Wednesday 15 September 2021

Whether offence of extortion is made out against accused if there is no averment in FIR that complainant has delivered any valuable assets to accused?

 From perusal of the aforesaid judgment, it is apparent that the

alleged offence under Section 384 of IPC has been quashed on the ground that no valuable assets have been delivered because of extortion, threaten, pressure created by the accused. In the present case also respondent No.5 has not delivered any valuable assets to the petitioner, therefore, the judgment referred to by respondent No.5 also support the contention of the petitioner and in that case also Madhya Pradesh High Court held that offence under Section 384 of IPC is not made out. Therefore, the judgments cited by learned counsel for respondent No.5 are

distinguishable from the facts of the present case. {Para 21}

22) From bare perusal of the FIR it can be very visualized that if we take the face value of the allegation made in the complaint, then also it can be very well seen that no offence under Section 388 of IPC is made out as respondent No.5 in his complaint has nowhere stated that on the basis of extortion made by the petitioner, respondent No.5 was put in fear of an accusation by the petitioner or he committed or attempted to commit any

offence punishable with death and has delivered any valuable assets to the petitioner. When prima facie provisions of Section 383 of IPC is not made out, then the offence under Section 388 of IPC cannot be made out, because unless and until the ingredient of extortion is established, then only the alleged offence, prima facie, is said to have been committed by the petitioner. Since the ingredients of Sections 383 of IPC are not made out, the ingredient of Section 388 of IPC cannot be, prima facie, established, therefore, registration of FIR, prima facie, is nothing, but an abuse of process of law.

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

WPCR No. 133 of 2017

Shatrughan Singh Sahu  Vs  State of Chhattisgarh 

Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas

Pronounced on 07-09-2021

1) The petitioner, who is an Advocate by profession, has filed the present writ

petition (cr.) challenging the registration of First Information Report against

him under Sections 384 and 388 of IPC on the basis of complaint filed by

respondent No.5 Kuleshwar Chandrakar before the Police Station Rudri in

connection with Crime No. 106 of 2015 on 9-10-2015 and subsequently, the

Police has submitted the final report before the learned Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Dhamtari, now the case has been transferred to learned

Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dhamtari, bearing Criminal Case No. 1405

of 2015 (State vs. Shatrughan Saho).

2) Brief facts, as projected by the petitioner in the present petition are that the

Government of Chhattisgarh has enacted the Shakambhari (Nal-Jal)

Scheme for benefit of agriculturists by granting subsidy. The beneficiary

farmers applied for irrigation instrument in the Department of Agriculture. As

per scheme, the State Government is giving them instrument and subsidy

after following certain procedure. The Rural Agricultural Extension Officer,

Village and Post Bhatgaon, Tahsil Kurud, District Dhamtari, Agricultural

Development Officer, Village and Post Charmudiya, Tahsil Kurud, District

Dhamtari, Agriculture Sub Divisional Officer, Colllectorate Dhamtari, Deputy

Director Agricultural Collectorate, Dhamtari and respondent

No.5/complainant Kuleshwar Chandrakar and Roshan Chandrakar,

Proprietor of Shri Ram Bore-wells have committed gross embezzlement at

the time of granting subsidy to the concerned agriculturists, therefore, the

petitioner made a complaint before the Collector, Dhamtari on 3-3-2015 and

24-4-2015 with regard to corruption done by them.

3) On 18-3-2015 the petitioner made a complaint before the Superintendent of

Police, Dhamtari for registration of FIR against the corrupt

employee/officers. Again, the petitioner along with other person namely

Naresh Kumar has also filed a complaint before the Superintendent of

Police, Dhamtari stating that the persons involved in the embezzlement

under the Shakambhari (Nal Jal) Scheme threatened them to cause death.

But the respondent authorities i.e., Collector and Superintendent of Police,

District Dhamtari and Director of Agriculture Department Raipur did not take

any action against the corrupt persons including the respondent No.5.

4) The Superintendent of Police has directed Rudri Police Station to enquire

into the matter. Though the statements of persons namely Manik Ram,

Tomar Sahu, Abhimanyu and Devendra Kumar have been recorded and all

have supported the case, still Police has not taken any action against the

erring officials. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has filed complaint under

Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C before the learned District and Sessions Court,

Dhamtari for registration of offence under Prevention of Corruption Act. On

9-10-2015, the complainant Kuleshwar Chandrakar lodged FIR against the

petitioner contending that the petitioner has demanded Rs.25,00,000/- by

way of extortion. Police has registered the FIR without conducting any

preliminary enquiry. Though the petitioner was present at his office along

with other advocates on 9-10-2015, still he has been roped in crime number

106 of 2015 for committing alleged offence under Sections 384 and 388 of

IPC.

5) On 20-12-2015 the petitioner has submitted an application before the Police

Station Rudri and prayed for an opportunity of defence and also submitted

the representation on 24-12-2015 along with documents, but the same has

not been considered. On 31-12-2015 when the petitioner was going to

court, at that time four persons came in motorcycle and threatened the

petitioner by pressing and compelled him to do compromise and withdraw

the complaint. On 31-12-2015 the petitioner made a complaint before the

Superintendent of Police, Dhamtari but no action has been taken. The

Police on the strength of the FIR lodged by respondent No. 5, after

investigation, registered the offence and final report has been submitted

before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhamtari. Now the case is transferred

to the court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dhamtari and learned

Magistrate registered the case bearing Criminal Case No. 1405 of 2015.

6) On the above factual matrix of the case, the petitioner prayed for quashing

of FIR registered against the petitioner in connection with Crime No. 106 of

2015 at Police Station Rudri, District Dhamtari for offence under Sections

384 and 388 of IPC.

7) This Court issued notice to the respondents and in pursuance of notice,

respondent No.5 has entered his appearance and filed his return. The State

counsel has also filed their return in which they have stated that on the

basis of complaint made by the petitioner, an enquiry has been conducted

by the Additional Collector & Inquiry Officer, Dhamtari has submitted his

report on 28-11-2016 wherein charges levelled against respondent No.5

and other Government officials have been found false and baseless. It has

also been stated that the petitioner being an Advocate indulged in making

complaint with regard to corruption under the scheme of the State

Government and requesting for registration of FIR. It is further contended

that the petitioner made another complaint before the Superintendent of


Police, District Dhamtari, regarding corruption being made in the Rajya

Poshit Sukshma Sichai Yojna by one Roshan Chandrakar which was

enquired into and upon enquiry no incriminating was found for taking

cognizance and the complaint of the petitioner was found to be false and

baseless and copy of the report has been forwarded by the Incharge of

Police Station, Dhamtari to the Superintendent of Police, Dhamtari on 7-2-

2015. He would further submit that the charges leveled against respondent

No.5 are false and baseless, therefore, the petition filed by the petitioner

deserves to be dismissed by this court.

8) Complainant/respondent No.5 has also filed his return in which he denied

the allegations made by the petitioner and would submit that as per material

collected by the Investigating Officer case under Section 384 and 388 of

IPC is made out. It has been further contended that the petitioner is a

habitual complainer and blackmailing the people and he has filed a

complaint against the Officer of the Agriculture Deportment alleging certain

irregularities and thereafter vide letter dated 24-10-2015 has withdrawn the

same which clearly shows the conduct of the petitioner itself. He would

further submit that prima facie the allegations leveled against him are made

out, therefore, the writ petition, at this juncture is not maintainable and is

liable to be dismissed by this court.

9) The petitioner has filed his rejoinder on 24-6-2021 and would submit that at

the time of incident, the petitioner was in the court of Chief Judicial

Magistrate to argue the criminal case and in this regard a copy of the order

sheet thereof has also been annexed. He would further submit that he has

been falsely implicated in this case as he was not present at the time of

alleged incident, therefore, the story projected by the complainant is false,

baseless and cannot be accepted at this juncture and would pray that the

petition filed by him be allowed and the criminal proceeding be quashed.

In support of his arguments, he has relied upon the judgments rendered by

Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana vs Bhajanlal reported in

1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335.

10) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

documents.

11) Before adverting to the facts of the case, it is necessary to examine

the provisions of Sections 24, 43, 44, 383, 384 and 388 of IPC which are

extracted as under as well as contents of the FIR.

Section 24 in The Indian Penal Code. 24.

“Dishonestly”. —Whoever does anything with the

intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or

wrongful loss to another person, is said to do that

thing “dishonestly”.

Section 43 of the IPC lays down the word 'illegal' is

applicable to everything which is an offence or

which is prohibited by law, or which furnishes

ground for a civil action; and a person is said to be

'legally bound to do' whatever it is illegal in him to

omit.

Section 44 of the IPC lays down that the word

'injury' denotes any harm whatever illegally caused

to any person, in body, mind, reputation or

property.

"383. Extortion --

Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of

any injury to that person, or to any other, and

thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in

fear to deliver to any person any property or

valuable security, or anything signed or sealed

which may be converted into a valuable security,

commits "extortion"."

“Section 384- Punishment for extortion- Whoever

commits extortion shall be punished with

imprisonment of either description for a term

which may extend to three years, or with fine, or

with both.

Section 388- Extortion by threat of accusation of

an offence punishable with death or

imprisonment for life, etc. - Whoever commits

extortion by putting any person in fear of an

accusation against that person or any other, of

having committed or attempted to commit any

offence punishable with death, or with

(imprisonment for life), or with imprisonment for a

term which may extend to ten years or of having

attempted to induce any other person to commit

such offence, shall be punished with

imprisonment of either description for a term be

one punishable under Section 377 of this Code,

may be punished with imprisonment for life”.

FIR

{Vernaculars omitted}

12) Hon'ble the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal vs. Committee

for Protection of Democratic Rights West Bengal, reported in 2010(3) SCC

571 has observed in para 57 which is extracted as under:

“57.As regards the power of judicial review conferred

on the High Court, undoubtedly they are, in a

way, wider in scope. The High Courts are

authorised under Article 226 of the Constitution, to

issue directions, orders or writs to any person or

authority, including any government to enforce

fundamental rights and, "for any other purpose". It

is manifest from the difference in the phraseology

of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution that

there is a marked difference in the nature and

purpose of the right conferred by these two

Articles. Whereas the right guaranteed by Article

32 can be exercised only for the enforcement of

fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the

Constitution, the right conferred by Article 226 can

be exercised not only for the enforcement of

fundamental rights, but "for any other purpose" as

well, i.e. for enforcement of any legal right

conferred by a Statute etc.”

13) Learned counsel for the respondent No.5 has filed his written

synopsis reiterating the stand which he has already taken in the petition.

He has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh

in Sudha Tripathi vs State of MP and another passed in M.Cr..No.11871

of 2019 decided on 2-5-2019, Satvir Singh and others vs. State of

Punjab and another, reported in (2001) 8 SCC 633, Abhyanand vs.

State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1961 SCC 1698 and would submit that

the prima facie offence for extortion is made out even from judgment

referred to above, it is evident that offence under Section 511 for

punishment of attempting to commit offence is made out and he would

submit that since the petitioner has attempted to commit an offence, as

such, charges are prima facie made out. He would further submit that the

petitioner was not present at the place of occurrence of the offence by

saying that he was before the Court, is his defence, this cannot be

examined by this Court. To substantiate this submission, he would rely

upon the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Vinod Raghuvanshi

v. Ajay Arora and others, reported in 2013 (10) SCC 581 and in State

of Bihar vs. PP Sharma and another, reported in 1991 (AIR) SC. In

State of A.P. vs. Goloconda Lingaswamy and another reported in 2004

AIR SC 3967, Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held as under:

“It is the material collected during the

investigation and evidence led in court which

decides the fate of the accused person. The

allegations of malafides against the informant

are of no consequence and cannot by

themselves be the basis for quashing the

proceeding”.

14) He would further relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme

Court in State of Orrisa Vs. Devendra Nath Padhi reported in (2005) 1

SCC 568 and would pray that the writ petition may finally dismissed.

15) Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that from perusal of

the FIR it is nowhere reflected that on extortion made by the petitioner,

complainant/respondent No.5 has delivered any valuable property to the

petitioner, as such, he has not committed offence under Section 384 of

IPC. Even from perusal of the final report, it is clear that the documents

submitted by the investigating agency regarding statements of the

witnesses, none of the witnesses has stated that on extortion made by the

petitioner by demanding Rs.25,00,000/- from respondent No.5. The

respondent No. 5 has given Rs.25,00,000/- to the petitioner, as such, there

is no ingredient of offence under Section 384 of IPC is made out.

16) It would be evident from the reading of Section 383 of the IPC that the

ingredients of 'extortion' are; (i) the accused must put any person in fear of

injury to that person or any other person; (ii) the putting of a person in such

fear must be intentional; (iii) the accused must thereby induce the person

so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, valuable security or

anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security;

(iv) such inducement must be done dishonestly. The terms 'dishonestly',

'illegally' and 'injury' used in "Section 383 of the IPC and in " Sections 24, 43

and 44 of the IPC respectively. On a careful consideration of the above

definitions and ingredients what appears is that if someone puts the others

intentionally in fear to any injury and thereby, dishonestly induces that

person who has been put into fear to deliver to the person any property or

valuable security or anything signed or sealed or which may be converted

into valuable security shall be liable to be punished for 'extortion'.

17). Thus, what is necessary for constituting an offence of 'extortion' is that

the prosecution must prove that on account of being put in fear of injury,

the victim was voluntarily delivered any particular property to the man

putting him into fear. If there was no delivery of property, then the most

important ingredient for constituting the offence of 'extortion' would not be

available. Further, if a person voluntarily delivers any property without there

being any fear of injury, an offence of 'extortion' cannot be said to have

been committed.

18) Hon'ble Supreme Court in R.S. Nayak vs. A.N. Antulay and

another, reported in (1986) 2 SCC 716, has held in para 60 and relevant

portion thereof is extracted as under:

“60. Before a person can be said to put any person

to fear of any injury to that person, it must appear

that he has held out some threat to do or omit to

do what he is legally bound to do in future. If all

that a man does is to promise to do a thing which

he is not legally bound to do and says that if

money is not paid to him he would not do that

thing, such act would not amount to an offence of

extortion. We agree with this view which has been

indicated in Habibul Razak v. King Emperor, A.I.R.

1924 All 197. There is no evidence at all in this

case that the managements of the sugar cooperatives

had been put in any fear and the

contributions had been paid in response to threats.

Merely because the respondent was Chief Minister

at the relevant time and the sugar co-operatives

had some of their grievances pending

consideration before the Government and

pressure was brought about to make the donations

promising consideration of such grievances,

possibly by way of reciprocity, we do not think the

appellant is justified in his contention that the

ingredients of the offence of extortion have been

made out. The evidence led by the prosecution

falls short of the requirements of law in regard to

the alleged offence of extortion. We see, therefore,

no justification in the claim of Mr. Jethmalani that a

charge for the offence of extortion should have

been framed”.

19) Learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that from bare

perusal of FIR it is crystal clear that since the offence under Section 383 of

IPC for extortion is not made out, then the offence under Section 388 of

IPC will also not be made out. He would rely upon the judgment of Hon'ble

Supreme Court in case Isaac Isanga Musumba and others vs. State of

Maharashtra and others, reported in 2014(15) 357, wherein Hon'ble the

Supreme Court has held in para 3 and 4 which are extracted as under:

“3. We have read the FIR which has been annexed

to the writ petition as Annexure P-7 and we find

therefrom that the complainants have alleged that

the accused persons have shown copies of

international warrants issued against the

complainants by the Ugandan Court and letters

written by Uganda Ministry of Justice &

Constitutional Affairs and the accused have

threatened to extort 20 million dollars (equivalent

to Rs.110 crores). In the complaint, there is no

mention whatsoever that pursuant to the

demands made by the accused, any amount was

delivered to the accused by the complainants. If

that be so, we fail to see as to how an offence of

extortion as defined in Section 383, IPC is made

out. Section 383, IPC states that whoever

intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury

to that person, or to any other, and thereby

dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to

deliver to any person any property, or valuable

security or anything signed or sealed which may

be converted into a valuable security, commits

'extortion'. Hence, unless property is delivered to

the accused person pursuant to the threat, no

offence of extortion is made out and an FIR for

the offence under Section 384 could not have

been registered by the police.

4. We also find on the reading of the FIR, there is

also an allegation that on 18th April, 2013

between 1 p.m. and 5.30 p.m. the accused

persons illegally entered into the Head Office of

the Company at Fort and demanded 20 million

dollars (equivalent to Rs.110 crores) saying that

they have international arrest warrants against

the complainants and upon failure to pay the said

sum the complainants will have to face dire

consequences. It is because of this allegation in

the FIR, the offence under Section 441, IPC is

alleged to have been committed by the accused

persons. On reading Section 441, IPC we find

that intent to commit an offence or to intimidate,

insult or annoy any person in possession of

property is a necessary ingredient of the offence

of criminal trespass. It is not disputed that there

was a business transaction between the accused

persons and the complainants. Hence, if the

accused persons have visited the premises of the

complainants to make a demand towards their

dues, we do not think a case of 'criminal trespass'

as defined in Section 441, IPC is made out

against the accused persons”.

20) On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.5 would

submit that Hon'ble the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has occasion to

consider the provisions of Section 384 of IPC and held that prima facie to

establish the offence under Section 384 of IPC, the ingredient namely the

accused should perpetuate the offence by extortion but the last subject of

delivery of valuable assets was not taken by the complainant. It is clearly

established that the petitioner had taken all possible steps of extortion,

fear in the mind of the complainant to pursue/induce the victim. The case of

the petitioner clearly demonstrates that the demand was made by the

petitioner to commit extortion. He would refer to the judgment of Hon’ble

Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Sudha Tripathi vs. State of

Madhya Pradesh (MCRC No 1187 of 2019 and another decided on 2-5-

2019 wherein it has been held in paras 6, 7 & 8 which are extracted as

under:

“6. Testing the attending factual matrix on the anvil

of legal provision and the analysis made (supra), it

is seen that charge-sheet reveals that the first two

foundational ingredients of extortion i.e. putting the

victim/complainant to fear and thereby to induce

her/her father to part with property/valuable

security are very much alleged. However, the fact

remains that the victim and her father who were

subjected to fear and inducement did not deliver

Rs.20,00,000/- as demanded by the petitioner and

other co-accused. Thus, the allegations prima facie

reveal satisfaction of the first stage of extortion

where all possible steps were taken by petitioner to

perpetuate the offence of extortion but the last step

of delivery of valuables was not taken by the

complainant. This clearly reveals that petitioner had

taken all possible steps of instilling fear in the mind

of complainant to persuade/induce the victim. This

positive overt act of petitioner clearly demonstrate

that attempt was made by petitioner to commit

extortion.

7. In the conspectus of the discussion supra, this

Court is of the considered view that allegation in

the charge-sheet spell out prima facie offence

punishable under Sec.385 (attempt to extortion) of

IPC and not Sec.384 of IPC.

8. Consequently, this Court deems it appropriate to

exercise its inherent powers to dispose of the

present petition in the following terms:-

1. The impugned prosecution against the petitioner

alleges an offence punishable u/S.385 (attempt to

extortion) of IPC and therefore, the charge-sheet as

impugned herein is sustained but should be treated

as alleging offence punishable u/S.385 and not

u/S.384 of IPC.

21) From perusal of the aforesaid judgment, it is apparent that the

alleged offence under Section 384 of IPC has been quashed on the

ground that no valuable assets have been delivered because of extortion,

threaten, pressure created by the accused. In the present case also

respondent No.5 has not delivered any valuable assets to the petitioner,

therefore, the judgment referred to by respondent No.5 also support the

contention of the petitioner and in that case also Madhya Pradesh High

Court held that offence under Section 384 of IPC is not made out.

Therefore, the judgments cited by learned counsel for respondent No.5 are

distinguishable from the facts of the present case.

22) From bare perusal of the FIR it can be very visualized that if we take

the face value of the allegation made in the complaint, then also it can be

very well seen that no offence under Section 388 of IPC is made out as

respondent No.5 in his complaint has nowhere stated that on the basis of

extortion made by the petitioner, respondent No.5 was put in fear of an

accusation by the petitioner or he committed or attempted to commit any

offence punishable with death and has delivered any valuable assets to the

petitioner. When prima facie provisions of Section 383 of IPC is not made

out, then the offence under Section 388 of IPC cannot be made out,

because unless and until the ingredient of extortion is established, then

only the alleged offence, prima facie, is said to have been committed by the

petitioner. Since the ingredients of Sections 383 of IPC are not made out,

the ingredient of Section 388 of IPC cannot be, prima facie, established,

therefore, registration of FIR, prima facie, is nothing, but an abuse of

process of law.

23) The learned counsel for the respondent No. 5 has referred the

judgment to prima facie establish that the petitioner has made an attempt

for extortion, or committed an offence, but this judgments are not

applicable to the facts of the present case as Chapter 17 deals with offence

against the property is itself a complete Chapter and Section 383 defines

extortion whereas the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the

respondent deals with Section 511 and offence related to cheating,

therefore, they are distinguishable from the facts and preposition of law

also.

24) Hon'ble the Supreme Court in M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt.

Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & others, reported in AIR 2021 SC 1918

has considered the power of High Court under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India for quashing of the FIR in exercise of power under

Section 482 of Cr.P.C.,. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and

has held in para 10(iii) which is extracted as under

“10 (iii) However, in cases where no cognizable

offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the

first information report the Court will not permit an

investigation to go on;”

25) Similarly, Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Kartar Singh Vs. State of

Punjab reported in (1994) 3 SCC 569, has held as under.

“ The power given to High Court under Article 226 is

an extraordinary power not only to correct the

manifest error but also to exercise it for sake of

justice. Under the scheme of the Constitution a

High Court is the highest court for purposes of exercising

civil, appellate, criminal or even constitutional

jurisdiction so far that State is concerned.

The jurisdiction possessed by it before coming

into force of the Constitution was preserved by Article

225 and by Articles 226 and 227 an extraordinary

jurisdiction was conferred on it to ensure

that the subordinate authorities act not only in accordance

with law but they also function within

the framework of law. That jurisdiction of the High

Court has not been taken away and in fact could

not be taken away by legislation. In England even

in absence of Constitution whenever an attempt

was made by Parliament to provide that the order

was final and no writ of certiorari would lie the

High Court always struck down the provision.

Since the High Court under the Constitution is a

forum for enforcement of fundamental right of a

citizen it cannot be denied the power to entertain

a petition by a citizen claiming that the State machinery

was abusing its power and was acting in

violation of the constitutional guarantee. Rather it

has a constitutional duty and responsibility to ensure

that the State machinery was acting fairly

and not on extraneous considerations. In State of

Maharashtra Vs. Abdul Hamid Haji Mohammed, this

Court after examining the principle laid down in

Kharak Singh Vs. The State of U.P. and Others, and

Paras Ram Vs. State of Haryana, held that the High

Court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition under

Article 226 in extreme cases. What are such extreme

cases cannot be put in a strait-jacket. But

the few on which there can be hardly any dispute

are if the High Court is of opinion that the proceedings

under TADA were an abuse of process

of court or taken for extraneous considerations or

there was no material on record that a case under

TADA was made out. If it be so then there is no

reason why should the High Court not exercise its

jurisdiction and grant bail to the accused in those

cases where one or the other exceptional ground

is made out”

26) From bare perusal of FIR it is crystal clear that no case of extortion is

made out, therefore, offence under Sections 384 and 388 of IPC against the

petitioner is not made out. The proceeding initiated by the complainant is

nothing, but an abuse of process of law and on this count alone this court is

quashing the FIR, therefore, no other ground is required to be dealt by this

court.

27) In view of above legal provisions, considering the facts of the case

and from perusal of FIR, prima facie, no case is made out against the

petitioner and criminal proceedings is manifestly attended against the

petitioner with malafide, therefore, initiation of criminal proceeding is

nothing, but an abuse of process of law.. Considering overall the facts and

circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the petitioner has made out

strong case for quashing of FIR. Accordingly, FIR No. 106 of 2015

registered at Police Station - Dhamtari on 9-10-2015 for alleged offence said

to have been committed under Section 384 and 388 of IPC is quashed.

Consequently, the criminal proceeding pending before the Judicial

Magistrate First Class, Dhamtari is also quashed.

28) Accordingly, the instant petition is allowed. No order as to costs.

29) A copy of this order be sent to learned Judicial Magistrate First Class,

for closure of the proceedings.

Sd/-

(Narendra Kumar Vyas)

Judge

Raju


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