Sunday, 25 November 2018

Whether plaintiff has proved his title if defendant has failed to prove his title?

As pointed out by the Apex Court in its decision reported in Brahma Nand v. Mathra Puri, MANU/SC/0295/1964 : A.I.R. 1965 SC 1506, the plaintiff has to succeed or fail on the title that he establishes and if he cannot succeed on the strength of his title his suit must fail notwithstanding that the defendant has no title to the property. Applying the above proposition of law, as pointed out by the Apex Court, I am of the firm view that the plaintiff has not established his case, consequently the judgment and decree of the courts below are erroneous and liable to be set aside."
5(af). In other words, aforesaid case law is for the proposition that plaintiff has to succeed or fail on the title he establishes and plaintiff cannot succeed by saying that defendant has no title to the property. To put it in terms of a generic legal principle, plaintiff has to discharge his burden of proof and cannot succeed by picking holes in the defence of defendant.

5(ag). In the instant case, from the narrative and discussion supra, it will be clear that plaintiffs who claim title to the suit property by succession have not been able to establish that Palani Kudumban predeceased Thavasi. To be noted, Palani Kudumban predeceased Thavasi and Thavasi inherited the entire suit property is pivotal and non negotiable for plaintiffs to establish their title. In other words, it is the sheet anchor and bedrock of plaintiffs' case.

5(ah). Having failed in discharging this burden of proof, attempt on the part of plaintiffs to say that it is unlikely that Ayyakutty could have become sole and absolute owner of suit property, it is unlikely that Ex. A.3 would have been executed jointly by two wives of Thavasi and wife of Palani Kudumban in 1947 if Palani Kudumban had predeceased Thavasi are all clearly attempts to pick holes in the case of defendant. Obviously, this is impermissible and plaintiffs cannot succeed on such basis. To be noted, it is not only a mere case of picking holes in the defence of defendant, it is a case of casting a cloud on the defence by making several presumptions and assumptions which are all in the realm of surmises and conjectures.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS (MADURAI BENCH)

S.A. No. 871 of 2002

Decided On: 18.04.2018

 Chinnan  Vs. Sangan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M. Sundar, J.

Citation: AIR 2018(NOC) 904 Mad


1. This litigation commenced more than two decades ago, to be precise on 06.08.1996 when one Chinnan along with his son and three daughters launched a suit against one Sangan (since deceased) regarding a vacant site admeasuring 2160 square feet or thereabouts.

2. A thumbnail sketch of facts absolutely essential for appreciating this judgment is set out infra under the caption 'Factual matrix in a nutshell'. To be noted, 'Factual matrix in a nutshell' contains only facts which are imperative for understanding and appreciating this judgment sans other particulars and details.

3. Facts in a Nutshell:

3(a). Suit property is a vacant site admeasuring 2160 square feet or thereabouts. This Second Appeal arises out of a suit being No. 306 of 1996 on the file of District Munsif Court, Aruppukkottai and the said court shall hereinafter be referred to as 'trial court' for the sake of convenience and clarity. From the description in the decree of the trial court, it can be culled out that the suit property is a rectangular piece of vacant site admeasuring 20 yards lengthwise (North to South) and 12 yards breadthwise (East to West).

3(b). Both learned counsel before me submit in unison without disagreement that 1 yard is 3 feet. Therefore, the suit property measures 60 feet lengthwise and 36 feet breadthwise and as mentioned supra, it is a rectangular piece of land.

3(c). It further unfurls from the description of the suit property in the trial court decree that Northern boundary of the suit property is a vacant site owned by the first plaintiff Chinnan, Southern and Eastern boundaries are properties belonging to one Palpandi and Western boundary is a street.

3(d). Considering that the suit property is 36 feet breadth and 60 feet lengthwise, I have mentioned supra that the suit property admeasures 2160 square feet or thereabouts.

3(e). As set out supra, it is a vacant piece of land/vacant site and it shall hereinafter be referred to as 'suit property' for the sake of brevity, convenience and clarity.

3(f). As mentioned supra, way back on 06.08.1996, one Chinnan along with his son and three daughters launched a suit being O.S. No. 306 of 1996 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Aruppukkottai against one Sangan qua suit property.

3(g). Prayer in the trial court qua suit property was for declaration of title and consequential permanent injunction against the defendant restraining the defendant from interfering with plaintiffs' possession of the suit property. Besides declaration of title and permanent injunction qua possession, there is a prayer for cost and the usual residuary prayer.

3(h). There was full contest and trial in the suit. On behalf of plaintiffs, two witnesses, P.W.1 and P.W.2, were examined and 16 exhibits, i.e., Exs. A.1 to A.16 were marked. On behalf of sole defendant, two witnesses, i.e., D.W.1 and D.W.2 were examined. On behalf of sole defendant, 4 exhibits, i.e., Exs. B.1 to B.4 were marked.

3(i). After full contest, the trial court by judgment dated 13.7.1999 dismissed the suit inter-alia holding that plaintiffs have not proved their title by discharging the burden of proof cast on them.

3(j). Plaintiffs carried the matter in appeal, by way of regular first appeal suit being A.S. No. 126 of 2001 on the file of Sub Judges' Court, Aruppukkottai. Sub Judges' Court, Aruppukkottai shall hereinafter be referred to as 'first appellate court' for the sake of convenience and clarity.

3(k). First appellate court, after full contest, dismissed the appeal in and by a judgment dated 22.02.2002, confirming the dismissal of the suit by the trial court.

3(l). Plaintiffs carried the matter to this court by way of the instant second appeal, i.e., S.A. No. 871 of 2002. The instant second appeal was admitted by this court on 14.05.2002 holding that four substantial questions of law arise for consideration (I shall refer to the substantial questions of law and give elaboration on the same infra under the caption 'Discussion'). Pending second appeal, sole defendant in the trial court, who was sole respondent in this second appeal, died and his legal heirs have been brought on record as respondent Nos. 2 and 3.

3(m). This being the facts in a nutshell, suffice to say that there is no dispute between both parties to this lis that the suit property originally belonged to one Mookkandi and the same was inherited by his two sons, Palani Kudumban and Thavasi. Suffice to say that it is also not in dispute between both parties to this lis that Palani Kudumban and Thavasi jointly inherited the suit property from Mookkandi. Thereafter, while plaintiffs case is predicated on the basis of succession via Thavasi, defendant's case is pivoted on the sale deed executed by Palani Kudumban's son Ayyakutty in favour of one Veeran (Ayyakutty's grand son through his daughter Rakki). Veeran is none other than defendant Sangan's father.

3(n). In other words, while plaintiffs laid the suit claiming title to the suit property by succession, defendant defended the suit by asserting title to the suit property by way of purchase under a sale deed. There shall be further elaboration in this regard under the caption 'Discussion' infra.

4. Trajectory of litigation:

Though trajectory of litigation can be discerned from the narration supra under the caption 'Facts in a nutshell', this being a second appeal, I deem it appropriate to dedicate a separate head and set out in short the trajectory of this litigation thus far. Plaintiffs being one Chinnan, his son and three daughters filed a suit (O.S. No. 306 of 1996 in trial court, i.e., District Munsif Court, Aruppukkottai) for declaration of title and consequential injunction qua suit property, the suit was dismissed by the trial court vide judgment dated 13.7.1999, plaintiffs carried the same by way of a regular first appeal, first appellate court, i.e., Sub Judges' Court, Aruppukkottai, also confirmed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the first appeal being A.S. No. 126 of 2001 by judgment dated 22.02.2002, against which plaintiffs who have been unsuccessful in two courts below and who have suffered two concurrent successive decrees of dismissal, have filed the instant second appeal, i.e., S.A. No. 871 of 2002 vide memorandum of grounds of appeal dated 15.5.2002, which was admitted on 4 substantial questions of law on 14.5.2002. To be noted, four substantial questions of law are extracted and reproduced infra. Instant second appeal is now before me for final disposal.

5. Discussion:

5(a). As mentioned supra, this second appeal was admitted on 14.05.2002 holding that four substantial questions of law arise for consideration. Before I proceed with the discussion, I deem it appropriate to set out those four substantial questions of law and they are as follows:

"(1) Whether the Courts below are right in rejecting Exhibit A.3, which establishes that Pichchi is the wife of Thavasi?

(2) Whether the Courts below are right in accepting the genealogy narrated by the respondent when the same had not been substantiated by proof?

(3) Whether the Courts below are right in relying upon MANU/TN/0672/1996 : 1996 2 CTC page 199, which has no application to the facts of the case?

(4) Whether the genealogy should not be strictly proved as required by the Supreme Court in MANU/SC/0303/1983 : 1983 SC 684 and whether the Courts below are right in accepting the case of the defendant without subjecting to any proof?"

5(b). As mentioned supra, plaintiffs have laid their claim to the suit property by succession. Defendant has defended the suit by asserting title on the basis of purchase by a sale deed being sale deed dated 30.06.1921 which has been marked as Ex. B.1 in the trial court.

5(c). As further alluded to supra, both parties to this lis do not dispute that the suit property originally belonged to one Mookkandi and that after the demise of Mookkandi, his two sons, Palani Kudumban and Thavasi inherited the suit property.

5(d). Where the disagreement and dispute arises between the parties to this lis is, while it is plaintiffs' case that Palani Kudumban predeceased Thavasi and after the demise of Palani Kudumban, suit property devolved on Thavasi entirely and while it is the further case of plaintiffs that from Thavasi, his daughter Iruli inherited the property, Iruli died on 30.10.1968, first plaintiff being Iruli's spouse and plaintiffs 2 to 5 being son and daughters of Iruli and first plaintiff, the suit property devolved on plaintiffs, it is defendant's case that there is nothing on record to show that Palani Kudumban predeceased Thavasi. To be noted, it is the specific case of defendant that suit property was sold by Palani Kudumban's son Ayyakutty to his daughter's son Veeran, who is none other than defendant Sangan's father vide aforesaid Ex. B.1.

5(e). Defendant submits that there should have been a partition between Palani Kudumban and Thavasi, wherein suit property fell to the share of Palani Kudumban, after which his son Ayyakutty executed Ex. B.1 sale deed way back in 1921 (30.06.1921, Ex. B.1, to be precise).

5(f). As both parties to this lis do not dispute that the suit property originally belonged to Palani Kudumban and Thavasi jointly after the demise of their father Mookkandi, the critical issue which fell for consideration before the trial court was whether Palani Kudumban predeceased Thavasi. No document has been marked as exhibit and there is no other tenable evidence before trial court to show the date of demise of Palani Kudumban.

5(g). On the contrary, date of demise of Thavasi has been established. The date of demise of Thavasi is 6.7.1942 and his death certificate has been marked as Ex. A.6.

5(h). Defendant's counsel Mr. S. Natarajan argued emphatically that his client's title deed is dated 30.6.1921 (Ex. B.1) and Thavasi would not have kept quiet and remained mute for 21 years, i.e., upto 6.7.1942 being his date of demise, if Palani Kudumban had predeceased him and if Thavasi had inherited the suit property as claimed by the plaintiffs. In other words, it is the specific case of defendant that Thavasi would not have remained mute for 21 years after execution of title deed Ex. B.1 on 30.6.1921 by Palani Kudumban's son Ayyakutty. According to defendant, the very fact that Thavasi under whom plaintiffs are claiming, remained mute would show that Palani Kudumban's son Ayyakutty was the sole and absolute owner of the suit property and had all rights to deal with suit property.

5(i). In contrast, Mr. S. Ramesh, learned counsel for appellants placed reliance on sale deed dated 12.7.1947 marked as Ex. A.3. It was pointed out that vendors in Ex. A.3 are three in number. One is Ural, senior wife of Thavasi, two is Pichchi, junior wife of Thavasi and the three is Rakki, wife of Palani Kudumban. To be noted, Ex. A.3 does not pertain to suit property. There is no dispute or disagreement on this. However, learned counsel for appellants contends that if Palani Kudumban had not predeceased Thavasi as pleaded by them, two wives of Thavasi and Palani Kudumban's wife Rakki would not have jointly executed sale deed Ex. A.3 on 12.7.1947.

5(j). Further to be noted, the first substantial question of law on which the second appeal has been admitted pertains to Ex. A.3.

5(k). Besides Ex. A.3, learned counsel for appellants also placed reliance on three other sale deeds dated 19.3.1968, 14.12.1971 and 19.5.1983 marked as Exs. A.1, A.2 and A.5 respectively. To be noted, all these three exhibits do not pertain to suit property. They have been referred to only in an attempt to show the boundaries to suit property.

5(l). Pausing the drift of discussion here for a moment, it may be necessary to refer to two other suits which were referred to in the courts below. One suit is O.S. No. 69 of 1979 on the file of District Munsif Court, Manamadurai filed by second plaintiff (Veeran). It is the specific case of plaintiffs that this suit pertains to suit property and that it was decreed in favour of second plaintiff, but intriguingly and interestingly, it was submitted by learned counsel on both sides before me that the judgment and decree in this suit have not been marked as exhibit in the trial court. However, this court examined the records received from courts below. On such examination, it came to light that decree dated 7.8.1980 in O.S. No. 69 of 1979 has in fact been marked as Ex. A.8 in the trial court. I also noticed that the reason for both learned counsel being lulled into the belief that this decree was not marked as exhibit in the trial court is owing to description of Ex. A.8 in the trial court judgment. While cataloging documents on plaintiffs' side, Ex. A.8 has been described as follows in the trial court:



It is obviously an error. This error has been continued and carried out in the index received from the trial court also. Be that as it may, a perusal of the decree reveals that the suit, i.e., O.S. No. 69 of 1979 is against third parties. Obviously, such third parties would have had no clue about Ex. B.1, under which the suit property was conveyed to first respondent in the second appeal. In other words, the cause of action is completely different and there was no occasion for the trial court to look into Ex. B.1 which is the title deed of first respondent in the instant case.

5(m). Further to be noted, O.S. No. 69 of 1979 is against third parties. Though assertion of right to title in one suit against third parties can be pressed into service in a subsequent suit, as alluded to supra, in the instant case, there was no occasion for considering Ex. B.1 in O.S. No. 69 of 1979. What is of greater significance is the decree dated 7.8.1980 in O.S. No. 69 of 1979 is an ex parte decree. This aspect has clearly been noticed by the first appellate court in paragraph 23 of this judgment and that portion of paragraph 23 of the first appellate court judgment reads as follows:



Therefore, Ex. A.8 does not help advance the case of appellants herein any further in the suit out of which this second appeal arises.

5(n). The other suit referred to in the court below is O.S. No. 308 of 1981 also on the file of District Munsif Court, Manamadurai. This suit was filed by the then sole defendant Sangan and it was dismissed for default on 6.7.1983 and the decree has been marked as Ex. A.9.

5(o). It was contended in the courts below that as the second of the aforesaid two suits, i.e., O.S. No. 308 of 1981 pertains to suit property, dismissal of the same for default vide Ex. A.9 decree would come in the way of defendant's defence by operation of res judicata. Courts below repelled this submission by holding that res judicata will not come into play as the suit has not been dismissed on merits, but it was dismissed for default.

5(p). In the High Court, both learned counsel fairly agreed that res judicata will not come into play owing to dismissal of the suit for default and not being a dismissal on merits.

5(q). Both courts below have also come to the conclusion that plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit property. To be noted, the suit property is a vacant site and therefore, in the normal circumstances, possession follows title. However, courts below have made an inference on the basis of Commissioner's report and came to the conclusion that plaintiffs have not established that they are in possession of suit property.

5(r). Now I turn back to substantial question of law No. 1, which turns on Ex. A.3. In this context, the findings of the first appellate court regarding Ex. A.3 is important and I deem it appropriate to extract the same. The same reads as follows:



5(s). As set out supra, first appellate court concurred with trial court verdict.

5(t). In the light of the above findings of the courts below and in the light of the undisputed obtaining position before me that Ex. A.3 does not pertain to suit property and that sale is in favour of third parties, I have no difficulty in answering the substantial question of law No. 1 in favour of respondents before me by holding that there is no infirmity in the inference made by courts below, particularly first appellate court regarding Ex. A.3.

5(u). As alluded to supra, Ex. A.3 merely shows that two wives of Thavasi and wife of Palani Kudumban jointly executed a sale deed on 12.7.1947 to third parties. As Ex. A.3 does not pertain to suit property, it does not in any manner throw light on whether Palani Kudumban predeceased Thavasi and whether Thavasi inherited the entire suit property. On this basis, I buttress my answer to substantial question of law No. 1 by holding that inference drawn from Ex. A.3 against plaintiffs in the trial court and in the appeal before the first appellate court are not incorrect.

5(v). Considering the language in which substantial question of law No. 1 is couched, I also deem it appropriate to say that Pichchi being the wife of Thavasi does not carry plaintiffs' case any further. Therefore, there is no dispute that Pichchi is junior wife of Thavasi and one Ural is his senior wife. Pichchi being junior wife of Thavasi, which comes to light from Ex. A.3 is of no relevance to the central issue in this lis and therefore, I have no hesitation in further buttressing (on this basis also) my answer to substantial question of law No. 1 against appellants and in favour of respondents by holding that courts below were right in making the aforesaid inference regarding Ex. A.3 and Ex. A.3 establishing Pichchi as the wife of Thavasi does not impact the central issue in this lis in any manner.

5(w). This takes us to the other substantial questions of law.

5(x). I deem it appropriate to deal with substantial questions of law Nos. 2 and 4 together as both pertain to genealogy.

5(y). From the narrative supra and from the submissions made before me today, it is clear that there is no dispute or disagreement with regard to genealogy. In other words, Mookkandi is a patriarch, Palani Kudumban and Thavasi are his two sons, Ayyakutty and Meikudumban are two sons of Palani Kudumban, Iruli is the daughter of Thavasi, plaintiffs are spouse and children of Iruli, defendant's predecessor in title Veeran (defendant's father) is son of one Rakki, who in turn is daughter of Ayyakutty being the first son of Palani Kudumban are all not in dispute at all. As would be evident from the narrative supra and discussion, the only dispute is whether Palani Kudumban predeceased Thavasi or not. On a demurrer, even if Palani Kudumban had predeceased Thavasi, it makes no difference to the genealogy as such. At best, there shall be difference in dates of succession as succession opens on death.

5(z). Both learned counsel before me, i.e., Mr. S. Ramesh for appellants and Mr. S. Natarajan for respondents very fairly submit that there is no dispute or disagreement regarding genealogy. This makes the task of answering substantial questions of law Nos. 2 and 4 a very straight and simple affair.

5(aa). Before answering substantial questions of law Nos. 2 and 4, I have to necessarily set out that there can be no disagreement or no two opinions about the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar Vs. Sri Radha Krishna Singh reported in MANU/SC/0303/1983 : AIR 1983 SC 684 regarding principles governing acceptance and relying upon genealogy. This has been very succinctly explained by Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 19 of Sri Radha Krishna Singh case. I deem it appropriate to extract paragraph 19 which reads as follows:

"19. The principles governing such cases may be summarized thus:

"(1) Genealogies admitted or proved to be old and relied on in previous cases are doubtless relevant and in some cases may even be conclusive of the facts proved but there are several considerations which must be kept in mind by the courts before accepting or relying on the genealogies:

a. Source of the genealogy and its dependability.

b. Admissibility of the genealogy under the Evidence Act.

c. A proper use of the said genealogies in decisions or judgments on which reliance is placed.

d. Age of genealogies.

e. Litigations where such genealogies have been accepted or rejected.

(2) On the question of admissibility the following tests must be adopted:

a. The genealogies of the families concerned must fall within the four corners of Section 32(5) or Section 13 of the Evidence Act.

b. They must not be hit by the doctrine of post litem motam.

c. The genealogies or the claims cannot be proved by recitals, depositions or facts narrated in the judgment which have been held by a long course of decisions to be inadmissible.

d. Where genealogy is proved by oral evidence, the said evidence must clearly show special means of knowledge disclosing the exact source, time and the circumstances under which the knowledge is acquired, and this must be clearly and conclusively proved."

5(ab). To be noted, as there is a specific reference to MANU/SC/0303/1983 : AIR 1983 SC 684 in the substantial question of law No. 4, it has become necessary for me to refer to the same supra.

5(ac). While there can be no two views or opinions about the principle laid down succinctly by Supreme Court regarding acceptance of genealogy, in the instant case as there is no dispute or disagreement that genealogy remained undisputed, substantial questions of law Nos. 2 and 4 cease to be conundrums as the answer is so straight and clear. Both substantial questions of law cannot but be answered in favour of respondents and against appellants in one simple sentence, i.e., there is no dispute or disagreement between parties to lis regarding genealogy.

5(ad). This takes us to substantial question of law No. 3.

5(ae). With regard to substantial question of law No. 3, there is reference to a case law, i.e., Arulmigu Viswewaraswami and Veeraraghava Perumal Temples Tiruppur, Coimbatore District Vs. R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder and another [MANU/TN/0672/1996 : 1996 (II) CTC 199] in the question as formulated. This substantial question of law turns on whether courts below were correct in holding that it has no application to the facts of the instant case. In the argument before me, it was pointed out that paragraph 19 of the judgment is relevant. Paragraph 19 reads as follows:

"19. In the light of the above discussion, the findings of the courts below cannot be sustained and I am satisfied that the plaintiff has miserably failed to prove his title. As pointed out by the Apex Court in its decision reported in Brahma Nand v. Mathra Puri, MANU/SC/0295/1964 : A.I.R. 1965 SC 1506, the plaintiff has to succeed or fail on the title that he establishes and if he cannot succeed on the strength of his title his suit must fail notwithstanding that the defendant has no title to the property. Applying the above proposition of law, as pointed out by the Apex Court, I am of the firm view that the plaintiff has not established his case, consequently the judgment and decree of the courts below are erroneous and liable to be set aside."
5(af). In other words, aforesaid case law is for the proposition that plaintiff has to succeed or fail on the title he establishes and plaintiff cannot succeed by saying that defendant has no title to the property. To put it in terms of a generic legal principle, plaintiff has to discharge his burden of proof and cannot succeed by picking holes in the defence of defendant.

5(ag). In the instant case, from the narrative and discussion supra, it will be clear that plaintiffs who claim title to the suit property by succession have not been able to establish that Palani Kudumban predeceased Thavasi. To be noted, Palani Kudumban predeceased Thavasi and Thavasi inherited the entire suit property is pivotal and non negotiable for plaintiffs to establish their title. In other words, it is the sheet anchor and bedrock of plaintiffs' case.

5(ah). Having failed in discharging this burden of proof, attempt on the part of plaintiffs to say that it is unlikely that Ayyakutty could have become sole and absolute owner of suit property, it is unlikely that Ex. A.3 would have been executed jointly by two wives of Thavasi and wife of Palani Kudumban in 1947 if Palani Kudumban had predeceased Thavasi are all clearly attempts to pick holes in the case of defendant. Obviously, this is impermissible and plaintiffs cannot succeed on such basis. To be noted, it is not only a mere case of picking holes in the defence of defendant, it is a case of casting a cloud on the defence by making several presumptions and assumptions which are all in the realm of surmises and conjectures.

5(ai). Therefore, I have no hesitation whatsoever in my mind holding that courts below, in the light of facts and circumstances of the case, were correct in relying on the aforementioned principle of law laid down by Madras High Court in Arulmigu Viswewaraswami and Veeraraghava Perumal Temples Tiruppur, Coimbatore District supra. In other words, substantial question of law No. 3 is also answered in favour of respondents and against appellants.

5(aj). In addition to this, learned counsel for respondents relied on following judgments. Judgments and relevant paragraphs are given in a tabular form infra.



5(ak). All the aforesaid judgments are in support of the proposition that findings of the nature rendered by courts below cannot be classified as perverse. In other words, aforesaid case laws were pressed into service to say that it is not a case of perversity qua findings demanding interference in a second appeal under section 100 CPC.

5(al). In the light of the detailed discussion supra and my answers to all four substantial questions of law, this principle for this case becomes otiose. However, I have catalogued the case laws only for the purpose of capturing the hearing as comprehensively as possible. It is not necessary to go into the principles in the light of the narrative supra. In any event, principles are indisputable.

6. CONCLUSION:

All substantial questions of law are answered against appellants and in favour of respondents. I have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that plaintiffs have not discharged the burden of proof cast on them and establishing title qua suit property.

7. DECISION:

S.A. No. 871 of 2002 is dismissed confirming the judgment and decree of the first appellate court, i.e., Subordinate Judge Court, Aruppukkottai, made in A.S. No. 126 of 2001 dated 22.2.2002, which in turn confirmed the judgment and decree dated 13.7.1999 made in O.S. No. 306 of 1996 by the trial court, i.e., District Munsif Court, Aruppukkottai. In the light of the nature of the case, I leave the parties to bear their respective costs.


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