Culpable Homicide and Murder under IPC: Law, Exceptions and Landmark Judgments

 Under the IPC, every murder is culpable homicide, but every culpable homicide is not murder. The easiest interview formula is: first see whether Section 299 is made out; then ask whether the case falls in any of the four clauses of Section 300, and finally check whether any of the five exceptions to Section 300 reduce it to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Core distinction

The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that culpable homicide is the genus and murder is its species. In simple terms, murder is the more aggravated form of culpable homicide, where the intention or knowledge is of a higher degree.

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What are Instances of Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder?

• Sudden Fight in Heat of Passion: A and B engage in a verbal fight, which escalates to a physical brawl without premeditation. A pushes B, who falls and dies from a head injury. This is generally culpable homicide as it was not pre-planned.
• Causing Death by Knowledge (Without Explicit Intent): A knows Z is hiding behind a bush. A convinces B to shoot at the bush to scare someone, knowing it is likely to kill Z. B shoots and kills Z. A is guilty of culpable homicide.

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Supreme Court: Intent Versus Knowledge: When a Knife Blow Becomes Culpable Homicide, Not Murder

 The assailant used knife and

inflicted serious injuries on the body of the deceased,

including below the belly. Looking to the act on part of

the appellant, it has to be concluded that the accused

was liable to be attributed with the knowledge that the

injuries which he was to inflict by using the weapon in

hand, would be sufficient to result into death in

ordinary course.

6.1 At the same time, the sequence of incident

highlights that there was an altercation involving the

nephew of the appellant and the deceased in the

evening time and subsequently in the night at around

10 p.m., the appellant went to the house of the accused

where he started abusing the deceased and ultimately

assaulted him to inflict the injuries with knife. There was

an element of impulse, anger and self-provocation on

part of the appellant.

6.2 Given the above aspects and in the totality

of facts and circumstances emerging in the whole

incident, it would not be correct to presume or view in

respect of the conduct on part of the appellant that the

appellant acted with premeditation to kill or that he

acted in assailing the deceased with an intention to

cause death. The degree of the offence committed

could not be said to be partaking the act of murder as

defined under Section 300, IPC, since it could be

concluded that the intention to cause death was

missing. The appellant could not have been convicted

and sentenced under Section 302, IPC.

6.3 The other attending aspects which may be

relevant in judging the nature of the offence committed

by the appellant were that the injuries did not result

into instantaneous death of the deceased. Thus, the

attack by the appellant remained with the knowledge

but without intention to cause death. Admittedly, the

death of the deceased was after 13 days. Not only that

he died while under treatment in the hospital but he

had developed septic conditions in the injuries

suffered by him. The cause of death was medically

identified as ‘Septicemia’.

7. Taking above factors cumulatively, this

Court is of the view that the conviction of the appellant

deserves to be converted from under Section 302, IPC

to under Section 304 Part I, IPC. The act on part of the

appellant has to be treated as ‘culpable homicide not

amounting to murder’ falling under Section 304 Part I,

IPC. This Court holds accordingly.

Non-Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1266 OF 2014

NANDKUMAR @ NANDU MANILAL MUDALIAR Vs STATE OF GUJARAT 

Author: N.V. ANJARIA, J.

Dated: NOVEMBER 10, 2025.

Citation: 2025 INSC 1302

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What is distinction between guilty intention and guilty knowledge as mentioned in part 1 and part 2 of S 304 of IPC and how it affects punishment which can be awarded to accused?

 60. Few important principles of law discernible from the

aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:-

(1) When the court is confronted with the question, what

offence the accused could be said to have committed, the

true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the

accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was

such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of

the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single

injury was caused. To illustrate : 'A' is bound hand and foot.

'B' comes and placing his revolver against the head of 'A',

shoots 'A' in his head killing him instantaneously. Here,

there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of 'B'

in shooting 'A' was to kill him, though only single injury was

caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling

within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another

instance, 'B' sneaks into the bed room of his enemy 'A' while

the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest

of 'A', 'B' forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of 'A' and

runs away. 'A' dies shortly thereafter. The injury to 'A' was

found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause

death. There may be no difficulty in holding that 'B'

intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be

caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in

the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would

bring the act of 'B' within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the

IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although

only single injury was caused.

(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused

may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC,

the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder,

will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's

case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in

that section. In the event of the case falling within any of

those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide

not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section

304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall

within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would

be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as

to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the

intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that

only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be

attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the

IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable

homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of

the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section,

if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it

would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case

fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.

(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person

falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable

homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is

punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however,

it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the

second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part

of this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’

whereas the second part would apply when there is no such

intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’.

(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury

was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in

the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the

requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are

fulfilled and the offence would be murder.

(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes

of cases: (i) when the case falls under one or the other of

the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the

exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not

of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the

expression 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to

cause death' but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is

generally spoken of as an injury 'likely to cause death' and

the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the

IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that

death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause

death or an injury likely to cause death.

To put it more succinctly, the difference between

the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the

first part, the crime of murder is first established and the

accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to

Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the

crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for

the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence

punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC,

the accused need not bring his case within one of the

exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.

(6) The word 'likely' means probably and it is distinguished

from more 'possibly'. When chances of happening are even

or greater than its not happening, we may say that the

thing will 'probably happen'. In reaching the conclusion, the

court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and

then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by

the act he was likely to cause death.

(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299

of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always

to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge

under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of

unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide

amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder

would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case

is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the

IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are

pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on

record, the prosecution must still be required under the law

to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section

300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the

prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any

one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely,

1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out

and the case may be one of culpable homicide not

amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the

IPC.

(8) The court must address itself to the question of mens

rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the

assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the

deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct

evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn

from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must

necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used,

part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force

used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the

circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack.

(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a

culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury

or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to

cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if

death has actually been caused and intention to cause such

injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts

resulting in the injury or injuries.

(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in

the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle,

can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to

cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in

the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the

required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which

has to be determined on the facts of each case.

(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the

intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily

injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the

ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he

inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the

victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of

Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies.

(12) In determining the question, whether an accused had

guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a

single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient

in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact

that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight

or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury

was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a

simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty

knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304

Part II of the IPC.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2043 OF 2023

ANBAZHAGAN Vs THE STATE 

Author: J.B. PARDIWALA, J. :

Dated: JULY 20, 2023.

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Supreme court: Circumstances From Which Intention To Cause Death Can Be Gathered

  In the case of Pulicherla Nagaraju (supra), this Court had an occasion to consider the case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and the intention to cause death. It was observed and held by this Court that the intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows.  The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention. Be that as it may.”In paragraph 29, it was observed as under:

“29. Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters — plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302, are not converted into offences punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under Section 302.

Supreme Court

JUSTICE M.R. SHAH JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA

The State of Uttarakhand Vs. Sachendra Singh Rawat

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 143 OF 2022

4th February 2022

Author: M.R. SHAH, J.

Citation: 2022 ALL SCR (ONLINE) 126

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Whether court can convert conviction granted to accused punishable under S 302 of IPC to 304 part 2 of IPC considering his subsequent conduct?

To substantiate his submission, he relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kalu Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/1230/1999 : (2000)10 SCC 324 wherein wife of the appellant had two wives. One of them died due to burn injuries. On the date of incident, appellant under the influence of liquor demanded ornaments from his second wife Vimla. But Vimla refused to part with her ornaments and that infuriated the appellant. He doused her with kerosene and wanted her to die and supplied a box of match-sticks to her. As she failed to ignite the match-stick appellant collected the match-box and lit one match-stick and set her ablaze. It was held that the conduct cannot be seen divorced from the totality of the circumstances. Very probably he would not have anticipated that the act done by him would have escalated to such a proportion that she might die. If he had ever intended her to die he would not alerted his senses to bring water in an effort to rescue her. All that the accused thought of was to inflict burns to her and to frighten her but unfortunately the situation slipped out of his control and it went to the fatal extent. He would not have intended to inflict the injuries which she sustained on account of his act. Therefore, the offence has to be brought down from first degree murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Therefore, conviction is altered from Section 302 to Section 304 Part-II IPC.

24. In the present case also it is established on record that due to quarrel between the appellant over very pretty count appellant poured thinner on the person of Sarika and set on fire. Subsequently, he tried to extinguish fire and took her to the hospital. Taking into consideration, it can be said that the appellant out of control did act of setting his wife on fire but subsequently, he extinguished fire by showing his remorse towards the act of setting fire of her wife. Therefore, it can be said that the appellant was not intended to kill his wife by setting her on fire. Therefore, act of the appellant cannot fall into purview of section 302 of IPC but it squarely falls under the provisions of Section 304 Part-II.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Appeal No. 873 of 2010

Decided On: 31.01.2020

 Avinash Baburao Rayate  Vs.  State of Maharastra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.V. More and Surendra P. Tavade, JJ.

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Whether accused can be held guilty for the offence of murder if he had no intention to cause death?

In this backdrop, the short question which falls for consideration is whether the Appellant's act of causing death of Smt. Anita and Khushal Singh tantamounts to offence of 'murder' as held by the trial court and the High Court or any lesser offence as urged by Shri Siddharth Luthra, learned senior Counsel for the Appellant. Sections 299 as well as 300, Indian Penal Code provide for situations in which death is caused by an act with the intention of causing death or such bodily injury which the offender knows is likely to cause death. Both Sections 299 and 300 deal with instances in which death is caused by an act with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause death of the person to whom injury is inflicted. These provisions also deal with cases where there is no intention of either causing death or a bodily injury which is ordinarily sufficient to cause death. The absence of intention to cause death or bodily injury which is in the ordinary course of nature likely to cause death is, therefore, not conclusive. What is required to be seen is whether the act is one where the offender must be deemed to have had the knowledge that he was likely, by such act, to cause death.

 The Appellant is, thus, guilty of an act, the likely consequences of which including causing fatal injuries to the persons being in a close circuit, are attributable to him. The offence committed by the Appellant, thus, would amount to 'culpable homicide' within the meaning of Section 299, though punishable Under Section 304 Part 2 of the Indian Penal Code.

17. Incidents of celebratory firing are regretfully rising, for they are seen as a status symbol. A gun licensed for self-protection or safety and security of crops and cattle cannot be fired in celebratory events, it being a potential cause of fatal accidents. Such like misuse of fire arms convert a happy event to a pall of gloom. Appellant cannot escape the consequences of carrying the gun with live cartridges with the knowledge that firing at a marriage ceremony with people present there was imminently dangerous and was likely to cause death.

 Everybody, who carries a gun with live cartridges and even others know that firing a gun and that too in the presence of several people is an act, is likely to cause death, as indeed it did. Guns must be carried with a sense of responsibility and caution and are not meant to be used in such places like marriage ceremonies.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 407 of 2020 

Decided On: 18.03.2020

 Bhagwan Singh  Vs. State of Uttarakhand

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.A. Bobde, C.J.I., B.R. Gavai and Surya Kant, JJ.

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What is distinction between sudden quarrel and sudden fight for applicability of S 300 Exception 4 of IPC?

 As observed by this Court in the case of Shivshankar (supra), intention is a matter of inference and when death is as a result of intentional firing, intention to cause death is patent unless the case falls under any of the exceptions. It is further observed and held that Exception 4 to Section 300 Indian Penal Code is attracted only when there is a fight or quarrel which requires mutual provocation and blows by both sides in which the offender does not take undue advantage.

8.3. In the case of Bhagwan Munjaji Pawade v. State of Maharashtra MANU/SC/0063/1978 : (1978) 3 SCC 330, in paragraph 6, this Court has observed and held as under:

6. ... It is true that some of the conditions for the applicability of Exception 4 to Section 300 exist here, but not all. The quarrel had broken out suddenly, but there was no sudden fight between the deceased and the Appellant. 'Fight' postulates a bilateral transaction in which blows are exchanged. The deceased was unarmed. He did not cause any injury to the Appellant or his companions. Furthermore, no less than three fatal injuries were inflicted by the Appellant with an axe, which is a formidable weapon on the unarmed victim. Appellant is therefore, not entitled to the benefit of Exception 4, either.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1670 of 2019 

Decided On: 08.11.2019

 Awadhesh Kumar  Vs.  State of U.P. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Arun Mishra, M.R. Shah and S. Ravindra Bhat, JJ.

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Whether Accused Party Armed With Weapons Can Claim Benefit Of Sudden Fight [Exception 4 To S 300 IPC]

It was next urged that the offence was not of murder but

may amount to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. It

has been urged that the case would fall within Exception 4 to

Section 300 IPC, which reads as follows:

“Exception 4 – Culpable homicide is not murder if it is

committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the

heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the

offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel

or unusual manner.”

7. We are of the view that the accused cannot take benefit of

this Exception. It has come in evidence that all the accused

persons came armed. Two were armed with sickles, one with an

iron pipe and the other with wooden staffs. Even if it is assumed

that they may not have come with the intention of killing, the fact

that they were armed, clearly indicates that the occurrence did

not take place in the heat of passion, upon a sudden quarrel. As

pointed out above, both sides were coming to attend a Panchayat

to settle a dispute. Where was the need to carry arms if the

intention was only to settle a dispute? Even otherwise, we feel

that Exception 4 is not applicable because the manner in which

the blow was given right on the middle of the head, brings this

case squarely within clause “Fourthly” of Section 300 IPC.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1893 OF 2010

GURU @ GURUBARAN  Vs  STATE REP. BY INSP. OF POLICE 

Deepak Gupta, J.

Dated:September 27, 2019

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Whether accused can be convicted for culpable homicide not amounting to murder in case of Road accident?

The above evidence has been considered by the High Court quite extensively. The High Court, on consideration of the entire prosecution evidence and having regard to the deficiencies pointed out by the defence, reached the conclusion that (1) the accused at the time of driving the car was under the influence of liquor; (2) he drove the car in drunken condition at a very high speed; and (3) he failed to control the vehicle and the vehicle could not be stopped before it ran over the people sleeping on the pavement. The High Court observed that the accused could not concentrate on driving as he was under the influence of liquor and the vehicle was being driven with loud noise and a tape recorder being played in high volume. The High Court held that the accused had more than 22 feet wide road for driving and there was no occasion for a driver to swing to the left and cover a distance of more than 55 feet; climb over the footpath and run over the persons sleeping on the footpath. The High Court took judicial notice of the fact that in Mumbai people do sleep on pavements. The accused was also aware of the fact that at the place of occurrence people sleep as the accused was resident of that area. The High Court took note of the fact that the accused had admitted the accident and his explanation was that the accident occurred due to mechanical failure and the defect that was developed in the vehicle but found his explanation improbable and unacceptable. The High Court also observed that the factum of high and reckless speed was evident from the brake marks at the site. The speeding car could not be stopped by him instantaneously. In the backdrop of the above findings, the High Court held that the accused could be attributed to have a specific knowledge of the event that happened. The High Court, thus concluded that the accused had knowledge and in any case such knowledge would be attributable to him that his actions were dangerous or wanton enough to cause injuries which may even result into death of persons.

66. We have also carefully considered the evidence let in by prosecution - the substance of which has been referred to above - and we find no justifiable ground to take a view different from that of the High Court. We agree with the conclusions of the High Court and have no hesitation in holding that the evidence and materials on record prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Appellant can be attributed with knowledge that his act of driving the vehicle at a high speed in the rash or negligent manner was dangerous enough and he knew that one result would very likely be that people who were asleep on the pavement may be hit, should the vehicle go out of control. There is a presumption that a man knows the natural and likely consequences of his acts. Moreover, an act does not become involuntary act simply because its consequences were unforeseen. The cases of negligence or of rashness or dangerous driving do not eliminate the act being voluntary. In the present case, the essential ingredients of Section 304 Part II Indian Penal Code have been successfully established by the prosecution against the Appellant. The infirmities pointed out by Mr. U.U. Lalit, learned senior counsel for the Appellant, which have been noticed above are not substantial and in no way affect the legality of the trial and the conviction of the Appellant under Section 304 Part II Indian Penal Code. We uphold the view of the High Court being consistent with the evidence on record and law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1318-1320 of 2007

Decided On: 12.01.2012

Alister Anthony Pareira  Vs. State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.M. Lodha and J.S. Khehar, JJ.

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When court should convert conviction from S 302 of IPC to S 304 of IPC?

We have gone through these two judgments. It is true
that the culpable homicide is defined in Section 299 of IPC. The

culpable homicide is a genus, whereas murder is it's species. All
murders are the culpable homicides, but all culpable homicides are
not murders. Defence can be successful in taking out the case from
the sweep of Section 300 of IPC in two contingencies. One is, if they
make out any exception given in Section 300 of IPC and, secondly, if
they make out a case of non-fulfillment of ingredients of clause firstly
to clause fourthly of Section 300 of IPC.
15] In those two contingencies, the culpable homicides will
not be murder and the accused is required to be dealt with as per
the punishment prescribed in Section 304 of IPC. In the judgments
referred above, there are certain guidelines as to how to appreciate
the evidence. There is emphasis on single blow of knife, no
argument or altercation immediately before the assault in between
the deceased and the appellant, the time of incident being night
time and absence of any motive. In the case of direct evidence, the
motive as a circumstance is not so important as in the case of
circumstantial evidence. So, in case of a case based on direct
evidence, there can be prosecution evidence on the point of motive
or it may not be there. If, however, such evidence is adduced, then
the duty of the Court is to assess the evidence. 

This would make us believe that it is

difficult to hold that there was any premeditation or pre-planning on
the part of the appellant to kill the deceased which would in turn
necessitate examining thoroughly the presence of intention or
knowledge as contemplated by Section 300 of IPC.

17] It is true that there are four injuries to the deceased. One
is abrasion on forehead that may be due to fall and there are stab
wounds on the chest and abdomen. The eye witnesses PW-4 Rafiq
and PW-7 Anushka have categorically stated about only one blow of
knife. It is very well true that the appellant has not given repeated
blows of knife on the deceased. It has also come in the evidence
that appellant ran away after the assault. The location of the injuries
on the body suggests that it was near a vital part of the body.
However, which part of the body, the assault would ultimately affect
would depend upon various factors i.e. the height of deceased and
the appellant, the distance in between them at the time of assault,
weapon used, the force applied and finally the intention of the
assailant. If the assault is from the very close distance, there is

likelihood of injuring the upper part of the body. Probably, if the
assault might have been on the abdomen or lower part of the body,
the result could have been different. Even though, the appellant had
brought knife along with him, we do not find that he intended to
cause death of deceased Shailesh. We are taking this view for the
reason that there is only single blow, that there is no argument or
altercation immediately earlier to the assault, that there are no
repeated blows even though opportunity was available and that
there is absence of evidence of expert suggesting that the injuries
were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. 3rd
clause of Section 300 requires that the bodily injury intended to be
inflicted must be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death and that means, it must be established by evidence. PW-10
Dr. Nilesh has been examined by the prosecution to prove the nature
of weapon used and it's connection with the stab injury. But, PW-10
does not say anything in this regard and his opinion vide Exh.66 is
also silent on this aspect of the matter. Merely because postmortem
is admitted (Exh.63) by defence, it does not relieve the prosecution
to prove the ingredients of Section 300 of IPC.
18] These facts create a doubt, in our opinion, about intention
of the appellant to inflict such injury as to cause the death of

Shailesh or the appellant having intention to deal such an injury as is
sufficient to cause death or the appellant having knowledge that in
all probability the injury caused by him would result in death of the
deceased. We infer that the appellant had intention to cause some
injury which possibly may not have caused the death and that it is
this element of uncertainty which takes the case out of the ambit of
Section 300 of IPC.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.361 OF 2016

 Suresh s/o Sadhuji Ghogre, Vs  The State of Maharashtra,

C ORAM : S.B. SHUKRE & S.M. MODAK, JJ.

PRONOUNCED ON : 11 th JANUARY, 2019.

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How to appreciate evidence in case of offence of culpable homicide?

 It is well settled that in order to be called a murder, it needs to be culpable homicide in the first place, that is to say all murders are culpable homicides, but the vice versa may not true in all cases. Therefore, we need to ascertain whether a case of culpable homicide is made out herein in the first place. In this context, we need to observe Section 299 of Indian Penal Code at the outset-

299. Culpable homicide.-- Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.

(Emphasis supplied)

17. As noted above, causation is an important ingredient to determine as to whether a person commits culpable homicide in the first place. Causation simply means "causal relationship between conduct and result". In this respect we need to assess whether the contentions of the parties could stand the scrutiny of the law of the land. Section 299 of Indian Penal Code indicates two types of causations, one the factual causation and the second the legal causation. Coming to the factual causation, it is a matter of fact as to whether the action of the Accused caused death of the person. But the second aspect concerns itself, whether the death can be sufficiently imputed to the accused's action as being responsible legally. In our considered opinion this case turns on the second leg of causal relationship wherein, could the injuries caused by the police officers be sufficiently imputed to be the cause of death of Joinus herein?

18. It is settled under common law wherein the principle of 'take their victim as they find them' is followed,1 meaning 'A person who does any act/omission which hastens the death of another person who, when the act is done or the omission is made, is labouring under some disorder or disease arising from another cause, is deemed to have killed that other person.' This principle has been expressly ingrained under the Explanation 1 to the Section 299 of Indian Penal Code. Without going into details on this aspect as this is not a case of multiple causation requiring us to consider the same, rather it is a case wherein the deceased died of asphyxiation due to contents of his vomit, hours later from the time when the injury was inflicted, which is an independent reason for cause of death herein.

19. As elucidated above, various other circumstances which disassociate the cause of death to the actions of the Appellant officers are available. It is on record that the injuries noted in the post-mortem report clearly indicate that the nature of these injuries were not grievous. The head injury noted does not show any internal fracture to the skull bone. Therefore, when, on facts, it is concurrently inferred by the courts below that the cause of death was due to asphyxiation, we do not see any reasons for accepting a different factual inference herein, as the same is not perverse.

20. Further, we agree with the reasoning of the High Court on the aspect that the PW-1 (Zarina) has not been completely honest in her statements. She has at times deposed over-zealously, thereby mandating us to be cautious in accepting her evidence. Further no witness has clearly deposed on the aspect of injuries and how they happened to be, except for blank statements that 'beatings were given to the deceased Joinus'. Further we may note that the surrounding circumstances also strengthen our conclusions such as firstly, the condition of the deceased was said to be good as per the statements of PW-21 (cell-inmate) and PW-42 (head constable) although he was suffering from tuberculosis, when he was admitted in the lock-up. Secondly, Joinus (deceased) was heavily inebriated when he was arrested and thirdly, the aspect of asphyxiation which is a significant cause to break the chain of causal link between the death of Joinus and the injuries inflicted by the Appellants herein.

21. As discussed above, the causal link between the injuries caused to the deceased by the erring officers and the death is not connected, therefore, Section 299 of Indian Penal Code is not attracted. Accordingly, there is no question of attracting Section 302 or 304 of Indian Penal Code.

22. In any case this Court in catena of cases has taken a view that, as regards the inference of facts, when two Courts have acquitted the Accused-Appellant of charges Under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, then it would not be appropriate upon this Court to overturn the factual finding, unless the view taken by the lower courts is shown to be highly unlikely or unreasonable or perverse. Although the learned Counsel for the State has tried to argue that the cumulative effect of the injuries was responsible for the death, but the medical evidence itself, on the other hand affirms the high possibility of death due to asphyxiation. Further there is no material brought before us to portray that the courts below had taken a perverse view. In this light, when two reasonable views are possible, then reversal of concurrent acquittal would not be appropriate herein.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 385-386, 299, 387-388 of 2008 and 182-187 of 2009

Decided On: 04.09.2018

 Yashwant  Vs.  The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.V. Ramana and Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, JJ.

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SHORT NOTES ON MURDER,CULPABLE HOMICIDE AND SUICIDE

The first offence against human life is culpable homicide. The word 'Homicide' comes from latin word 'homa' means man and 'cide' means cut. Killing of a human being by another human being is homicide.

Kinds if homicide- Homicide is either lawful or unlawful. Lawful homicide includes cases falling under the general exceptions that is S 76 to S 106.

Read important judgments on Murder.
Click here

S 299 of IPC defines culpable homicide as,Whoever causes death,

1. with intention of causing death,
2. with intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
3. With knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death.
   Explanation to S 299 of IPC.
   

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When culpable homicide will not amount to Murder?

The weapon used in the fight between the parties is ‘Kirpan’ which is used by ‘Amritdhari Sikhs’ as a spiritual tool. In the present case, the Kirpan used by the appellant-accused was a small Kirpan. In order to find out whether the instrument or manner of retaliation was cruel and dangerous in its nature, it is clear from the deposition of the Doctor who conducted autopsy on the body of the deceased that stab wounds were present on the right side of the chest and of the back of abdomen which implies that in the spur of the moment, the appellant-accused inflicted injuries using Kirpan though not on the vital organs of the body of the deceased but he stabbed the deceased which proved fatal. The injury intended by the accused and actually inflicted by him is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or not, must be determined in each case on the basis of the facts and circumstances. In the instant case, the injuries caused were the result of blow with a small Kirpan and it cannot be presumed that the accused had intended to cause the inflicted injuries. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. It is clear from the materials on record that the incident was in a sudden fight and we are of the opinion that the appellant-accused had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this Exception provided he has not acted cruelly.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

(Before A.K. Sikri and R.K. Agrawal, JJ.)

Surain Singh .

v.

The State of Punjab .

Criminal Appeal No. 2284 of 2009

Decided on April 10, 2017

Citation: 2017 SCC ONLINE SC364

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When accused can be held guilty for culpable homicide not amounting to murder?

 From the above narration, it is crystal clear that the appellant had committed two acts. The first act was manhandling the deceased by giving a slap.  Immediately, she fell down and became motionless, but, still she was alive. The second act was that believing that she had already died, he poured kerosene and set fire to her. The death was only due to the burn injuries. Whether from these two acts of the appellant, can it be concluded that he is guilty of murder or at least guilty of culpable homicide?

13. In English law, every offence is defined based only on general principles of the common law whereas, fortunately, in India, every offence is defined, both as to what must be done and with what intention it must be done, by the section of the penal code which creates it a crime. Section 299 of IPC defines culpable homicide.  The opening words of Section 299 of IPC need to be kept strongly in mind. Section 299 reads as follows:-

"299. Culpable homicide. Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide."

14. The death undoubtedly should have been caused by a human being as defined in Section 46 of IPC. Similarly, the act of causing death need not necessarily be by a single act and it may be by a series of acts which, as defined in Section 33 of IPC, may constitute a single act. It is not every such act / acts causing death that makes the act of the accused as an offence of culpable homicide. For a homicide being culpable, it should be further proved that the act of the accused was done with the intention of causing death; or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death. These three are the species of mens rea in culpable homicide.  Unless it is proved that the act of the accused would fall under any one of these three ingredients, it would not amount to an offence of culpable homicide. With this broad understanding of the definition of culpable homicide, let us again proceed further to analyze the facts of the present case.

15. As we have already concluded , the appellant had committed two acts. One was slapping the deceased and making her motionless/unconscious and the second was pouring kerosene and setting fire to her. Whether two or more acts of an accused would constitute a single act or not depends upon the fact whether there was continuity of action.  As defined in Section 33 of IPC, a series of acts may constitute a single act.  But, if more than one act are committed, not in series, it would not constitute a single act.  In the instant case, going by the evidences available on record, we are of the view that these two acts were committed in  a series and, therefore, they constitute a single act as defined in Section 33 of IPC. 

16. So far as the first act is concerned, undoubtedly, it will not fall within the ambit of Section 299 of IPC inasmuch as by the said act, the appellant did not cause the death of the deceased though he believed that he had caused death by the first act. Further, the first act of slapping was done not with either intention to cause death or intention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or with the knowledge as defined in Section 299 of IPC. 

17. Now, so far as the second act is concerned,  it was only by this act he caused the death of the deceased. At the time when he did the same, according to him, he was under the belief that the deceased  was no more. Therefore, when he committed the second act also the appellant had no intention to cause death of the deceased or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Since the appellant  was under the belief that the deceased was already  dead, it cannot be said that the appellant, had intended to cause death or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Thus, the second act of the appellant, causing the death of the deceased by pouring kerosene and setting fire to the deceased also,  would not fall within the first or second limb of Section 299 of IPC at all.  

18. Now, turning to the third limb of Section 299 of IPC, it speaks of knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death.  Here again, it can be argued that since the appellant was under the belief that the deceased was no more, knowledge on his part that by his act he was likely to cause death cannot be imputed. But, such argument cannot be countenanced for, such belief can not be farcical or illogical. It should be examined whether the belief of the accused  in this case, that the deceased was no more was based on logic and on good faith. If the belief of the appellant that the deceased was already dead is based on due care and attention, then, the knowledge as dealt with in the third limb of section 299 of IPC cannot be imputed to him. But, if the belief that the deceased was dead was not based on due care and attention and such belief was recklessly held, then, certainly, knowledge as defined in Section 299 of IPC can be imputed to the accused. In other words, the belief of the appellant that the deceased was dead must be out of good faith.  The term Good faith is defined in Section 32 of IPC which reads as follows:-

52. Good faith . Nothing is said to be done or believed in good faith which is done or believed without due care and attention.  

19. In the instant case,  the appellant, without taking due care and attention, that is, without fully ascertaining whether the deceased was already dead or not, in haste, had poured kerosene and set fire to the deceased. There was total lack of due care and attention on the part of the appellant.  Thus, the belief of the appellant that the deceased was already dead was not based on due care and attention and so, he cannot escape by taking recourse to the plea of good faith as defined in Section 52 of IPC. In such view of the matter, we have to hold that the second act of the appellant in the instant case would squarely fall within the third limb of section 299 of IPC. 

THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED:     07.04.2016

CORAM:

 MR . JUSTICE M.JAICHANDREN

 MR. JUSTICE S.NAGAMUTHU

Criminal Appeal No.457 of 2013

Rajan Vs State Rep. by

The Inspector of Police,

Citation: 2017 CRLJ 500

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When doctor will be prosecuted for medical negligence?

It prima facie appears as per the report of CDMO,
Bolangir that only normal delivery facilities were available in the
Women’s Care Nursing Home. The deceased was diagnosed as
G3P2 in labour with ‘antepartum haemorrhage’. According to
medical science, patient of ‘antepartum haemorrhage’ should be
hospitalised in a well equipped centre with facilities for blood
transfusion, emergency caesarean section and neonatal care
unit. Being a gynaecologist, the petitioner must be aware about
nature of treatment to be provided to such patient and the
consequence likely to follow if the safeguards are not properly
taken. Even if no such facilities to deal with such patient was
available in the Nursing Home, the petitioner did not advise the
complainant to take the deceased to D.H.H., Bolangir rather 37
assured the complainant that the deceased was in normal
condition. When there was heavy vaginal watery discharge after
the petitioner inserted one tablet inside the vagina of the
deceased and she felt severe pain, the petitioner gave one saline
and injection and told the complainant that the deceased would
be alright within fifteen minutes. Thus prima facie materials are
available on record to show that the petitioner knowingly kept
the deceased in the Nursing Home with assurance to the
complainant for normal delivery even though he was aware that
it was a critical case and there are no such facilities in the
Nursing Home to deal with such case. The attempt of forceps
delivery appears to have caused rupture of her uterus, as a
result of which there was profuse bleeding and the condition of
the deceased became serious. The forceps delivery was not
appropriate in a birthing centre like the Nursing Home of the
petitioner where a caesarean section could not have been done,
if needed. It was not an unforeseen injurious occurrence which
could not be reasonably anticipated but creation of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk of harm to the deceased by a conscious
disregard for that risk. Therefore, it is prima facie apparent that
the petitioner did such a high degree of negligence while dealing
with the case of the deceased which in the facts and 
circumstances no medical professional in his ordinary senses and
prudence would have done. The hazard taken by the petitioner
was of such a nature that the rupture of the uterus and severe
bleeding and risk to the lives of the mother and the unborn baby
was most likely imminent. The petitioner prima facie appears to
have not exercised the skill with reasonable competence and did
not adopt the practice acceptable to the medical profession of
that day. As a doctor, it was the duty of the petitioner to explain
the deceased or at least the complainant, chances of success and
the risk of failure of the suggested treatment and inform them
about the foreseeable risks and possible negative effects of the
treatment keeping in mind the patient's specific condition. The
independent and competent medical opinion given by the team
of doctors, the statements of the witnesses and the other
surrounding circumstances raise accusing fingers at the
petitioner which is not at all healthy sign for medical profession.
In order to attract the ingredients of offence under
section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code, there must be
commission of culpable homicide not amounting to murder i.e.
the death of the person must have been caused, such death
must have been caused by the act of the accused by causing
bodily injury and there must be knowledge on the part of the 39
accused, but without any intention that the bodily injury is such
that it is likely to cause death. To constitute the offence of
‘culpable homicide’ as defined in section 299 of the Indian Penal
Code, the death must be caused by doing an act: (a) with the
intention of causing death, or (b) with the intention of causing
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or (c) with the
knowledge that the doer is likely by such act to cause death.
Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code on the other
hand carves out a specific offence where death is caused by
doing a rash or negligent act and that act does not amount to
culpable homicide under section 299 Indian Penal Code or
murder under section 300 Indian Penal Code. Where the
intention to kill a person or knowledge that doing of an act was
likely to cause a person's death are there, section 304-A of the
Indian Penal Code has to make room for the graver and more
serious charge of culpable homicide. Negligence and rashness
are essential elements under section 304-A of the Indian Penal
Code. In other words, the applicability of section 304-A of the
Indian Penal Code is limited to rash or negligent acts which
cause death but fall short of culpable homicide amounting to
murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder.40
In case of Alister Anthony Pareira -Vrs.- State of
Maharashtra reported in (2012) 2 Supreme Court Cases
648, it is held as follows:-
“47. Each case obviously has to be decided on its
own facts. In a case where negligence or
rashness is the cause of death and nothing
more, Section 304-A may be attracted but
where the rash or negligent act is preceded with
the knowledge that such act is likely to cause
death, Section 304 Part II IPC may be attracted
and if such a rash and negligent act is preceded
by real intention on the part of the wrongdoer to
cause death, offence may be punishable under
Section 302 IPC.”
14. Thus, looking to the matter from all angles, I have no
doubt in my mind that knowledge cannot be attributed to
petitioner that his act might cause such bodily injuries which
may, in ordinary course of nature, be sufficient to cause death
Thus, in my opinion, there are no prima facie materials for
commission of an offence under section 304 Part II of the Indian
Penal Code. However, there are sufficient materials to proceed
against the petitioner under section 304-A of the Indian Penal
Code as due to his rash or negligent acts, death of the deceased
was caused which falls short of culpable homicide not amounting
to murder.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK
CRIMINAL REVISION NO. 758 of 2013

 Dr. Subas Chandra Dash 
 V
State of Orissa 

 P R E S E N T:

 THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.K. SAHOO
 Date of Judgment: 27.02.2017

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