can intervene in exercise of power under section 482
of Cr.P.C. The relevant extracts contained in
paragraph Nos.7 and 8 of the said decision deserve to
be reproduced hereinafter to substantiate the
conclusion:
“We have carefully considered the rival
submissions made before us. From bare perusal of
Section 482 of the Code, it is clear that the
object of exercise of power under the Section is
to prevent abuse of process of law, and to
secure ends of justice. In Rajiv Thapar and
others v. Madan Lal Kapoor1, this Court has
enumerated the steps required to be followed
before invoking inherent jurisdiction by the
High Court under Section 482 of the Code as
under:-(2013) 3 SCC 330 : (AIR 2013 SC (Supp)
1056).
"30. Based on the factors canvassed in the
foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate
the following steps to determine the
veracity of a prayer for quashment raised
by an accused by invoking the power vested
in the High Court under Section 482, Cr P
C:
30.1. Step one : whether the material relied
upon by the accused is sound, reasonable,
and indubitable i.e. the material is of
sterling and impeccable quality?
30.2. Step two : whether the material
relied upon by the accused would rule out
the assertions contained in the charges
levelled against the accused i.e. the
material is sufficient to reject and
overrule the factual assertions contained
in the complaint i.e. the material is such
as would persuade a reasonable person to
dismiss and condemn the factual basis of
the accusations as false?
30.4. Step four whether proceeding with the
trial would result in an abuse of process
of the court, and would not serve the ends
of justice?
30.4. Step four whether proceeding with the
trial would result in an abuse of process
of the court, and would not serve the ends
of justice?
30.5. If the answer to all the steps is in
the affirmative, the judicial conscience of
the High Court should persuade it to quash
such criminal proceedings in exercise of
power vested in it under Section 482. CrPC.
Such exercise of power, besides doing
justice to the accused, would save precious
court time, which would otherwise be wasted
in holding such a trial (as well as
proceedings arising therefrom) specially
when it is clear that the same would not
conclude in the conviction of the accused."
8. In Rishipal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh
and another2, explaining the law in the similar
circumstances, as in the present case, this
Court observed, in paragraph 17, as under:-
(2014) 7 SCC 215 : (AIR 2014 SC 2567).
"It is no doubt true that the courts have
to be very careful while exercising the
power under Section 482, CrPC. At the same
time we should not allow a litigant to file
vexatious complaints to otherwise settle
their scores by setting the criminal law
into motion, which is a pure abuse of
process of law and it has to be interdicted
at the threshold."
In Rishipal Singh (supra), the complainant, who
was an accused in connection with an offence
punishable under Section 138 of the Act, had
filed a criminal complaint relating to offences
punishable under Sections 34, 379, 411, 417,
418, 467, 468, 471 and 477, IPC.”
27. In view of the aforesaid proposition of law, which is
well defined by catena of decisions, the background
of these facts require the Court to intervene and
exercise inherent jurisdiction and accordingly, the
second complaint is not only non-maintainable but has
the colour of abuse of process of law at the
instance of respondent No.2 and therefore, the Court
deems it proper to quash the same.
28. Thus, complaint filed by respondent No.2 being Crime
Register No.I-284 of 2007 before J.P. Road Police
Station, Vadodara, against the petitioners and also
the proceedings arising out of the said complaint
are quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute.
While coming to this conclusion, the word of caution
to be maintained is that in view of aforesaid
position prevailing on record, the Court has deemed
it proper to quash the second complaint. However,
quashing of this complaint would not preclude or
relieve the Investigating Officer from examining the
first complaint in detail and taking every step to
bring home the crime which is alleged in the said
complaint. With these observations, the petition is
allowed in aforesaid terms.
(A.J. SHASTRI, J.)
RADHAN
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