Under which circumstances the court must give interim injunction against defamation publication?

 Under the Law of Defamation, the test of defamatory nature

of a statement is its tendency to insight an adverse opinion on

feeling of other persons towards the Plaintiff. The words must

result in the Plaintiff to be looked upon with the feeling of hatred, contempt, ridicule, dislike or to convey an imputation to him or disparaging him or his office, profession, calling, trade or

business. {Para 19}

In India, like most other common law countries the burden

is proof is on the Defendant to show that the statement is true or

the publication was not intentional.

In S. Puttaswamy vs. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1, a 9 Judge Bench of the Highest Court has authoritatively held that right of privacy is a fundamental right and the only permitted exception is where, there is counter veiling public interest, which in particular

circumstances is strong enough to outweigh it.

20] What the Defendant No.1 is attempting, is investigative

journalism, which is definitely not in the interest of general public

at large, as a Journalist, though he may be duty bound to appraise

the public, of the facts and data which is in their interest, it

definitely cannot be attempted at the cost of defaming the

Plaintiff. The freedom of press, which is being evolved as a species of speech, definitely will have to be balanced against a right, which an individual has to his reputation. Justification by truth is a well accepted defence, which is available to answer the action, as truth of defamatory words, is accepted as defence to an action of libel or slander, though not in a criminal trial. However, what is important is, that the Defendant must make clear, the particulars of justification and the the case which he is seeking to set up and justify.

21] In the present case, Mr. Waahiid Khan has not offered a

single justification of truth, but what is asserted by him, is the

right to give his audience an objective and fair view.

A reference is made to an interview with accused No.13

Amit Majethia, but in any case, such disclosure is merely hearsay.

In fact, in the reply filed,what is disclosed is the FIR

registered with Matunga Police Station, where the Plaintiff is one

of the accused and reference is also made to revelations by Mr.

Amit Majethia to him, where he exposed the Plaintiff as gambling

tycoon of India and disclosed that the Plaintiff was in charge of the

alleged criminal activities in Dubai and his uncle was in charge of

the same in Mumbai.

22] It is highly surprising, that a responsible Journalist,

without asserting the truthfulness of the statement, from Amit

Majethia who was interviewed by him, has thought it fit to put

the revealation on public platform and in public domain

including Shawn TV, instagram account. Though a feeble attempt

is made by Defendant No.1 to assert that he had no intention to

defame or harm the reputation of the Plaintiff, but he has

accepted to bring some important facts to light, burden is upon

him to establish that the Plaintiff is associated with criminal

activities or that he is involved in any sort of hooking. Obviously,

the Defendant has not taken a reasonable precaution of

ascertaining the truth before publication of the interview, by

casting imputations which prima facie amount to defamatory

statement.

23] The question as regards grant of interim relief in form of an

injunction restraining the Defendants from publishing the

defamatory Article on the public platform, it is a trite position of

law in India, that a mere plea of justification would not be

sufficient for denial of interim relief and the Defendant No.1 apart

from it will have to show that the statements were made bonafide

and were in public interest and reasonable precaution was taken

to ascertain the truth and the statements were based on sufficient

material which could be tested for its veracity.

24] The above position of law is well settled in India and is at

variance with the principles of law in England, where in an action for defamation once a Defendant raise a plea of justification, at interim stage, the Plaintiff is not entitled for an interlocutory injunction, but the same not being the position in India, where the Court is entitled to scrutinize the material tendered by the Defendant, so as to test its veracity and to ascertain, whether the statements are made bonafide and whether they are in public interest.

Thus, in India, even at the interlocutory stage, the Court is

very much entitled to look at the material which is alleged to be

defamatory in nature.

25] As a result of position of Law which has evolved in India,

the truth of defamatory words is a complete defence to an action

of libel and slander, but a Journalist or Reporter is not expected to transgress the limits of his right of speech and expression and

cannot claim protection by simply stating that the information,

was provided to him by someone and it is in public interest to

divulge the same, on the pretext that duty lies in giving out that

information to the public.

Investigative Journalism definitely does not enjoy any

special protection and the umbrage of public interest definitely do not permit a publication, which would amount to lowering down the reputation of any person , in any manner particularly without justifying the publication on the basis of its truthfulness. Just because, the Defendant No.1 is interested in ascertaining the

truth or is interested in going to roots of the complaint that is

filed, resulting into an FIR, do not necessarily mean that the

publication is in public interest and particularly when the

complaint is under investigation.

26] A write up which contain imputations and insinuations

against the character of the Plaintiff, particularly when they are

baseless and reckless, as in response to the Interim Application,

except stating that it is based on the First Information Report

and an interview of some third person, no justification is offered,

by the First Defendant.

A publication by a Journalist who claim to have exposed

many scams definitely do not authorize him to publish a column/

article, which may result into hatred, ridicule or contempt of the

Plaintiff and he may not escape the consequences, merely on the

pretext that it is in public interest.

If a CR is registered on a complaint and it is under

investigation, the Defendant No.1 has offered no justification for

running a story, which according to the Plaintiff tends to lower

his image in the public.

29] The position in India, being evolved to the effect that it is

open for the Court to pass a restraint order, but it shall be passed

with great caution and the Plaintiff must prove that the words

complained of, are untrue and any subsequent publication would

be malafide. The case of the Plaintiff falls within these four corners, as the defence of truth if permitted to be availed at the stage of trial, which in this country will be long wait, would have the desired effect of maligning the image of the Plaintiff and without any sufficient cause/justification being offered by any supporting material.

30] For the above reasons, I am convinced to grant the reliefs

in the Interim Application

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO.399 OF 2024

IN  SUIT (L) NO.398 OF 2024

Khanjan Jagadishkumar Thakkar Vs Waahiid Ali Khan & Ors. 

CORAM : BHARATI DANGRE, J

DATE : 2nd April, 2024.

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Bombay High Court Allows 2010 Acid Attack Victims To Seek Compensation Despite Lapse Of Limitation Period

The learned counsel for the petitioners fairly submits that insofar as prayer clauses (c) and (c-i) of the writ petition are concerned, the same stand answered by virtue of the aforesaid Scheme of 2022. He submits that the petitioners desire to seek benefit under the said Scheme. However, under Clause 16 thereof, a period of limitation has been prescribed and the claim is required to be made within a period of three years from the date of occurrence of the offence or conclusion of the trial. He submits that in the present case, the incident in question occurred on 4th October 2010 while the trial concluded in the year 2015. He, therefore, submits that the claims sought to be raised by the petitioners be directed to be entertained without being treated as being barred by limitation. {Para 5}

6. We find that under the Proviso to Clause 16, the delay beyond a period of three years can be condoned in deserving cases. We find the present case to be a deserving one for the reason that after being subjected to an acid attack, the petitioners were required to approach this Court in the matter of grant of compensation. During pendency of this writ petition, the Scheme of 2022 came to be implemented. We therefore find that the petitioners can be permitted to move an application seeking compensation in accordance with the Scheme of 2022.

7. Accordingly, it is directed that if the petitioners seek compensation under the Scheme of 2022 by making an appropriate application within a period of four weeks from today, the application shall be considered on its own merits and in accordance with law. Keeping all grounds for seeking compensation as raised in the writ petition open, it is disposed of in aforesaid terms.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO.962 OF 2016

ALONG WITH

INTERIM APPLICATION NO.2022 OF 2020

 Petitioners/  Applicants  Vs 1. State of Maharashtra, 

CORAM : A.S. CHANDURKAR & JITENDRA JAIN, JJ

DATE : 3RD APRIL, 2024.

ORAL JUDGMENT : ( Per A.S. Chandurkar, J. )

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Bombay HC: FIR Won't Stand Quashed If Revision Court Sets Aside Magistrate's Order For Police Investigation Into Cognizable Offence

To equip the revisional court to exercise the discretion in a correct manner, it may be advantageous for the revisional court to ascertain whether, pursuant to the direction of the Magistrate, FIR has, in fact, been registered. Two situations are conceivable : pre and post-registration of FIR pursuant to the order by the Magistrate. {Para 125}

126. (a) If the FIR is yet not registered, an interim order passed by the revisional court, staying effect and operation of the impugned order Under Section 156(3), will have full play and the investigating agency cannot proceed to register the FIR and enter into investigation lest the order passed by the revisional court would be denuded of the meaning and content.

(b) Such an interim order before the registration of the FIR will operate with full force and vigor, irrespective of the nature of the infirmity in the impugned order which weighed with the revisional court to stay such an order.

(c) On the other hand, if the FIR has already been registered, before the revisional court passes an interim order, then the nature of the infirmity in the impugned order may become relevant.

(d) If the revisional court finds that the impugned order suffers from jurisdictional error, (of the nature referred to in Para Nos. 119, 120 and 122 above), in our considered view, the revisional court must be construed to have the power to stay further proceedings pursuant to the registration of the FIR if the matter is still at the stage of investigation.

(e) We hasten to add that while passing such an order of stay of the proceedings at the stage of investigation, the revisional Court ought to record reasons which weighed with the court to hold that there appears a jurisdictional error in passing an order Under Section 156(3) of the Code and thereupon, in terms, direct that the further proceedings be stayed.

(f) However, where the investigation culminates into lodging of the chargesheet and/or cognizance has been taken by the jurisdictional court, the interim order or final order passed by the revisional court setting aside the order passed by the Magistrate Under Section 156(3), will not have the effect of quashing the resultant prosecution.

127. We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the submission of Mr. Desai that the view that after FIR is registered revision is not an efficacious remedy, would render the statutory remedy of revision redundant. The order passed by the revisional Court setting aside a direction for investigation, even after registration of the FIR, cannot be said to be bereft of any utility. If such an order is passed before the completion of investigation, the investigating agency may take the same into account in determining the course the investigation shall culminate into. If such an order is passed, post lodging of the chargesheet, the jurisdictional Magistrate may have the benefit of the said order at the stage of taking cognizance or during the course of the inquiry, as envisaged by the Code. The High Court may also have due regard to the order of the revisional Court while considering the prayer for quashing the FIR and/or prosecution in exercise of writ or inherent jurisdiction.

128. The conspectus of aforesaid discussion is that in our view, the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Kailash Dattatraya Jadhav (supra), that in a case where on the basis of an order Under Sub-section (3) of Section 156 of the Code, FIR is registered, the remedy of revision under the Code, is not an efficacious remedy, lays down the correct position in law.

[O] ANSWERS

129. We are, therefore, inclined to answer question (i) in the negative. As regards question (ii), in our view, the revisional Court can interfere with an order Under Section 156(3) at the stage and to the extent indicated in paragraph 126 above. The Reference is answered accordingly.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition Nos. 2517 of 2022, 

Decided On: 10.04.2024

Arun P. Gidh and Ors. Vs. Chandraprakash Singh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Revati Mohite Dere, N.J. Jamadar and Sharmila U. Deshmukh, JJ.

Author: N.J. Jamadar, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/2292/2024.

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Whether prosecution must prove that nobody had knowledge about the existence of dead body before information given by accused for proof of discovery statement U/S 27 of Evidence Act?

As such, for bringing the case under Section 27 of the

Evidence Act, it will be necessary for the prosecution to

establish that, based on the information given by the accused

while in police custody, it had led to the discovery of the fact,

which was distinctly within the knowledge of the maker of the

said statement. It is only so much of the information as

relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered would be

admissible. It has been held that the rationale behind this

provision is that, if a fact is actually discovered in consequence

of the information supplied, it affords some guarantee that the

information is true and it can therefore be safely allowed to be

admitted in evidence as an incriminating factor against the

accused. {Para 13}

14. We will have to therefore examine as to whether the

prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the

recovery of the dead body was on the basis of the information

given by the accused persons in the statement recorded under

Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The prosecution will have to

establish that, before the information given by the accused

persons on the basis of which the dead body was recovered,

nobody had the knowledge about the existence of the dead

body at the place from where it was recovered.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3869 OF 2023

RAVISHANKAR TANDON  Vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

Author: B.R. GAVAI, J.

Citation:  2024 INSC 299.

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