Showing posts with label immovable property. Show all posts
Showing posts with label immovable property. Show all posts

Thursday, 9 October 2025

Supreme Court: Minor Can Repudiate Guardian's Voidable Sale Through Conduct After Attaining Majority, Not Necessary To File Suit

 The above discussion leads us conclusively to hold that it is

not always necessary for a minor to institute a suit for

cancellation of a voidable sale transaction executed by his

guardian on attaining majority within the limitation provided

and that such a transaction can be avoided or repudiated by

his conduct. The question stands answered accordingly. {Para 34}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11342 OF 2013

K. S. SHIVAPPA  Vs SMT. K. NEELAMMA

 Author: PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

Dated: OCTOBER 07, 2025. 

Citation: 2025 INSC 1195

Print Page

Supreme Court: For Valid Oral Gift (Hiba) of immovable property under Muslim Law, Public Possession Must Be Proved; Absence Of Mutation Raises Doubt

 The precedents are that to constitute a valid conveyance through an oral gift, the three contemporaneous conditions of declaration by donor, acceptance by donee, possession by donee and to continue to establish possession through contemporaneous evidence to show that Hiba is acted upon. The Hiba is not used as a surprise instrument and cannot sprout into a transfer of property as per the convenience of a party. Moreover, to keep in line with the sanctity of Hiba, it is in the interest of the donor, donee and a third person interested in the subject matter that Hiba is acted upon by completing all three essential requirements in public knowledge rather than in secrecy. The Courts appreciate fulfilment of contemporaneous requirements and possession through evidence while recognising conveyance through an oral gift. Possession is one of the important conditions to constitute a valid oral gift. The courts presume possession of a party from the circumstances pleaded and proved. In the case at hand, there is a consistent revenue record, Ex. P-2, Ex. P-3, Ex. P-4, Ex. P-5 and Exs. D-9 to D-43 showing in the revenue records that the names of Defendants are entered in ROR and their predecessors in interest, both in the title and possession columns. The Plaintiff places oral evidence, and the circumstances summed up above do not inspire confidence for accepting that there has been a valid oral gift in any capacity, i.e., as a daughter or otherwise, in favour of Plaintiff. The impugned judgments presume possession in favour of Plaintiff on ipse dixit statements, and the courts below fell in grave error in not appreciating the long lapse of years and continued silence of Plaintiff vis-à-vis the Suit Property. The next limb is whether Ex. P-8 satisfies as a Memorandum recording the past transaction and would come to the aid of the Plaintiff, at least to the extent of 10 acres said to have been given. Ex. P-8 bears L T I of

Khadijabee. The plaint in OS No. 68 of 1971 is marked as D-44. Khadijabee has signed the plaint in Urdu, and during cross-examination, PW2 specifically stated that Khadijabee was signing, not affixing her L T I. This inconsistency remained unexplained. Further, under Ex. P-8, in clause 5, which reads that the donee shall hereafter peacefully hold and possess and enjoy the land property with all its inclusions without any interference, claim or demand whatsoever from the donor. Ex. P-8 belies the possession and transfer said to have been made on 05.12.1988. From the above, except the self-serving and oral evidence from interested witnesses of Plaintiff, there is no evidence on possession, whether actual or constructive, having been delivered to Plaintiff. On the other hand, the Exhibits relied on by the Plaintiff, coupled with D-8 to D-43, do not enable, presuming that the Plaintiff continued to be in possession of 10 acres of the suit schedule. The High Court was liberal in explaining away the minor variations, if any, in Ex. P-8 do not adversely affect the Plaintiff’s claim. With respect, we are unable to subscribe to the said view. Consequently, the claim of the Plaintiff under Hiba and Ex. P-8, for want of evidence on possession, fails, and the point is answered in favour of the Defendants. {Para 39}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 12512 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 16996 of 2022)

Decided On: 07.10.2025

Dharmrao Sharanappa Shabadi and Ors. Vs. Syeda Arifa Parveen

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ahsanuddin Amanullah and S.V. Bhatti, JJ.

Author: S.V. Bhatti, J.

Citation:  2025 INSC 1187,MANU/SC/1384/2025.

Print Page

Friday, 5 September 2025

The Unsung Hero of Property Deals: Why Index II Is Your Property's Best Friend?

 

When you step into the world of property registration in India, you'll encounter numerous documents that seem important but confusing. Among these, Index II stands out as one of the most undervalued yet crucial documents that every property owner should understand and safeguard. Think of it as your property's official "birth certificate" — a compact document that packs tremendous legal punch.

What Exactly Is Index II?

Print Page

Sunday, 29 June 2025

Who are necessary parties for suit relating to mortgages?

 Order XXXIV, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 deals with the parties that must be joined in suits relating to mortgages of immovable property.

Main Provision

"Subject to the provisions of this Code, all persons having an interest either in the mortgage-security or in the right of redemption shall be joined as parties to any suit relating to the mortgage."

Print Page

Tuesday, 24 June 2025

The Priority Principle: How Section 50 of the Registration Act Protects Property Rights

 Understanding why registered documents trump unregistered ones in Indian property law

Property disputes are among the most complex and emotionally charged legal battles in India. At the heart of many such disputes lies a fundamental question: when multiple documents claim rights over the same property, which one prevails? Section 50 of the Registration Act, 1908 provides a clear answer that has shaped Indian property law for over a century.

The Golden Rule of Property Documentation

Print Page

Sunday, 26 January 2025

Supreme Court: An agreement for sale in respect of an immovable property does not transfer title in favour of the purchaser under the agreement

 It is well settled that an agreement for sale in respect of an immovable property does not transfer title in favour of the purchaser under the agreement. In view of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, an agreement for sale does not create any interest in the property. The only mode by which an immovable property worth more than Rs. 100/- (Rupees one hundred) can be sold is by a sale deed duly registered in accordance with the Indian Registration Act, 1908. {Para 6}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. ... of 2025 (Arising out of Diary No. 38616 of 2018)

Date of Order: 07.01.2025

Indian Overseas Bank Vs. M.A.S. Subramanian and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SCOR/07610/2025.

Print Page

Monday, 20 January 2025

Supreme Court: Agreement For Sale Doesn't Transfer Title Or Create Interest In Property :

It is well settled that an agreement for sale in

respect of an immovable property does not transfer title in

favour of the purchaser under the agreement. In view of

Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, an

agreement for sale does not create any interest in the

property. The only mode by which an immovable property worth

more than Rs.100/- (Rupees one hundred) can be sold is by a

sale deed duly registered in accordance with the Indian

Registration Act, 1908. {Para 6}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL NOS. OF 2025

(Arising out of Diary No.38616 of 2018)

INDIAN OVERSEAS BANK  Vs.  M.A.S SUBRAMANIAN & ORS.

Dated: January 07, 2025.

Print Page

Tuesday, 12 November 2024

What are different Kinds of Possession of immovable property?

“Possession is nine points in law,” is a principle that highlights the crucial role possession plays in determining ownership and legal rights in property law. There are ten kinds of possession namely;


1) Actual Possession: This is when a person physically occupies and controls the property.

2) Constructive Possession: Here, possession is not physical but through legal rights. For example, a landlord has constructive possession over a property even though they may not physically occupy it.
Print Page

Sunday, 28 July 2024

Supreme Court: Rules for interpretation of the term "A dispute relating to immovable property" as per The Commercial courts Act

 A dispute relating to immovable property per se may not be a commercial dispute. But it becomes a commercial dispute, if it falls under Sub-clause (vii) of Section 2(1)(c) of the Act viz. "the agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce". The words "used exclusively in trade or commerce" are to be interpreted purposefully. The word "used" denotes "actually used" and it cannot be either "ready for use" or "likely to be used" or "to be used". It should be "actually used". Such a wide interpretation would defeat the objects of the Act and the fast tracking procedure discussed above. {Para 37}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7843 of 2019.

Decided On: 04.10.2019

Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. Vs. K.S. Infraspace LLP and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bopanna and R. Banumathi, JJ.

Authored By : A.S. Bopanna, R. Banumathi

Citation: MANU/SC/1378/2019,(2020) 15 SCC585.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

Print Page

Supreme Court: Provisions of CPC as amended by Commercial Courts Act are to be construed strictly and are to be interpretated in narrow sense

 A perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and the various amendments to Code of Civil Procedure and insertion of new Rules to the Code applicable to suits of commercial disputes show that it has been enacted for the purpose of providing an early disposal of high value commercial disputes. A purposive interpretation of the Objects and Reasons and various amendments to Code of Civil Procedure leaves no room for doubt that the provisions of the Act require to be strictly construed. If the provisions are given a liberal interpretation, the object behind constitution of Commercial Division of Courts, viz. putting the matter on fast track and speedy resolution of commercial disputes, will be defeated. If we take a closer look at the Statement of Objects and Reasons, words such as 'early' and 'speedy' have been incorporated and reiterated. The object shall be fulfilled only if the provisions of the Act are interpreted in a narrow sense and not hampered by the usual procedural delays plaguing our traditional legal system. {Para 36}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7843 of 2019.

Decided On: 04.10.2019

Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. Vs. K.S. Infraspace LLP and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bopanna and R. Banumathi, JJ.

Authored By : A.S. Bopanna, R. Banumathi

Citation: MANU/SC/1378/2019,(2020) 15 SCC585.
Print Page

Wednesday, 30 August 2023

Whether hindu woman can claim right in immovable property U/S 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act if she was not in possession of that property?

 Section 14 subSection (1) had no application in this case. The essential ingredient of Section 14 sub Section(1) is possession over the property. Admittedly the plaintiff was never in possession of the property. The possession was always that of the defendant and therefore Section 14 subSection (1) would not be applicable. In Ram Vishal (dead) by lrs. and Ors. v.Jagan Nath & Another. reported in (2004) 9 SCC 302 the position of possession being a prerequisite to sustain a claim under subsection (1) of Section 14 of the 1956 Act was confirmed in Para 16 which is quoted below:

 ‘16. In our view, the authority in Raghubar Singh case [(1998)

6 SCC 314] can be of no assistance to the respondent.

As has been held by this Court, a preexisting right is a sine

qua non for conferment of a full ownership under Section 14 of

the Hindu Succession Act. The Hindu female must not only be

possessed of the property but she must have acquired the

property. Such acquisition must be either by way of

inheritance or devise, or at a partition or “in lieu of

maintenance or arrears of maintenance” or by gift or by

her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription…’

[Emphasis Supplied]

5. As per the law as it existed at their relevant time the

property which was an agricultural property would devolve

upon the male child and daughters would get only a

limited right to maintenance till, they were married and the

widow would be entitled to maintenance from the income

from the property till her death or remarriage. As per the

family Settlement Deed dated 12.03.1938 which was relied

upon by both the parties, the property in dispute was

specifically allotted to Sami Vaidyar and his only son

Sukumaran. Therefore, the widow of Sami Vaidyar i.e.,

Choyichi will not have any right over the property. The

findings of all the courts below were that Choyichi was

never in possession of the property and therefore she

would not get the right, as claimed by her under Section

14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

2023INSC774

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.254 OF 2010

M. SIVADASAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS Vs A. SOUDAMINI (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS.

Dated: AUGUST 28, 2023.

Print Page

Saturday, 24 June 2023

How to appreciate evidence if son is claiming that his mother had no earnings and is holding immovable property as benamidar of his father?


Crucial question which is to be answered in the present appeal is whether the transaction i.e. the purchase of suit property under registered deed of sale dated 20.01.1970 by Lila is benami transaction. {Para 11}

12. Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 defines the expression, 'benami transaction' and equipped the appropriate authority with powers to acquire benami property. Provisions of three sections being Sections 35 & 8 of the 1988 Act, which was initially a 9-section legislation, came into force with effect from 5.9.1988 whereas the remaining provisions thereof came into force from the date being 19.9.1988. Section 3 being a prohibitory legislation cannot have retrospective operation but the Section 2(a) of the Act which is a piece of declaratory legislation can have its application irrespective of its date or duration. So, definition of the expression 'benami transaction' can be borrowed from Section 2(a) of the 1988 Act in respect of the transaction held prior to promulgation of the said Act. As defined in Section 2(a) of the Act 'benami transaction' means any transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by any other person. A transaction must, therefore, be benami irrespective of its date or duration.

13. In India, two kinds of benami transactions are generally recognized. Where a person buys a property with his own money but in the name of another person without any intention to benefit such other person, the transaction is called benami. In that case, the transferee holds the property for the benefit of the person who has contributed the purchase money, and he is the real owner. The second case which is loosely termed as a benami transaction is a case where a person who is the owner of the property executes a conveyance in favour of another without the intention of transferring the title to the property thereunder. In this case, the transferor continues to be the real owner. [See, the judgment delivered in the cases of Bhim Singh - vs- Kan Singh, reported in (1980) 3 SCC 72 and Pulin Behari Addy (supra)].

14. However, there is a presumption in law that the person who purchases the property is the owner of the same and such presumption can be displaced only by pleading and successfully proving that the person whose name appears in the document is not the real owner, but only a benami and heavy burden lies on the person who pleads that recorded owner is mere name-lender.

15. Now, coming to the case at hand, it can be argued that to hold the subject transaction as benami transaction, it is to be proved by the principle of preponderance of probability that although the suit property was purchased in name of Lila but the consideration money was paid or provided by her husband and not by Lila.

16. Indisputably, subject deed of sale was executed and registered on 20.01.1970. Sekhar preferring the suit in 2011 claimed that Lila, transferee was mere name-lender and Sekhar adduced his oral testimony only and he did not produce any document whereas Lila deposed in 2016 and adduced her oral accounts which found support from the evidence of DW-2 and Lila had produced all the documents relating to suit property.

17. During course of hearing, both the appellant and the respondents advanced their arguments on the issue relating to 'burden of proof'. So, main question centred around the present appeal is whether it was Sekhar who had to discharge the burden to prove that the subject sale transaction was benami transaction or it was Lila who was to prove that she purchased the suit property from own fund or 'stridhan' properties detailing the source of such fund and disclosing every details of payment of consideration money.

18. The question relating to burden of proof has been set at rest in the judgment of Jaydayal Poddar (Deceased) thr. Lrs. -vs. Mst. Bibi Hazra reported in AIR 1974 SC 171 in which the Hon'ble Apex Court ruled as follows:

"It is well settled that the burden of proving that a particular sale is benami and the apparent purchaser is not the real owner, always rests on the person asserting it to be so. This burden has to be strictly discharged by adducing legal evidence of a definite character which would either directly prove the fact or benami or establish circumstances unerringly and reasonably raising an inference of that fact. The essence of a benami is the intention of the party or parties concerned; and not unoften such intention is shrouded in a thick veil which cannot be easily pierced through. But such difficulties do not relieve the person asserting the transaction to be benami of any part of the serious onus that rests on him; nor justify the acceptance of mere conjectures or surmises, as a substitute for proof. The reason is that a deed is a solemn document prepared and executed after considerable deliberation, and the person expressly shown as the purchaser in the deed, starts with the initial presumption in his favour that the apparent state of affairs is the real state of affairs. Though the question, whether a particular sale is benami or not, is largely one of fact, and for determining this question, no absolute formulae or acid test, uniformly applicable in all situations, can be laid down; yet in weighing the probabilities and for gathering the relevant indicia, the courts are usually guided by these circumstances: (1) the source from which the purchase money came; (2) the nature and possession of the property, after the purchase; (3) motive, if any, for giving the transaction a benami colour; (4) the position of the parties and the relationship, if any, between the claimant and the alleged benamidar; (5) the custody of the title-deeds after the sale and (6) the conduct of the parties concerned in dealing with the property after the sale."

19. In the given case, Sekhar claimed that his mother, Lila was a mere name-lender. He deposed that at the relevant time of sale, he was not present and he could not say the actual amount of consideration money and he admitted that he did not verify from attesting witness, identifier etc. whether his father paid the consideration money and he admitted that his father never claimed himself to be the real owner of the suit property and he admitted that he did not have any document to show that his father paid the consideration money.

20. From evidence of Lila, it appears that Lila admitted that she was a home-maker throughout her life and she had no independent income of her own and she asserted that she purchased the suit property from her 'stridhan' properties. She claimed that she herself purchased the property selling her gold ornaments. Admittedly, Lila testified that during his stay in the suit property, Sekhar used to behave well with her.

21. Mr. Poddar tried to convince us that since both the parties have led evidence, question of burden of proof has lost its significance and Court should pass judgment appreciating evidence let in by the parties and since, Lila failed to disclose the particulars of her 'stridhan' properties and since, Lila admitted that she was a home-maker throughout her life having no independent income of her own, the learned Court below should have come to the conclusion that Lila was nothing but a mere name-lender.

22. At the cost of reiteration, it may be stated that a Court is required to bear in mind the well-settled principles to the effect that the burden of showing that a transfer is a benami transaction always lies on the person who asserts it. In the Indian society, if a husband supplies the consideration money for acquiring property in the name of his wife, such fact does not necessarily imply benami transaction. Source of money is, no doubt, an important factor but not a decisive one. The intention of the supplier of the consideration money is the vital fact to be proved by the party who asserts benami. In other words, even if it is proved that Sailendra paid the consideration money, the plaintiff must further prove that Sailendra really intended to enjoy the full benefit of the title in him alone.

23. In the case before us, Sekhar could not bring any evidence even to show what was amount of consideration money and how the consideration money was paid and how the suit property was purchased and even he could not prove who paid the consideration money. He could not produce any document relating to the suit property. Title deed and all documents relating to the suit property were all along in the custody of Lila and Lila all along paid municipal tax and got the suit property mutated in her name and Sekhar could not bring any evidence on record to lead any prudent man to infer that his father had a motive to create benami in name of his mother or Sailendra intended to enjoy the full benefit of the title in him alone. Judgments relied upon by the appellant in spite of having unquestionable value of the proposition laid down therein, shall not come in aid of the appellant in the factual matrix of the case at hand.

24. As a result, we are inclined to hold that learned Court below has correctly held that Sekhar has failed to discharge his burden to prove that subject sale transaction is benami transaction and we have not found any wrong in the approach and decision of the learned Court below and we are of the view that judgment and decree impugned cannot be annihilated. 

Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

Sri Sekhar Kumar Roy vs Smt. Lila Roy & Another on 7 June, 2023
Present: The Hon'ble Justice Tapabrata Chakraborty 
&The Hon'ble Justice Partha Sarathi Chatterjee
Author: Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J.
Print Page

Sunday, 18 June 2023

Who can be treated as the owner of immovable property as per MRTP Act where unauthorized construction is done?

 Plain reading of the above provisions of law discloses that in cases of any development within the territorial limits of the planning authority without the prior permission under the said Act or after revocation of such permission granted under the said Act, if carried out, then it could be ordered to be removed as well as direction can be issued for restoring the land to the condition which existed prior to the concerned development. The authority can also direct to restore such status quo ante within specified period. However, the specified period shall not be less than one month. Such a direction can be issued to the owner of the concerned development. The term "owner" would obviously disclose the person in whom the ownership of the property or the structure vests. The Section 2(18) of the said Act, however, widens the scope of the said expression "owner" by defining it to mean to include any person for the time being receiving or entitled to receive, whether on his own account or as agent, trustee, guardian, manager or receiver for another person or for any religious or charitable purpose, the rents or profits of the property in connection with which it is used. In other words, it is not only the person in whom the title of the property stands, but even his agent or person acting on behalf of the owner for the purpose of receipt of rent or profits from such property would be the owner for the purpose of the said expression under Section 53 of the said Act. Undoubtedly, in the case of co-operative societies, either the Chairman as well as the other members of the managing committee thereof would be the owners of the property of the society for the purpose of the said section.

{Para 7}.

Bombay High Court
D.N. Punamiya vs The State Of Maharashtra (Through ... on 10 February, 2005
Bench: R Khandeparkar

Citation: 2005(2) Bom CR 747.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page

Saturday, 10 June 2023

Whether the court can protect the possession of a person who is claiming title to an immovable property based on an agreement of sale?

No doubt, agreement to sell is not a document of title or a deed of transfer of property by sale and as such, may not confer absolute title upon the Plaintiff-Respondent over the suit property in view of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, nonetheless, the agreement to sell, the payment of entire sale consideration as mentioned in the agreement itself and corroborated by the receipt of its payment and the fact that the Plaintiff-Respondent was put in possession of the suit property in accordance with law as is also established by the possession memo on record, goes to prove that the Plaintiff-Respondent is de-facto having possessory rights over the suit property in part performance of the agreement to sell. This possessory right of the Plaintiff-Respondent is not liable to be disturbed by the transferer, i.e., the Defendant-Appellant. 

10. In the wake of the finding that the above-mentioned documents have not been fraudulently obtained or have not been manipulated, treating the said documents to be duly executed and as genuine, one thing is clear that the Plaintiff-Respondent is in a settled possession of the suit property at least in part performance of the agreement which cannot be disturbed or disputed by the transferer, i.e., the Defendant-Appellant.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 7527-7528 of 2012

Decided On: 02.06.2023

Ghanshyam  Vs. Yogendra Rathi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipankar Datta and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.

Author: Pankaj Mithal, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0642/2023

Print Page

Wednesday, 24 May 2023

Circumstances where gazette publication is not conclusive proof of immovable property being wakf property?

  It may be noted that Wakf Board is a statutory authority under the Wakf Act. Therefore, the official Gazette is bound to carry any notification at the instance of the Wakf Board but nonetheless, the State Government is not bound by such a publication of the notification published in the official Gazette merely for the reason that it has been so published. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. A.P. State Wakf Board and Ors. MANU/SC/0155/2022, this Court consisting of one of us (V. Ramasubramanian, J. as a Member) held that the publication of a notification in the official Gazette has a presumption of knowledge to the general public just like an advertisement published in the newspaper but such a notification published at the instance of the Wakf Board in the State Gazette is not binding upon the State Government. It means that the notification, if any, published in the official Gazette at the behest of the Wakf Act giving the lists of the wakfs is not a conclusive proof that a particular property is a wakf property especially, when no procedure as prescribed Under Section 4 of the Wakf Act has been followed in issuing the same.{Para 35}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 7467-7470 of 2014

Salem Muslim Burial Ground Protection Committee  Vs.  State of Tamil Nadu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Ramasubramanian and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.

Author: Pankaj Mithal, J.

Decided On: 18.05.2023.

Citation: MANU/SC/0597/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

Print Page

Is the declaration of any immovable property as wakf valid if it was done without a survey of that property?

The another limb of the argument is that the suit land has been declared to be a wakf property vide notification dated 29.04.1959. In this regard, it has to be noted that such a declaration has to be in consonance with the provisions of the Wakf Act, 1954 or the Waqf Act, 1995. Both the aforesaid Acts lay down the procedure for issuing notification declaring any property as a wakf. {Para 30}


31. The Wakf Act, 1954, which actually is relevant for our purpose, provides that, first, a preliminary survey of wakfs has to be conducted and the Survey Commission shall, after such inquiry as may be deemed necessary, submit its report to the State Government about certain factors enumerated therein whereupon the State Government by a notification in the official Gazette direct for a second survey to be conducted. Once the above procedure of survey is completed and the disputes arising thereto have been settled, on receipt of the report, the State Government shall forward it to the Wakf Board. The Wakf Board on examining the same shall publish the list of wakfs in existence with full particulars in the official Gazette as contemplated Under Section 5 of the Act. Similar provisions exist under the Waqf Act, 1995.


32. A plain reading of the provisions of the above two Acts would reveal that the notification Under Section 5 of both the Acts declaring the list of the wakfs shall only be published after completion of the process as laid down Under Section 4 of the above Acts, which provides for two surveys, settlement of disputes arising thereto and the submission of the report to the State Government and to the Board. Therefore, conducting of the surveys before declaring a property a wakf property is a sine qua non. In the case at hand, there is no material or evidence on record that before issuing notification Under Section 5 of the Wakf Act, 1954, any procedure or the survey was conducted as contemplated by Section 4 of the Act. In the absence of such a material, the mere issuance of the notification Under Section 5 of the Act would not constitute a valid wakf in respect of the suit land. Therefore, the notification dated 29.04.1959 is not a conclusive proof of the fact that the suit land is a wakf property. It is for this reason probably that the Appellant Committee had never pressed the said notification into service up till 1999.


33. In Tamil Nadu Wakf Board v. Hathija Ammal (Dead) by Lrs. Etc. MANU/SC/0518/2001 : AIR 2002 SC 402, it was observed that the Wakf Board should follow the procedure as required Under Section 4, 5 and 6 or Section 27 of the Wakf Act before notifying the wakfs Under Section 5 of the Act.


34. In Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal MANU/SC/0485/2017 : (2017) 13 SCC 174, it was observed as under:


16. Thus, it is amply clear that the conducting of survey by the Survey Commissioner and preparing a report and forwarding the same to the State or the Wakf Board precedes the final act of notifying such list in the Official Gazette by the State under the 1995 Act (it was by the Board under the 1954 Act). As mentioned supra, the list would be prepared by the Survey Commissioner after making due enquiry and after valid survey as well as after due application of mind. The enquiry contemplated Under Sub-section (3) of Section 4 is not merely an informal enquiry but a formal enquiry to find out at the grass root level, as to whether the property is a wakf property or not. Thereafter the Wakf Board will once again examine the list sent to it with due application of its mind and only thereafter the same will be sent to the Government for notifying the same in the Gazette....

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 7467-7470 of 2014

Salem Muslim Burial Ground Protection Committee  Vs.  State of Tamil Nadu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Ramasubramanian and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.

Author: Pankaj Mithal, J.

Decided On: 18.05.2023.

Citation: MANU/SC/0597/2023
Print Page

Sunday, 16 April 2023

Can the previous owner of acquired land be considered a trespasser if they retain or re-take possession of the land?

 

The issue as to what is meant by "possession of the land by the State after its acquisition" has also been considered by Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority's case (supra). It is opined therein that after the acquisition of land and passing of award, the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances. The vesting of land with the State is with possession. Any person retaining the possession thereafter has to be treated trespasser. When large chunk of land is acquired, the State is not supposed to put some person or police force to retain the possession and start cultivating on the land till it is utilized. The Government is also not supposed to start residing or physically occupying the same once process of the acquisition is complete. If after the process of acquisition is complete and land vest in the State free from all encumbrances with possession, any person retaining the land or any re-entry made by any person is nothing else but trespass on the State land. Relevant paragraphs 244, 245 and 256 are extracted below:


244. Section 16 of the Act of 1894 provided that possession of land may be taken by the State Government after passing of an award and thereupon land vest free from all encumbrances in the State Government. Similar are the provisions made in the case of urgency in Section 17(1). The word "possession" has been used in the Act of 1894, whereas in Section 24(2) of Act of 2013, the expression "physical possession" is used. It is submitted that drawing of panchnama for taking over the possession is not enough when the actual physical possession remained with the landowner and Section 24(2) requires actual physical possession to be taken, not the possession in any other form. When the State has acquired the land and award has been passed, land vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances. The act of vesting of the land in the State is with possession, any person retaining the possession, thereafter, has to be treated as trespasser and has no right to possess the land which vests in the State free from all encumbrances.


245. The question which arises whether there is any difference between taking possession under the Act of 1894 and the expression "physical possession" used in Section 24(2). As a matter of fact, what was contemplated under the Act of 1894, by taking the possession meant only physical possession of the land. Taking over the possession under the Act of 2013 always amounted to taking over physical possession of the land. When the State Government acquires land and drawns up a memorandum of taking possession, that amounts to taking the physical possession of the land. On the large chunk of property or otherwise which is acquired, the Government is not supposed to put some other person or the police force in possession to retain it and start cultivating it till the land is used by it for the purpose for which it has been acquired. The Government is not supposed to start residing or to physically occupy it once possession has been taken by drawing the inquest proceedings for obtaining possession thereof. Thereafter, if any further retaining of land or any re-entry is made on the land or someone starts cultivation on the open land or starts residing in the outhouse, etc., is deemed to be the trespasser on land which in possession of the State. The possession of trespasser always inures for the benefit of the real owner that is the State Government in the case.

256. Thus, it is apparent that vesting is with possession and the statute has provided Under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1894 that once possession is taken, absolute vesting occurred. It is an indefeasible right and vesting is with possession thereafter. The vesting specified Under Section 16, takes place after various steps, such as, notification Under Section 4, declaration Under Section 6, notice Under Section 9, award Under Section 11 and then possession. The statutory provision of vesting of property absolutely free from all encumbrances has to be accorded full effect. Not only the possession vests in the State but all other encumbrances are also removed forthwith. The title of the landholder ceases and the state becomes the absolute owner and in possession of the property. Thereafter there is no control of the landowner over the property. He cannot have any animus to take the property and to control it. Even if he has retained the possession or otherwise trespassed upon it after possession has been taken by the State, he is a trespasser and such possession of trespasser enures for his benefit and on behalf of the owner.

{Para 12}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2749/2023 

Decided On: 11.04.2023

Land and Building Department through Secretary and Ors. Vs.

Attro Devi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Rajesh Bindal, JJ.

Author: Rajesh Bindal, J

Citation: MANU/SC/0361/2023,

Print Page

Sunday, 15 January 2023

Can the plaintiff get possession of the suit property if the defendants fail to prove their title over the suit property?

In the above factual background, for the Plaintiff to succeed, she has to establish that she has a legal title to the Schedule 'A' property, and consequently, is entitled to a decree of possession. The Defendants cannot be dispossessed unless the Plaintiff has established a better title and rights over the Schedule 'A' property. A person in possession of land in the assumed character as the owner, and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership, has a legal right against the entire world except the rightful owner.9 A decree of possession cannot be passed in favour of the Plaintiff on the ground that Defendant Nos. 1 to 12 have not been able to fully establish their right, title and interest in the Schedule 'A' property. The Defendants, being in possession, would be entitled to protect and save their possession, unless the person who seeks to dispossess them has a better legal right in the form of ownership or entitlement to possession. {Para 30}


31. The burden of proof10 to establish a title in the present case lies upon the Plaintiff as this burden lies on the party who asserts the existence of a particular state of things on the basis of which she claims relief11. This is mandated in terms of Section 101 of the Evidence Act, which states that burden on proving the fact rests with party who substantially asserts in the affirmative and not on the party which is denying it. This Rule may not be universal and has exceptions13, but in the factual background of the present case, the general principle is applicable. In terms of Section 102 of the Evidence Act, if both parties fail to adduce evidence, the suit must fail.15 Onus of proof, no doubt shifts and the shifting is a continuous process in the evaluation of evidence, but this happens when in a suit for title and possession, the Plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability to shift the onus on the Defendant. In the absence of such evidence, the burden of proof lies on the Plaintiff and can be discharged only when he is able to prove title.16 The weakness of the defence cannot be a justification to decree the suit.17 The Plaintiff could have succeeded in respect of the Schedule 'A' property if she had discharged the burden to prove the title to the Schedule 'A' property which squarely falls on her. This would be the true effect of Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act.18 Therefore, it follows that the Plaintiff should have satisfied and discharged the burden under the provisions of the Evidence Act, failing which the suit would be liable to be dismissed.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 878 of 2009

Smriti Debbarma (Dead) through Legal Representative Vs. Prabha Ranjan Debbarma and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjiv Khanna and J.K. Maheshwari, JJ.

Author: Sanjiv Khanna, J.

Decided On: 04.01.2023.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0010/2023

Print Page