Supreme Court: Whether onus of proof shifts on accused if victim of crime is the wife and the incident happened in the matrimonial home?

 We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties very carefully and had gone through the record. The Trial Court had gone into the evidence and observed that there was no evidence to connect the Appellant with the crime. It is true that the incident happened in the matrimonial home and some presumption regarding the special knowledge etc. could be raised in such a situation. But the basic onus on the prosecution is to prove its case and the on us does not change merely because the victim is the wife and the accused the husband and the incident happened in the matrimonial home. {Para 6}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 389 of 2004

Decided On: 29.03.2011

Ranjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

H.S. Bedi and C.K. Prasad, JJ.

Citation: 2011 INSC 230, MANU/SC/0495/2011,(2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 595

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What is basic concept of matrimonial home and what is the difference between matrimonial home and shared-household?

In Indian law, the concepts of "matrimonial home" and "shared household" are closely related but have distinct meanings and implications.

Matrimonial Home:-

The matrimonial home is the primary residence where a married couple resides during their marriage. It is the place where they establish their marital life, raise their children, and build a shared future. The matrimonial home holds significant emotional and symbolic value, representing the foundation of their marital relationship.

While the matrimonial home is typically owned or rented by one or both spouses, the concept of matrimonial home extends beyond legal ownership. It is the place where the couple has established a joint household, irrespective of their individual property rights.

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Whether injunction application to restrain daughter-in-law from entering the marital home is maintainable?

 In the present case, the first defendant has squarely questioned the title, of the plaintiff, to the suit property, and has contended that it is joint family property. She has claimed her right, therein, not merely on the ground that it is her matrimonial home, but as the mother of a coparcener to the joint family. These disputes required to be adjudicated, in the suit, and no order, interlocutory or otherwise, can be passed on the premise that the plaintiff is right, and the first defendant is wrong.

35. In my opinion, it is not necessary to enter, deeply, into the circumstances in which mandatory, or prohibitory, injunction, can be granted at an interim stage, as these principles are well settled. The decisions, on which Ms. Rajkotia relies, and which have been cited hereinabove, clearly indicate that, essentially, a plaintiff, in order to be justified to claim an interlocutory mandatory, or prohibitory, injunction, has to establish (i) a strong case in his favour, the standard being higher than that of a prima facie case, (ii) that denial of prohibitory injunction would result in irreparable loss to her, and (iii) that the balance of convenience is decidedly in favour of grant of mandatory, or prohibitory, injunction at the interlocutory stage. Additionally, grant of mandatory or prohibitory injunction, at an interim stage, has been approved where the failure, to do so, would result in the suit becoming infructuous, or the final relief, sought therein, being rendered illusory. None of these criteria are satisfied, in the present case. Most importantly, the first defendant had been residing with the plaintiff, since 2002 (or, at the latest, 2014, even if the plaintiff's stand were to be accepted), and it was only on 10th May, 2020 the first defendant left the house of the plaintiff, to visit her mother. It cannot, therefore, be said, by any stretch of imagination, that, by allowing the defendant to return to the house, where she had been staying till 10th May, 2020, irreparable harm would ensue, to the plaintiff. Mere bald assertions, to the effect that the first defendant was harassing the plaintiff, can hardly suffice. Given the option between allowing the first defendant to return to her matrimonial home, where she had been residing since 2002, or 2014, and banishing her, at least during the pendency of the suit, therefrom, the balance of convenience is also, decidedly, in favour of the former, rather than the latter, alternative.

36. Ms. Rajkotia had sought to submit that, were injunction, as prayed by her, in this application, not granted at this stage, the suit would be rendered effectively infructuous, as it would linger on for years. The submission fails to impress. The prayer, in the suit, is for a decree of possession, in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants, in respect of the suit property, and for the decree of permanent injunction, restraining the first defendant from interfering with the peaceful possession of the suit property, by the plaintiff. In fact, the prayer, in the present application, effectively seeks grant of the prayers in the suit, before the suit is tried and at an interlocutory stage. If this Court were to restrain the first defendant, at this stage itself, from returning to the suit property, the plaintiff would secure possession thereof, and, effectively, a permanent injunction, in terms of prayer (b) in the suit, would also be granted. The plaintiff, therefore, effectively seeks decreeing of the suit without a trial.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

I.A. 4618/2020 in CS (OS) 506/2018

Decided On: 02.07.2020

Anita Chopra  Vs.  Rohini Chopra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C. Hari Shankar, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1332/2020

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Whether Wife can demand flat in redeveloped building claiming that she had vacated premises as per S 95A notice of MHADA?

Smt. Pusalkar has argued before us in-person that she was removed from her matrimonial home through the statutory mechanism contained in Section 95A of the 1976 Act, which bore the threats of penal measure and summary eviction process. But this was during the time the decree of judicial separation remained operative. She traces the root of her ‘dishousing’ to a notice dated 10th July 2000 (bearing no. MBR & RB/FN/GN/2136 of 2000) issued by the Board under the 1976 Act. Her case is that it is composite statutory obligation of MHADA, the builder and her husband to rehouse her in her matrimonial home. It is a fact that the said respondents functioned under a statutory scheme while redeveloping the property, commencing from approval of the development scheme, vacating the old building and re-entry into the allocated portion of the redeveloped premises by her husband’s family. The appellant was also dishoused from the said building under that scheme. But in our opinion, when a builder has discharged his obligation by accommodating the original owners in the redeveloped

portion as per such a scheme, a lady married into that family would not be entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court to enforce her right to matrimonial home citing the provisions of the said statute, if her husband does not permit her to reside in the allocated portion. She does not have any independent claim on title or interest to that property having its genesis in that statute. Her claim of right to reside in her matrimonial home is sought to be projected by her as collateral to the statutory right of her husband to be rehoused or rehabilitated in the new building. But her right to reside in her matrimonial home stands detached from and is independent of the statutory scheme under the said Act. Neither MHADA, nor the builder can have any further legal obligation to rehouse her. She is staking her claim as a constructive beneficiary of the redevelopment scheme. But our opinion is that the right she is seeking to enforce, though flows from a set of events on the basis of which her husband can claim rehabilitation, is actually anchored to an independent legal principle under the Family Law. We accept that she was an occupier under Section 2 (25) of the 1976 Act, but such occupier status was dependent upon her husband’s independent right as part owner of the property. Her right flowing from her matrimonial status cannot get diffused with her right of rehousing or rehabilitation under the statutory  scheme. Her right to reside in her matrimonial home does not flow from the 1976 Act.

Though she was dishoused as an occupier applying the provisions of the 1976 Act, claim of her rehousing is based on her status as wife of the respondent no. 8. In our opinion, such claim has to be adjudicated upon by the Civil Court or the Family Court or any other forum the law may prescribe. Such right of the appellant cannot be diffused with the right of her husband under the 1976 Act, whose family property, part of which he is the owner, has been reconstructed.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7231 OF 2012

AISHWARYA ATUL PUSALKAR Vs MAHARASHTRA HOUSING & AREA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY 

ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.

Dated: 27 April, 2020.

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When it is not necessary to call domestic incident Report in domestic violence case?

 It is contended on behalf of the Respondent-husband that the domestic incident report of a Protection Officer or a service provider under Section 12 of the D.V. Act has not been obtained and hence no case of domestic violence is made out. On this ground, it is argued on his behalf that no injunction

restraining him from entering upon the matrimonial home is made out and hence the impugned order of the Family Court not granting any relief in that behalf and allowing the wife as well as the husband to continue to reside in the matrimonial home does not require any interference.

8. A domestic incident report is required to be prepared by a Protection Officer under Section 9(1) (b) of the D.V. Act. This is contemplated in case of physical violence when complaint in that behalf is made or filed. The Protection Officer, in such a case, functions under Section 9(1)(a) of the D.V. Act. The injuries caused to the aggrieved person are required to be documented. Consequently, a report in that behalf would be required to be seen by the Magistrate who may be called upon to ultimately determine and consider the application after some time when it reaches hearing. At such time, no evidence of any injuries etc. may be shown to the Magistrate except under the report of the Protection Officer. Consequently, the said provision is an enabling provision. Such a report cannot be made in case of any application alleging Domestic Violence which may be other than physical violence e.g. Verbal or emotional abuse. An application made under Sections 18 and 19 of the D.V. Act may have to 

be considered based upon the facts of each case and not necessarily with the aid and assistance of any Protection Officer or Service Provider. It may be required to be considered only upon the application made to the Court by the aggrieved person herself. In such a case no domestic incident report may be filed or may be necessitated. This is one such case.

Bombay High Court

Mrs.Sabah Sami Khan vs Adnan Sami Khan on 21 October, 2010

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Whether offence of abetment to commit suicide is made out if wife commits suicide in her matrimonial home?

Budhiyarinbai (PW4) has also admitted in her cross-examination that her daughter Jamunbai used to come to the maternal house on every occasions of Tijafestival and after the festival they used to take her to her matrimonial house. She also admitted that father of her daughter used to go to the matrimonial house of their daughter and return after knowing well being of their daughter. She further admitted that they did not report about assault or beating to their daughter nor did they call any panchayat meeting in this regard. In paragraph 8, she has categorically admitted that during the period of 4 years their daughter never complained of any assault on her. In paragraph 9 also, she admitted that her daughter was coming to her maternal house happily and was returning to her matrimonial house happily. She never refused to go back to her matrimonial house.

14. From the above statements of Chintaram (PW3) and Budhiyarinbai (PW4), it is clear that their daughter/deceased used to visit at her maternal house on every occasions of Tija festival. It is also clear that father of the deceased also used to visit the matrimonial house of the deceased. From the admission of Budhiyarinbai (PW4) in paragraph 8, it is also clear that the deceased never complained of beating to her by the in-laws during the period of 4 years. From her admission, it is further clear that the deceased was happily going to her matrimonial house and she never refused to go to her matrimonial house. From the statements of both these witnesses, it is clear that there were small domestic issues between the deceased and her in-laws and she was not having any grievance against the issues.

15. Baliram (PW7), brother-in-law (Jija) of the deceased has stated that once he had gone to the matrimonial house of the deceased. At that time, the Appellants had not talked to him, therefore, he had returned therefrom. At that time, the deceased had told him that whenever any of her relatives visits there, they do not talk to the relative. She had also told him that after returning of the relative, they beat her. In paragraph 6 of his cross-examination, he has admitted that this incident took place before 2 years of the death of the deceased. He further admitted that during those 2 years, he never listened about any beating given to the deceased by her in-laws. From the above also, the prosecution case does not find support.

In the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur

(Before Arvind Singh Chandel, J.)

 Chhannu, S/o Tikaram Sahu, 

v.

State of Madhya Pradesh (now Chhattisgarh) .

Criminal Appeal No. 2537 of 1999

Decided on November 6, 2017, 

Citation:

2017 SCC OnLine Chh 1234

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Whether wife can reside in her matrimonial house even if her husband is not owner of said house?

 In this case, admittedly, till the dispute started between the
Petitioner and Respondent, both of them were very much residing in
the flat at Mulund and, therefore, as they have lived together in the
said flat as a 'couple', as a 'husband and wife', in a domestic
relationship, it becomes her 'shared household', as stated in the
definition of Section 2(s) of the D.V. Act. In such a situation,
whether the said flat belongs to or owned by the Respondenthusband,
is totally irrelevant. As stated above, Section 19(a) of the
D.V. Act makes it clear that, whether or not the Respondent has a
legal or equitable interest in the shared household, the Court can
pass a residence order, restraining the Respondent from
dispossessing, or, in any other manner, disturbing the possession of
the aggrieved person – Petitioner-wife herein. Therefore, much
emphasis laid by the Family Court on the fact that the flat at Mulund
belongs to the Respondent's father and not to the Respondent, is
totally misplaced. The question of title or proprietary right in the
property is not at all of relevance, when the provisions of the D.V.
Act; especially Section 19 thereof, are to be considered. As a matter
of fact, it needs to be emphasized that, as the wife's right to reside in
the matrimonial home was being defeated on this very ground that
the house does not belong to the husband or does not stand in his
name, this D.V. Act was brought in the Statute Book with the specific
and clear language and the unequivocal Clause that the 'title of the
husband or that of the family members to the said flat', is totally
irrelevant. It is also irrelevant whether the Respondent has a legal
or equitable interest in the shared household. The moment it is
proved that it was a shared household, as both of them had, in their
matrimonial relationship, i.e. domestic relationship, resided
together there and in this case, upto the disputes arose, it follows
that the Petitioner-wife gets right to reside therein and, therefore, to
get the order of interim injunction, restraining Respondent-husband
from dispossessing her, or, in any other manner, disturbing her
possession from the said flat.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.10696 OF 2017
Roma Rajesh Tiwari V Rajesh Dinanath Tiwari 
 CORAM : DR. SHALINI PHANSALKAR-JOSHI, J.
 DATE : 12TH OCTOBER 2017.

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Whether court can direct husband to remove himself from his own house till disposal of divorce proceeding?

The only issue to be addressed in this case is whether the order directing Appellant-husband to remove himself from the matrimonial home of which he is a co-owner warrants interference.

10. It is an undisputed fact that the property is a shared household of the parties. The Appellant-husband is working with the Taj Group of Hotels and the Respondent-wife is working as an airhostess with the British Airways. As is seen from the organisations in which they are working, both the Appellant and the Respondent are independent and having their own source of income. We have gone through the allegations of domestic violence made not only by the Respondent-wife but also in the affidavits filed by their grown up daughters wherein they have expressed their feelings in view of the dispute between their parents and also their feelings as to the conduct of their father at home. We do not propose to go into those averments in the affidavit sworn in by the daughters, lest it would prejudice either parties while contesting the main matter.

11. Section 19(1)(b) of the Protection of Women Domestic Violence Act provides that the Court may direct the Appellant-husband to remove himself from the shared household. The order passed Under Section 19 of the Act seeks to maintain continued and undisturbed residence of the aggrieved party within the shared household and in pursuance of same it directs the Respondent to execute a bond with or without surety or secure an alternate accommodation for the aggrieved party and pay the rent for the same and restrains the Respondent from or renouncing property rights or valuable security of the aggrieved party.

12. The Family Court arrived at a finding that prima facie material was available on record to accept the allegation of the Respondent-wife on domestic violence wherein the concerned Judge had exercised his discretion Under Section 19(1)(b) of the Domestic Violence Act which provides that the Magistrate on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place can remove the spouse from the shared household which in our opinion he has rightly done. Exercise of discretion by Family Court cannot be said to be perverse warranting interference. The High Court while declining to interfere with the order has also considered the factual and legal position.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6450 of 2017

Decided On: 09.05.2017

Samir Vidyasagar Bhardwaj Vs.Nandita Samir Bhardwaj

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Kurian Joseph and R. Banumathi, JJ.

Citation:AIR 2017 SC 2713

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Whether it can be held that sisters are not in possession of joint family property only on ground they are residing in their matrimonial house?

Further, it is held that to apply these principles, the defendants had to establish that the plaintiffs have been excluded from the joint possession of the suit land twelve years prior to filing of the suit. Whereas, to prove such facts, D.Ws. 1 and 2 have deposed that from the year 1980, Huchchirappa was in possession of the suit land and after his death, his wife and children are in possession. These statements have been denied by the plaintiffs in the cross-examination. Exclusive possession has been claimed on the basis of allotment of suit land to the share of Huchchirappa. It was held that the defendants have failed to establish the partition and allotment of suit land to the share of Huchchirappa, as there was no convincing evidence to show that the plaintiffs were excluded from the joint possession of the suit land after 1980. Only because the plaintiffs are residing in their matrimonial house, it cannot be held that they were excluded from possession. Thus, the learned trial judge on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record has held that the defendants have failed to establish that the plaintiffs have been excluded from the joint possession of the suit land. As such, the suit of the plaintiffs is not barred under Article 110 of the Limitation Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA (DHARWAD BENCH)

Regular First Appeal No. 100108 of 2016 [PAR/POS]

Decided On: 09.01.2017

Durgavva and Ors. Vs. Annapoornavva and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ravi V. Malimath and K. Somashekar, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2017 karnat 38

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Whether demand of wife for privacy amounts to cruelty to her husband?

 It was in the background of these facts that the learned trial Judge held:-

“The petitioner has claimed that the respondent wanted to stay in a separate accommodation. She definitely requires/required one bedroom for herself and the petitioner. Such a demand from the newlywed cannot be considered as unwarranted or undesirable. If the respondent at all wanted to stay in a separate accommodation that could be only because she did not or could not have the required privacy in the matrimonial home in such a large family. I am, therefore, of the considered view that her expectation/demand was not unreasonable.”

15. Privacy is a fundamental human right. Oxford dictionary defines privacy as “a state in which one is not observed or disturbed by the other people.” So when a woman enters into matrimony, it is the duty of the family members of her matrimonial home to provide her with some privacy. There is no evidential backing by the appellant or his family members showing that they had provided requisite privacy to the respondent. The Family Court was therefore correct in holding that such demand was not unreasonable and as such did not constitute cruelty.

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before S. Ravindra Bhat and Deepa Sharma, JJ.)

Mini Appa Kanda Swami @ Mani 

v.

M. Indra 

MAT. APP. 45/2011

Decided on September 21, 2016

Citation:2016 SCC OnLine Del 5312 : (2016) 234 DLT 243 (DB)

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Whether desertion can be tested by merely ascertaining which party left matrimonial home first?

 The desertion is not to be tested by merely
ascertaining which party left the matrimonial home first. If one spouse is
forced by the conduct of the other to leave, the desertion could be by such
conduct of other spouse and compelled to live separately.
19. In the decision reported as (2010) 4 SCC 476 Ravi Kumar vs Julmidevi
the Supreme Court has observed as under:-
“13. It may be noted only after the amendment of the said
Act by the amending Act 68 of 1976, desertion per se
became a ground for divorce. On the question of
desertion, the High Court held that in order to prove a
case of desertion, the party alleging desertion must not
only prove that the other spouse was living separately but
also must prove that there is an animus deserendi on the
part of the wife and the husband must prove that he
has not conducted himself in a way which
furnishes reasonable cause for the wife to stay away from
the matrimonial home.”
20. Thus, the facts above do show that appellant was forced by the conduct
of the respondent to leave the matrimonial home and that it is the respondent
who is guilty of constructive desertion and had made the appellant and her
daughter run from pillar to post even for their bare minimum maintenance and
had rather failed to prove the behavior of the appellant towards him was such
that it ever caused a reasonable apprehension in his mind that it was not safe
for him to continue the matrimonial relations with the appellant. The
respondent herein had failed to bring his case within the parameters of cruelty
and desertion as defined and as such, we set aside the impugned judgment
dated November 22, 2013 of the learned Judge, Family Court, Dwarka in HMA
No.444/2009 tilted ‘Sohan Singh Nehra vs Nisha Rani’.
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Dated : January 06, 2017
 MAT.APP.(F.C.) 82/2014
MRS. NISHA RANI 
v
SH. SOHAN SINGH NEHRA 
CORAM:
 MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
 MR. JUSTICE YOGESH KHANNA

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When High court can quash prosecution against family members of Husband under S 498A of IPC?

In the instant case, as we have already seen that there
are specific allegations against husband Shrikant and his
father Sudama Prasad who lived together in the matrimonial
home of the complainant along with her. Thus, the power
under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot
be used to stifle their prosecution. However, so far as
remaining applicants/accused persons are concerned, none of
them lived together with the husband and father-in-law in the
matrimonial home of the complainant. Moreover, there are no
specific and credible allegations with necessary particulars,against them. Only omnibus allegations shorn of even basic
details, have been leveled; therefore, in the opinion of this
Court, they should not be made to undergo the rigmarole of a
criminal trial. Allowing trial to proceed against the aforesaid
relatives would be travesty of justice and abuse of process of
law. As such, exercise of extra-ordinary powers of the High
Court reserved under section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, is called for.
MCRC-2112-2015

Dated;10-12-2015
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH : AT JABALPUR
Miscellaneous Criminal Case No.2112/2015
 Shrikant Tamrakar and others
Vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh and another

Present:- Hon'ble Shri Justice C.V. Sirpurkar

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When offence of cruelty U/S 498A of IPC can not be said to be continuing offence?

Criminal - Territorial jurisdiction - Validity of - Section 498A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 178 of Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Present appeal filed against order whereby High court held that First Information Report for offence under Section 498A of Code lodged by Respondent was liable to be tried by Court at place where wife's parents resided, which had jurisdiction to try offence - Whether impugned order of territorial jurisdiction of Court at wife's native place to try offence alleged against Appellants was maintainable - Held, offence of cruelty cannot be said to be a continuing one as contemplated by Section 178 of Code - From FIR it was found that all incidents alleged by complainant in respect of alleged cruelty were said to have occurred at place where both Appellant and his wife resided after marriage - High Court was not right in holding that in present case mental cruelty inflicted upon Respondent "continued unabated" on account of no effort made by Appellants to take her back to her matrimonial home, and threats given by Appellants over telephone - High Court did not make reference to any particular piece of evidence regarding threats said to have been given by Appellants over telephone - Thus, going by complaint, it could not be held that Court at wife's native place had jurisdiction to try offence since appropriate Court at place where both Appellant and his wife resided after marriage would have jurisdiction to try said offence - Accordingly, impugned order of High court was set aside - Appeal allowed. [paras 7 and 8]

Equivalent Citation: 2015ALLMR(Cri)4502,  I(2015)DMC126SC, 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 546 of 2009

Decided On: 04.08.2014

 Amarendu Jyoti  Vs. State of Chattisgarh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:S.J. Mukhopadhaya and S.A. Bobde, JJ.

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When offence of misappropriation of streedhan by IN-LAWS is not made out?

In paragraph 4 of the complaint, there is a general allegation that the cash and gifts which the respondent No. 2 and accused No. 1-Vaibhav had received during marriage were kept at the matrimonial home by all the accused persons including the applicant No. 1, who is accused No. 7, being the mediator for the marriage between the respondent No. 2 and accused No. 1-Vaibhav; and the applicant No. 2, who is accused No. 4, being the sister in law of the complainant-Non-applicant No. 2. It is an admitted position that both these applicants were not part of matrimonial home of the accused No. 1 and Non-applicant No. 2. Therefore, no offences relating to cheating and criminal breach of trust punishable under Sections 417 and 406 would be prima facie made out against these applicants. Besides, there is also no allegation in paragraph 4 that the Non-applicant No. 2 at any point of time demanded return of the Stridhan articles to her from those accused persons who are residing in her matrimonial home.

Equivalent Citation: 2015ALLMR(Cri)2607, 2015(2)Crimes368(Bom.)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Application No. 251 of 2014

Decided On: 14.01.2015

 Gopal and Ors.

Vs.

 State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Coram:S.B. Shukre, J.

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Whether offence of ill-treatment and humiliation in matrimonial home is continuing offence?

 Mr. Sanyal also relied on a decision of
this Court in Bhura Ram and Others vs.
State of Rajasthan and Another, (2008) 11
SCC 103 wherein following the decision in
Y. Abraham Ajith and Others (supra), this
Court held that “cause of action”; having
arisen within the jurisdiction of the court
where the offence was committed, could not

be tried by the court where no part of
offence was committed. For the same
reasons, as mentioned in the earlier
paragraph, while there is no dispute as to
the proposition in view of the fact that in
the case on hand, the offence was a
continuing one and the episode at Gaya was
only a consequence at the continuing
offence of harassment and ill-treatment
meted out to the complainant, clause (c) of
Section 178 is attracted. In view of the
above reason, both the decisions are not
applicable to the facts of this case and we
are unable to accept the stand taken by Mr.
Sanyal.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR

S.B. CRIMINAL MISC. PETITION NO.2163/2013
Harikesh Dhanak & Anr.
V/S
State of Rajasthan & Anr.
Date of Order : 10th April, 2014
PRESENT
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAY BISHNOI
Citation; 2015(2)crimes 322 Raj

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Whether wife can claim right of residence in house of mother in law as per domestic violence Act?

Perusal of both the impugned judgments and orders
shows that the house at Mahsul colony, Nanded is in the name
of Kevalabai w/o Madhavrao Mahurkar, who is the mother of
present respondent. Both the courts below, on the basis of
available evidence have recorded a finding concurrently that the
said house, at no point of time, was the matrimonial house.
Further said house was not shared by the present applicants
with the respondent. Therefore, merely because the
respondent has any right of succession in the said house, that
will not entitle the present applicants to claim the right of
residence.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
AURANGABAD BENCH, AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 235 OF 2013
Sandhya w/o Sanjay Mahurkar,

VERSUS
Sanjay s/o Madhav Mahurkar,

CORAM : V.M.DESHPANDE, J.
DATED : 13 th January, 2015
Citation;2015 ALLMR(CRI)1393

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