The respondent no.1 being Municipal Council, is an artificial person and its rights to enter into such transactions are, therefore, as stipulated in Section 92 of 1965 Act. The Municipal Council cannot be claimed to have done something in violation of Section 92, nor petitioners before this Court urge that the respondent no.1/Municipal Council has entered into any agreement with them which violates that provision. The situation was required to be considered by me in the judgment reported in the case of Municipal Council, Pusad, through its Chief Officer Vs. Kundanlal Mohanlal Jaiswal & others (supra) and that judgment clearly covers this controversy. {Para 7}
8. Section 92 of 1965 Act deals with transfer of municipal property. Its Sub-Section 1 restrains Municipal Council from transferring any of its immovable property without sanction of the State Government. The Municipal Council has to forward a proposal for such transfer accompanied by resolution of Municipal Council and that resolution has to be passed by not less than two-thirds of total number of Councilors and it cannot be inconsistent with Rules made in this behalf by the State Government. Sub-Section 3 permits Municipal Council to lease its immovable property for a period not exceeding three years. But then such lessee is not permitted to make any permanent constructions on such immovable property. Such lease can be further renewed by the Municipal Council beyond the period of three years. But then, total period of any lease cannot exceed nine years. The lease cannot be granted or renewed unless supported by resolution passed at a meeting of the Municipal Council.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY(AURANGABAD BENCH)
B.P. DHARMADHIKARI, J.
Dashrath Ambadas Pujari Vs. The Municipal Council, Tal.-Tuljapur, Dist.-Osmanabad & Anr.
Writ Petition No.1018 of 2011,
25th February, 2011
Citation: 2011(3) ALL MR 78, 2011(3) MHLJ 846,
JUDGMENT :- Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Taken up for final hearing by consent of parties.
2. The Municipal Council moved the competent authority under the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955, and sought eviction of respective petitioner contending that he was in unauthorized possession, mentioning that he was inducted initially in 1995 either by oral or written agreement and there was no subsequent agreement either oral or written. They also pointed out that on 15-9-2009, petitioners executed an undertaking and accepted that there was no agreement after 1995. The application was opposed by the present petitioners who raised various defences and ultimately the application was allowed. This order was then questioned in statutory appeal under Section 7 by the present petitioners before District Court at Osmanabad. Learned District Judge-4, Osmanabad, has vide judgment dated 18th January, 2011, dismissed those appeals.
3. Adv. Mr. R. S. Deshmukh, for the petitioners, has contended that burden was upon respondent/Municipal Council to establish alleged unauthorized possession of the petitioners and the respondent did not enter into witness box or did not produce any documents. He states that even up to 1998, rent was being regularly accepted from the petitioners without any objections and when petitioners requested for production of certain documents from the Municipal Council to show authorized nature of possession, the Municipal Council even did not produce those documents. He has invited attention to judgment of this Court reported at 2009(1) ABR (NOC) 31 (BOM.) (Aurangabad Bench), in the case of Suhash Vishwanath Kolapkar Vs. Assistant Collector, Ahmednagar & another, to urge that the competent authority, as also, appellate authority have not considered the challenge as raised and reasons recorded are also not in accordance with law. He also points out that the respondent/Municipal Council was under obligation to lead evidence and to produce material and in the absence thereof, their application needed rejection. He is relying upon judgment of Hon. Apex Court reported at AIR 2008 SC 876 : [2008 ALL SCR 224], in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nusli Neville Wadia & another, particularly paragraph 48, to substantiate this. The judgment delivered by me at Nagpur, reported at 2006(2) Bom.C.R. 795, in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Ramu Motiram Motwani & another, is also relied upon to substantiate this contention. Various earlier orders passed by Civil Courts in the matter protecting possession of the petitioners, withdrawal of an appeal filed under Order 43, Rule 1-R of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by petitioners in one such matter is also pressed into service.
4. Adv. Mr. K. K. Kulkarni, for respondent no.1/Municipal Council, on the other hand, has urged that both the authorities have taken correct view of the controversy. He has invited attention to consideration in this respect by the appellate court. He has relied upon judgment delivered by me at Nagpur, reported at 2007(3) AIR Bom.R. 155, in the case of Municipal Council, Pusad, through its Chief Officer Vs. Kundanlal Mohanlal Jaiswal & others, to argue that the possession of petitioners cannot be treated as legal in any case. Lastly, the undertaking given by petitioners on 15-9-2009 is also relied upon to show that such challenge at their instance is not maintainable.
5. Learned AGP Mr. Tambe, for respondent no.2, has supported the impugned order.
6. The facts clearly show that the Municipal Council pleaded that in 1995 there was either oral or written agreement and petitioners came to be inducted in the municipal premises. There is no further agreement thereafter. The petitioners have continued to pay the rent every month and Municipal Council has continued to accept it. On one or two occasions, because of apprehended forcible dispossession, petitioners filed Civil Suits and Civil Court also protected their possession. The petitioners have, in this background, on 15-9-2009, executed an undertaking and that undertaking specifically mentions that in 1995, the shop block was given to him for a period of 3 years on rent. Thereafter, till date i.e. till 15-9-2009, there is no agreement in relation thereto between parties. The petitioner has further stated that he has withdrawn Regular Civil Suit No.196/2009 filed by him against the Municipal Council. In paragraph 3, he has given no objection to allotment of said shop block in accordance with provisions of Section 92 of the Maharashtra (Municipal Councils), (Nagar Panchayats) and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 (For short, "1965 Act") and the Rules for disposal of immovable properties framed in 1983 (For short, "1983 Rules") under the said Act. This paragraph 3 makes a reference to provisions of Section 92 of 1965 Act. In paragraph 4, he has further stated that if Municipal Council is unable to allot it in accordance with law till March, 2010, the same should be allotted to him in accordance with the provisions of Section 92 of 1965 Act and provisions of 1983 Rules.
7. The respondent no.1 being Municipal Council, is an artificial person and its rights to enter into such transactions are, therefore, as stipulated in Section 92 of 1965 Act. The Municipal Council cannot be claimed to have done something in violation of Section 92, nor petitioners before this Court urge that the respondent no.1/Municipal Council has entered into any agreement with them which violates that provision. The situation was required to be considered by me in the judgment reported in the case of Municipal Council, Pusad, through its Chief Officer Vs. Kundanlal Mohanlal Jaiswal & others (supra) and that judgment clearly covers this controversy.
8. Section 92 of 1965 Act deals with transfer of municipal property. Its Sub-Section 1 restrains Municipal Council from transferring any of its immovable property without sanction of the State Government. The Municipal Council has to forward a proposal for such transfer accompanied by resolution of Municipal Council and that resolution has to be passed by not less than two-thirds of total number of Councilors and it cannot be inconsistent with Rules made in this behalf by the State Government. Sub-Section 3 permits Municipal Council to lease its immovable property for a period not exceeding three years. But then such lessee is not permitted to make any permanent constructions on such immovable property. Such lease can be further renewed by the Municipal Council beyond the period of three years. But then, total period of any lease cannot exceed nine years. The lease cannot be granted or renewed unless supported by resolution passed at a meeting of the Municipal Council.
9. The undertaking by the petitioners show that in 1995, they were inducted for a period of three years. Facts to examine the validity or otherwise of that initial exercise are not pleaded and are not relevant at this stage as they have expressly accepted that after 1995, there is no other agreement between parties in relation to suit premises. The outer limit of 9 years has expired in 2004 itself. Hence after 1998, the possession of petitioners is not authorized in the light of provisions of 1965 Act or then, 1983 Rules framed thereunder.
10. The judgment delivered by me at Nagpur, in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Ramu Motiram Motwani & another (supra), considers altogether different contention. The State of Maharashtra, petitioner therein, was contending that "Panthala" was an encroachment within premises of R.T.O. office and the occupant was claiming to be tenant of Credit Co-operative Society of employees of R.T.O. and he had filed a Civil Suit to protect his rights which was pending. In that background, provisions of Section 4(2) of the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955, are looked into and interpreted. This judgment has no relevance in the present facts.
11. The other judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court reported in the case of Suhash Vishwanath Kolapkar Vs. Assistant Collector, Ahmednagar & another (supra) considers the issue of absence of reasons and this Court has found that the said authority mentioned under Section 4 of the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, being quasi judicial authority, is duty bound to observe principles of natural justice and give reasonable opportunity to parties and then deal with issues in accordance with law. Paragraph 19 in this background records that mere hearing at length by the appellate authority (District Court) is not sufficient and the same is not sufficient to cure absence of reasons in the order passed by the competent authority. The emphasis is on proper appreciation by competent authority first and then evaluation of that exercise by the District Court as appellate authority. Again, this ruling is not relevant here.
12. In the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nusli Neville Wadia & another, [2008 ALL SCR 224] (supra), in paragraph 48, on which reliance has been placed by learned Counsel for the petitioners, the Hon. Apex Court has observed that the body filing application before competent authority under such enactment has to lead appropriate evidence. Facts in present matter show that said burden is already discharged. Moreover, here, as the undertaking given on 15-9-2009 itself is sufficient to hold that possession of petitioners is unauthorized and has been accordingly relied upon by the District Court to arrive at that conclusion, I do not see any jurisdictional error or perversity. I do not find any merits in the petitions.
13. In the result, the petitions are dismissed. Rule is discharged. No costs.
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