Tuesday, 10 September 2019

Whether Judicial officer who is compulsorily retired is entitled to get compensation?

A bare perusal of these two paragraphs clearly shows
that the Division Bench of the High Court itself was
aware that no case for imposing punishment was made out.
It appears that the High Court was of the view that since
the present appellant had already been out of job for
eight years and he was aged about 53 years, he should not
be brought back in service after such a long time. We are
not inclined to agree with this view of the High Court.
Once the High Court held that the charges had not been
proved against the appellant, who was a judicial officer,
his honour and dignity required that he should be brought
back into the service. We hold that the appellant has not
committed any act unbecoming of a judicial officer.
Unfortunately, we cannot do so because now he has already
passed the age of superannuation. Therefore, the only
issue is how should the relief be molded? Should he be
granted the entire back-wages with interest or can one
lump-sum amount be granted as compensation?
We are of the considered view that since the
appellant has not worked during all these years and this
will lead to another round of litigation to decide what

he was earning during this period, in lieu of awarding
him back-wages, we direct that a lump-sum amount of Rs.20
lakhs be paid to the appellant. This amount to be paid
within six months from today, failing which it shall
carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.4514 OF 2010

YOGESH M. VYAS Vs  REGISTRAR, HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT

Dated:September 03, 2019



The only issue in this case is what relief should be
granted to the appellant.
The appellant, who was a Judicial Officer and joined
judicial service on 09.11.1981 held various positions.
During the period 15.06.1992 to 12.06.1994, the appellant
was working as Civil Judge (JD) and JMFC, Visnagar. It is
alleged that he granted seven bail orders against the
provision of law and initially the allegations were of
corruption against him. These allegations were enquired
into and after inquiry it was held that there was no
direct evidence to show that corrupt practice was done by
the appellant but he had exercised jurisdiction not
vested in him by enlarging the accused on bail in cases
falling under Section 307 IPC. The enquiry officer also

noted that there may be the possibility of the appellant
having indulged in some corruption. Another allegation
was that in a civil case, after granting ex parte order,
he had vacated injunction the very next day without
notice to the plaintiff. The appellant was visited with
the penalty of compulsory retirement on the basis of the
report submitted against him.
The appellant filed a writ petition and in the writ
petition the High Court came to the conclusion that no
charge of corruption was made out against the appellant.
The High Court, however, dealing with the issue of the
nature of the misdemeanour of the appellant and the
punishment to be imposed upon him, held as follows:
"10. We may now refer to two cases, where no
consent of the learned APP was recorded in
the orders. In the bail application arising
from FIR No.3 of 1994, the incident had taken
place on account of dispute between the
agriculturists. There was one contused
laserated wound of 1 cm and the other
injuries were simple stick injuries. The blow
attributed by Farsi was shown in the medical
certificate as wound caused by a hard and
blunt object. This incident also occurred
when there was an altercation between the
complainant and the accused when they were
goind with the cattle in the outskirts of the
village at about 08:30 in the morning of
06.01.1994.

The other incident was in Misc. Criminal
Application No.62 of 1993, where also there
were cross complaints and the complaint of
the accused was also lodged.
11. Looking to the contents of the bail
applications and the orders passed by the
petitioner, it thus appears that while the
seven cases under consideration did not fall
in the excepted categories mentioned in the
first proviso to Section 437(1), with the
consent of the learned APP, the petitioner
granted bail in five matters, where there
were disputes between the complainant and
injured witnesses who were agriculturists and
the accused were also agriculturists. It is
true that as per the decisions of the Apex
Court and of the learned Single Judges of
this Court, in such cases, the Magistrate
should not have treated them as extraordinary
or exceptional cases, but we do note the
submission of the learned advocate for the
petitioner that at the relevant time, i.e. in
1993-94, the Magistrates were passing such
orders when, prima facie, they were satisfied
that the offence did not amount to offence
under Section 307 of IPC. It was on account
of such approach on the part of the
Magistrates that this Court on the
administrative side had to establish a State
Judicial Academy for imparting proper inservice
training to the Magistrates to
impress upon them that the Magistrate is not
to grant bail for offences punishable with
death or imprisonment for life unless the

accused belongs to any of the excepted
categories indicates in the first proviso to
Section 437(1), or on an extraordinary
occasion as observed in Gurucharan Singh's
case (supra)"
A bare perusal of these two paragraphs clearly shows
that the Division Bench of the High Court itself was
aware that no case for imposing punishment was made out.
It appears that the High Court was of the view that since
the present appellant had already been out of job for
eight years and he was aged about 53 years, he should not
be brought back in service after such a long time. We are
not inclined to agree with this view of the High Court.
Once the High Court held that the charges had not been
proved against the appellant, who was a judicial officer,
his honour and dignity required that he should be brought
back into the service. We hold that the appellant has not
committed any act unbecoming of a judicial officer.
Unfortunately, we cannot do so because now he has already
passed the age of superannuation. Therefore, the only
issue is how should the relief be molded? Should he be
granted the entire back-wages with interest or can one
lump-sum amount be granted as compensation?
We are of the considered view that since the
appellant has not worked during all these years and this
will lead to another round of litigation to decide what

he was earning during this period, in lieu of awarding
him back-wages, we direct that a lump-sum amount of Rs.20
lakhs be paid to the appellant. This amount to be paid
within six months from today, failing which it shall
carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum.
The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
...................J.
(DEEPAK GUPTA)
...................J.
(ANIRUDDHA BOSE)
New Delhi
September 03, 2019

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