Showing posts with label Madras high court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Madras high court. Show all posts

Friday, 26 June 2026

Madras HC: Under which circumstances, Insurance Company is not liable to pay compensation?

 As far as the present case is concerned, it is the categorical evidence of R.W.2 that the driver of the offending lorry was not possessing the licence to drive the transport vehicle or the hazardous vehicle and even the Ex.R.2-xerox copy of badge register refers to No. 11134/81307 standing in the name T.G.Sundarajan, S/o.Gopal Mesthray, No. 4, 7th Cross Street, Devi Karumari Nagar, Madras -42. Indeed, in Ex.R.1 Investigator's Report the driver of the lorry was authorised to drive light motor vehicles and from 30.10.1991 was authorised to drive heavy goods vehicle also and the same was renewed from 28.06.1995. Suffice it to point out for this Court that the offending lorry driver Elayasamy was not in possession of a licence/endorsement to drive the hazardous goods vehicle and that he was only possessed of a licence to drive heavy goods vehicle with effect from 30.10.1991 and therefore, there was a violation of policy condition and as such, the Tribunal was quite correct in exonerating the second respondent/Insurance Company from its liability to pay and moreover, the appellants/petitioners have not proved that the driver Elayasamy had the valid licence in regard to the type of vehicle viz., hazardous vehicle involved in the accident and consequently, the appeal fails and the same is hereby dismissed. {Para 16}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

C.M.A. (NPD) No. 10 of 2004

Decided On: 11.06.2009

Nagamani and Ors. Vs. Singaravelu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M. Venugopal, J.

Citation: MANU/TN/1293/2009

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Sunday, 14 June 2026

Madras HC: Under which circumstances the court can direct forwarding of complaint to police under S 151 of CPC?

 In the case on hand, since, as I have already pointed out, the offence of forgery of Exs. A2 and A3 was committed outside the Court, even before they were produced before the Court, there can be no impediment for the police to register a case. When it was pointed out by this Court to the learned counsel on either side that this Court has power to issue a direction to the Tahsildar, Tambaram to forward a complaint to the police in respect of the above offence of forgery, for registration of a criminal case so as to investigate the same thoroughly to find out the real culprits, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that such power is not available for this Court in a civil proceedings. Of course, it is true that there is no express provision in the Civil Procedure Code specifically empowering a Civil Court to issue a direction either to a party or to a witness to make a complaint to the police. But at the same time, it needs to be noted that there is no prohibition, either express or implied, thereby prohibiting a Civil Court from issuing any direction to a party or a witness to forward a complaint to the police when a serious offence of forgery is alleged. {Para 59}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

Second Appeal No. 479 of 2012 and M.P. Nos. 1 and 2 of 2012

Decided On: 30.03.2015

N. Natarajan Vs. The Executive Officer

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S. Nagamuthu, J.

Citation: MANU/TN/0811/2015

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Thursday, 22 January 2026

Madras HC: How to calculate compensation under S 163A of Motor vehicle Act?

 Further, the Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs.15,000/- towards loss of love and affection, Rs.20,000/- towards loss of consortium and Rs.5,000/- towards funeral expenses. The appellants are entitled only for a sum of Rs.5,000/- towards loss of consortium, Rs.2,000/- towards funeral expenses and Rs.2,500/- towards loss of estate. In view of the excess amount granted by the Tribunal under conventional heads, the appellants are not entitled to any enhancement.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

C.M.A.No.400 of 2020

Sendhiammal  Vs. Ramshuklal

CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE MS.JUSTICE V.M.VELUMANI

DATED: 13.02.2020.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Madras HC: Claimant is not entitled to get future prospect U/S 163A of Motor vehicle Act

From the award of the Tribunal, it is seen that the appellants claimed compensation for the death of one Munusamy. When the claim petition was filed under Section 163(A), the Tribunal has to follow structural formula contained in the Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act. As per the Second Schedule, the claimants are entitled to compensation only if the income of the deceased is Rs.40,000/- per annum or less than the same. The claimants have claimed in the claim petition that the deceased was working as a coolie and was earning a sum of Rs.3,300/- per month and the Tribunal accepting the same, fixed the monthly income of the deceased at Rs.3,300/-, deducted 1/3rd towards personal expenses, fixed the age as 31 years as per Post Mortem Certificate, applied multiplier 17 and granted compensation as per the Second Schedule. As per structural formula, the appellants are not entitled for any enhancement towards future prospects. {Para 9}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

C.M.A.No.400 of 2020

Sendhiammal  Vs. Ramshuklal

CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE MS.JUSTICE V.M.VELUMANI

DATED: 13.02.2020.
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Saturday, 15 November 2025

Video on Madras High Court judgment protecting Child Welfare and Preventing Misuse of Law

 This video analyzes the landmark judgment delivered by the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court on November 13, 2025, in CRL RC(MD) No. 1148 of 2024. The judgment highlights critical legal principles on the finality of mutual consent divorce decrees, the doctrine of natural guardianship, and the protection of women's dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution. It firmly rejects the misuse of maintenance provisions as a tool for perpetuating matrimonial discord by family members and emphasizes that child welfare must remain paramount, with co-parenting guided by cooperation rather than confrontation. This analysis is invaluable for judges, advocates, and legal scholars focused on family law and child maintenance jurisprudence.




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Monday, 8 September 2025

Madras HC: How to decide interim maintenance enhancement application filed by wife even though she is having sufficient income?

Further, the fact that the respondent has received substantial monies for the last three financial years is also not in dispute. The object of Section 24 is only for providing interim maintenance to the wife to enable her to get sufficient income to live a comfortable lifestyle. I do not see that the respondent is not possessed of such sufficient income already, warranting further monies from the petitioner by way of interim maintenance. {Para 16}

18.In Rajnesh's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that there is no straight jacket formula for fixing maintenance and the Court has to waive the status of parties, reasonable needs of the wife and dependent children, their education qualifications, any independent source of income accruing to the wife and whether such income would be sufficient to enable the wife to maintain the same standard of living as she was accustomed to in the matrimonial home, whether the wife was employed before and after marriage, etc.

19.Even applying the ratio laid down in Rajnesh's case, I do not find that the respondent requires any further amounts by way of interim maintenance to lead a comfortable lifestyle. In view of the aforesaid discussions regarding her holding of immovable properties as well as the substantial income by way of substantial dividends of the Company. 

 THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

CRP.No.2590 of 2025

& CMP.No.14720 of 2025

Dr.C.Amarnath Vs  Dr.J.Remabarathi 

CORAM: MR. JUSTICE P.B.BALAJI

Dated : 22.08.2025.

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Monday, 23 June 2025

Supreme Court: Generally speaking the provisions of a statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative

 The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dattatraya Moreshwar Vs The State of Bombay MANU/SC/0014/1952 : 1952:INSC:18 : AIR 1952 SC 181) held that generally speaking the provisions of a statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty, and the case is such that, to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature, it has been the practice of Courts to hold such provisions to be directory.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS (MADURAI BENCH)

W.A. (MD) Nos. 1155 of 2020, 1200, 1216 of 2019, C.M.P. (MD) Nos. 6322, 10380 and 10467 of 2019

Decided On: 07.02.2025

Deepa Vs. S. Vijayalakshmi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.R. Swaminathan and M. Jothiraman, JJ.

Author: G.R. Swaminathan, J.

Citation:  MANU/TN/0552/2025.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Madras HC: Provisions for Arrest Of Women At Night Are Directory, Not Mandatory:

Whenever a statute prescribes that a particular act is to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence, it would be difficult to hold that the requirement is not mandatory and the specified consequence should not follow."


The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dattatraya Moreshwar Vs The State of Bombay MANU/SC/0014/1952 : 1952:INSC:18 : AIR 1952 SC 181) held that generally speaking the provisions of a statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty, and the case is such that, to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature, it has been the practice of Courts to hold such provisions to be directory.


15. Section 46(4) of Cr.P.C has not spelt out the consequence of non-compliance with the requirement set out therein. If the provision was intended to be mandatory, the legislature would definitely have provided for the consequences of non-compliance. It cannot be denied that when a Police officer effects arrest pursuant to the power conferred on him by Cr.P.C, he is carrying out a public duty. The matter is not between the official effecting arrest and the arrestee. There is a third party involved, namely, victim / defacto complainant. The victim cannot be allowed to suffer for the neglect of duty by the Police officer.


16. There are certain practical aspects to be borne in mind. Let us conceive of this situation: a woman commits murder after sunset and before sunrise; the information reaches the local Police Station; the accused is about to escape; in such a situation, should the officer concerned prepare a written report, send it to the local Magistrate, wait for His Honour's permission and upon receipt thereof, proceed to arrest the accused? We have no doubt in our minds that the horse would have bolted by then. Mechanical adherence to procedures can injure public interest at times. That is why, when the Nagpur Bench of the High Court of Bombay directed the State Government to issue instructions to all police officials that no female persons shall be detained or arrested without the presence of the lady constable and in no case after sunset and before sunrise, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra Vs Christian Community Welfare Council of India MANU/SC/0817/2003 : (2003) 8 SCC 546 observed that while they agreed with the object behind the direction, a strict compliance with the said direction in a given circumstance would cause practical difficulties to the investigating agency and even might give room for evading the process of law by unscrupulous accused.


17. The statutory provision envisages that the woman police officer should make a written report and obtain the prior permission of the Magistrate before making arrest. One can very easily imagine situations when the investigating officer is left with very little time to respond. Suppose a heinous offence takes place at midnight. The jurisdictional Magistrate may not be available or accessible. Digital solutions may not also work. The Magistrate may be fast asleep. The written report sent by mail would be lying in his inbox. The accused will not be waiting for the Police officer to obtain permission from the Magistrate.

19. Though we have held that Section 46(4) of Cr.P.C / 43(5) of BNSS is directory and not mandatory, the provision cannot be rendered otiose by the Police. There is a laudable reason for incorporating such a provision. It is meant to serve as a note of caution to the officers effecting arrest of women. While failure to adhere to the statutory requirement may not lead to the arrest being declared illegal, the officer concerned may have to offer explanation for inability to comply with the procedure.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS (MADURAI BENCH)

W.A. (MD) Nos. 1155 of 2020, 1200, 1216 of 2019, C.M.P. (MD) Nos. 6322, 10380 and 10467 of 2019

Decided On: 07.02.2025

Deepa Vs. S. Vijayalakshmi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.R. Swaminathan and M. Jothiraman, JJ.

Author: G.R. Swaminathan, J.

Citation:  MANU/TN/0552/2025

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Saturday, 7 June 2025

Whether Session Judge can release person accused of offences under Pocso Act on anticipatory bail?

Criminal - Anticipatory Bail - Jurisdiction for - Sections 5(i) and 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), Section 438 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Present reference is with regard to jurisdiction of District Court and Sessions Court in entertaining anticipatory bail application under Section 438 of CrPC - Whether District and Sessions Court has jurisdiction to entertain anticipatory bail application under Section 438 of CrPC for commission of offence punishable under Sections 5(i) and 6 of POCSO Act - Held, object of POCSO Act is to provide protection to children from offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography - POCSO Act incorporated child-friendly procedures for reporting, recording of evidence, investigation and trial of offences - Special Court constituted for speedy trial of offences against children - POCSO Act also empowers Special Court to remand accused at pre-cognizance stage, grant bail - Regular Sessions Court cannot deal with application under Section 438 of CrPC, in respect of any offence under POCSO Act at any point of time - Reference answered. 

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS (MADURAI BENCH)

Criminal Reference (MD) No. 2 of 2020

Decided On: 30.09.2020

In Re: The Additional Registrar General, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M. Sathyanarayanan and V. Bharathidasan, JJ.

Author: V. Bharathidasan, J.

Citation:  MANU/TN/5476/2020,
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Sunday, 30 March 2025

Madras HC: Multiplier of 3 should be applied while granting compensation under Motor accident if deceased was aged more than 70 years

In this case, the deceased admittedly crossed 70 years. He was 71 years old at the time of his death. Therefore, the correct multiplier is only ‘3’ and not ‘5’. Likewise, the claimants are undoubtedly legal heirs of the deceased, but they are not dependants of the deceased financially. As submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant, 71 years old male member will have his own expenses peculiarly related to his age. Therefore, his financial need will certainly be between 1/3rd and 50%. So, 1/3rd has to be deducted towards his personal expenses from the notional income inclusive of future prospect. {Para 8}

 In the High Court of Madras

(Before G. Jayachandran, J.)

United India Insurance Company Ltd. Vs Mary Victoria and Others 

Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 1320 of 2016 and C.M.P. No. 10195 of 2016

Decided on August 27, 2020.

Citation: 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 16456.

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Wednesday, 12 March 2025

Whether the court should refuse to decree suit for specific performance of contract if appellant has obtained permission for sale of minor's property by making false representation?

In HMGOP No. 39 of 1996 the learned Principal and District Judge, Chengalpattu passed an order permitting the 1st Respondent to effect sale of the minors' property at `3,200/- per cent. This order was passed on 30.4.1996. In the meantime, the Appellant had paid a sum of `50,000/- on 2.1.1996, and another sum of `50,000/- on 8.1.1996 to the First Respondent. {Para 6}

9. However, it was stated that the sale was not in the interest of minors and therefore, the 1st Respondent was not able to comply the demand of Notice. The Appellants filed a Suit in OS No. 930 of 1996 in the Court of District Munsif for a permanent injunction restraining the Respondents from disposing of the suit property. The Suit was resisted by the Respondents. Thereafter, the Appellants filed the present Suit for specific performance of the Sale Agreement on 13.8.1995.


10. The 1st Respondent filed a Written Statement inter alia stating that the alleged agreement dated 13.8.1995 is only an agreement to enter into a Sale Agreement of the property and it is not a concluded contract. He would admit the execution of such document to sell the suit properties at the rate of `20,000/-per cent. He would also admit the subsequent payments dated 2.1.1996 & 8.1.1996. However, he would state that the Appellant himself engaged his own lawyer to file HMGOP No. 39 of 1996 and has given a false information by stating the sale price at `3,200/- per cent. He would also allege that the value of the property was more than `30,000/-per cent and the sale of the property is not in the interest of the minors and he is not bound by the agreement dated 13.8.1995 which is not a concluded contract.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

A.S. No. 178 of 2007

Decided On: 12.10.2011

R. Radhakrishnan and Ors. Vs. G. Ekambaram and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K. Mohan Ram & G.M. Akbar Ali, JJ.

Author: G.M. Akbar Ali, J.

Citation:  MANU/TN/4268/2011.
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Monday, 10 February 2025

Madras HC: Provisions Against Arrest Of Women At Night Are Directory, Not Mandatory

 The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dattatraya Moreshwar Vs The State of Bombay AIR 1952 SC 181) held that generally speaking the provisions of a statute creating public duties are directory and those conferring private rights are imperative. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty, and the case is such that, to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the legislature, it has been the practice of Courts to hold such provisions to be directory.

15.Section 46(4) of Cr.P.C has not spelt out the consequence of non-compliance with the requirement set out therein. If the provision was intended to be mandatory, the legislature would definitely have provided for the consequences of non-compliance. It cannot be denied that when a Police officer effects arrest pursuant to the power conferred on him by Cr.P.C, he is carrying out a public duty. The matter is not between the official effecting arrest and the arrestee. There is a third party involved, namely, victim / defacto complainant. The victim cannot be allowed to suffer for the neglect of duty by the Police officer.

16.There are certain practical aspects to be borne in mind. Let us conceive of this situation: a woman commits murder after sunset and before sunrise; the information reaches the local Police Station; the accused is about to escape; in such a situation, should the officer concerned prepare a written report, send it to the local Magistrate, wait for His Honour's permission and upon receipt thereof, proceed to arrest the accused? We have no doubt in our minds that the horse would have bolted by then. Mechanical adherence to procedures can injure public interest at times. That is why, when the Nagpur Bench of the High Court of Bombay directed the State Government to issue instructions to all police officials that no female persons shall be detained or arrested without the presence of the lady constable and in no case after sunset and before sunrise, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra Vs Christian Community Welfare Council of India (2003) SCC 8 546 observed that while they agreed with the object behind the direction, a strict compliance with the said direction in a given circumstance would cause practical difficulties to the investigating agency and even might give room for evading the process of law by unscrupulous accused.


17.The statutory provision envisages that the woman police officer should make a written report and obtain the prior permission of the Magistrate before making arrest. One can very easily imagine situations when the investigating officer is left with very little time to respond. Suppose a heinous offence takes place at midnight. The jurisdictional Magistrate may not be available or accessible. Digital solutions may not also work. The Magistrate may be fast asleep. The written report sent by mail would be lying in his inbox. The accused will not be waiting for the Police officer to obtain permission from the Magistrate.

We are therefore of the view that it would not be in the interest of maintaining law and order if a Police officer is expected to write to the local Magistrate and effect arrest only after obtaining his/her prior permission. Such a stringent condition would disable Police officers from effectively discharging their public duties.

19.Though we have held that Section 46(4) of Cr.P.C / 43(5) of BNSS is directory and not mandatory, the provision cannot be rendered otiose by the Police. There is a laudable reason for incorporating such a provision. It is meant to serve as a note of caution to the officers  effecting arrest of women. While failure to adhere to the statutory requirement may not lead to the arrest being declared illegal, the officer concerned may have to offer explanation for inability to comply with the procedure.

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

W.A(MD)Nos.1155 of 2020, 1200 & 1216 of 2019

Deepa Vs S.Vijayalakshmi .

CORAM: MR.JUSTICE G.R.SWAMINATHANAND

 MR.JUSTICE M.JOTHIRAMAN

 DATED : 07.02.2025.
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Saturday, 1 February 2025

Madras HC: Under which circumstances Motor accident claim tribunal should not refuse to entertain Claim petition as barred by limitation?

The Parliament in its wisdom has ensured that the hapless victims of motor accidents need not depend upon stakeholders in Court for the purpose of initiation of proceedings. The proceeding itself is initiated on the basis of the report filed by the Police Authorities. In effect, the petition under Section 166 is only a reminder to the Court that the police have already filed the Detailed Accident Report containing all the requisite details like the First Information Report, Interim Accident Report, First Accident Report and therefore, it has to take up the said report as a claim petition. In other words, the claim petition is only a reminder to the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal to perform its duty under Rule 21 Annexure XIII of Central Motor Vehicles Rules and to process the claim petition. {Para 28}

29. In view of the above discussion, it is clear that in cases where any request is filed and accessible by the Tribunal, then there will be no question of six months limitation arising. The issue of six months limitation will arise only in case where no FIR has been registered by the Police and no report has been sent/uploaded.

30. The members of the Bar represented that the Police are not sending the report and hence, there arises a problem.

31. A reading of Section 166(4) shows that if any report of the accident is forwarded to it under Section 159, the same shall be treated as an application for compensation. It is no more the discretion of the police. Rule 4(A)(5)(1) of the Tamil Nadu Rules read with the Central rules make it mandatory. It has now become a statutory duty of the Police to sent a report. It is pertinent to point out that the amendment under Section 166(4) does not speak about the Interim Accident Report (IAR), First Accident Report (FAR) and Detailed Accident Report (DAR) but speaks about “any report that has been sent by the police”. Therefore, even if an FIR sent by the police to the Tribunal, the same should be treated a Claim Petition.

32. The upshot of the discussion is that on registration of an FIR, a claimant is entitled to present the petition without the fear of it being thrown out, on the ground of limitation. This would be the correct reading of the present legal dispensation in all cases where FIR is registered within six months, of the date of any motor accident which takes place after 01.04.2022.

In the High Court of Madras

(Before V. Lakshminarayanan, J.)

Malaravan Vs  Praveen Travels Private Limited and Others 

C.R.P. No. 2558 of 2023

Decided on August 18, 2023, 

Citation: 2023 SCC OnLine Mad 5467 : (2023) 2 TN MAC 416 : (2023) 5 Mad LJ 57 : 2023 ACJ 2062.

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Madras HC: An unborn child aged five months onwards in the mother's womb till its birth can be treated as equal to a child in existence.

Various Human Rights Commissions also held that the stillborn child is entitled to compensation on account of the injuries caused or death occurred due to the violation of human rights. Even the Transfer of Property Act recognised the rights of the stillborn child and several provisions of Indian Penal Code, 1860, also provide for punishment by reason of hurt or birth or abortion with regard to the stillborn child.


(8) To decide whether a child in the womb of the mother can be called as a person, it is pertinent to discuss different stages of birth of a child in the womb of a mother. Technically the term developing ovum is used for the first seven to ten days after conception, i.e., until implantation occurs. It is called an 'embryo' from one week to the end of the second month and later it is called 'foetus'. It becomes an infant only when it is completely born. The life may enter immediately on the date of conception in the form of a small cell, which gets multiplied, but physically a mother can feel the movement of child only when the foetus is twenty weeks old, i.e., five months, as the cell changes its structures and texture to become an eye, legs, bones, blood, head, etc., and only when the child makes movements touching the internal walls of the womb, then the actual life does take its physical form, therefore, there may be controversy as regards the exact date of life entering the foetus but there cannot be any controversy as regards the life of the unborn child if a woman is carrying seven months pregnancy, as in many instances premature delivery takes place during the seventh month of pregnancy and the child still survives.


An unborn child aged five months onwards in the mother's womb till its birth can be treated as equal to a child in existence.


The unborn child to whom the live birth never comes can be held to be a 'person' who can be the subject of an action for damages for his death. As already stated above, a person means a human being regarded as an individual and an individual's body: concealed on his person. Therefore, human foetus to whom personhood could be attributed was also destroyed in the accident in the instant case; had the accident not occurred the unborn child would have survived and seen the light of the day.



We are unable to uphold the view taken by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh and this court in the decisions referred to above that loss of foetus should be taken as an injury sustained by the pregnant woman in the accident. In the first place, foetus is another life in the woman and it comes as a baby in the course of time. Though foetus grows in the body of the woman, it cannot be equated to or considered to be a part of the body of the woman. In effect, loss of foetus consequent upon the death of the pregnant woman is actually loss of a child in the offing for the husband of the woman. Secondly, there is no scope for considering compensation for the bodily injury of the victim, who died in the road accident. Therefore, it would be illogical to grant compensation treating the death of foetus along with the woman dying in the accident treating it as another bodily injury. In our view, compensation to be granted for the death of a pregnant woman in motor accident is for loss of two lives. Therefore, appellant in this case is entitled to claim compensation separately for the loss of his child in the womb of his wife, who perished in the accident.

22. This court would be failing in its duty, if the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice J.R. Midha of Delhi High Court in Prakash v. Arun Kumar Saini, MANU/DE/0337/2010 : 2010 ACJ 2184 (Delhi), is not referred. The Hon'ble Judge has considered the whole gamut of law on the right of an unborn child, by considering the statutory provisions in various enactments, where the rights of an unborn child have been recognised in law, Indian and foreign case-laws and at para 16, held that the foetus is another life in woman and that loss of foetus is actually a loss of child in the offing and hence, the appellants therein were entitled to compensation for the loss of foetus. The Hon'ble Judge has held that an unborn child in the mother's womb till his birth has to be treated as equal to a child in existence. Among other statutory provisions, learned Judge has considered the Explanation to section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which states that "for the purposes of this section, 'minor' includes a child in the womb". Section 20 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 recognises the rights of a child in the womb, which reads as follows:


A child who was in the womb at the time of the death of an intestate and who is subsequently born alive shall have the same right to inherit to the intestate as if he or she had been born, before the death of the intestate, and the inheritance shall be deemed to vest in such a case with effect from the date of the death of the intestate.

Among other judgments and enactments considered threadbare by the Hon'ble Judge, clauses (x) and (xi) of para 15 of the judgment in Prakash's case (supra), are worth reproduction,--


Black's Law Dictionary refers to 'rights of unborn child', thus:


The rights of an unborn child are recognised in various different legal contexts; e.g. in criminal law, murder includes the unlawful killing of a foetus (Cal. Penal Code, section 187), and the law of property considers the unborn child in being for all purposes which are to its benefit, such as taking by will or descent. After its birth, it has been held that it may maintain a statutory action for the wrongful death of the parent. In addition, the child, if born alive, is permitted to maintain an action for the consequences of prenatal injuries, and if he dies of such injuries after birth, an action will lie for his wrongful death. While certain States have allowed recovery even though the injury occurred during the earlier weeks of pregnancy, when the child was neither viable nor quick, Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa 267, 167 A 2d 93; Smith v. Brennan, 31 NJ 353, 157 A 2d 497, other States require that foetus be viable before a civil damage action can be brought on behalf of the unborn child.


(xi) The legal status of unborn person is discussed in Salmond on Jurisprudence, 11th Edn., at pp. 354 and 355, the relevant portion of which reads as follows:


Though the dead possesses no legal personality, it is otherwise with the unborn. There is nothing in law to prevent a man from owning property before he is born. His ownership is necessarily contingent, indeed, for he may never be born at all; but it is nonetheless a real and present ownership.


A child in its mother's womb is for many purposes regarded by a legal fiction as already born in accordance with the maxim, nasciturus pro iam nato habetur. In the words of Coke: 'The law in many cases hath consideration of him in respect of the apparent expectation of his birth'. Thus, in the law of property, there is a fiction that a child en ventre sa mere is a person in being for the purposes of (1) the acquisition of property by the child itself, or (2) being a life chosen to form part of the period in the rule against perpetuities.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

C.M.A. No. 3279 of 2012 and M.P. No. 1 of 2012

Decided On: 30.01.2013

Rakhi Kothari Vs. R. Soundaapandian and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S. Manikumar, J.

Citation: MANU/TN/2909/2013.

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Wednesday, 25 December 2024

Madras HC: Revenue records will not confer any title unless supported by valid documents

 It is needless to reiterate again that, revenue records are not documents for title, it will not confer any title, unless supported by valid documents. Likewise documents created fraudulently though registered is non est in eye of law. {Para 46}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

A.S. No. 876 of 2019, C.M.P. Nos. 26727 of 2019 and 13994 of 2020

Decided On: 17.02.2021

Somasundaram Vs. Parameswariammal

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. G. Jayachandran, J.

Citation:  MANU/TN/0670/2021,2021(1) LW 912,2021(4) CTC 44.

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Sunday, 15 December 2024

Under which circumstance the MACT can infer that deceased was liable for contributory negligence if he did not wear helmet at the time of accident?

 At the same time, major portion of the contribution to the accident is on the part of the deceased. This is more so that the deceased did not wear helmet at the time of accident. Further, on the date of accident, the deceased was a minor and not in possession of a driving licence to drive the two wheeler. Therefore, it is appropriate to fix 25% liability on the part of driver of the car and 75% on the part of the deceased himself.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 272 of 2020

Decided On: 01.06.2021

Panneerselvam and Ors. Vs. I Two Distribution and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R. Subbiah and S. Kannammal, JJ.

Author: R. Subbiah, J.

Citation:  MANU/TN/4019/2021,AIRONLINE 2021 MAD 1016,2022 AAC 305 (MAD).

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Wednesday, 11 December 2024

Madras HC: Minors are non earning members and hence money should not be deducted towards their personal expenses in motor accident claim petition

 So far as minors are concerned, they are non earning members and there is no occasion for them to spend money towards the personal expenses and there cannot be any deduction towards their personal expenses. In Lata Wadhwa case (cited supra) and Kishan Gopal case (cited supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court after fixing the notional monthly income of the minor applied the multiplier and taken the entire amount as the loss of dependency and no deduction was made for their personal expenses. In the above circumstances, this Court is of the view that there cannot be any deduction towards personal expenses from the notional income of deceased minors.{Para 18}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

C.M.A. No. 1625 of 2020 and C.M.P. No. 11960 of 2020

Decided On: 10.11.2020

Reliance General Insurance Company Limited Vs. H. Mallika Bee and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Bharathidasan, J.

Citation:  MANU/TN/6628/2020.

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Monday, 25 November 2024

Madras HC: Sub- registrar should not insist for original document or non traceability certificate in case of lost document in every case for Property Transfer

 Adverting to the facts on hand, the document that is sought to be registered is a release deed executed by the sister in favour of the brother. The document recites that the property belonged to the father. The parties are not strangers to each other. They have produced registration copies of the antecedent documents which are registered in the very same office. Unless the Registrar has a doubt regarding the genuineness of the copies issued by his own office, insistence on production of originals is a superfluous exercise. As we had already stated, it is a common knowledge and accepted phenomena today that one cannot secure a certificate from a Government office without the price.{Para 10}

In such situation, driving executant of documents to obtain a non traceability certificate in case of lost document in every case, will result only in encouraging under hand dealings. When certified copies have been produced and it is not impossible for the Sub Registrar to have it verified with the original record that is available in his own office, insisting upon a non traceability certificate appears to be rather a wasteful exercise. Even in Punithavathy's case referred to supra, we have observed that the Registrars will not refuse registration particularly, when the parties to the documents are relatives and they take the risk of obtaining the document without examining the title. The copies of the documents have already been produced. The Sub Registrar could have verified the same with the original records in his office and register the instrument without dogmatically refusing registration. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

W.A.No.1160 of 2024

P.Pappu Vs  The Sub Registar,

CORAM :

 MR.JUSTICE R.SUBRAMANIAN

and

 MR.JUSTICE R.SAKTHIVEL

DATED : 27.09.2024.

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Friday, 1 November 2024

Madras HC: Privacy as a fundamental right includes spousal privacy also and evidence obtained by invading this right is inadmissible

 This is primarily because there has been a clear invasion of theprivacy right of the wife. It is obvious that the husband had stealthily obtained the information pertaining to the call history of his wife. He was not the owner of the mobile device or the registered user of the sim card. He had clandestine custody of the same for probably a brief while. There has been a clear breach of the privacy of the wife. In Justice K.Puttaswamy (Retd) v. UOI (AIR 2017 SC 4161), it was held that privacy is a fundamental right. Can evidence procured in violation of this right be admissible in evidence?. This question does not admit of an easy answer. The learned amicus has tabulated the dichotomy of judicial opinion :

Admissible Inadmissible

Kethana Lokes v. Rahul Bettakotte

2024 Karnataka HC 21752

Asha Latha v. Durgesh

2023 SCC OnLine Chh 3959

Deepti Kapur v. Kunal Julka

AIR 2020 Del 156

Rayala Bhuvanewari v.

Naggaphanender AIR 2008 AP 98

Preeti v. Kunal

AIR 2016 Raj 153

Neha v. Vibhor Garg (2021)

(Punjab & Haryana HC)

Sachin Arora v. Manju

2023 DHC 3197

Sankarram v. Kalaiselvi

CMSA(MD)No.54 of 2021 (Madurai

Bench of the Madras High Court).

Neha v. Vibhor Garg has been challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP (C) No.21195 of 2021. Vide order dated 28.04.2022, the proceedings before the Family Court have been stayed. The order of the High Court had not been stayed. {Para 9}

10.The following observations and ratio laid down by the Court of

Appeal in Imerman v. Technquiz (2010 EWCA Civ 908) are relevant : “it was a breach of confidence for a person intentionally to obtain another person’s information secretly and without authorisation, knowing that he reasonably expected it to be private, and, without that other persons authority, ...... that the husband had an expectation of privacy at common law and in accordance with article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in respect of the majority of documents stored on the server which had been accessed without his authority at a stage in the divorce proceedings ....

Why should one spouse have no right of confidentiality

enforceable against the other in relation to their separate lives and personalities?...

Each spouse is entitled to a separate life, distinct from the

shared matrimonial life.

Legal protection applies to protect the confidence itself, not merely to prevent the dissemination of information. It does not need to be shown that the information will be misused; merely that it has been obtained in breach of confidence would be sufficient.”

In Katz v. United States (389 U.S 347 (1967), Justice Harlan propounded the reasonable expectation of privacy test to determine whether an action by the government has violated an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. It was a two part test ; the individual has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognise as reasonable. If both requirements are met and the government has taken an action which violates this 'expectation', then the government's action has violated the individual's right. In a research paper titled “My Diary is Your Diary : The Right to Privacy in a Marriage” by Turkish author Dr.Nadire Ozdemir, it was recommended that the Harlan test laid down in the context of state surveillance should be extended to matrimonial relationships also and that the spouses should be entitled to claim right of privacy against each other.

11.Some of the courts which leaned in favour of admissibility of

evidence obtained in breach of privacy relied on Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. The said provision is as follows :

“Application of Indian Evidence Act, 1872:—A

Family Court may receive as evidence any report, statement,

documents, information or matter that may, in its opinion, assist it

to deal effectually with a dispute, whether or not the same would

be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act,

1872 (1 of 1872).”

I am however not able to agree with such an approach. Though privacy like any other fundamental right is not absolute, it was held in Justice K.Puttaswamy case by Justice D.Y.Chandrachud for himself and three other Hon'ble Judges that any curtailment or deprivation of the privacy right would have to take place under a regime of law and that the procedure must be fair, just and reasonable and subject to constitutional safeguards. The expression

“regime of law” requires some elaboration. Taking inspiration from the title of the book “Legislating Privacy” by Priscilla M Regan, I hold that “regime of law” envisages a special and comprehensive legislation dealing with the subject of privacy. Such a parliamentary legislation would also deal with the question relating to admissibility of evidence procured in breach of one's privacy. Exceptions may be created. National security and supreme public interest could be overriding considerations. In the absence of such a

comprehensive legislation, one has to conclude that there is no “regime of law” dealing with the subject of privacy as of now. The Family Courts Act, 1984 was enacted more than three decades prior to Justice Puttaswamy judgment. The discretionary power conferred on the Family Court under Section 14 of the Family Courts Act cannot be said to fall within the meaningof the aforesaid expression “regime of law”. There is no legislative validation of evidence obtained by violating the fundamental right to privacy. In this background, it would not be proper for the courts to carve out exceptions on their own.

12.The observations made by the High Court of Harare, Zimbabwe

in CRB 57 of 2016 (S. v Nsoro) dated 25.02.2016 are apposite though rendered in a criminal case. The deceased husband refused to let the accused wife read a text message which the husband had received on his phone. Out of anger over the deceased’s refusal to divulge the message, the wife had stabbed the husband causing his death. Justice Chitapi has the following take on the right to privacy between spouses :

“...Section 57 (d) of the Constitution provides that

every person has the right to privacy of their

communications. There is no law which provides that

a husband or wife has a right to infringe on the

privacy of the other’s communications. The accused’s

insistence that the deceased should divulge a

communication made to him on his phone was in

itself an infringement upon the right of the deceased

to privacy of communication. The deceased was

lawfully entitled to refuse to divulge the message he

had received on his phone to the accused albeit the

accused being his wife....

It is the court’s view that society should learn to

respect privacy of communications. Many a time, the

cellphone has been cause of ‘matrimonial quarrels

and domestic disputes because couples do not respect

each others' right to communications made or

received. A cellphone is materially a gadget which is

intended to ease communications between persons. A

lot of cases come before the courts in which a spouse

will have invaded the private communications of

another by going through messages and other

communications on the other spouse’s phone. This

practice should be deprecated. It amounts to

investigating or eavesdropping on one another.

Usually, spouses who do this will be aiming to find

evidence of wrongful conduct by the other.

Eavesdropping on another’s cellphone is evidence of

lack of trust in that other person. Courts are flooded

with cases where couples or spouses seek to prove

wrongful conduct by the other using evidence in the

form of messages retrieved from another spouse’s

phone. Such evidence unless obtained with the

consent of the owner of the phone would have been

illegally obtained in contravention of the rights of

every person to the privacy of communication as

guaranteed by Section 57 of the constitution and

evidential rules relating to admissibility of illegally

obtained evidence should be applied....”

13.I came across an interesting article titled “Rethinking the ‘Fruits

of the poisonous tree’ doctrine: Should the ‘ends’ justify the

‘means’?” (2020 SCC OnLine Blog OpEd 76). The authors Bharat Chugh & Taahaa Khan lament the consequentialist approach that ‘the tree may be poisonous but the fruit is fine’. To them, the concept of ends justifying the means is deeply troubling and calls for judicial intervention. They also invoke the “Unfair Operation Principle” applied by the UK Courts. This principle prohibits admission of evidence if in the given case, its reception runs contrary to the principles of basic fairness. The principle gives courts the discretion to decide, on a case to case basis, as to what would operate fairly or unfairly against the accused, and in appropriate cases, exclude such evidence. Theauthors refer to 94th Report of the Law Commission of India which suggests exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained in criminal cases.

14.Trust forms the bedrock of matrimonial relationships. The

spouses must have implicit and total faith and confidence in each other. Snooping on the other destroys the fabric of marital life. One cannot pry on the other. Coming specifically to the position of women, it is beyond dispute that they have their own autonomy. They are entitled to expect that their private space is not invaded. The wife may maintain a diary. She may jot down her thoughts and intimate feelings. She has every right to expect that her husband will not read its contents except with her consent. What applies to diary will apply to her mobile phone also. The Hon'ble Supreme Court is now considering the question whether forcible sexual intercourse by the husband against the wife's will would constitute marital rape. Obtaining of information pertaining to the privacy of the wife without her knowledge and consent cannot be viewed benignly. Only if it is authoritatively laid down that evidence procured in breach of the privacy rights is not admissible, spouses will not resort to surveillance of the other. One may wonder if marital misconduct which has to be made out for obtaining relief may become impossible of proving. It is not so. It can very well be established and proved by appropriate means. Interrogatories can be served. Adverse inference can be drawn. The charged spouse can be called upon to file affidavit with the express warning that falsity will lead to prosecution for perjury. In exceptional cases, the court can even take it upon itself to unearth the truth. Law cannot proceed on the premise that marital misconduct is the norm. It cannot permit or encourage snooping by one spouse on the other. Privacy as a fundamental right includes spousal privacy also and evidence obtained by invading this right is inadmissible.

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

CRP(MD)No.2362 of 2024

R..... ... Petitioner/Petitioner/Respondent

vs.

1.B..... ...Respondent/Respondent/Petitioner

2.The Secretary to Government,

 Ministry of Electronics and

Information Technology

(MEITY), Government of India,

 New Delhi. ... 2nd respondent

CORAM

 MR.JUSTICE G.R.SWAMINATHAN

Pronounced on : 30.10.2024.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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