The assailant used knife and
inflicted serious injuries on the body of the deceased,
including below the belly. Looking to the act on part of
the appellant, it has to be concluded that the accused
was liable to be attributed with the knowledge that the
injuries which he was to inflict by using the weapon in
hand, would be sufficient to result into death in
ordinary course.
6.1 At the same time, the sequence of incident
highlights that there was an altercation involving the
nephew of the appellant and the deceased in the
evening time and subsequently in the night at around
10 p.m., the appellant went to the house of the accused
where he started abusing the deceased and ultimately
assaulted him to inflict the injuries with knife. There was
an element of impulse, anger and self-provocation on
part of the appellant.
6.2 Given the above aspects and in the totality
of facts and circumstances emerging in the whole
incident, it would not be correct to presume or view in
respect of the conduct on part of the appellant that the
appellant acted with premeditation to kill or that he
acted in assailing the deceased with an intention to
cause death. The degree of the offence committed
could not be said to be partaking the act of murder as
defined under Section 300, IPC, since it could be
concluded that the intention to cause death was
missing. The appellant could not have been convicted
and sentenced under Section 302, IPC.
6.3 The other attending aspects which may be
relevant in judging the nature of the offence committed
by the appellant were that the injuries did not result
into instantaneous death of the deceased. Thus, the
attack by the appellant remained with the knowledge
but without intention to cause death. Admittedly, the
death of the deceased was after 13 days. Not only that
he died while under treatment in the hospital but he
had developed septic conditions in the injuries
suffered by him. The cause of death was medically
identified as ‘Septicemia’.
7. Taking above factors cumulatively, this
Court is of the view that the conviction of the appellant
deserves to be converted from under Section 302, IPC
to under Section 304 Part I, IPC. The act on part of the
appellant has to be treated as ‘culpable homicide not
amounting to murder’ falling under Section 304 Part I,
IPC. This Court holds accordingly.
Non-Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1266 OF 2014
NANDKUMAR @ NANDU MANILAL MUDALIAR Vs STATE OF GUJARAT
Author: N.V. ANJARIA, J.
Dated: NOVEMBER 10, 2025.
Citation: 2025 INSC 1302
The appellant herein has challenged the
judgment and order dated 04.12.2009 passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat in Criminal
Appeal No.137 of 2000. Thereby the High Court
confirmed the judgment and order dated 31.01.2000 of
the City Sessions Court, Ahmedabad in Sessions Case
No.25 of 1999, convicting the appellant for the offences
punishable under Sections 302 and 504, Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the IPC’). The
appellant-convict came to be sentenced to
imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.2000/- and in
default to undergo simple imprisonment for one year.
In respect of the offence under Section 504, IPC he was
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one
year, to pay fine of Rs.1000/- and to undergo the simple
imprisonment in default for three months, both the
sentences were to run concurrently.
2. The charge was framed against the
appellant under Sections 504, 324, IPC and Section 302,
IPC subsequently added at exhibit-1, for committing
murder of one Louis Williams in the late night of
13.06.1998 at the residence of said Louis - the
complainant.
3. As per the prosecution story, on
12.06.1998 at about 8.00 p.m., the appellant and his
brother Tanvel were quarrelling with each other. One
Rajesh, who was a nephew of the complainantdeceased,
intervened. At that time the accused stated
to have inflicted injuries on the thigh to the said Rajesh
by using knife. No police complainant was lodged
against the accused in that regard as it was an internal
quarrel. Rajesh took treatment in a private hospital, and
after taking treatment, had been sleeping in his house.
In the intervening night of the same day at about 1.00
p.m. the accused named Nandkumar @ Nandu went to
the house of the deceased, and hurled abusive
language. The complainant got up to come out of his
house. As the appellant was abusive, the deceased
interfered. The appellant inflicted stab injury by knife
on the deceased on the left side of the back and on the
right hand. The appellant thereafter ran away from the
place taking the knife.
3.1 It was stated that there was no vehicle
available since it was late night to take the victim Louis
to the hospital, however a person in the neighbour who
had a rickshaw helped to take the injured Louis to the
L.G. Hospital, accompanied by his sister Gajraben (PW
2). The police constable on duty of the hospital
informed the Kanabha police station telephonically
about admission of the said Louis to the hospital, who
had been inflicted with stab wound. A Wardhi was sent,
which was received by the police officer concerned on
the morning of the next day on 13.06.1998. The First
Information Report was recorded thereafter, as the
competent police officer went to the hospital. At that
time, offence under Sections 324 and 504 came to be
registered as per C.R. No.I-107/98.
3.2. The injured victim having been treated for
the said injuries, came to be discharged from the
hospital. An operation was performed by the doctor
regarding injuries. It appears that the complainantvictim
was again admitted to the hospital and died
while receiving the treatment in the afternoon of
26.06.1998. The cause of the death was indicated to be
Septicemia. The charge for the offence under Section
302, IPC was added. The post-mortem of the dead body
of the deceased was conducted. The appellant
voluntarily surrendered at the police station on
29.06.1998 going there with knife and the said weapon
was thus recovered.
3.3 The charge against the appellant was
framed for the offences under Sections 504, 324 and
302, IPC. The trial was held in which the prosecution
examined 14 witnesses. In the statement under Section
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the
appellant pleaded innocence and said that he was
falsely implicated. At the end of the trial, as stated
above, the appellant was convicted and sentenced in
respect of the offences under Sections 302 and 504, IPC,
whereas came to be acquitted in respect of the offence
under Section 324, IPC.
3.4 While convicting the appellant, the Trial
Court, after discussing the evidence, took the view that
Page 5 of 14
the knife injury was caused on the abdomen of the
deceased and the said injury was found by the doctor
to be sufficient in formal course to cause death.
According to the Trial Court, merely because the
deceased succumbed to the injuries after 10 days of the
incident, it could not be said that the injury was not such
which would cause death of a person in the normal
course. It was further reasoned that the nature of the
main injury, as per the medical evidence, was possible
by the sharp knife which was muddamla article No.3
and that the appellant-assailant injured the stomach of
the deceased and that the stitches were taken and the
spleen was removed. According to the Trial Court, the
murder was committed intentionally and knowingly.
3.5 When the Judgment and order of the Trial
Court was appealed against before the High Court, the
High Court did not find any discrepancy in the
testimony of Gajraben (PW 2) who was stated to be eyewitness.
By relying on her testimony as well as the
testimony of Rajesh (PW4) and further reading together
the medical evidence, held that the offence of murder
against the appellant was established. The High Court
noted that the injuries suffered by the victim
subsequently developed into septic condition and the
victim died of Septicemia.
Page 6 of 14
4. Heard learned counsel for the respective
parties.
5. Looking at the material evidence and
relevant aspects of the case, the accused was inflicted
with three injuries by the appellant with knife. The
evidence of Dr. Dharmila Shah (PW 8) mentioned the
injuries sustained by the deceased as available from
the medical report. The injuries were (i) speared
wound of the size of 5 x 2 cm below the belly and on the
left side, (ii) cut wound of 2 x ½ x .25 cm of L shape on
the hand, (iii) crushed wound of the size of 3 x 1 x ½ cm
on the right hand. It was suggested in the evidence of
PW 8 that when the belly was opened and the injuries
were examined, further noticed was the cut of 5 cm on
the back and that it was bleeding. There was a speared
wound of the size of 2 x ½ x 1 cm on the stomach. There
was also an injury on the small intestine which was a
related wound.
5.1 PW 8 stated that when the deceased was
admitted for primary treatment in the hospital, he was
admitted by one Dr. Brijesh Patel, as injured patient
who had gone to America. It was stated that the patient
was in a conscious state when admitted as patient for
treatment of the injuries and that Gajraben had given
consent for the operation of the deceased. The
deceased was admitted on 13.06.1998 and remained as
Page 7 of 14
injured patient till 26.06.1998, who died on 26.06.1998
at around 12.15 p.m. while being treated as he
developed septic condition in the wounds.
5.2 While the Trial Court has accepted the
evidence of Gajraben (PW 2) and Rajesh (PW 4) and the
High Court has proceeded to confirm the reasoning by
affirming the conviction and sentence, a factual
contention is coming forth that both PWs 2 and 4 were
relatives of the deceased therefore, interested
witnesses. Gajraben was sister of the deceased who
took him to the hospital and also signed the concerned
papers for the operation. Rajesh (PW4) was his
nephew. It was sought to be highlighted that there was
no independent eye-witness other than the said two
witnesses. It was emphasised that the death occurred
after gap of thirteen days.
5.3 While advocate for the appellant in the
first place assailed the very conviction, as alternatively
submitted that in any case, the appellant could have
been convicted and sentenced for an offence lesser
than under Section 302, IPC. It was submitted that even
if the act on the part of the appellant leading to the
death of the victim was ‘culpable homicide’, it did not
amount to offence of ‘murder’.
5.4 In Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code,
1860, Section 299 defines ‘culpable homicide’.
Page 8 of 14
‘Murder’ is defined under Section 300, IPC. The
exceptions are provided in Section 300, IPC as to under
which circumstances the ‘culpable homicide’ would not
become murder. Section 304, IPC deals with situations,
where the ‘culpable homicide’ does not amount to
murder. In other words, it would not fall within the
definition of ‘murder’. Section 300, IPC, although
defines the offence which would become ‘culpable
homicide amounting to murder’, it has, as stated above
several exceptions.
5.5 Section 304, IPC has two parts namely;
Section 304 Part I and Section 304 Part II. The distinction
between these two Parts of Section 304, IPC is required
to be considered having regard to the provisions of
Sections 299 and 300, IPC. Whether the offender had
intention to cause death or he had no such intention
brings out the vital distinction.
5.6 In Kesar Singh & Anr. v. State of Haryana (2008) 15 SCC 753,
this Court observed thus,
“The distinguishing feature is the mens rea. What
is prerequisite in terms of clause (2) of Section 300 is
the knowledge possessed by the offender in regard
to the particular victim being in such a peculiar
condition or state of health that the intentional harm
caused to him is likely to be fatal. Intention to cause
death is not an essential ingredient of clause (2).
When there is an intention of causing a bodily injury
coupled with knowledge of the offender as regards
likelihood of such injury being sufficient to cause the
death of a particular victim would be sufficient to
bring the offence within the ambit of this clause.”
(Para 10)
5.6.1 For the above purpose, the exceptions
contained in Section 300, IPC are taken into
consideration. In the same judgment, the Court further
explained the distinction between ‘culpable homicide
amounting to murder’ and ‘not amounting to murder’,
stating,
“Culpable homicide is genus, murder is its specie.
The culpable homicide, excluding the special
characteristics of murder, would amount to culpable
homicide not amounting to murder. The Code
recognises three degrees of culpable homicide.
When a culpable homicide is of the first degree, it
comes within the purview of the definition of Section
300 and it will amount to murder. The second degree
which becomes punishable in the first part of Section
304 is culpable homicide of the second degree. Then
there is culpable homicide of third degree which is
the least side of culpable homicide and the
punishment provided for is also the lowest among
the punishments for the three grades. It is punishable
under the second part of Section 304.” (Para 11)
5.7 In other words, where the two ingredients
namely that the infliction of bodily injury on deceased
was caused intentionally and secondly that it was
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of
nature, are satisfied, the offence would amount to
murder. There may be circumstances which may
emerge from the facts and evidence of a given case that
the offence becomes ‘culpable homicide not
amounting to murder’.
5.8 In Virsa Singh v. State of PunjabAIR 1958 SC 465 and
further in Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v. State of
Maharashtra3, this Court stated that divided into two
Parts, Section 304, IPC deals with the situations where
‘culpable homicide’ would not be a murder. The
conceptualisation of the ‘culpable homicide not
amounting to murder’ were explained in the following
way, as quoted in para 4 of the Kesar Singh1,
“If an injury is inflicted with the knowledge and
intention that it is likely to cause death, but with no
intention to cause death the offence would fall within
the definition of Section 304 Part I, however, if there
is no intention to cause such an injury, but there is
knowledge that such an injury can cause death, the
offence would fall within the definition of Section 304
Part II. Thus, is intention. If intention to cause such an
injury as is likely to cause death, is established, the
offence would fall under Part I but where no such
intention is established and only knowledge that the
injury is likely to cause death, it would fall under Part
II.”
6. In the context of the above parameters as
to what would constitute murder under Section 302, IPC
and under what circumstances the ‘culpable homicide’
would not amount to murder, recollecting the basic
facts of the present case, looking to the kind and nature
of injuries referred to above which is available from the
medical evidence, it could not be said that the injuries
were not of the nature which were sufficient to cause
death in ordinary course. The assailant used knife and
inflicted serious injuries on the body of the deceased,
including below the belly. Looking to the act on part of
the appellant, it has to be concluded that the accused
was liable to be attributed with the knowledge that the
injuries which he was to inflict by using the weapon in
hand, would be sufficient to result into death in
ordinary course.
6.1 At the same time, the sequence of incident
highlights that there was an altercation involving the
nephew of the appellant and the deceased in the
evening time and subsequently in the night at around
10 p.m., the appellant went to the house of the accused
where he started abusing the deceased and ultimately
assaulted him to inflict the injuries with knife. There was
an element of impulse, anger and self-provocation on
part of the appellant.
6.2 Given the above aspects and in the totality
of facts and circumstances emerging in the whole
incident, it would not be correct to presume or view in
respect of the conduct on part of the appellant that the
appellant acted with premeditation to kill or that he
acted in assailing the deceased with an intention to
cause death. The degree of the offence committed
could not be said to be partaking the act of murder as
defined under Section 300, IPC, since it could be
concluded that the intention to cause death was
missing. The appellant could not have been convicted
and sentenced under Section 302, IPC.
6.3 The other attending aspects which may be
relevant in judging the nature of the offence committed
by the appellant were that the injuries did not result
into instantaneous death of the deceased. Thus, the
attack by the appellant remained with the knowledge
but without intention to cause death. Admittedly, the
death of the deceased was after 13 days. Not only that
he died while under treatment in the hospital but he
had developed septic conditions in the injuries
suffered by him. The cause of death was medically
identified as ‘Septicemia’.
7. Taking above factors cumulatively, this
Court is of the view that the conviction of the appellant
deserves to be converted from under Section 302, IPC
to under Section 304 Part I, IPC. The act on part of the
appellant has to be treated as ‘culpable homicide not
amounting to murder’ falling under Section 304 Part I,
IPC. This Court holds accordingly.
8. This Court in its order dated 13.06.2014
while granting leave noted that the appellant had
already served in jail for more than 14 years and came
to be enlarged on bail.
9. As a result of the above discussion, the
conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section
302, IPC is set aside and the same is converted into one
under Section 304 Part I, IPC.
10. The sentence of 14 years already
undergone by the appellant shall be treated as
sufficient and subserve the interest of justice. The bail
bond of the appellant furnished to the Trial Court shall
stand discharged.
11. The present appeal is accordingly allowed
to the above extent.
In view of disposal of the appeal as
above, all pending interlocutory applications would not
survive and are accordingly disposed of.
………………………………….., J.
[ K. VINOD CHANDRAN ]
………………………………….., J.
[ N.V. ANJARIA ]
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 10, 2025.
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