Thursday 20 August 2020

Supreme Court: Accused should raise plea of insanity or juvenility generally in the trial court

Pleas of unsoundness of mind under Section 84 of IPC or mitigating
circumstances like juvenility of age, ordinarily ought to be raised during trial
itself. Belated claims not only prevent proper production and appreciation of
evidence, but they also undermine the genuineness of the defence’s case.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1551 of 2010

Mohd. Anwar Vs  The State (N.C.T. of Delhi) 

Surya Kant, J:
Dated: 19.08.2020

The present criminal appeal, which has been heard through video
conferencing, is at the instance of Mohd. Anwar who impugnes the
judgment dated 22.02.2010 of the High Court of Delhi whereby his appeal
against a judgment dated 27/29.04.2004 of the Additional Sessions Judge,
Karkardooma, convicting and sentencing him under Section 394 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) and Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959, was
turned down.
2. The case of the prosecution is that the victim-complainant, Tabban
Khan (PW-1), was riding his motorcycle on the main road near Shahdara
around 11:30PM on 17.05.2001, when he stopped to ease himself near a  fishpond. Suddenly, three boys (including the appellant) caught hold of him
and started assaulting him. They were armed with a knife and revolver.
Upon extortion, the complainant handed over a bundle of five-hundredrupees
notes totalling around thirty thousand (Rs 30,000) to the boys, who
then contemplated murdering him by stabbing, so that he would not report
the matter to the police. Hearing commotion of passers-by, the three boys
left the complainant and ran towards a warehouse. The complainant then
returned to his home and reported the matter to the jurisdictional police the
following evening. This complaint was subsequently converted into an FIR
on 20.05.2001 at 7:45PM.
3. A police party, on 20.05.2001 at about 8:30PM, during routine
checking of buses near GT Road, noticed three boys surreptitiously
deboarding a bus through the rear door. On suspicion, Constable Vinod
Kumar (PW-4) and Constable Prakash Chand (PW-7) chased and
apprehended them, and recovered a prohibited buttondar knife from the
appellant and his co-accused. They also confessed to having robbed the
present complainant. All three were arrested and produced before the
Metropolitan Magistrate for a Test Identification Parade (“TIP”) the following
day, which they refused to undergo.
4. The prosecution examined twelve witnesses during trial which
included the victim-complainant (PW-1), the Metropolitan Magistrate who
sought to conduct the TIP proceedings (PW-10) and a total of ten

policemen. Sketches of the knife, arrest memos, site plans, and recovered
money and weapons were admitted in evidence. The appellant and his coaccused
plainly denied the allegations and claimed that the case was
planted by the police upon their failure to pay a bribe of rupees twenty-five
thousand. They, however, led no evidence in defence.
5. The trial Court discarded the defence plea for want of supporting
material, and further found the likelihood of false implication being remote.
All twelve prosecution witnesses were noted to have withstood crossexamination
and their testimonies were designated as being stellar. The
trial Court explained the absence of any public witness as being nothing
abnormal given the circumstances of the case. The unreasoned refusal of
the accused to take part in the TIP proceedings was found to be highly
incriminating and substantiating their guilt.
6. The trial Court, thus, held all three accused guilty of robbery with
attempt to cause grievous hurt and sentenced them to seven years
rigorous imprisonment under Section 397/34 of IPC, five years rigorous
imprisonment under Section 392/34 of IPC, two years rigorous
imprisonment under Section 25 of the Arms Act and fine of rupees five
thousand (or imprisonment of six months in lieu thereof).
7. The appellant approached the High Court which dismissed the
charge under Section 397 of IPC, and instead convicted him under Section
394 with a reduced sentence of only two years rigorous imprisonment.

Another co-accused, Mohd Aslam, was acquitted on charges of robbery as
the version of the complainant qua him was found doubtful. The High Court
noted that although as per the FIR three ‘unidentified’ persons had robbed
the victim but PW-1 admitted during his cross-examination that he
previously knew Mohd Aslam who was a friend of his children.
8. As far as the present appellant was concerned, the High Court
specifically noted that no animosity or motive for false implication had been
proferred by him, and that there were no contradictions in the testimonies
of the witnesses as regards his role in the crime. The minor delay in lodging
of the FIR was considered insignificant, for it was a late time occurrence
and the victim could therefore not be expected to visit a police station in
such terrorised mental state of mind. Use of a revolver was considered an
improvement for it had not been mentioned in the FIR. Considering the
absence of any specific weapon being attributed to the appellant, charges
of robbery with grievous hurt or attempt to murder were dropped.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant raised new arguments of juvenility
and insanity before the High Court. It was claimed that Mohd Anwar was
merely 15 years at the time of occurence and was undergoing treatment for
a mental disorder at a government hospital. This was supported through a
copy of an OPD card and the testimony of the appellant’s mother who
stated that he sometimes had to be kept chained at home to prevent harm
to himself and others. The High Court took notice of the appellant’s age being 21 years at the time of recording of his Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement in March 2004 and concluded that the appellant would therefore have been an able-minded major at the time of incident in May, 2001.
10. These very same arguments have again been canvassed before us
by learned counsel for the appellant. Assailing the judgments of the High
Court and the trial Court on the charge of robbery, he urged that the
prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. He asserted that lack of independent witnesses, absence of injuries
on the person of the complainant as well as the inconsistency in the
complainant’s version regarding his knowledge of co-accused Mohd Aslam,
all together evidenced that no incident of robbery ever took place. Further,
the FIR had been lodged after an unexplained delay of three days, despite
the police station being walking distance from the site of the incident, thus
suggesting that the entire proceedings were concocted.
11. Learned Additional Solicitor General, on the other hand, buttressed
the judgment of the High Court by highlighting the various evidences and
consistent testimonies of the twelve witnesses. He maintained that the
belated defences of juvenility and insanity were an afterthought, and that
the High Court had already taken a lenient view by reducing the sentence
from seven to two years.

12. At the outset, it must be highlighted that appellate Courts ought not to
routinely re-appreciate the evidence in a criminal case. This is not only for
reasons of procedure, expediency, or finality; but because the trial Court is
best placed to holistically appreciate the demeanour of a witness and other
evidence on record. Given the concurrent finding of the Courts below on
key aspects of the robbery, we do not find it a fit case for such re-appraisal
of evidence.
13. Further, the testimonies of the witnesses are indeed impeccable and
corroborative of each other. The crime of robbery with hurt has been
established by the testimony of PW-1 and the other evidence on record.
The complainant (PW-1) had no motive to falsely implicate the appellate
and/or to allow the real culprits to go scot-free. The refusal to participate in
the TIP proceedings and the lack of any reasons on the spot, undoubtedly
establish the appellant’s guilty conscience and ought to be given
substantial weight.1 The three-day delay in registration of FIR, as projected
by the appellant, is devoid of factual basis. The original record shows that
the complaint was, in fact, registered within a few hours of the incident on
18.05.2001. It was because of preliminary police enquiry that another two
days passed between reporting and subsequent lodging of FIR on
1 Ashwani Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 308, ¶ 19.

14. Pleas of unsoundness of mind under Section 84 of IPC or mitigating
circumstances like juvenility of age, ordinarily ought to be raised during trial
itself. Belated claims not only prevent proper production and appreciation of
evidence, but they also undermine the genuineness of the defence’s case.
15. As noted by the High Court, no evidence in the form of a birth
certificate, school record or medical test was brought forth; nor any expert
examination has been sought by the appellant. Instead, the statement
recorded under Section 313 CrPC shows that the appellant was above 18
years around the time of the incident, which is a far departure from the
claimed age of 15 years.
16. The plea of mental disorder too remains unsubstantiated. No
deposition was made by any witness, nor did the appellant himself claim
any such impairment during his Section 313 CrPC statement. On the
contrary, his conduct of running away from the spot of the crime on
17.05.2001 as well as the attempt to escape from the bus on 20.05.2001
evidence an elevated level of mental intellect. The answers recorded in
response to the questions put forth by the Additional Sessions Judge at the
Sec 313 CrPC stage are also not mechanical or laconic. For example, the
appellant explains his refusal to participate in the TIP proceedings by
alleging that his face had already been shown by the police to the

17. Mere production of photocopy of an OPD card and statement of
mother on affidavit have little, if any, evidentiary value. In order to
successfully claim defence of mental unsoundness under Section 84 of IPC, the accused must show by preponderance of probabilities  that he/she suffered from a serious-enough mental disease or infirmity which would affect the individual’s ability to distinguish right from wrong.2 Further, it must be established that the accused was afflicted by such disability particularly at the time of the crime and that but for such impairment, the crime would
not have been committed. The reasons given by the High Court for
disbelieving these defences are thus well reasoned and unimpeachable.
18. Regardless thereto and given the ingrained principles of our criminal
law jurisprudence which mandates that substantive justice triumph
limitations of procedure, this Court on 22.07.2020 tried to enquire into the
mental health of the appellant, by requesting the learned Additional Solicitor
General to get the appellant mentally examined. However, notwithstanding
such efforts, the appellant who had been granted bail by this Court earlier,
is untraceable. The government counsel submits that the appellant is not
residing at his claimed address since the past eight years, and even the
appellant’s own counsel fairly admitted to not having received any
instructions from his client since the past ten years. We are thus left with no
option but to hold that the plea of mental illness is nothing but a made-up
story, and is far from genuine.
2 TN Lakshmaiah v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 1 SCC 219, ¶ 9.

19. Given such inability of the appellant to establish juvenility or insanity,
raise any doubt regarding guilt; and considering the detailed reasons
accorded by the High Court, the reliable testimony of twelve witnesses as
well as the leniency shown in sentencing, we see no reasons to interfere
with the impugned order(s). The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The
appellant’s bail bonds are cancelled and the respondent-State is directed to
take the appellant into custody to serve the remainder of his sentence.
…………………………….. J.
…………………………… J.
DATED : 19.08.2020

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