Supreme Court: Consider Increasing Retirement Age Of District Judges To 61

Having regard to the fact that this issue is likely to arise

in all the States, let notice be issued to all the High Courts,

States, Union Territories and the Union of India.

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Writ Petition(s)(Civil) No(s). 1022/1989

ALL INDIA JUDGES ASSOCIATION & ORS. Vs  UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 

[ONLY IA No. 178214/2026 AND IA No. 178357/2026 ARE LISTED UNDER THIS ITEM]

Date : 13-07-2026 This matter was called on for hearing today.

CORAM : HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JOYMALYA BAGCHI

HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE V. MOHANA

1. Issue notice.

2. List along with W.P. (Civil) No. 986/2025 on 22.07.2026.

3. Meanwhile, the applicant(s) shall be allowed to continue in

service till the age of 61 years, provided they have not already

been released from the service.

4. Having regard to the fact that this issue is likely to arise

in all the States, let notice be issued to all the High Courts,

States, Union Territories and the Union of India.

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Supreme Court: No Constitutional Court Can Direct Trial Courts To Write Bail Orders In A Particular Manner

 In a given case, if necessary, the court can incorporate a chart as directed in paragraph 9 while deciding a bail application. However, if a High Court directs that in every bail order, a chart should be incorporated in a particular format, it will amount to interference with the discretion conferred on the Trial Courts. Therefore, in our view, what is observed in paragraph 9 of the decision in the case of Jugal Kishore MANU/RH/0611/2020 : (2020) 4 RLW 3386 cannot be construed as mandatory directions to our Criminal Courts. At the highest, it can be taken as a suggestion which need not be implemented in every case. No Constitutional Court can direct the Trial Courts to write orders on bail applications in a particular manner. One Judge of a Constitutional Court may be of the view that Trial Courts should use a particular format. The other Judge may be of the view that another format is better. {Para 12}

16. Therefore, to conclude, we hold that the directions issued in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Jugal Kishore MANU/RH/0611/2020 : (2020) 4 RLW 3386 cannot be said to be binding directions. At the highest, the same shall be treated as suggestions made by the High Court. Non compliance with what is observed in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the said decision by a judicial officer cannot be treated as an act of indiscipline or contempt.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 5388 of 2024.

Decided On: 17.12.2024

Ayub Khan Vs. The State of Rajasthan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Augustine George Masih, JJ.

Author: Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1347/2024.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: The direction of calling for an explanation from a judicial officer by a judicial order was inappropriate. Explanation of a judicial officer can be called for only on the administrative side.

Secondly, even assuming that the Appellant was guilty of indiscipline, on the judicial side, the High Court ought not to have passed an order calling for an explanation from a judicial officer. The direction of calling for an explanation from a judicial officer by a judicial order was inappropriate. Explanation of a judicial officer can be called for only on the administrative side. 

{Para 13}

18. The High Court ought to have shown restraint. The High Court cannot damage the career of a judicial officer by passing such orders. The reason is that he cannot defend himself when such orders are passed on the judicial side.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 5388 of 2024.

Decided On: 17.12.2024

Ayub Khan Vs. The State of Rajasthan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Augustine George Masih, JJ.

Author: Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1347/2024.

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Whether the court can quash prosecution against accused for an offence U/S 306 of IPC if no material is available him in chargesheet regarding that offence?

In the present case, at the outset, we must note that the

Applicant, a Judicial Officer, was never involved in the pending

lis, as the suit property was purchased by his brother

exclusively and only he was party to the litigation. There is no

reason for the deceased to have implicated the Applicant, as he

was not connected with the dispute at all. The material in the

charge-sheet in form of statements implicating the Applicant,

are too far fetched and definitely fall short of any instigation/

incitement and a bare reference to his presence in Miraj in the

month of May, where he is alleged to have threatened the

deceased and asked him to vacate the subject property is not

sufficient to attract instigation/incitement, as the offence is

registered on 24/06/2016. In any case, even it is not the

allegation of the prosecution that the Applicant abetted the

suicide by instigating or inciting the deceased in any manner,

as abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person

or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing and without

a positive act on part of the Applicant to instigate or aid in

commission of suicide by the deceased, he cannot be convicted

for an offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC.

In order to attract the offence under Section 306, clear

mens rea to commit the offence has to be established, as it

requires active/direct act, leading the deceased to commit

suicide left with no other option, but in the present case, the

material in the charge-sheet falls short of proving the

ingredients of Section 306 and, hence, in our view, by

exercising the inherent power conferred under Section 482,

the purpose of it being to prevent the abuse of process or to

secure the ends of justice, we deem it appropriate to safeguard

the interest of the Applicant.

In absence of we exercising the power, the Applicant will

have to unnecessarily face the rigmarole of trial, which

ultimately would result in acquittal, as no material in the

charge-sheet collected by the prosecution attract the

ingredients of Section 306 of IPC and we would be failing in

discharge of our duty, if we do not step in and save the

Applicant from undergoing the long drawn process of trial, as

the material in the charge-sheet through close scrutiny, do not

in any manner, establish the ingredients of abetment of suicide

under Section 306 of IPC against him.

For the reasons recorded above, we are satisfied that

human liberty, which is the most cherished constitutional

value, must be protected by us, by exercising the inherent

power conferred under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure

Code. {Para 20}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.959 OF 2016

WITH

INTERIM APPLICATION NO.2060 OF 2024

Nasirhusen Mohiddin Jamadar Vs  The State of Maharashtra & Anr. 

CORAM: BHARATI DANGRE & MANJUSHA DESHPANDE, JJ.

 DATED : 18 th  NOVEMBER, 2024

ORDER (PER BHARATI DANGRE, J.) :-

Citation: 2024:BHC-AS:45637-DB.

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Orissa HC: Mere absence of affidavit supporting allegations against Judicial Officer does not warrant automatic dismissal of complaint and departmental proceedings

 The Hon'ble Chief Justice of India, vide D.O. letter No. CJI/CC/Comp/2014/1405 dated 03-10-2014, issued a circular, that was later circulated as a guideline by the Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice as per Annexure-3 for dealing with the complaints against the subordinate judiciary, read as -

“As you are aware, recently, Hon'ble the CJI, vide his D.O. No. CJI/CC/Comp/2014/1405 dt. 03.10.2014 addressed to the Chief Justice of all the High Courts has asked the High Courts and subordinate judiciary not to entertain any complaint against a judicial officer it is accompanied by sworn affidavits and verifiable material to substantiate the allegation. Expressing concern over the large number of complaints being filed against subordinate judiciary by people having vested interest and personal agenda, Hon'ble CJI has directed that authenticity of the complaints must be ascertained before any action is taken on it. In view of the provisions of the Article 235 of the Constitution, further action relating to the grievance/complants against the judicial officers lies at the High Court level.”

The letter imports specific directives to the Chief Justices of all the High Courts, emphasising that complaints against judicial officers should not be entertained unless accompanied by sworn affidavits and verifiable material to substantiate the allegations. This guideline was issued to address the concerns over the rising number of complaints against the subordinate judiciary, often filed by individuals with vested interests and personal agendas. The Hon'ble CJI underscored the necessity of ensuring the authenticity of such complaints before taking any action to prevent unwarranted harassment of judicial officers. {Para 7}

8. A plain reading of the guideline is sufficient to understand its object. The words “accompanied by sworn affidavits” and “verifiable material to substantiate the allegation” have to be read together in a complete and comprehensive manner. It emerges, that, merely because a complaint is not supported by sworn affidavits, it does not automatically warrant an outright dismissal. In the complete and comprehensive reading of the said guideline, a complaint is not supposed to be ignored from its very inception without even verifying the legitimacy of the complaint as nowhere in the guideline the High Court is debarred from initiating its own enquiry over any complaint where the allegations prima facie reveals verifiable material supporting the complaint subject to an enquiry on the authenticity of the allegations against a concerned judicial officer. The object of initiating an enquiry in the first place is to ensure that serious allegations can be investigated thoroughly, even if the initial complaint lacks sworn affidavit, which underscores the High Court's authority and discretion in managing the subordinate judiciary.

While the guideline aims to protect judicial officers from unwarranted harassment, it does not eliminate the possibility of addressing genuine issues faced by individuals or communities due to the actions of a judicial officer. The High Court retains the responsibility to ascertain the authenticity of the complaints and take appropriate action based on verified facts. The requirement for sworn affidavits and verifiable material ensures that the process is fair and that decisions are not arbitrary. This is a kind of precaution suggested to protect the judicial officers from unwarranted harassment.

9. The concerned guideline issued by the Hon'ble CJI is designed to balance the need to protect judicial officers from frivolous complaints with the necessity of addressing genuine grievances. It is to uphold the principles of fairness, non-arbitrariness, and judicial independence, ensuring that the judiciary function effectively and impartially. The guideline is to reinforce the importance of due process in handling complaints against judicial officers. It ensures that complaints are evaluated based on evidence and merit, thereby upholding the rule of law.

 In the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack

(Before S.K. Sahoo and Chittaranjan Dash, JJ.)

Santosh Kumar Agarwal Vs Orissa High Court and Others.

W.P. (C) No. 17678 of 2024

Decided on August 8, 2024

Citation: 2024 SCC OnLine Ori 1952.

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'Feeble excuses'; Bombay HC directs administrative action against Judicial Magistrate for non-compliance with order for expeditious disposal of trial

 2.2) In the report, the learned JMFC has stated that the said casecame up before her for the first time on 30th January 2023 and at that time, the concerned clerk did not point out to her that the said case is made time bound by the High Court. One of the reason given by the learned Judicial Officer is that, she is dealing with huge pendency of 10 years plus cases both Criminal and Civil and therefore, she has to give attention to each and every matter on priority basis. That, there is insufficient staff to her court and it goes on frequent leave.

3) Perusal of the report clearly indicates that even though the present case was placed before the learned Judicial Officer for the first time on 30th January 2022, she did not adopt necessary steps for expeditious disposal of the said case by taking recourse of the provisions of Cr. P.C. for giving complete effect to the Order dated 24th February 2021 passed by this Court.

4) Numerous other excuses are also given in the said report for not completing the said trial within the stipulated period. Even if the complainant was not cooperating with the trial court, the trial court has powers to apply provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to take the said case to its logical end, as per the directions issued by this Court. The offence alleged against Applicant is under section 498A read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and under section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.(page-4). As per the report itself, there are in all 9 witnesses.

5) Despite the said fact, learned Judicial Officer has now sought

an extension of 6 months to dispose of the said case.

6) We are unable to accept the feeble excuses given by the learned Judicial Officer in not complying with the directions issued vide Order dated 24th February 2021 and paying scant respect to it. It appears to us that the Judicial Officer concerned, is not serious in performing her judicial work. This requires attention by the learned Administrative Committee of this Court.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 1685 OF 2024

IN

CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 66 OF 2021

Chandragupt Rambadan Chauhan  Vs. The State Of Maharashtra & Anr.

CORAM : A. S. GADKARI AND

DR. NEELA GOKHALE, JJ.

 DATE : 9 th  AUGUST, 2024.

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Supreme court Judgment on Judges Pay and pension dated 19 May 2023

All India Judges Association v. UoI And Ors. WP(C) No. 643/2015

 https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sY6iqBoUctijLg2-dNrC8FQ1_4LaMLL9/view?usp=sharing

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Kerala HC: Special Pay of Judicial Officer is Part Of Pay, Should Be Reckoned To Calculate Pension

 The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners

contends that the action of the respondents in issuing

Government Orders which are completely at variance with the

directions contained in the judgment of this Court amounts to

an open challenge to the orders and authority of this Court and

that the said directions are completely illegal and violative of

the directions of this Court. {Para 14}

15. I have considered the contentions advanced. This

Court in the earlier round of litigation had specifically

considered the nature of the special pay granted to judicial

officers pursuant to the directions of the Shetty Commission.

It was found that special pay would come within the definition

of pay under Rule 12(23). Special Pay is a benefit which is

granted to officers posted in specific posts having

administrative responsibilities for the extra work which is done

by them. The argument that grant of special pay to some

officers will lead to a junior-senior anomaly had been agitated

in the earlier litigation also but did not find favour with this

Court. The argument cannot be sustained for a moment in

view of the fact that the principles on which a difference in pay

between a senior and junior is to be considered to be an

anomaly are provided in the very same Rule itself. Grant of

special pay for administrative duties would not, by any stretch

of imagination, result in any junior-senior anomaly since it is a

special emolument given for extra work done.

16.  We hope and trust that the appellants would put a

quietus to this issue, so that, objections of this nature are not

unnecessarily raised as against the judicial officers concerned.”

The impugned orders passed by the Government,

without considering the declaration of law by this Court, are

completely unsustainable. The contention of the respondents

that special pay cannot be reckoned for the purpose of fixation

of pension is without any merit whatsoever. The said

contentions are repelled. The orders and letters impugned in

these writ petitions are, therefore, set aside. It is declared that

the special pay granted to judicial officers is a part of their pay

and that it is to be reckoned for the purpose of calculation of

pension. The respondents shall take appropriate steps to see

that the pension of the judicial officers who drew special pay at

the time of their retirement is revised and the arrears are

disbursed to them forthwith, at any rate, within three months

from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

WP(C) NO.694 OF 2022

 CHERIAN VARGHESE Vs STATE OF KERALA,

PRESENT

 MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN

Dated:  18TH DAY OF JANUARY 2023 

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Supreme Court directs pay hike for subordinate judiciary as per the recommendations of the Second National Judicial Pay Commission w.e.f January 1, 2016

Subordinate Judiciary - Supreme Court directs pay hike for subordinate judiciary as per the recommendations of the Second National Judicial Pay Commission w.e.f January 1, 2016.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

 Writ Petition (Civil) No.643/2015;

ALL INDIA JUDGES ASSOCIATION Vs UNION OF INDIA . & ORS.

Coram: N.V. RAMANA; CJI., KRISHNA MURARI; J., HIMA KOHLI; J.

Dated:  27-07-2022 

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Allahabad HC: If Judge adjourns a case because of Advocate's strike, it amounts to misconduct

 The Principal Judge owes an explanation to this Court why he had adjourned the case acknowledging a probable strike by Advocates on 20.05.2022. The adjournment by the Principal Judge prima facie amounts to misconduct. No Court ought to take notice of a strike or a probable strike by the Advocates. The directions of the Supreme Court in District Bar Association., Dehradun through its Secretary v. Ishwar Shandilya and others, (2020) 17 SCC 672 read:

"6.6. In spite of the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid

decisions, this Court time and again deprecated the lawyers to go

on strikes, the strikes were continued unabated.

Once this is the position, the action of the Trial Judge in adjourning the case on 21.05.2022 to 08.07.2022 requires to be explained by him, which he shall do through a report for the time being before any further orders are passed. Even otherwise, in a Family Court, the presence of an Advocate is not a necessity, though this Court is mindful of the fact that no meaningful justice can be done in the absence of the learned Counsel for parties.

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

Case :- MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 2850 of 2022

Petitioner :- Premraj Pratap Singh

Respondent :- Alka Singh @ Meenu

Hon'ble J.J. Munir,J.

Order Date :- 23.5.2022

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When the high court should not consider a complaint against Judicial Officer in his transfer, promotion and compulsory retirement?

  In context of the three complaints filed against the appellant, it is important to note that the same were never communicated to the petitioner during his service tenure and that the complaints had been subsequently closed. Moreover, two out of the three complaints were closed prior to the meeting of the Higher Judicial Committee and therefore, could not have been the basis of the decision of the Committee. Additionally, in so far as the complaint dated 20.10.2015 (bearing No. R/V/JP/PIN/118/2015) is concerned, it is neither supported by any affidavit nor has any address been provided in it and importantly, was also closed by the respondent prior to the appellant’s discharge order. In this context, it is pertinent to refer to the Standing Order No. 03./S.O./2015 dated 10.06.2015 which directed that:

“The complaint making allegations against members of the subordinate judiciary in the states should not be entertained and no action should be taken thereon, unless it is accompanied by a duly sworn affidavit and verifiable material to substantiate the allegations made therein

……..

……..

……..

The entry of the complaint in the pre-institution register for inward number will not be treated as pendency of Vigilance matter against the Judicial Officer and will not be taken into consideration against the Judicial Officer in any service matter including transfer, promotion and for compulsory retirement.”

(emphasis supplied)

In the present case, the record clearly showcases that no verifiable complaint was filed against the appellant that could form the basis of the disciplinary proceeding against him. {Para 55}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL NO.2029 OF 2022

 ABHAY JAIN Vs THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AND ANR.

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Whether high court should remove a Judicial officer if he passes a wrong order without extraneous reason?

  Hence, in light of the above judicial pronouncement, we hold that the accused K.K. Jalia had the right to file bail application at any stage when undergoing imprisonment as an under-trial prisoner. The fact that the two other co-accused had already been enlarged on bail was a valid reason for granting bail to accused K.K. Jalia. If the High Court was to initiate disciplinary proceedings based on a judicial order, there should have been strong grounds to suspect appellant’s bona fides and the order itself should have been actuated by malice, bias or illegality. This is clearly not the case in the present matter. The appellant was competent and well within his right to grant bail to the accused in discharge of his judicial functions. {Para 64}

65. This court in P.C. Joshi vs State of U.P. [(2001) 6 SCC 491] held that:

“That there was possibility on a given set of facts to arrive at a different conclusion is no ground to indict a judicial officer for taking one view and that too for alleged misconduct for that reason alone. The enquiry officer has not found any other material, which would reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or devotion to duty or that he has been actuated by any corrupt motive. At best, he may say that the view taken by the appellant is not proper or correct and not attribute any motive to him which is for extraneous consideration that he had acted in that manner. If in every case where an order of a subordinate court is found to be faulty a disciplinary action were to be initiated, the confidence of the subordinate judiciary will be shaken and the officers will be in constant fear of writing a judgment so as not to face a disciplinary enquiry and thus judicial officers cannot act independently or fearlessly. Indeed the words of caution are given in K.K. Dhawan case [(1993) 2 SCC 56 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 325 : (1993) 24 ATC 1] and A.N. Saxena case [(1992) 3 SCC 124 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 861 : (1992) 21 ATC 670] that merely because the order is wrong or the action taken could have been different does not warrant initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the judicial officer. In spite of such caution, it is unfortunate that the High Court has chosen to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellant in this case.”

66. We concur with the view of this Court in the aforesaid case that merely because a wrong order has been passed by the appellant or the action taken by him could have been different, this does not warrant initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the judicial officer.

67. This court in Krishna Prasad Verma vs State of Bihar [(2019) 10 SCC 640], while setting aside the High Court’s order, quashed the charges against the officer therein and granted him consequential benefits while holding that:

“No doubt, there has to be zero tolerance for corruption and if there are allegations of corruption, misconduct or of acts unbecoming of a judicial officer, these must be dealt with strictly. However, if wrong orders are passed, that should not lead to disciplinary actions unless there is evidence that the wrong orders have been passed for extraneous reasons and not because of the reasons on the file.

….…..

……...

………

………

The main ground to hold the appellant guilty of the first charge is that the appellant did not take notice of the orders of the High Court whereby the High Court had rejected the bail application of one of the accused vide order dated 26-11-2001 [Shivnath Rai v. State of Bihar, Criminal Misc. No. 30563 of 2001, order dated 26-11-2001 (Pat)] . It would be pertinent to mention that the High Court itself observed that after framing of charges, if the non-official witnesses are not examined, the prayer for bail could be removed, but after moving the lower court first. The officer may have been guilty of negligence in the sense that he did not carefully go through the case file and did not take notice of the order of the High Court which was on his file. This negligence cannot be treated to be misconduct. It would be pertinent to mention that the enquiry officer has not found that there was any extraneous reason for granting bail. The enquiry officer virtually sat as a court of appeal picking holes in the order granting bail.

…….

…….

…….

…….

We would, however, like to make it clear that we are in no manner indicating that if a judicial officer passes a wrong order, then no action is to be taken. In case a judicial officer passes orders which are against settled legal norms but there is no allegation of any extraneous influences leading to the passing of such orders then the appropriate action which the High Court should take is to record such material on the administrative side and place it on the service record of the judicial officer concerned. These matters can be taken into consideration while considering career progression of the judicial officer concerned. Once note of the wrong order is taken and they form part of the service record these can be taken into consideration to deny selection grade, promotion, etc., and in case there is a continuous flow of wrong or illegal orders then the proper action would be to compulsorily retire the judicial officer, in accordance with the Rules. We again reiterate that unless there are clear-cut allegations of misconduct, extraneous influences, gratification of any kind, etc., disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated merely on the basis that a wrong order has been passed by the judicial officer or merely on the ground that the judicial order is incorrect.”

(emphasis supplied)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL NO.2029 OF 2022

  ABHAY JAIN Vs THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AND ANR.

Coram: UDAY UMESH LALIT; VINEET SARAN, JJ. 

Dated: March 15, 2022

Author: Vineet Saran, J.

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Supreme Court Deprecates Impleading Judges In Petition Challenging Grant Of Bail

  Firstly, we see no reason why the petitioner should have filed this writ petition challenging the order of the Magistrate directly in this Court. Further, we also fail to understand why the Judge granting bail has been impleaded by name as respondent no.6 and also the Additional District Judge, who has refused to interfere with the order passed by the Magistrate has been impleaded by name as respondent no.7. The said conduct of the petitioner is deprecated.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

VINEET SARAN; C.T. RAVIKUMAR, JJ. 

Writ Petition(s)(Criminal) No(s). 48/2022.

BALAKRAM @ BHURA Vs THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.

Dated:  21-02-2022

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Procedure to be followed by high court for promotion of district Judge

 No doubt that the judgments are evaluated and interviews are

conducted by the Hon'ble Judges of this Court. As such, the

assessment of the judgments of the candidate as well as assessment of the performance of the candidate in vivavoce would be presumed to be on objective basis. However, by now, it is a settled principle of law that merely because there is no possibility of discretion being not

exercised properly, that by itself cannot be a ground for granting wider

discretion howsoever high the authority may be. We may also

gainfully refer to the Judgment of the Apex Court in Ajay Hasia vs.

Khalid MujibAIR 1981 SC 487. In the said case, selection process included 33.33

percentage marks for oral interview. Their Lordships held that

allocation of a high percentage of marks for the oral interview as

compared to the marks allocated for the written test, cannot be

accepted by the Court as free from the vice of arbitrariness. After

discussing the entire legal position, Their Lordships observed that

allocation of more than 15% of the marks out of the total marks for

the oral interview would be arbitrary and unreasonable and was liable

to be struck down as constitutionally invalid. In the Rules that fall for

consideration before us more than twice permissible limit of 15% i.e.

33.33% of the marks are allocated on the basis of oral interview. Not

only that even 33.33 % of the marks which are to be allocated on the

basis of evaluation of the judgment are also on the basis of subjective

evaluation which may differ from a judge to judge.{Para 12}

13] We are therefore of the prima facie view that award of only

33% of marks on the basis of objective assessment and 66.66 % of

marks on the basis of subjective assessment i.e. evaluation of

judgments and oral viva appears to be an issue which needs to be

looked into.

14] We may clarify that we do not propose to encroach upon the rule

making powers of the High Court on the Administrative Side.

However, as already discussed hereinabove, we may also observe that it is high time that the Rules which govern the promotions of high office of District Judge need to be reframed in a proper format. We may also prima facie observe that the selection process for the

promotion should not have more than 50% of the marks to be

determined on the basis of subjective assessment i.e. evaluation of

judgment and granting of marks for vivavoce. We therefore feel that

rule making authority i.e. High Court on the Administrative Side will

address the issue and find out a system of selection which has more

weightage on the objective assessment than the subjective assessment

of the candidate.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 1440 OF 2017

Surekha Abhay Sinha  V/s State of Maharashtra 

Mr. Ravi Gadagkar a/w Mr. Aniket Ransubhe i/b Mr. Ajay Basutkar for the Petitioner.

Mr. Himanshu Takke, Asstt. Govt. Pleader for Respondent Nos. 1 and

Mr. A.A. Kumbhakoni, Advocate General a/w Mr. Rahul Nerlekar for Respondent No.3.

CORAM: B. R. GAVAI &  M.S. KARNIK, JJ.

DATE: 4th September, 2017

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Whether disciplinary authority can rely on statements of witnesses recorded in preliminary enquiry if enquiry officer has not permitted delinquent to cross-examine them?

In the aforesaid backdrop, we have to consider the most relevant issue involved in this case. Admittedly, the Enquiry Officer, the High Court on Administrative side as well on Judicial side, had placed a very heavy reliance on the statement made by Shri C.B. Gajjar, Advocate, Mr. G.G. Jani, complainant and that of Shri P.K. Pancholi, Advocate, in the preliminary inquiry before the Vigilance Officer. Therefore, the question does arise as to whether it was permissible for either of them to take into consideration their statements recorded in the preliminary inquiry, which had been held behind the back of the Appellant, and for which she had no opportunity to cross-examine either of them.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2668 of 2005

Decided On: 18.03.2013

 Nirmala J. Jhala Vs.  State of Gujarat and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.S. Chauhan and F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, JJ.

Author: B.S. Chauhan, J.

Citation:MANU/SC/0257/2013,AIR 2013 SC 1513

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Whether high court should initiate a departmental enquiry against Judicial officer on the ground that he has passed the wrong order?

That is why we again repeat that one of the responsibilities of the High Court on the administrative side is to ensure that the independence of the District judiciary is maintained and the High Court acts as a guardian and protector of the District judiciary.

16. We would, however, like to make it clear that we are in no manner indicating that if a judicial officer passes a wrong order, then no action is to be taken. In case a judicial officer passes orders which are against settled legal norms but there is no allegation of any extraneous influences leading to the passing of such orders then the appropriate action which the High Court should take is to record such material on the administrative side and place it on the service record of the judicial officer concerned. These matters can be taken into consideration while considering career progression of the concerned judicial officer. Once note of the wrong order is taken and they form part of the service record these can be taken into consideration to deny selection grade, promotion etc., and in case there is a continuous flow of wrong or illegal orders then the proper action would be to compulsorily retire the judicial officer, in accordance with the Rules. We again reiterate that unless there are clear-cut allegations of misconduct, extraneous influences, gratification of any kind etc., disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated merely on the basis that a wrong order has been passed by the judicial officer or merely on the ground that the judicial order is incorrect.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 8950 of 2011

Decided On: 26.09.2019

 Krishna Prasad Verma (D) thr. L.Rs.  Vs. State of Bihar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Deepak Gupta and Aniruddha Bose, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SC/1364/2019, 2020(2) MHLJ 296

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Whether the government can refuse to grant medical reimbursement to govt servant if he has failed to obtain referral order before taking medical treatment?

The reply of the Government is short and opposes the prayer

of the petitioner on two grounds. Firstly that there was no referral order allowing the petitioner to take the treatment from outside the State and secondly, there were no extra ordinary urgent grounds for the petitioner to have travelled outside the State for his treatment without presenting himself before the Medical Board.

[5] Both the objections of the Government need to be overruled.

Firstly, as noted the petitioner was struggling with aggressive infection on

his nose which did not get cured despite his treatment at the hands of

ENT specialist and skin specialist. The petitioner therefore desired to

have further investigations and opinion from the experts. He, therefore,

approached the authorities for permission to travel outside State. His

request dated 29th November, 2019 met with no immediate response. He could not wait any longer. He started his travel on 5th December, 2019. It was only thereafter that the Medical Board conveyed to him that unless and until he is present a referral order cannot be issued in his favour. On 7th December, 2019 the hospital at Vellore detected that the petitioner was suffering from cancer. Under such circumstances it was not expected for the petitioner to have waited for the Medical Board to call him for

personal appearance for grant of referral order which would delay his

treatment. As things turned out, having gone to Vellore for investigations,

the petitioner ended up the undergoing entire treatment even without

returning home for which purpose his leave was sanctioned by the

employer.

[6] Under such circumstances to expect the petitioner to wait for

the referral order is unreasonable. It is not even the case of the

respondents that the specialized treatment needed for such cancer is

readily available within the State. In other words going by the stand of the

respondents if the petitioner had presented himself before the Medical

Board and waited for long enough for the Medical Board to respond to

his request for grant of referral order, the same would have been granted.

Only on that ground to deny the benefit of reimbursement of medical

expenditure would be interpreting the policy of the Government too

rigidly. Further, the ground that there was no urgency in the petitioner

departing for treatment, also must be rejected. After having waited for

long enough for the treatment prescribed by the local doctors to have

effect and the treatment having failed to have desired effect, the petitioner

had to have a proper diagnosis and line of treatment. It is not as if the

petitioner departed immediately without informing the employer or even

the Medical Board. The petitioner did approach the Medical Board but

could not give too long a time for Medical Board to respond. The

petitioner had to take a calculated risk of departing without prior referral

order.

HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA

AGARTALA

W.P(C) No. 289/2020

Sri Kali Sankar Baidya, Vs.  The State of Tripura, 

HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. AKIL KURESHI

Dated: 30/09/2020

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Whether protection under Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 is available to Ex-Judge?

 Reference to Sub-section 1 of Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 in verbatim is important and relevant. The provision reads as under:

“3. Additional protection to Judges.-(1) Notwithstanding anything

contained in any other law for the time being in force and subject to the

provisions of sub-section (2), no court shall entertain or continue any civil or

criminal proceeding against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, thing

or word committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or

purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function.

XXXXXXXX”

It is apparent that sub-section 1 of Section 3 of Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 directs

that no Court shall entertain any civil or criminal proceeding against any person who is or was

a Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him, or in the course of,

acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official and judicial duty or function.

It is apparent on perusal of the impugned orders, and not disputed, that the Sub-

Divisional Judicial Magistrate (Respondent No.1 & 4) was acting in discharge of his judicial

duty while passing the impugned orders. The orders might be illegal, however, law provides

appropriate remedies to the petitioner to challenge the said orders. The actions of the Judge,

however, stand protected by virtue of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 (subject to the

provision of sub-section 2 of Section 3 of the Act of 1985).

9. A conjoint reading and understanding of the Act of 1850 (supra) and the Act of 1985

(supra) make it clear that protection available to a Judge under Judicial Officers’ Protection

Act, 1850 is in respect of any action taken in good faith; whereas the protection available

under the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 is absolute and is available not only to a sitting

Judge but also to an Ex-Judge in respect of the actions taken or words spoken by him while

discharging his official or judicial functions.

THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT

Case No. : WP(C) 3057/2020

RAHENDRA BAGLARI Vs THE SUB-DIVISIONAL JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE (M) AND 3 ORS.

BEFORE

HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. AJAI LAMBA

Dated:15.09.2020

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Whether government is liable to pay interest to government servant on gratuity if there is delay in payment of gratuity?

In State of U.P. and others v. Dhirendra Pal Singh, MANU/SC/1479/2016 : 2016(4) UPLBEC 2881, the Apex Court relying upon State of Kerala and others v. M. Padmanabhan Nair, MANU/SC/0296/1984 : (1985) 1 SCC 429, held that the pension and gratuity are no longer bounty to be distributed by the Government to its employees but rather valuable rights in their hands and any culpable delay in distribution thereof must visit with penalty with interest.

19. In Y.K. Singla v. Punjab National Bank and others, MANU/SC/1109/2012 : (2013) 3 SCC 472, the Apex Court, after discussing the issue relating to interest payable on the amount of gratuity not paid within time, directed that interest at the rate of 8% per annum shall be paid on the amount of gratuity.

20. In view of the above decision, as there was no justification on the part of the respondents for withholding the payment of 90% of the enhanced gratuity admissible to the petitioner, we are of the opinion that the petitioner is entitle to be compensated for the loss by way of payment of interest. Accordingly, the communications dated 6.9.2012 and 13.12.2012 (Annexures 5 and 7 to the writ petition) stand quashed and the respondents are directed to pay 90% of the enhanced gratuity to the petitioner with interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date the enhanced gratuity became due and payable i.e. 4th November, 2010 till the date of its payment.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 937 of 2013

Decided On: 23.10.2017

 Radhey Shyam Chaubey  Vs.  High Court of Judicature and Ors.

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Whether government servant or judicial officer can be denied pension if judicial proceeding is pending against him?

The petitioner retired on 31.12.2007 as District Judge. At the time of retirement no disciplinary action was pending against him On 5.2.2008, subsequent to his retirement a First Information Report was lodged at Police Station Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477-A, 120-B IPC and Section 13(1) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act which was registered at Case Crime No. 152 of 2008. In view of the aforesaid criminal case only 90% of his gratuity amounting to Rs. 3.15 lacs out of total Rs. 3.5 lacs was released in his favour on 6.1.2012 on completion of necessary formalities.

2. The Government Order dated 4th November, 2010, issued on the basis of the Justice E. Padmanabhan Committee report dated 17.7.2009 which was accepted by the Supreme Court vide its orders dated 19.7.2010, 29.7.2010 and 2.8.2010 the State Government provided that all judicial officers retiring on 1.1.2006 or thereafter would be entitle to gratuity/death cum retirement gratuity of Rs. 10 lacs.

3. The petitioner had retired on 31.12.2007 and, as such, became entitled to gratuity of Rs. 10 lacs as per the aforesaid Government Order in place of Rs. 3.50 lacs.

8. It is settled in law that payment of post retirement dues including gratuity are not bounty and that they cannot be withheld unless the rules provide for it. In other words, in the absence of any rules permitting withholding of post retiral dues including gratuity, the Government cannot withhold the same.

9. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 is unable to place before us any rule or statutory provision permitting withholding of post retiral dues due to pendency of a criminal case.

10. Civil Services Regulations vide Regulation 919-A(3) provides that no death-cum-retirement gratuity shall be paid to the Government servant until the conclusion of the departmental proceedings or the enquiry by the Administrative Tribunal and issue of final orders thereon.

12. A simple reading of the aforesaid provision reveals that the bar on payment of death-cum-retirement gratuity is until the conclusion of the departmental proceedings or the enquiry by the Administrative Tribunal. This bar is not applicable where a criminal case is pending as it is not a departmental proceeding or an enquiry by the Administrative Tribunal.

13. In the case at hand, there is no departmental proceedings or any enquiry by the Administrative Tribunal pending against the petitioner. The petitioner is only facing criminal proceedings and there is certainly no provision which puts a rider on the payment of death-cum-gratuity to a Government servant or a judicial officer merely for the reason that criminal proceedings are pending against him.

14. A Division Bench of this Court in State of U.P. and three others v. Faini Singh (Special Appeal No. 416 of 2014 decided on 25.4.2014) while considering the provisions of Regulation 919-A(3) of Civil Services Regulations observed that the power of withholding or withdrawing pension is to be used in cases where allegations are of serious nature or grave misconduct and of causing pecuniary loss and it cannot be exercised mechanically merely on the pendency of any judicial proceedings without considering the allegations against the retired Government servant. In other words, pendency of even judicial proceedings has not been recognized as a matter of right to withhold the pension.

15. In Bangali Bahu Misra v. State of U.P., MANU/UP/1042/2002 : 2003(3) AWC 1760, a Division Bench of this Court seized of a similar controversy held that in the absence of any provision under law even if the petitioner is subjected to punishment in criminal proceedings that would not be a ground for withholding the post retiral benefits admissible to him.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 937 of 2013

Decided On: 23.10.2017

 Radhey Shyam Chaubey  Vs.  High Court of Judicature and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Pankaj Mithal and Irshad Ali, JJ.

Citation: 2018 (3) AWC 2521.

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