Saturday 11 September 2021

Under which circumstances Session court or High court can grant anticipatory bail to accused for limited period of time?

 A recent Constitution Bench judgment of this Court, in Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1 has clarified the extent of power exercisable by

Courts under Section 438, Cr.P.C. The Court ultimately held as follows:

“91.1. Regarding Question 1, this Court holds that the protection granted to a

person under Section 438 CrPC should not invariably be limited to a fixed period; it

should enure in favour of the accused without any restriction on time. Normal

conditions under Section 437(3) read with Section 438(2) should be imposed; if

there are specific facts or features in regard to any offence, it is open for the court

to impose any appropriate condition (including fixed nature of relief, or its being

tied to an event), etc.

91.2. As regards the second question referred to this Court, it is held that the

life or duration of an anticipatory bail order does not end normally at the time and

stage when the accused is summoned by the court, or when charges are framed,

but can continue till the end of the trial. Again, if there are any special or peculiar


features necessitating the court to limit the tenure of anticipatory bail, it is open for

it to do so.”

(emphasis supplied)

14. The Constitution Bench in Sushila Aggarwal (supra) has authoritatively held

that when a Court grants anticipatory bail under Section 438, Cr.P.C., the same is

ordinarily not limited to a fixed period and would subsist till the end of the trial.

However, it was clarified by the Court that if the facts and circumstances so warranted,

the Court could impose special conditions, including limiting the relief to a certain

period.

15. It is therefore clear that a Court, be it a Sessions Court or a High Court, in

certain special facts and circumstances may decide to grant anticipatory bail for a

limited period of time. The Court must indicate its reasons for doing so, which would

be assailable before a superior Court. To do so without giving reasons, would be

contrary to the pronouncement of this Court in Sushila Aggarwal (supra). If the High

Court had therefore decided to allow the anticipatory bail application of the

respondents-accused herein, albeit for a limited period of 90 days, the task before this

Court would have been somewhat easier. We would only have had to assess the

reasons assigned by the Court, if any, for the imposition of such special condition in

terms of the judgment in Sushila Aggarwal (supra).

In the Supreme Court of India

(BEFORE N.V. RAMANA, C.J. AND SURYA KANT AND ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.)

Criminal Appeal No. 522 of 2021

Nathu Singh Vs  State of Uttar Pradesh and Others 

Decided on May 28, 2021

2021 SCC OnLine SC 402

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

N.V. RAMANA, C.J.:— Leave granted.

2. The present Criminal Appeals, by way of Special Leave, raise common question of

law and are therefore being disposed of together.

3. In both the impugned orders, the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, while

dismissing the anticipatory bail application of the respondents-accused, granted them

90 days to surrender before the Trial Court to seek regular bail and granted them

protection from coercive action for the said period. Aggrieved by the grant of such

relief, the complainants in both the matters are currently in appeal before us.

4. As only a question of law is being raised, it is not necessary for this Court to

advert to the facts of both the matters extensively. It is sufficient to point out that in

the first case, pertaining to Nathu Singh, the appellant's daughter was married to

respondent no. 2 in that case on 14.02.2014. As she died under suspicious

circumstances in her matrimonial home on 02.01.2021, the complainant registered

FIR No. 07/2021 at police station Masuri, Ghaziabad under Sections 304B and 498A,

IPC read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the respondents

nos. 2 to 5.

5. In the second case, the allegations are that the appellant's brother and the

latter's two sons were attacked by the respondents in that case, due to a dispute

between the parties relating to encroachment of land. The two sons were attacked on

their vital parts, with one of them suffering a skull fracture as a result of which he was

in a coma for one week. The other had lacerations on his head. The complainant

registered FIR No. 371/20 at police station Thana Bhawan, Shamili under Sections

307, 504 and 34, IPC.

6. The respondents in both the cases approached the High Court under Section 438,

Cr.P.C., during ongoing investigation, and sought protection from arrest. Vide the

impugned orders dated 08.02.2021 and 28.01.2021, the High Court dismissed the

applications of the respondents but granted them the aforementioned relief in

identically worded orders. The relevant portion of the order, as extracted from the

impugned order dated 08.02.2021, is as follows:

“…. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of material

brought on record as well as complicity of accused and also judgement of the Apex

Court in the case of P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24 : AIR 2019 SC 4198, this Court does not find any exceptional ground to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Section 438 Cr.P.C.

However, in view of the entirety of facts and circumstances of the case and on

the request of learned counsel for the applicants, it is directed that in case the

applicants appear and surrender before the court below within 90 days from today

and apply for bail, their prayer for bail shall be considered and decided as per the

settled law laid by this Court in the case of Amrawati v. State of U.P. reported in

(2004) 57 ALR 290 as well as judgement passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case

of Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. reported in 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC).

Till then, no coercive action shall be taken against the applicants….”

(emphasis supplied)

7. Aggrieved by the impugned orders, the complainants-appellants have filed the

present appeals by way of special leave.

8. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants, the respondent-State and the

respondents-accused at length.

9. The learned counsel for the appellants, supported by the learned State counsel,

urged that once the High Court declined the final relief of pre-arrest to the

respondents, it could not grant them any further protection. The learned counsel

submitted that Section 438, Cr.P.C. does not contemplate the grant of any such

protection on the dismissal of the application filed by an accused. Rather, the proviso

to Setion 438(1), Cr.P.C. specifically provides for the arrest of the accused on a

rejection of the relief sought in their application. The impugned orders, wherein the

High Court granted protection to the respondents subsequent to the dismissal of their

application, was therefore passed in excess of the High Court's jurisdiction under

Section 438, Cr.P.C. The learned State counsel further submitted that the High Court's

orders have hampered the ongoing investigation as the police have been denied

custodial interrogation of the accused, notwithstanding the fact that the nature of

offences in both cases is grave and heinous.

10. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents-accused justified the

discretion exercised by the High Court and submitted that the High Court has the

power to pass such orders, in the interest of justice.

11. The sole question to be answered by the Court in the present appeals relates to

whether the High Court, while dismissing the anticipatory bail applications of the

respondents, could have granted them protection from arrest.

12. The considerations on the basis of which the Court is to exercise its discretion

to grant relief under Section 438, Cr.P.C. have been decided by this Court in a catena

of judgments and needs no restatement.

13. A recent Constitution Bench judgment of this Court, in Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1 has clarified the extent of power exercisable by

Courts under Section 438, Cr.P.C. The Court ultimately held as follows:

“91.1. Regarding Question 1, this Court holds that the protection granted to a

person under Section 438 CrPC should not invariably be limited to a fixed period; it

should enure in favour of the accused without any restriction on time. Normal

conditions under Section 437(3) read with Section 438(2) should be imposed; if

there are specific facts or features in regard to any offence, it is open for the court

to impose any appropriate condition (including fixed nature of relief, or its being

tied to an event), etc.

91.2. As regards the second question referred to this Court, it is held that the

life or duration of an anticipatory bail order does not end normally at the time and

stage when the accused is summoned by the court, or when charges are framed,

but can continue till the end of the trial. Again, if there are any special or peculiar


features necessitating the court to limit the tenure of anticipatory bail, it is open for

it to do so.”

(emphasis supplied)

14. The Constitution Bench in Sushila Aggarwal (supra) has authoritatively held

that when a Court grants anticipatory bail under Section 438, Cr.P.C., the same is

ordinarily not limited to a fixed period and would subsist till the end of the trial.

However, it was clarified by the Court that if the facts and circumstances so warranted,

the Court could impose special conditions, including limiting the relief to a certain

period.

15. It is therefore clear that a Court, be it a Sessions Court or a High Court, in

certain special facts and circumstances may decide to grant anticipatory bail for a

limited period of time. The Court must indicate its reasons for doing so, which would

be assailable before a superior Court. To do so without giving reasons, would be

contrary to the pronouncement of this Court in Sushila Aggarwal (supra). If the High

Court had therefore decided to allow the anticipatory bail application of the

respondents-accused herein, albeit for a limited period of 90 days, the task before this

Court would have been somewhat easier. We would only have had to assess the

reasons assigned by the Court, if any, for the imposition of such special condition in

terms of the judgment in Sushila Aggarwal (supra).

16. However, in the present appeals, the High Court, after considering the facts and

circumstances of the case, particularly the gravity and severity of the accusations

against the respondents, rejected the application of the respondents-accused. It is

after rejecting the application that the High Court chose fit to grant some relief to the

respondents while directing them to surrender before the Trial Court to file a regular

bail application within 90 days, by protecting them from any coercive action during

that period. The appellants-complainants are aggrieved by the same and are

challenging the power of the Court to pass such a protective order after the dismissal

of the anticipatory bail application.

17. To determine whether the Court can pass such orders, it is necessary to first

analyze the relevant provision, viz., Section 438, Cr.P.C. The relevant portion of

Section 438, Cr.P.C. is extracted below:

438. Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest

(1) Where any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an

accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High

Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section that in the event of

such arrest he shall be released on bail; and that Court may, after taking into

consideration, inter alia, the following factors, namely:—

xxx

either reject the application forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of

anticipatory bail:

Provided that, where the High Court or, as the case may be, the Court of

Session, has not passed any interim order under this sub-Section or has rejected

the application for grant of anticipatory bail, it shall be open to an officer

incharge of a police station to arrest, without warrant, the applicant on the basis

of the accusation apprehended in such application.

xxx

(2) When the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under subsection

(1), it may include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts

of the particular case, as it may think fit, including -

xxx

(3) If such person is thereafter arrested without warrant by an officer in charge


of a police station on such accusation, and is prepared either at the time of arrest or

at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail, he shall be released on

bail; and if a Magistrate taking cognizance of such offence decides that a warrant

should issue in the first instance against that person, he shall issue a bailable

warrant in conformity with the direction of the Court under sub-section (1).

(emphasis supplied)

18. The focus of Section 438, Cr.P.C., when read in its entirety, clearly relates to

the grant of anticipatory bail by the Court. Section 438(1) explicitly lays down certain

factors that need to be considered by the Court before granting the relief sought.

Section 438(2) lays down the conditions that may be imposed by the Court while

granting the relief. Section 438(3) dictates the consequences of the grant of relief

under the Section.

19. The only guidance relating to what is to take place once an application under

Section 438, Cr.P.C. is rejected is found in the proviso to Section 438(1), Cr.P.C.,

which specifically provides that once an application is rejected, or the Court seized

with the matter refuses to issue an interim order, it is open to the police to arrest the

applicant. It is this proviso that the present appellants have relied upon to argue that

the High Court, once it rejected the anticipatory bail applications of the respondentsaccused,

did not have the power to grant any further relief.

20. At first blush, while this submission appears to be attractive, we are of the

opinion that such an analysis of the provision is incomplete. It is no longer res integra

that any interpretation of the provisions of Section 438, Cr.P.C. has to take into

consideration the fact that the grant or rejection of an application under Section 438,

Cr.P.C. has a direct bearing on the fundamental right to life and liberty of an

individual. The genesis of this jurisdiction lies in Article 21 of the Constitution, as an

effective medium to protect the life and liberty of an individual. The provision therefore

needs to be read liberally, and considering its beneficial nature, the Courts must not

read in limitations or restrictions that the legislature have not explicitly provided for.

Any ambiguity in the language must be resolved in favour of the applicant seeking

relief. In this context, this Court, in the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in

Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565, which was recently

upheld and followed by this Court in Sushila Aggarwal (supra), held as follows:

“26. We find a great deal of substance in Mr. Tarkunde's submission that since

denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, the court should lean

against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section 438,

especially when no such restrictions have been imposed by the legislature in the

terms of that section. Section 438 is a procedural provision which is concerned with

the personal liberty of the individual, who is entitled to the benefit of the

presumption of innocence since he is not, on the date of his application for

anticipatory bail, convicted of the offence in respect of which he seeks bail. An overgenerous

infusion of constraints and conditions which are not to be found in Section

438 can make its provisions constitutionally vulnerable since the right to personal

freedom cannot be made to depend on compliance with unreasonable restrictions.

The beneficent provision contained in Section 438 must be saved, not jettisoned…”

(emphasis supplied)

21. When the proviso to Section 438(1), Cr.P.C. is analyzed in line with the above

dictum, it is clear that the proviso does not create any rights or restrictions. Rather,

the sole purpose of the proviso appears to be clarificatory in nature. It only restates,

inter alia, the obvious proposition that unless an individual has obtained some

protection from the Court, the police may arrest them. In line with the ruling in

Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia (supra), the proviso cannot be read as constituting a bar on

the power of the Court.


22. If the proviso to Section 438(1), Cr.P.C. does not act as a bar to the grant of

additional protection to the applicant, the question still remains as to under what

provision of law the Court may issue relief to an applicant after dismissing their

anticipatory bail application.

23. Without going into the question of whether Section 438, Cr.P.C. itself allows for

such a power, as it is not necessary to undertake such an exercise in the present case,

it is clear that when it comes to the High Court, such a power does exist. Section 482,

Cr.P.C explicitly recognizes the High Court's inherent power to pass orders to secure

the ends of justice. This provision reflects the reality that no law or rule can possibly

account for the complexities of life, and the infinite range of circumstances that may

arise in the future.

24. We cannot be oblivious to the circumstances that Courts are faced with day in

and day out, while dealing with anticipatory bail applications. Even when the Court is

not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to an accused, there may be circumstances

where the High Court is of the opinion that it is necessary to protect the person

apprehending arrest for some time, due to exceptional circumstances, until they

surrender before the Trial Court. For example, the applicant may plead protection for

some time as he/she is the primary caregiver or breadwinner of his/her family

members, and needs to make arrangements for them. In such extraordinary

circumstances, when a strict case for grant of anticipatory bail is not made out, and

rather the investigating authority has made out a case for custodial investigation, it

cannot be stated that the High Court has no power to ensure justice. It needs no

mentioning, but this Court may also exercise its powers under Article 142 of the

Constitution to pass such an order.

25. However, such discretionary power cannot be exercised in an untrammeled

manner. The Court must take into account the statutory scheme under Section 438,

Cr.P.C., particularly, the proviso to Section 438(1), Cr.P.C., and balance the concerns

of the investigating agency, complainant and the society at large with the

concerns/interest of the applicant. Therefore, such an order must necessarily be

narrowly tailored to protect the interests of the applicant while taking into

consideration the concerns of the investigating authority. Such an order must be a

reasoned one.

26. The impugned orders passed by the High Court, in the present appeals, do not

meet any of the standards as laid out above. We say so for the following reasons:

firstly, after the dismissal of the anticipatory bail application, on the basis of the

nature and gravity of the offence, the High Court has granted the impugned relief to

the respondents without assigning any reasons. Secondly, in granting the relief for a

period of 90 days, the Court has seemingly not considered the concerns of the

investigating agency, complainant or the proviso under Section 438(1), Cr.P.C., which

necessitates that the Court pass such an exceptional discretionary protection order for

the shortest duration that is reasonably required. A period of 90 days, or three

months, cannot in any way be considered to be a reasonable one in the present facts

and circumstances.

27. The impugned orders therefore do not withstand legal scrutiny. The resultant

effect of the High Court's orders is that neither are the respondents found entitled to

pre-arrest bail, nor can they be arrested for a long duration. During the said duration

they can roam freely without being apprehensive of coercive action. We are thus of the

view that the High Court committed a grave error in passing such protection to the

respondents-accused. Such a direction by the High Court exceeds its judicial discretion

and amounts to judicial largesse, which the Courts do not possess.

28. For the aforestated reasons, the present appeals are allowed. The impugned

order of the High Court dated 08.02.2021 in Criminal Miscellaneous Anticipatory Bail


Application No. 2219 of 2021, and order dated 28.01.2021 in Criminal Miscellaneous

Anticipatory Bail Application No. 1700 of 2021, to the extent of granting protection for

90 days to the respondents-accused are set aside, leaving it open to the Investigating

Agency to proceed in the matters in accordance with law and complete the

investigation. If the respondents-accused have been meanwhile sent to judicial

custody, their application(s) for regular bail or any request for their police remand

made by the Investigating Officer shall be decided by the competent Court,

uninfluenced by the observations made hereinabove.

29. Ordered accordingly.


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