Sunday, 30 August 2026

Nation Builders, Not Non-Earning Members: What ₹30,000 a Month Tells Us About India’s Invisible GDP Gap


Submitted by 

Shivang Goyal

BBALLB 

Christ (deemed to be University)

https://drive.google.com/file/d/15kf_qwQbpe-ZIAhkHZkeYe2i__lzKnuM/view?usp=sharing

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Breaking the Glass Ceiling: Barriers to Women in Leadership


Submitted by :

Prisha Khanna 

BBA LLB

CHRIST(DEEMED TO BE UNIVERSITY), DELHI NCR CAMPUS 

 https://drive.google.com/file/d/1R9YrJyi-8AzQYb7j9rKZtXo0POFEv8XB/view?usp=sharing

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Beyond the Numbers: Moving from Gender Representation to True Inclusion


 Submitted by By Aditya Kumar  •  Student of Law, School of Law, Christ (Deemed to be University), Delhi NCR

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jb_Mn6msxMzaT0by9XJDtXL7f2Wnea3l/view?usp=sharing


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Supreme Court: The benefit of discrepancy between medical evidence and the inquest report should be given to accused

 On this basis the learned trial Judge held that the bruise marks on scapular region and waist of the dead body noted in the Inquest Panchnama by the Investigating Police Officer,“were nothing but the marks of post-mortem stainings”. This view of the evidence taken by the trial court could not be said to be palpably wrong. Nor was the High Court fair enough to the medical officer, Dr Sati Punjabi, inasmuch as it held that she had failed to note some contusion marks mentioned in the Inquest Panchnama, through sheer‘inadvertence or by design’. The Police Officer who prepared the Inquest Panchnama was not an expert in medical jurisprudence. The possibility of his having mistaken the postmortem staining marks on the waist and shoulder of the deceased, for ante-mortem bruises, could not be ruled out. In any case, in such a situation, as a matter of judicial caution, the benefit of this discrepancy between medical evidence and the inquest report, on this point in issue, ought to have been given to the appellants.  {Para 4}

 In the court of Supreme court of India

Maula Bux And Others v. State Of Rajasthan .

Dated: Feb 15, 1980

CASE NO.Criminal Appeal No. 345 of 1974.

Bench: Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, Justice R.S. Sarkaria

 Citations:1983 SCC 1 379 . 1983 SCC CRI 199 .

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Supreme Court: Rough notes prepared at the time of occurrence of incident is primary evidence, in its absence fair report can not be given importance

A noticeable feature in the case is that the report Exhibit P. A. is said to have been prepared on the basis of the "rough notes" prepared by P.W. 1 but the "rough notes" is not forthcoming and has not been marked in evidence and it is said to have been destroyed. Since the "rough notes" constitute the first recorded entry of the speech it is an important document and in the absence of it the fair report cannot be given unreserved acceptance. {Para 14}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 222 of 1986

Decided On: 20.01.1987

Balbir Singh Vs. State of Haryana

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.P. Sen and S. Natarajan, JJ.

S. Natarajan, J.

Citation: 1987 SCC (Cri) 193,AIR 1987 SUPREME COURT 1053

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Bombay HC: Prosecution must examine the witnesses, who have no concern with the C.A. report and muddemal property if C.A. report and muddemal property is not received

  It is really surprising that since 2020, the prosecution could not secure the muddemal and C.A. report and seeking the time to open the trial. It also appears wrong practice to discharge the lawyer defending the accused at eleventh hour. The lawyer should intimate the Court well in advance about withdrawing the powers. The accused appears to have been unnecessarily languishing in jail. The Trial Court is directed to call for the Chemical Analysis report within a given time. The prosecution has to examine the witnesses, who have no concern with the C.A. report and muddemal property. So, at least there shall be some progress. Learned Principal District Judge, Aurangabad to take care of and examine such witnesses, having no concern with C.A. report and muddemal. {Para 2}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH

AT AURANGABAD

908 BAIL APPLICATION NO.1671 OF 2022

VEDPRAKASH RAMNATH THAKUR Vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

CORAM : S. G. MEHARE, J.

DATE : 28.06.2023

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Supreme Court: If prosecution case is that deceased has died by strangulation, it must prove beyond reasonable doubt that deceased has died as a result of strangulation and strangulation alone

 We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made by advocate Mr. Talekar, appearing for the accused. The Doctor (PW.4) was cross examined at length on technical aspects regarding difference between signs of strangulation and hanging. We have reproduced some important portions of his admissions. But after taking over all view of the evidence of Doctor we are of the opinion that the defence has succeeded in creating doubt about the case of the prosecution that Seema died as a result of strangulation. It is basic principle of criminal law that it is for the prosecution to prove a case against accused beyond reasonable doubt and, if it is a case of murder, then the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that Seema died as a result of strangulation and strangulation alone. This test in criminal law is not satisfied by the prosecution. In any case the defence has succeeded in creating doubt about this story of strangulation particularly when the case is entirely based on circumstantial evidence, absence of motive and nobody seeing the accused in the house when Seema died on that night. {Para18}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Appeal No. 276 of 2001

Decided On: 12.07.2006

Surendra Gyanchand Chawla Vs. The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

D.G. Deshpande and V.M. Kanade, JJ.

Author: D.G. Deshpande, J.

 Citation: 2006 All M R (Cri.)2262, 

2006CRILJ3694, MANU/MH/0387/2006

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Supreme Court: Material omissions amounting to contradiction and material improvement in the evidence of prosecution witness, the court should disbelieve prosecution evidence

14. Material Contradictions:


While appreciating the evidence, the court has to take into consideration whether the contradictions/omissions had been of such magnitude that they may materially affect the trial. Minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters without effecting the core of the prosecution case should not be made a ground to reject the evidence in its entirety. The Trial Court, after going through the entire evidence, must form an opinion about the credibility of the witnesses and the appellate Court in normal course would not be justified in reviewing the same again without justifiable reasons. (Vide: State Represented by Inspector of Police v. Saravanan and Anr.   MANU/SC/8113/2008 : AIR 2009 SC 152).

15. Where the omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt about the truthfulness of a witness and other witness also make material improvements before the court in order to make the evidence acceptable, it cannot be safe to rely upon such evidence. (Vide: State of Rajasthan v. Rajendra Singh   MANU/SC/0446/1998 : (2009) 11 SCC 106).


16. The discrepancies in the evidence of eye-witnesses, if found to be not minor in nature, may be a ground for disbelieving and discrediting their evidence. In such circumstances, witnesses may not inspire confidence and if their evidence is found to be in conflict and contradiction with other evidence or with the statement already recorded, in such a case it cannot be held that prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. (Vide: Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh   MANU/SC/0279/2009 : (2009) 11 SCC 334).

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 891 of 2004

Decided On: 11.11.2010

Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P. Sathasivam and B.S. Chauhan, JJ.

Author: B.S. Chauhan, J.

Citation: 2011 All M R (Cri.) 288 (SC),2010 INSC 770, MANU/SC/0947/2010.

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Bombay HC: How to appreciate evidence in case of abetment of suicide of wife if evidence shows that everything was going on smoothly in her matrimonial home?

The evidence of complainant (PW 2) and other witnesses show that Mangalabai died within one and half months of the marriage. Out of this period, she lived in the house of her parents for more than 20 days. The evidence of complainant shows that even during the Mango season, she stayed with her parents for 10-15 days continuously. She was sent back to parents house as per custom on every occasion and the accused persons never prevented her from going to the house of her parents. All the customary rites and functions were arranged by the accused and also by the family of the complainant. The husband never avoided to visit the house of his in-laws. The message about the incident was given by the family of the accused to complainant immediately. They also approached police after the incident. It appears that in the early hours of 24.6.1992, they noticed that Mangalabai was dead. She had probably consumed poison on the night between 23rd and 24th. No neighbour of the accused is examined and all the witnesses examined are interested witnesses. These circumstances need to be kept in mind at the time of appreciation of evidence given by the complainant and his relatives. {Para 9}


10. The defence has not disputed that Mangalabai died due to consumption of insecticide. There is evidence of doctor and there is C.A. report to show that death took place due to insecticide. The evidence on record shows that accused persons do not own agricultural land and they are working as barber, having their hair cutting shop in the village. The evidence of complainant during cross examination and also the mention in the complaint show that accused No. 4 was living in Sillod due to his service. Thus, on the day of incident accused No. 4 was not there, but he was also involved in the case. No investigation was made by police to find out as to how and from where the deceased procured the insecticide, when accused are not agriculturists. These circumstances also need to be kept in mind at the time of appreciation of evidence of witnesses. Suggestions are given by the defence to prosecution witnesses that Mangalabai had no intention to cohabit with the accused for some reason and due to that she committed suicide. Though these suggestions are denied, the fact remains that for most of the period after the marriage Mangalabai was staying with her parents.


11. It was arranged marriage. The evidence of complainant and other witnesses show that the accused had seen the deceased atleast twice and the husband had approved her for marriage. It is not the case of complainant that at the time of settlement of marriage, something was demanded by giving excuse that Mangalabai was black in complexion or her tooth were not properly arranged and she was looking ugly. As it was arranged marriage and Mangalabai was approved by Ganesh, it does not look probable that immediately after the marriage, accused Ganesh started saying that she was not liking Mangalabai. On the contrary, Ganesh took her to religious places after the marriage and all the ceremonies were performed and attended by Ganesh. It is not version of complainant that Ganesh had directly expressed to him that he was not liking Mangalabai. 

12. In any case, the story given by the interested witnesses do not appear to be probable in nature. Accused No. 3 was already having a colour T.V. set in his house. As it was settled marriage and accused No. 3 had approved the deceased for marriage, it does not look probable that such demand was made subsequent to marriage. If the complainant and his family had really promised to meet the demand at Diwali festival, there was no reason for the accused to give ill-treatment to the deceased. In any case, the stay of the deceased in the house of the accused was so short that there was no possibility of giving ill-treatment to the deceased as defined under section 498-A of I.P.C. It is already discussed that investigation was not made to find out as to how the deceased procured the bottle of insecticide. The evidence of Police Officer shows that after registration of A.D., some statements were recorded. Those statements were not brought before the Court. The neighbours of the accused are not examined. It appears that the trial Court had given much emphasis on so called conduct. The death took place in the night time and probably insecticide was consumed in the night time by deceased. Thus, there was no opportunity for the accused to know about the consumption of the insecticide. In view of all the circumstances, the appellate Court has acquitted the respondents. This Court sees no reason to interfere in the decision given by the first appellate Court. 

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Appeal No. 469 of 2000

Decided On: 28.01.2013

The State of Maharashtra Vs. Ramrao and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

T.V. Nalawade, J.

Citation: 2013 ALL M R (Cri) 3454,MANU/MH/1858/2013.

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Supreme Court: Whether the court should held that deceased wife committed suicide due to ill treatment on account of demand of dowry if no dowry was demanded at the time of marriage?

The High Court after reappreciating the evidence confirmed those findings. The High Court has held that the whole story regarding demand of dowry was unnatural and improbable in view of the fact that Rajeeva was married to respondent No. 1 at the instance of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and that before or at the time of marriage they had not demanded any dowry and that they also knew that financial condition of the father of Rajeeva was not such that he could have given a scooter, a fridge, an almirah, a water filter and cash of Rs. 2000/-. {Para 5}


6. On going through the judgments of both the courts and the evidence, we find that the reasons given by the two courts for not placing reliance upon the aforesaid two witnesses are not at all improper. PW 1-father of Rajeeva, happened to be a friend of respondent Nos. 2 and 3. His daughter was married to respondent No. 1 at the instance of respondent Nos. 2 and 3. It was also not disputed that while fixing the marriage, no demand for dowry was made. In view of these facts and circumstances, it is not believable that within seven days of the marriage, they would have started demanding such articles. Even in the letter, Ex. P.4 produced by the friend of Rajeeva - PW 5, there is no mention of demand of dowry or ill-treatment, by any of respondents. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 136/94

Decided On: 08.01.1998

Meka Ramaswamy Vs. Dasari Mohan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.T. Nanavati and S.S.M. Quadri, JJ.

Judgement Pronounced by G.T. Nanavati, J.-

Citations: AIR 1998 SUPREME COURT 774,1998 (1) Supreme (Cr.) 156/1998 ALL M R (Cri) 419 MANU/SC/0042/1998.
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Supreme Court: How to appreciate evidence of demand of dowry if there is evidence that family of accused was more prosperous than family of deceased wife?

 In the instant case, there is no doubt that there is evidence to suggest that the deceased was subjected to harassment and cruelty by the Appellant and his family members in connection with demand of dowry. The evidence of PWs. 4, 5 and 6 do support the case of the prosecution in this regard. It is, however, contended on behalf of the Appellant that though these witnesses have made such allegations, the allegations are not true. In the first instance, it was submitted that the family of the Appellant is relatively more prosperous than the family of the deceased. There is no allegation that any dowry was demanded at the time of marriage. The defence evidence also proves that the marriage ceremony was a simple ceremony where only the chunni ceremony was performed with only 11 or 17 persons constituting the barat. It was further contended that the family of the Appellant has considerable landed property, about 30 bighas of land and they are agriculturists. That apart the father of the Appellant was employed with the Electricity Board at Nabha. The Appellant had no reason to demand Rs. 10,000/- for supporting a shop because he did not intend to start any such shop nor was there any necessity to do so. So far as demand of a fridge is concerned, only three weeks before the occurrence they had purchased a new fridge and therefore, the allegation regarding demand of articles and Rs. 10,000/- appear to be false. Even before the marriage, the Appellant had in his house a black and white T.V. and therefore, there was really no need for the Appellant to demand a T.V. In any event, in these circumstances, it does not appear probable that for such petty things the Appellant would commit the murder of the deceased. The Learned Counsel therefore, argued that the prosecution evidence regarding demand of dowry must be rejected outright. There is no evidence to establish that such a complaint was ever made to anyone before the occurrence, nor had the parents of the deceased convened any panchayat making such a grievance, particularly in the background of the fact that the family of the Appellant had twice convened panchayat and had even taken the panchayat members to the village of the deceased to complain about her conduct. It was, therefore, submitted that Section 304B was not attracted to the facts of this case. It may be that the deceased committed suicide after she had a serious quarrel with her husband for her having stayed for the night at the house of Balwant Rai with whom the husband suspected her illicit relationship. {Para 10}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 880 of 2005

Decided On: 07.11.2006

Sanjiv Kumar Vs. State of Punjab

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.P. Singh and Tarun Chatterjee, JJ.

Author: B.P. Singh, J.

Citation: 2010 (3) SCC (Cri) 330,MANU/SC/8928/2006

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Bombay HC: Whether the court can draw presumption U/S 113A of evidence Act, if there is no complaint of ill-treatment after resumption of co-habitation?

 It is the submission of learned senior counsel for the appellant that after resumption of co-habitation till unfortunate incident of drowning, there is no evidence to show that during this period of 3 months the deceased was subjected to cruelty except a bald statement of PW1 Ramchandra Bawane.


19. Though Exhibit 41 dated 10.5.1995 is available on record, which shows that on 10.3.1993 appellant Anandrao poured kerosene on deceased Sangeeta. According to the prosecution, it is under the signature of deceased Sangeeta. The said report was addressed to the Kothari Police Station. However, record shows that actually the report was not lodged with the Kothari Police Station. Said report Exhibit 41 is coming on record during the course of investigation by PW7 Subhash Shinde. His evidence shows that during inquiry, PW1 first informant Ramchandra handed over copy of Exhibit 41 to him. Learned Judge of the Court below, in my view, has rightly discarded the said document since PW1 first informant Ramchandra is totally silent about said report in his FIR lodged against the appellant. and also evidence of PW1 Ramchandra does not have any reference about same.


20. PW1 first informant Ramchandra has admitted that no report was lodged with the police after resumption of co-habitation. Non-filing of report after resumption of cohabitation has its own importance. Exhibit 35 is not only signed by appellant Anandrao, deceased Sangeeta, and pancha witnesses but signed by PW1 first informant Ramchandra also. Exhibit 35 was required to be executed because according to the prosecution, deceased Sangeeta was subjected to cruelty and only on execution of Exhibit 35 deceased was allowed to have co-habitation with appellant Anandrao.


Had there was any ill-treatment after execution of Exhibit 35 and prior to incident of drowning, it would have been a natural reaction on the part of PW1 Ramchandra to report the matter to the police or at least to Panchayat before whom Exhibit 35 was executed to point out them that in spite of execution of Exhibit 35, still appellant Anandrao is persistent in committing ill-treatment to deceased Sangeeta. Nothing such has happened. In my view, therefore, importance cannot be attached to bald statement made during the course of recording of evidence of PW1 first informant Ramchandra that after execution of Exhibit 35 ill-treatment continued. Therefore, I reject the evidence of PW1 first informant Ramchandra that there used to be ill-treatment even after execution of document Exhibit 35.


21. It is the obligation on the part of the prosecution to prove that deceased Sangeeta was subjected to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. On such proof only, the prosecution can press into service statutory presumption as available to it under Section 113A of the Evidence Act. In absence of proof of cruelty, merely because deceased Sangeeta met with an unnatural death within a span of 2 years of her marriage, ipso facto the prosecution cannot take recourse to Section 113A of the Evidence Act. Re-appreciation of the prosecution evidences shows that there was no ill-treatment after resumption of co-habitation after execution of document Exhibit 35 till the date of unfortunate incident on 20.5.1995. 

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Criminal Appeal No. 278 of 2001

Decided On: 11.07.2017

Anandrao Vs. The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.M. Deshpande, J.

Citation: 2017 ALL M R (Cri) 3436,MANU/MH/1454/2017.
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Bombay HC: Non disclosure of ill treatment to wife by her family members to independent witness prior to her death whether fatal U/S 306 of IPC?

It may be seen that there is no independent witness, to whom any of the family members of the victim had ever reported before her death that, the victim was subjected to ill-treatment. All the allegations about ill-treatment came after the unfortunate incident. Though the witnesses are parents and siblings of the victim, they speak in different voices. There is no unanimity amongst them as to what was the cause of the victim's ill-treatment and how it was meted out. It, therefore, seems that the entire story about ill-treatment is afterthought. The victim did not have any issue. {Para 13}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Appeal No. 361 of 1996

Decided On: 13.01.2006

Pandurang Vs. State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.C. Chavan, J.

Citation: 2006 ALL M R (Cri) 975, MANU/MH/0859/2006.
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Supreme Court: Whether false explanation or non-explanation by accused U/S 313 of CRPC can be used to complete the chain of circumstantial evidence?

 Another circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is, that the Appellant failed to give any explanation in his statement Under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure.

By now it is well-settled principle of law, that false explanation or non-explanation can only be used as an additional circumstance, when the prosecution has proved the chain of circumstances leading to no other conclusion than the guilt of the Accused. However, it cannot be used as a link to complete the chain.{Para 24}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1348 of 2013 +

Decided On: 02.03.2021

Shivaji Chintappa Patil Vs. State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rohinton Fali Nariman and B.R. Gavai, JJ.

Author: B.R. Gavai, J.

Citation: MANU / SC / 0136 / 2021,AIR 2021 SC 1249,( 2021 ) 5 SCC 626,[ 2021 ] 2 SCR 617

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Under which circumstances S 106 of Evidence Act will operate against either a husband or wife staying under the same roof and were last seen together?

 It will also be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of Gargi (supra):

33.1. Insofar as the "last seen theory" is concerned, there is no doubt that the Appellant being none other than the wife of the deceased and staying under the same roof, was the last person the deceased was seen with. However, such companionship of the deceased and the Appellant, by itself, does not mean that a presumption of guilt of the Appellant is to be drawn. The trial court and the High Court have proceeded on the assumption that Section 106 of the Evidence Act directly operates against the Appellant. In our view, such an approach has also not been free from error where it was omitted to be considered that Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve the prosecution of its primary burden. This Court has explained the principle in Sawal Das v. State of Bihar,   MANU/SC/0201/1974 : (1974) 4 SCC 193 in the following: (SCC p. 197, para 10)


10. Neither an application of Section 103 nor of 106 of the Evidence Act could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the Accused. {Para 21}


22. It could thus be seen, that it is well-settled that Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not directly operate against either a husband or wife staying under the same roof and being the last person seen with the deceased.


Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve the prosecution of discharging its primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof would lie upon the Accused.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1348 of 2013 +

Decided On: 02.03.2021

Shivaji Chintappa Patil Vs. State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rohinton Fali Nariman and B.R. Gavai, JJ.

Author: B.R. Gavai, J.

Citation: MANU / SC / 0136 / 2021,AIR 2021 SC 1249,( 2021 ) 5 SCC 626,[ 2021 ] 2 SCR 617

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Supreme Court: Whether onus of proof shifts on accused if victim of crime is the wife and the incident happened in the matrimonial home?

 We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties very carefully and had gone through the record. The Trial Court had gone into the evidence and observed that there was no evidence to connect the Appellant with the crime. It is true that the incident happened in the matrimonial home and some presumption regarding the special knowledge etc. could be raised in such a situation. But the basic onus on the prosecution is to prove its case and the on us does not change merely because the victim is the wife and the accused the husband and the incident happened in the matrimonial home. {Para 6}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 389 of 2004

Decided On: 29.03.2011

Ranjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

H.S. Bedi and C.K. Prasad, JJ.

Citation: 2011 INSC 230, MANU/SC/0495/2011,(2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 595

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Supreme Court: How to appreciate evidence if prosecution has taken far off resident as panch to seizure panchnama?

 In fact, the recovery of the weapons on disclosure of the Appellants itself becomes doubtful. The witness of Recovery Memo P.W.1 - Mohd. Ayub Khan was declared hostile and another witness P.W.10 - Chittar admitted that signatures were obtained on the memos and annexures at the Police Station itself. It is also pertinent to mention here that P.W.1 - Mohd. Ayub Khan was residing 4 Kms. away from the place of recovery and P.W.10 - Chittar was residing 8 Kms. away from the place of recovery and were also declared hostile. Prosecution failed to establish as to why none of the local persons were called to be the witnesses. The conduct of the prosecution appears to be extremely doubtful and renders the case as concocted, to falsely implicate the Appellants. {Para 24}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1327, 1369 and 1370 of 2008

Decided On: 13.07.2011

Mustkeem Vs. State of Rajasthan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.K. Ganguly and Deepak Verma, JJ.

Author: Deepak Verma, J.

Citation: AIR 2011 SC 2769,MANU / SC / 0795 / 2011,

[ 2011 ] 9 SCR 101,( 2011 ) 11 SCC 724

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Supreme Court: Whether there must be communication to qualify for statement U/S 157 of Evidence Act?

Then comes section 157, which we have already set out above. Here also the words used are 'Statement made by'. We see no reason why the word 'statement' should not have been used in its primary meaning in this section also. There is nothing in the section which in any way requires that an element of communication to another person should be imported into the meaning of the word 'statement' used therein. It was urged that if we do not imply communication to another person in the meaning of the word 'statement' in this section, it would result in a witness corroborating himself by producing some writing made by him and kept secret and that this would be very dangerous. Now, a distinction must be made between admissibility of such a writing and the value to be attached to it. Section 157 makes previous statements even of this type admissible; but what value should be attached to a corroboration of this nature is a different matter to be decided by the court in the circumstances of each case. The witness who is sought to be corroborated is produced in the witness-box and is liable to cross-examination. The cross-examiner may show that no reliance should be placed on such an earlier statement. The danger, therefore, which the learned counsel for the appellant emphasised is really no danger at all for the witness is subject to cross-examination. The main evidence is the statement of the witness in the witness-box and a document of this nature is only used to corroborate him. If the main evidence is shaken by cross-examination, corroboration by such a document would be of no use. There is, therefore, no reason to give a different meaning to the word 'statement' in this section because of this alleged danger, which really does not exist. {Para 12}

17. It is clear, therefore, the word 'statement' used in section 157 of the Act means 'something that is stated' and the element of communication to another person is not included in it. As such the notes of attendance prepared by Santook were statements within the meaning of section 157 of Evidence Act and admissible in evidence.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 31 of 1958

Decided On: 04.11.1958

Bhogilal Chunilal Pandya Vs. The State of Bombay

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K. Subba Rao, K.N. Wanchoo and N.H. Bhagwati, JJ.

Author: K.N. Wanchoo, J.

Citation: 1959 AIR SC 356,1958 INSC 93, MANU/SC/0035/1958

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Digital Rape: Not a Cybercrime — A Crime of the Hand

The moment most people hear "digital rape," their mind jumps to hacking, deepfakes, or online abuse. That instinct is entirely wrong, and the mix-up matters because it shapes how victims are heard, how police respond, and how the public understands consent.

The word "digital" here has nothing to do with computers, phones, or the internet. It comes from the Latin word digitus, meaning finger. In plain terms, "digital rape" is medico-legal shorthand for non-consensual sexual penetration using a finger — sometimes extended to a toe or thumb. It is not a term found in any statute book. No law in India names an offence called "digital rape." It survives purely as descriptive language used by doctors, investigators, and the media to specify the manner of assault.

Where the Law Actually Places It

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Allahabad HC: Could police expect the complainant to first produce electronic or other corroborative evidence before registering an FIR?

 The Call Detail Records, location records, subscriber details and other electronic evidence, if legally obtainable and available, can be collected by the investigating agency after registration of the FIR. It was not proper for the police to treat the non-production of such material by the prosecutrix as a reason to refuse registration of the FIR. The burden of conducting a lawful investigation cannot be shifted upon the prosecutrix at the stage when she approaches the police with information disclosing cognizable offences. {Para 53}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 18961 of 2026

Decided On: 06.08.2026

Arpit Gupta Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Chandra Dhari Singh and Tarun Saxena, JJ.

Author: Chandra Dhari Singh, J.

Citation: 2026:AHC:168404-DB),MANU/UP/1934/2026
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