Bombay HC: Whether the court should release the accused on anticipatory bail if dispute is of civil nature?

 I have perused the first information report. Prima-facie,

the dispute between the parties appears to be of a civil nature.

Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case, I am

inclined to release the applicants on anticipatory bail. {Para 9}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION NO. 3087 OF 2025

Shantadevi Mafatlal Purohit and Ors  V/s. The State of Maharashtra and Anr. 

Mr. Bipul Maity Advocate for the Applicants.

Ms. Supriya Kak, APP for the Respondent/State.

Mr. Sunil R. Pandey i/b Adv. Raju M., Advocate for the first

informant.

CORAM : N.R. BORKAR, J.

DATE : 06.02.2026.

Citation: 2026:BHC-AS:9463

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LLM Notes: Legislative approaches during late colonial era in dealing with juveniles

 The legislative approaches during the late colonial era in India to deal with juveniles reflected a gradual shift from punitive to reformative methods, influenced by global reform movements and British colonial policies. Key features and legislations of this period include:

• Indian Penal Code 1860: Recognized children under 7 as incapable of crime (doli incapax), and children aged 7 to 12 as having conditional immunity based on maturity, establishing age-based differentiation in criminal liability.

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LLM Notes: Juvenile Justice as a Distinct System: Should Juveniles Be Treated Differently from Adults?

 Foundational Philosophical Basis

The concept of juvenile justice as a distinct system is fundamentally rooted in the recognition that children are developmentally different from adults and therefore require specialized treatment within the legal framework. This distinction is based on several key philosophical principles that form the bedrock of modern juvenile jurisprudence.

The Doctrine of Parens Patriae

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Madhya Pradesh HC: JJ Act Overrides NIA Act, Juvenile Booked Under UAPA To Be Tried By Children's Court not Special Judge, NIA Act

While discussing the juvenile issue, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Yakub Abdul Razak Memon (supra) observed that there is no doubt that JJ Act is beneficial in nature and is socially oriented legislation and in case the provisions are not complied with, the object of its enactment would be frustrated. However, while resolving the conflict between the JJ Act, 2000 and TADA Act, 1987, it was observed that Section 1(4) of JJ Act, 2000 was added w.e.f. 22.08.2006 which gave overriding effect over other statutes. However, the other statutes in that case was TADA Act which was not in existence and was repealed much before coming into force of the amendment of 22.08.2006. Since the overriding effect was provided over other statutes and TADA Act stood repealed much before the same, it could not be said that JJ Act, 2000 will have an overriding effect upon the TADA Act. In the present case, both the NIA Act, 2008 and JJ Act, 2015 are in operation. The later in point of time is JJ Act which provides for clear cut non-obstante over any other law for the time being in force whereas Section 13 of the NIA Act provides for non-obstante clause giving an overriding effect only upon the Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore, this Court is of the view that the JJ Act, 2015 will have an overriding effect over the NIA Act, 2008. {Para 25}

26. On a mature consideration of the above discourse as well as the legal position, especially considering the effect of Section 1(4) of Act, 2015, it is hereby held that when the FIR is registered under a Scheduled Act prescribed under the NIA Act and a juvenile has been directed to be tried as an adult by the Children's Court, then the jurisdiction to try the case would vest in Children's Court and not in the Special Judge under the NIA Act.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (JABALPUR BENCH)

Misc. Criminal Case No. 1133/2025

Decided On: 19.05.2025

In Reference Vs. Memo No. 454/2024 Bhopal Dated 23/11/2024

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Dwivedi, J.

Citation:  MANU/MP/1475/2025.

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LLM Notes: Varying Definitions of Child and Juvenile in Indian Law

The concept of "child" in Indian law presents a complex landscape of varying age definitions that depend entirely on the specific legal context and purpose of each statute. Unlike many jurisdictions that maintain uniform definitions, India's legal framework demonstrates significant inconsistency in determining who qualifies as a child, with age limits ranging from as low as 7 years to as high as 21 years across different laws. This variation reflects the diverse objectives of different legislations, from child protection and labor regulation to criminal justice and marriage prevention.

- Age-Based Variations Across Different Legal Frameworks

14-Year Age Limit Laws

Multiple labor-focused legislations define a child as someone who has not completed 14 years of age. The Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 specifically states that a "child means a person who has not completed his fourteenth year of age". Similarly, the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 defines "child means a person who has not completed fourteen years of age". The Factories Act, 1948 also adheres to this 14-year threshold for defining children in industrial employment contexts.

15-Year Age Limit Specifications

The Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 establishes a unique 15-year threshold, defining "child means a person who has not completed his fifteenth year". This law specifically prohibits the employment of children in any capacity within motor transport undertakings. The Plantations Labour Act, 1951 similarly defines "child means a person who has not completed his fifteenth year" in certain provisions, though some sections maintain the 14-year limit.

18-Year Universal Standard

The most commonly adopted age limit of 18 years appears in several major child protection laws. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 defines a child as "a person who has not completed eighteen years of age". The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO), 2012 states that "child means any person below the age of eighteen years". The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 defines a "minor" as "a person who is below the age of 18 years".

- Fundamental Differences Between Child and Juvenile Concepts

Scope and Application Context

The term "child" encompasses a broader protective framework covering civil, family, and welfare matters, while "juvenile" specifically refers to young individuals in conflict with criminal law.  Children are protected under various civil legislations concerning education, labor, marriage, and general welfare, whereas juveniles are specifically addressed within the criminal justice system.

Legal Framework Orientation

Child-focused laws emphasize protection, welfare, and prevention of exploitation across multiple life domains including education, health, and safety. Juvenile justice laws, conversely, concentrate on rehabilitation, reformation, and reintegration of young offenders back into society. The Juvenile Justice Act specifically addresses "children in conflict with law" and "children in need of care and protection".

Age Determination Philosophy

Child definitions vary based on the specific protection or regulation needed, while juvenile classification maintains consistency around criminal responsibility and rehabilitation capacity. The juvenile justice system assumes that individuals under 18 lack the maturity for full criminal responsibility and require specialized treatment.

- Gender-Specific and Special Case Definitions

Marriage-Related Age Distinctions

The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 presents gender-specific definitions where "child means a person who, if a male, has not completed twenty-one years of age, and if a female, has not completed eighteen years of age". This law reflects traditional concepts of marriageable age while attempting to prevent child marriages.

Educational Age Parameters

The Right to Education (RTE) Act, 2009 specifically targets children "in the age group of six to fourteen years" for free and compulsory elementary education. This law creates both a lower and upper age boundary, focusing on the critical educational development period.

Criminal Responsibility Framework

The Indian Penal Code establishes a unique framework where children below 7 years are considered incapable of committing crimes, while those between 7-12 years may be held responsible only if they demonstrate sufficient maturity to understand the consequences of their actions. This graduated approach recognizes developing cognitive abilities.

- Sector-Specific Legal Variations

Industrial and Labor Protection Laws

Manufacturing and industrial sectors predominantly adopt the 14-year threshold to balance child protection with economic realities. The Beedi and Cigar Workers Act, Factories Act, and Child Labour Act all prohibit employment of children below 14 years in their respective sectors.

Transportation and Mining Industries

The Motor Transport Workers Act extends protection to 15 years, recognizing the additional risks in transportation work. The Mines Act, 1952 provides the strongest protection by prohibiting anyone below 18 years from mine-related work.

Family and Personal Laws

Family-oriented legislation like the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act maintains the 18-year standard for determining legal capacity regarding property, custody, and guardianship matters .

- Contemporary Challenges and Legal Implications

Jurisdictional Confusion

The varying definitions create significant challenges in legal application, particularly when cases involve multiple laws or when determining which protective framework applies. Courts must navigate these inconsistencies when adjudicating matters involving young individuals.

International Standards Alignment

While the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child defines anyone below 18 as a child, India's domestic laws demonstrate significant deviation from this international standard. This creates complications in implementing international child protection protocols.

Enforcement and Implementation Issues

The lack of uniformity in child definitions complicates enforcement efforts, particularly in cases involving exploitation, trafficking, or abuse where multiple laws may apply simultaneously. Law enforcement agencies must determine which definition applies based on the specific circumstances and legal framework involved .

Conclusion

The concept of "child" in Indian law demonstrates remarkable fluidity, with definitions ranging from 7 to 21 years depending on the specific legal context and protective objectives. While juvenile justice laws maintain relative consistency around the 18-year threshold for criminal matters, child protection spans a much broader spectrum of age-based definitions. This variation reflects India's attempt to balance diverse social, economic, and cultural considerations while providing age-appropriate protections across different sectors. However, this fragmented approach creates significant challenges in legal application and enforcement, highlighting the need for greater harmonization while maintaining context-specific protections .

 The concept of "child" in Indian law demonstrates significant variation across different statutes, with age limits ranging from under 14 years to under 21 years depending on the specific legislation and its objectives. This diversity reflects the different contexts and purposes for which child protection laws were enacted.

Variation in Age Definitions Across Laws

Under 14 Years:

• Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986: Defines a child as "a person who has not completed his fourteenth year of age"

• Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966: States that "child means a person who has not completed fourteen years of age"

• Dangerous Machines (Regulation) Act, 1983 and Minimum Wages Act, 1948 also follow the 14-year threshold.

Under 15 Years:

• Plantations Labour Act, 1951: Defines "child means a person who has not completed his fifteenth year"

• Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961: Uses the same 15-year definition for regulating conditions of motor transport workers

Under 16 Years:

• Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956: Defines "child" as a person below 16 years of age, while "minor" refers to persons aged 16 to 18 years.

Under 18 Years:

• Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015: Defines a child as "a person who has not completed 18 years of age".

• Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012: States that "child means any person below the age of eighteen years".

• Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009: Considers "child" as any person below 18 years.

• Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Define "child" as any person below eighteen years.

Gender-Specific Definitions:

• Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006: Provides different age thresholds based on gender - "child means a person who, if a male, has not completed twenty-one years of age, and if a female, has not completed eighteen years of age".

Constitutional Framework

The Indian Constitution provides foundational protection for children through various articles:

• Article 21A: Guarantees free and compulsory education to children aged 6-14 years.

• Article 24: Prohibits employment of children below 14 years in hazardous industries.

• Article 45: Directs states to provide early childhood care and education for children below six years.

Reasons for Variation

The different definitions exist because each law addresses specific aspects of child protection and welfare. Labor laws focus on physical capacity for work, hence the lower age limit of 14 years, while laws addressing sexual offenses and juvenile justice use 18 years to ensure comprehensive protection during adolescence. Marriage laws reflect traditional social practices and legal capacity considerations, explaining the gender-specific age differences.

Challenges and Implications

This variation in definitions creates several challenges:

• Implementation difficulties: Different age thresholds can lead to confusion in enforcement

• Potential loopholes: Children may fall through gaps in protection due to inconsistent definitions

• Legal inconsistencies: The same individual might be considered a child under one law but not another

The lack of uniformity has led to calls for harmonizing the definition of "child" across all Indian legislation, with many experts suggesting alignment with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which defines a child as anyone below 18 years of age. This would ensure more coherent and effective child protection measures across all areas of law.

Child and Juvenile Definitions in Indian Law

Comprehensive Comparison Table

Legal Framework	Age Limit	Definition	Scope/Application
Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986	14 years	Person who has not completed 14 years	Labor protection in hazardous occupations
Factories Act, 1948	14 years	Person who has not completed 14 years	Industrial employment protection
Beedi and Cigar Workers Act, 1966	14 years	Person who has not completed 14 years	Tobacco industry labor protection
Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961	15 years	Person who has not completed 15 years	Transportation sector employment
Plantations Labour Act, 1951	15 years	Person who has not completed 15 years	Plantation sector employment
Juvenile Justice Act, 2015	18 years	Person who has not completed 18 years	Criminal justice and child protection
POCSO Act, 2012	18 years	Any person below 18 years	Sexual offence protection
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956	18 years	Person below 18 years	Family law and guardianship
Right to Education Act, 2009	6-14 years	Children in age group 6-14 years	Elementary education provision
Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006	Male: 21 years, Female: 18 years	Gender-specific age limits	Marriage prevention
Mines Act, 1952	18 years	Person below 18 years	Mining industry protection
Indian Penal Code	7 years (minimum), 7-12 years (conditional)	Below 7: no criminal capacity, 7-12: conditional	Criminal responsibility

Key Differences: Child vs Juvenile

Aspect	Child	Juvenile
Scope	Broad protective framework (civil, family, welfare)	Specific to criminal justice system
Focus	Protection, welfare, exploitation prevention	Rehabilitation, reformation, reintegration
Age Variation	7-21 years (context-dependent)	Primarily 18 years (criminal law)
Legal Framework	Multiple laws with varying definitions	Juvenile Justice Act primarily
Application	Education, labor, marriage, health, safety	Criminal proceedings and corrections

Mind Map Structure for Memorization

CHILD AND JUVENILE DEFINITIONS IN INDIAN LAW
│
├── CHILD CONCEPT
│   │
│   ├── 14-YEAR THRESHOLD
│   │   ├── Child Labour Act 1986
│   │   ├── Factories Act 1948
│   │   └── Beedi & Cigar Workers Act 1966
│   │
│   ├── 15-YEAR THRESHOLD
│   │   ├── Motor Transport Workers Act 1961
│   │   └── Plantations Labour Act 1951
│   │
│   ├── 18-YEAR THRESHOLD
│   │   ├── Juvenile Justice Act 2015
│   │   ├── POCSO Act 2012
│   │   ├── Hindu Minority Act 1956
│   │   └── Mines Act 1952
│   │
│   ├── SPECIAL CASES
│   │   ├── RTE Act: 6-14 years
│   │   ├── Child Marriage Act: M-21, F-18
│   │   └── IPC: Below 7 (no capacity), 7-12 (conditional)
│   │
│   └── CHARACTERISTICS
│       ├── Broad protective scope
│       ├── Context-dependent definitions
│       └── Civil/family/welfare focus
│
└── JUVENILE CONCEPT
    │
    ├── PRIMARY DEFINITION
    │   └── Below 18 years (criminal law context)
    │
    ├── LEGAL FRAMEWORK
    │   └── Juvenile Justice Act 2015
    │
    ├── CATEGORIES
    │   ├── Children in conflict with law
    │   └── Children in need of care and protection
    │
    └── CHARACTERISTICS
        ├── Criminal justice specific
        ├── Rehabilitation focused
        └── Consistent age threshold

Memory Aids for Exam Preparation

Age-Based Mnemonics

• 14 Years: "Factories, Labour, Beedi" (FLB = Fourteen Limit Base)

• 15 Years: "Motor Transport, Plantations" (MTP = Fifteen Plus)

• 18 Years: "Juvenile POCSO Hindu Mines" (JPHM = Eighteen Maximum)

Quick Reference Categories

Labor Protection Laws (14-15 years)

• Focus: Employment prohibition

• Industries: Manufacturing, transport, plantations

General Protection Laws (18 years)

• Focus: Comprehensive welfare

• Areas: Criminal justice, sexual offenses, family law

Special Case Laws

• Education: 6-14 years (RTE)

• Marriage: Gender-specific (M-21, F-18)

• Criminal capacity: Graduated (7, 7-12, 18)

Exam Strategy Points

Key Contrasts to Remember:

• Child = Broad protection across multiple domains

• Juvenile = Specific to criminal justice system

• Age varies by law's purpose and sector

• No uniform definition across Indian legislation

Critical Legal Principles:

• Protective intent varies by sector

• Economic vs. welfare considerations

• International standards vs. domestic variations

• Gender-specific applications in certain laws

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LLM Notes: Sexual Abuse and Juvenile Justice in India: A Comprehensive Analysis of Legal Frameworks and Current Challenges

 India faces a complex and deeply troubling intersection between child sexual abuse and juvenile justice, where the legal system must balance protection of vulnerable children with rehabilitation of young offenders. The country has witnessed alarming statistics revealing that child sexual abuse has reached epidemic proportions, with comprehensive studies showing that every second child in India has experienced some form of sexual abuse. This crisis occurs within a legal framework governed by two primary pieces of legislation: the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. These laws represent India's commitment to protecting children while addressing the unique challenges posed when children themselves become perpetrators of serious crimes. The intersection of these frameworks creates complex legal scenarios that test the boundaries of justice, rehabilitation, and child protection, particularly evident in cases where one child protected under juvenile law commits sexual offences against another child protected by POCSO provisions.

Legal Framework for Child Protection: The POCSO Act

Comprehensive Definition and Scope

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Comparative Analysis of the hierarchy, Jurisdiction and powers of Criminal courts to impose sentences as per provisions of CR.P.C and BNSS 2023

S 4 of CRPC(S 4 of BNSS)- Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws.—(1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained.

(2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.

S 5 of CRPC (S 5 of BNSS)- Saving.—Nothing contained in this Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local law for the time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force.

 Chapter II

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Supreme Court: Juvenile Cannot Be Denied Bail Without Recording Finding That Proviso To S. 12(1) Juvenile Justice Act Is Applicable

Section 12 of the JJ Act reads thus:

“Section 12: Bail to a person who is apparently a child

alleged to be in conflict with law.

(1) When any person, who is apparently a child and is

alleged to have committed a abailable or non-bailable

offence, is apprehended or detained by the police or

appears or brought before a Board, such person shall,

notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in any other

law for the time being in force, be released on bail

with or without surety or placed under the supervision

of a probation officer or under the care of any fit

person:

Provided that such person shall not be so released if

there appears reasonable grounds for believing that

the release is likely to bring that person into

association with any known criminal or expose the said

person to moral, physical or psychological danger or

the persons release would defeat the ends of justice,

and the Board shall record the reasons for denying the

bail and circumstances that led to such a decision.

6. From the phraseology used in sub-section 1 of Section

12, a juvenile in conflict with law has to be necessarily

released on bail with or without surety or placed under

supervision of a probation officer or under the care of any

fit person unless proviso is applicable.

7. We have perused all the orders passed earlier by the JJ

Board, Special Court and High Court and specially the order

dated 11th December, 2023 passed by the JJ Board. There is

no finding recorded that the proviso to sub-Section 1 of

Section 12 is applicable to the facts of the case. Without

recording the said finding, bail could not have been denied

to juvenile in conflict with law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.9566/2024)

JUVENILE IN CONFLICT WITH LAW Vs

THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Augustine George Masih, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SCOR/98552/2024

Dated: August 14, 2024.

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Under which circumstances the high court may issue writ of Habeas Corpus and certiorari against judicial order?

 Pronouncing upon the issue whether a writ of Habeas

Corpus would lie against an order of remand under Section 167,

by referring to the decision in case of Manibhai Ratilal Patel Vs.

State of Gujarat and ors, (2013) 1 SCC 314 which had taken a view that a writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be entertained when a person is committed to judicial custody or police custody by the Competent Court by an order which prima facie does not appear to be without jurisdiction or passed in an absolutely mechanical or wholly illegal manner, reference was made to a decision in case of SFIO Vs. Rahul Modi, 2019(5) SCC 260 which had laid down the position of law as below:-

“19 The law is thus clear that in a Habeas Corpus proceedings,

a Court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention

at the time of return and not with reference to the institution of the

proceedings”.

It is in this background the circumstances in which the writ

of Habeas Corpus shall lie, were clearly stipulated in the following

words:-

“If the remand is absolutely illegal or the remand is afflicted with the vice of lack of jurisdiction, a Habeas Corpus petition would indeed lie. Equally, if an order of remand is passed in an absolutely mechanical manner, a person affected can seek the remedy of Habeas Corpus. Barring such situations, Habeas Corpus petition will not lie.”

36] We have no hesitation in coming to a conclusion that in the

present case, both the conditions are clearly attracted, as the

remand of the CCL, by three distinct orders passed by the Board is absolutely illegal as the impugned order, are afflicted with vice of lack of jurisdiction and further orders of remand being passed by the Board, in an absolutely mechanical manner, without

considering the most significant and pivotal fact that the CCL

continue to be on bail and there is no cancellation or revocation of the order, enlarging him on bail.

37] The act of the respondent therefore, squarely fall within the

parameters laid down in Gautam Navlakha (supra) for

entertaining a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus. 

Looking to the manner in which the entire matter has been

dealt with by the Investigating Agency and also the various orders passed by the Board upon the application preferred by it, we must clearly express that this is one of the fit case where we shall exercise our jurisdiction by issuing a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus, as prayed for in prayer clause (a) and issue a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the subsequent orders remanding the CCL to Observation Home.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.2372 OF 2024

Pooja Gagan Jain v. State of Maharashtra

CORAM : BHARATI DANGRE &

MANJUSHA DESHPANDE, J

DATED : 25th JUNE, 2024.

JUDGMENT :- (PER BHARATI DANGRE, J.)

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Supreme Court: Section 94 Juvenile Justice Act | Ossification Test Has Been Kept At The Last Rung To Determine Age

Section 94(2) of the JJ Act provides for the mode of determination of age. In the order of priorities, the date of birth certificate from the school stands at the highest pedestal whereas ossification test has been kept at the last rung to be considered, only in the absence of the criteria Nos. 1 and 2, i.e. in absence of both certificate from school and birth certificate issued by a Corporation/Municipal Authority/Panchayat. {Para 20}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 121 of 2022

Decided On: 05.03.2024

Vinod Katara Vs. State of U.P.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.

Authored By : B.R. Gavai, Sandeep Mehta

Citation:  MANU/SC/0173/2024.

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Questions and answers on law(Part 58)

Q No. 1 :- How many times preamble of constitution was amended?

Ans:- The Preamble has been amended only once so far, in 1976, by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976. The amendment added three new words:

1. Socialist
2. Secular
3. Integrity. It also changed "unity of the nation" to "unity and integrity of the nation

Q No. 2:- Which of the following Amendment of the Constitution deals with reservation for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) in education and public employment?

Ans:- 103rd Constitutional Amendment provides 10% reservation for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) in education and public employment.

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What is duty of Juvenile Justice Board while doing preliminary assessment of Juvenile for trying him as adult?

 The next important aspect that needs to be gone into and considered is, as to whether the inquiry and preliminary assessment conducted by the J.J.B. to pass final order under Section 18 sub-section (3) of the J.J. Act to try the JCLs as an adult, is sustainable in law? In order to satisfy myself, I have gone through the Roznama maintained by the J.J.B. The Roznama relevant for the purpose of this proceeding is from 04.12.2018 to 01.04.2019. It is to be noted that the roznama is maintained to record the summary of the proceeding undertaken before the Court on the given date. On 04.12.2018, the informant made an application at Exh.52 under Section 15 read with Section 18 of the J.J. Act and prayed to try the JCLs (accused nos. 1 and 5) as an adult. Perusal of the roznama of the proceeding from 04.12.2018 to 01.04.2019 would show that there is no mention of providing a copy of the application either to the JCLs or their advocates. Similarly, there is no mention of providing copy of the SIR submitted by the Probation Officer either to the JCLs or to their advocates. The report of the Psychiatrist was received by the J.J.B. on 01.04.2019. The order in question was passed on 01.04.2019. There is no mention in the Roznama that a copy of the report of the Psychiatrist was provided to the JCLs or to their advocates. It is to be noted that the inquiry to arrive at a conclusion to try the child as an adult, has to be conducted in a transparent and fair manner. The record of inquiry maintained by the Court in this regard must not leave any scope to doubt the reasonable and fair approach of the Board. It is to be noted that in the roznama, there is no mention of presence of the advocates for the JCLs and presence of JCL nos. 1 and 5, on some dates. It is to be noted that the object behind calling SIR through the Probation Officer and the report of the Psychiatrist, is to arrive at a final decision on the point of trial of the JCLs as an adult. Section 15 of the J.J. Act provides for preliminary assessment in case of heinous offence alleged to have been committed by a child, who has completed or is above the age of 16 years. The Board is required to conduct a preliminary assessment with regard to his mental and physical capacity to commit the offence, ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which the alleged offence is committed. The Board, in the process of assessment, may take assistance of experienced Psychiatrists or psychosocial workers or other experts. In this case, the J.J.B. called SIR from the Probation Officer and also report from the Psychiatrist to decide the application (Exh.52) made by the informant, father of the victim, to try the JCLs as an adult in view of heinous offence committed by them.{Para 12}

13. It is to be noted that in the process of this preliminary assessment, the J.J.B. on its own, in exercise of the powers under Section 14 of the J.J. Act or on the application of the victim or the informant, is required to ensure the effective and meaningful participation of the child. The Board has to follow the general principles laid down under Section 3 of the J.J. Act for proper administration of the Act. The inquiry conducted under Section 15 of the J.J. Act must display the adherence to the basic procedural standards of fairness. The child in this process is required to be given fair and unbiased hearing.

14. In this case, the J.J.B. did not conduct the inquiry and preliminary assessment as provided under Sections 14 of the J.J. Act. The J.J.B. on the application made by the informant, father of the minor victim, started preliminary assessment as provided under Section 15 of the J.J. Act. It is to be noted that the J.J.B. was required to display fairness and unbiased approach in the entire process. The J.J.B. was required to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the J.J. Act and ensure transparency and fairness in the proceeding. The roznama of the J.J.B. produced on record does not indicate that the J.J.B. ensured active participation of the JCLs in the inquiry proceeding. It needs to be stated that the final order passed by the J.J.B. to try the JCLs as an adult with such a half-hearted inquiry, has caused prejudice not only to the JCLs, but to the informant and the victim. In this case, the J.J.B. has not followed the procedure laid down under the J.J. Act and the J.J. Rules while conducting preliminary assessment of the JCLs to try them as an adult. It has caused prejudice not only to the JCLs, but also to the informant and the victim. The trial of the child below 18 years of age before the J.J.B. is a rule and trial of the child above 16 years of age before the regular Court as an adult, is an exception. The exceptional circumstances must exist and must be proved within the parameters of Section 15 of the J.J. Act to try the child as an adult in case of heinous offences. In this case, the J.J.B. has not followed the procedure prescribed under the J.J. Act and the J.J. Rules. The order passed by the J.J.B. and confirmed by learned Additional Sessions Judge/Children's Court, therefore, has caused prejudice not only to the JCLs, but also to the informant and the victim. The orders are, therefore, required to be quashed and set aside.

15. The J.J.B. consists of Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate, First Class with at least three years experience and two social workers selected by following the procedure. Section 7 of the J.J. Act provides the procedure to be followed by the J.J.B. Section 7, subsection (3) and the Proviso to sub-section (3) of the J.J. Act is required to be considered in the context of the question involved before this Court. Sub-section 3 provides that a Board may act notwithstanding the absence of any member of the Board and the order of the Board shall not be invalid by the reason only of the absence of any member during any stage of proceedings. Proviso to sub-section (3) of the J.J. Act is applicable to the proceeding where the order is with regard to the final disposal of the case or in making the order under sub-section 3 of Section 18. It provides that at the time of final disposal of the case or in making order under sub-section (3) of Section 18, at least two members including the Principal Magistrate, must be present for the said purpose. Perusal of the relevant roznama does not indicate presence of remaining two members of the Board. Even the order passed by the J.J.B. does not make a reference about presence of the remaining two members. The order is required to be authored by the Principal Magistrate. However, in the order, there must be a mention of the presence of remaining members of the Board. In this case, neither in the roznama, nor in the final order, there is mention of presence of the remaining two members. It is to be noted that this mandatory procedural compliance is required to be strictly met. In such serious matter, casual or mechanical approach cannot adopted. On this count also the order passed by the J.J.B. cannot be sustained.

 In the High Court of Bombay(Nagpur Bench)

(Before G.A. Sanap, J.)

Mustafa Khan Jabbar Khan Vs State of Maharashtra, 

Criminal Revision Application No. 32 of 2020

Decided on June 28, 2023, 

Citation: 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1285.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Whether victim or her relative can make application before Juvenile Justice Board to try Juvenile as adult?

The J.J.B., as per the provisions of Section 15 of the J.J. Act, on its own, was required to conduct the preliminary assessment with regard to the mental and physical capacity to commit such offence, ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which the offence was committed by the JCLs. This inquiry by the J.J.B., in terms of Section 14, sub-section (3) of the J.J. Act, has to be conducted within the prescribed timeline. In this case, it appears that the J.J.B. has failed to discharge its duty to make the preliminary assessment as provided under Section 14, sub-section (3) of the J.J. Act. Section 2, clause (33) defines “heinous offences”. The said definition is extracted below:—

“2. Definitions:—

(33) “heinous offences” includes the offences for which the minimum punishment under the Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) or any other law for the time being in force is imprisonment for seven years or more.”

10. It is to be noted that the minor victim was subjected to sexual assault. The persons involved in the crime are facing serious charge of gang rape. In my view, considering the nature of crime and keeping in mind the definition of heinous offences provided above, it was the bounden duty of the J.J.B. under the J.J. Act to conduct the preliminary inquiry and assessment. The J.J.B. has failed to discharge its duty in accordance with law. The father of the victim made an application at Exh.52 and called upon the J.J.B. to conduct preliminary assessment/inquiry and try the JCLs i.e. accused nos. 1 and 5 as an adult with the remaining five accused. On behalf of the JCLs, an objection has been raised that the inquiry contemplated under Section 15 of the J.J. Act, after prescribed timeline, neither can be conducted by the J.J.B. nor an application for such an inquiry can be entertained at the behest of the informant or the victim. In my view, this submission can not be accepted for more than one reason. Learned Additional Sessions Judge has dealt with this aspect in great detail. I record my concurrence with the observations made by the learned Judge on this point. It is to be noted that the timeline has been prescribed under the J.J. Act for conducting the inquiry by the J.J.B.

11. The J.J.B. consists of a Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate, First Class and two other members. The J.J. Act does not bar the right of the victim or the informant to invoke the provisions in case of failure of the J.J.B. to discharge its duty under the law. It is to be noted that to try the JCLs as an adult in case of heinous crime and where the age is above 16 years, is an exception to the general rule of trying the child below 18 years of age as a juvenile. It is to be noted that there is no express provision under the J.J. Act, whereby substantial right of the victim or the informant to put the law into motion and apply to the J.J.B. to comply the mandate of the J.J. Act, is debarred or taken away. Therefore, in my view, in this case on the ground of procedural lapse on the part of the J.J.B., the right of the informant to apply before the J.J.B. even after prescribed timeline cannot be taken away. I record my agreement with the finding recorded by learned Additional Sessions Judge as well as by the J.J.B. on this point.

 In the High Court of Bombay(Nagpur Bench)

(Before G.A. Sanap, J.)

Mustafa Khan Jabbar Khan Vs State of Maharashtra, 

Criminal Revision Application No. 32 of 2020

Decided on June 28, 2023, 

Citation: 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1285.

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Whether the police can register an offence against a child nine year old in respect of accident?

 Central Government Act

Section 83 in The Indian Penal Code

83. Act of a child above seven and under twelve of immature understanding.—Nothing is an offence which is done by a child above seven years of age and under twelve, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion.

 Misconception or ignorance of law is not an excuse, much less, for a police officer and in the peculiar facts, more so, having regard to the fact that the child was only 9 years of age. This action of the police i.e. of registration of FIR, has resulted in traumatizing a 9 year old boy. Despite Section 83 of the Indian Penal Code, the police have proceeded to register the FIR as against the petitioner’s son, a minor aged 9 years, at the behest of the respondent No.3. The action reflects complete non-application of mind by the concerned officer whilst registering the offence. {Para 15}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 3062 OF 2022; 

`AK’ Vs State of Maharashtra

Coram: REVATI MOHITE DERE; J., S. M. MODAK, J.

Dated: 20th OCTOBER 2022

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Whether juvenile who is tried as adult can be released on bail as per S 12 of Juvenile justice Act?

 On detailed analysis of the statutory scheme, the questions were answered as under :-

“26. Clearly therefore, even when a child is sent-up for trial as

an adult before a Children’s Court, the child does not become

an adult or ‘major’, but is only to be treated differently

considering the heinous nature of the offence alleged and

consequent need for a stricter treatment of the offender,

though still as a juvenile in conflict with law. It must be borne

in mind that the Legislature has created this categorization

based upon an assessment of the child’s “mental and physical

capacity to commit such offence, ability to understand the

consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which

he allegedly committed the offence”. If the intention of the

Legislature was that upon such assessment, the child would

de-jure become an adult, then the question of there being a

separate Children’s Court to try him with specific safeguards

provided for the trial would not arise. That however is not the

case.

28. With specific reference to the application at hand, it

bears mentioning that even though a child may be sent-up for

trial before the Children’s Court as an adult, there is no

provision in the JJ Act that requires any departure from

considering the matter of release of such child on bail under

section 12.

12. It is to be noted that the Juvenile Justice Act is a

beneficial piece of legislation and it must be construed by

taking into consideration the object behind it’s enactment,

being to provide for the care, protection, treatment,

development and rehabilitation of neglected or delinquent

juveniles. It is a beneficial legislation aimed at making

available the benefit of the Act to the neglected or delinquent

juveniles.

While construing the provision contained in Section 12,

which contemplate that a juvenile shall be released on bail

notwithstanding anything contained in the Cr.P.C. and Section

12 further stipulates that he may be released with or without

sureties, or may even place under the supervision of the

Probation Officer or under the care of any fit person. The only

embargo in not releasing such a person on bail is the proviso,

which prescribes that if there appears reasonable grounds for

believing that the release is likely to bring that person into

association with any known criminal or expose the said person

to moral, physical or psychological danger or the person’s

release would defeat the ends of justice.

16. In any case, the J.J.Act focuses on a principle of

presumption of innocence and on the principle of best interest

as well as principle of repatriation and restoration, by virtue of

which, the applicant, who is a juvenile, has a right to be reunited

with his family at the earliest and to be restored to the

same socio-economic and cultural status that he was in, before

coming under the purview of this Act, unless such restoration

and repatriation is not in his best interest.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

BAIL APPLICATION NO.2282 OF 2021

Shubham @ Bablu Milind Suryavanshi Vs The State of Maharashtra 

CORAM: BHARATI DANGRE, J.

DATED : 21st OCTOBER, 2022

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