Supreme Court: Magistrate Doesn't Require Prior Sanction To Direct FIR Registration Under S.156(3) CrPC

 Part IV

Our Conclusions

164. For the foregoing reasons and discussion, our conclusions are summarised as follows:

V. The statutory framework under the Code of Criminal Procedure (now the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), provides a comprehensive and layered mechanism to set the criminal law in motion. The duty of the police to register an FIR upon disclosure of a cognizable offence is mandatory, as settled in Lalita Kumari (supra).

VI. In cases of non-registration of FIR, the Code of Criminal Procedure/BNSS provide efficacious remedies. An aggrieved person may approach the Superintendent of Police Under Section 154(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure or corresponding Section 173(4) of BNSS and thereafter invoke the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Under Section 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding Section 175 of BNSS) or proceed by way of a complaint Under Section 200 of Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding Section 223 of BNSS). These remedies constitute a complete statutory architecture.

VII. The availability of such remedies, coupled with the supervisory jurisdiction of constitutional Courts Under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution demonstrates that no legislative vacuum exists warranting the intervention sought. The appropriate course lies in ensuring faithful and even-handed enforcement of existing law.

VIII. The supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate Under Section 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure or corresponding Section 175 of BNSS is of wide amplitude and includes supervisory oversight over the investigation at appropriate stages. This power is intended to ensure that the investigation is conducted in a fair, impartial, and lawful manner, and may be exercised simultaneously during the stage of investigation, where the material on record discloses any deficiency, inaction, or taint in the investigative process.

IX. The requirement of prior sanction Under Sections 196 and 197 of Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding Sections 217 and 218 of BNSS) operates at the stage of taking cognizance and does not extend to the pre-cognizance stage of registration of FIR or investigation Under Section 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding Section 175(3) of BNSS). An order directing investigation Under Section 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure does not amount to taking cognizance within the meaning of Section 190 of Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding Section 210 of BNSS).

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 943 of 2021, 

Decided On: 29.04.2026

Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0419/2026,

Print Page

Can a Sessions Judge Consider the Accused’s Defence While Deciding Revision Against an Order Under Section 156(3) CrPC?

 Revision Is Not a Mini-Trial:

An order under Section 156(3) CrPC often marks the beginning of criminal investigation, but the challenge that follows in revision frequently tempts the revisional court to travel beyond its proper limits. The central question is not whether the accused may be heard at all, but whether the Sessions Judge can evaluate the accused’s defence on merits while deciding a criminal revision against such an order.

The answer, in law, is nuanced but clear. The Sessions Judge may hear the accused where the revisional order is likely to prejudice him, and may examine the legality, propriety, regularity, and jurisdictional soundness of the Magistrate’s order. But the revisional court cannot convert the hearing into a factual adjudication of the defence or a premature evaluation of disputed material.

Print Page

Supreme Court: Under which circumstances, complainant is not entitled to file similar application U/S 156(3) of CRPC for second time?

 The short issue for consideration in this appeal

is as to whether the learned Magistrate has the

jurisdiction to invoke Section 156(3) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) for

the second time, in spite of the earlier order dated

10.08.2022 whereby the learned Magistrate dismissed

the initial application filed by the respondentcomplainant

under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. as

well as the subsequent closure report filed by the

police, pursuant to the direction given by the High

Court to conduct a preliminary inquiry.

Though arguments have been made by the learned

Senior Counsel appearing for the State that there is

no bar under law in doing so, the fact remains that

the second round of resorting to Section 156(3) of

the Cr.P.C. is nothing but an attempt to review the

earlier order passed by the High Court. It is also

pertinent to state that the liberty given by the

High Court to the respondent-complainant was only

for the purpose of invoking Section 200 of the

Cr.P.C. Maybe it is an oversight which made the

respondent–complainant to invoke Section 156 (3) of

the Cr.P.C., once again, instead of filing a private

complaint under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. Suffice

it to state that the parameters for the invocation

of both the aforesaid sections are quite different.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2193 /2026

MOHAN KARTHIK & ORS. Vs  STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ANR. 

Dated: APRIL 27, 2026.

Print Page

Supreme Court: Magistrate can monitor the investigation to ensure a proper investigation U/S 156 of CRPC

 If such an application Under Section 156(3) is filed before the Magistrate, the Magistrate can direct the FIR to be registered and also can direct a proper investigation to be made, in a case where, according to the aggrieved person, no proper investigation was made. The Magistrate can also under the same provision monitor the investigation to ensure a proper investigation.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 102 of 2011

Decided On: 20.03.2020

 M. Subramaniam  Vs.  S. Janaki 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.V. Ramana, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

Print Page

Supreme Court: Magistrate can recommend change of the investigating officer under investigation U/S 156 of CRPC so that a proper investigation is done in the matter

 This Court has held in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., that if a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been registered by the police, or having been registered, proper investigation is not being done, then the remedy of the aggrieved person is not to go to the High Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but to approach the Magistrate concerned Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure. If such an application Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure is made and the Magistrate is, prima facie, satisfied, he can direct the FIR to be registered, or if it has already been registered, he can direct proper investigation to be done which includes in his discretion, if he deems it necessary, recommending change of the investigating officer, so that a proper investigation is done in the matter. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 102 of 2011

Decided On: 20.03.2020

 M. Subramaniam  Vs.  S. Janaki 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.V. Ramana, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

Print Page

Important articles and judgments on police investigation U/S 156 of CRPC {S 175(3 ) of BNSS }

 

1) Supreme Court: How BNSS Modernizes Section 156(3) CrPC: Key Changes and Implications

35. Further, by requiring the Magistrate to consider the submissions made by the concerned police officer before proceeding to issue directions Under Section 175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on the police officer responsible for registering FIRs Under Section 173. Mandating the Magistrate to consider the submissions of the concerned police officer also ensures that the Magistrate applies his mind judicially while considering both the complaint and the submissions of the police officer thereby ensuring that the requirement of passing reasoned orders is complied with in a more effective and comprehensive manner.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 352/2020

Decided On: 16.01.2025

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0134/2025, 2025 INSC 139.

https://www.lawweb.in/2025/03/supreme-court-how-bnss-modernizes.html

2) Supreme Court: Magistrate's Order U/S. 156(3) CrPC For registration of FIR is Not Vitiated Merely Because Complainant Didn't Avail Remedy Under S.154(3)

Print Page

Supreme Court: Proposed Accused Has Right To Be Heard In Revision Filed Against Dismissal Of Petition Under Section 156(3) CrPC

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 156(3) - Proposed accused has right to be heard in revision filed under Section 401 Cr.P.C. against dismissal of petition under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 HRISHIKESH ROY; J., MANOJ MISRA; J.

 May 12, 2023 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2023 

 SANTHAKUMARI & ORS. Vs STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ANR.

Print Page

Bombay HC: Sessions Judge Can consider Electronic Evidence in Criminal Revision Without Section 65-B Certificate

 For considering whether the learned Revisional Court has rightly passed the order and at this stage whether for viewing CD or any other material, whether certificate under section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act is necessary? At this stage the Court is not accepting the said document as a proof in the trial. The Court is also not adjudicating upon any of the issues or the points with the help of such a document. As stated, it is only for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether case is made out to issue direction under section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. assuming that the Court takes cognizance by rejecting the prayer for directions under section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. and direct police to make an inquiry under section 202 of the Cr.P.C., still stage of trial is yet to come. The question of admissibility of offence would come only in the Trial and not any time before such document is tendered into evidence and sought to be proved by the prosecution or the parties to the proceedings. Therefore, the question of expecting a certificate under section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act itself does not arise at this stage. {Para 16}

21. This Court finds in view of above discussion that at this stage, what needs to be considered is only that a revision is pending before the Sessions Court against order passed by the learned JMFC refusing to pass order under section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. The objection is only to viewing of the CD by the Revisional Court. The learned Sessions Judge has rightly held that there is no bar to look into the documents and has rightly rejected the application and permitted the respondent to display the video recording. This order is passed only to enable the Court to look into the material that was produced before the Magistrate and nothing else. This Court finds that no fault can be found with the impugned order. For the above reasons, the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge does not require any interference.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition No. 76 of 2023

Decided On: 05.06.2023

Sudhir and Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Kishore C. Sant, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1987/2023

Print Page

Sessions Judge’s Power to Examine Electronic Evidence in CrPC 156(3) Revision: Clarification from Bombay HC

 Background and Case Snapshot

In a pivotal judgment delivered on June 5th, 2023, the Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench) addressed a recurring procedural question confronting criminal practitioners and judges: Can a Sessions Court, during revision proceedings under Section 156(3) CrPC, view evidence (specifically electronic evidence like a CD) that is not yet

“admissible” under the Indian Evidence Act? The controversy stemmed from Sudhir and Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (Criminal Writ Petition No. 76 of 2023).

Print Page

Supreme Court: Magistrate's Order U/S. 156(3) CrPC For registration of FIR is Not Vitiated Merely Because Complainant Didn't Avail Remedy Under S.154(3)

In the facts and circumstances of the case, as the informant

had directly moved the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of

the CrPC without exhausting his statutory remedies, the

Magistrate could have avoided taking action on the said

application and could have refused to direct for the

registration of the FIR. However, as entertaining an

application directly by the Magistrate is a mere procedural

irregularity and since the Magistrate in a given

circumstance is otherwise empowered to pass such an

order, the action of the Magistrate may not be illegal or

without jurisdiction. {Para 32}

33. To sum up, the Magistrate ought not to ordinarily entertain

an application under Section 156(3) CrPC directly unless

the informant has availed and exhausted his remedies

provided under Section 154(3) CrPC, but as the Magistrate

is otherwise competent under Section 156(3) CrPC to direct

the registration of an FIR if the allegations in the

application/complaint discloses the commission of a

cognizable offence, we are of the opinion that the order so

passed by the Magistrate would not be without jurisdiction

and would not stand vitiated on this count.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

EXTRAORDINARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.18084 OF 2024

ANURAG BHATNAGAR & ANR. Vs STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR. 

 Author: PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

Citation:  2025 INSC 895.

Dated: JULY 25, 2025

Print Page

Bombay HC: Magistrate has duty to monitor investigation after passing order as per S 156 of CRPC

 While answering to one of our questions to the learned

Magistrate as to whether he, i.e. (including his predecessors), had

monitored the investigation at any point of time or not, it has been

answered that no communication was ever made by the Court of the

concerned Magistrate to the police station regarding the progress in

the investigation. In fact, in Sakiri Vasu Vs. State of U.P. and Others,[(2008) 2 SCC 409], the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while taking note of the powers of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., has made the observation regarding monitoring of the investigation by the Magistrate, which we have, in fact, already quoted in our order dated 07th April 2025. {Para 5}

6. Under the said circumstance, when there is absolutely no

investigation made since the registration of the F.I.R., we direct Police Inspector, MIDC CIDCO Police Station, Aurangabad, to carry out the investigation in respect of the said F.I.R., which is registered as M-Case No.7 of 2012, as contemplated under law. We hope that the said investigation would be expedited and would be taken to its

logical end by the police.

7. We also direct the learned Magistrate to adhere to the observations in Sakiri Vasu (Supra) and monitoring the investigation in such matters including this, wherein the investigation has been directed under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C.

8. While getting the report, the concern

IN THE JUDICATURE OF HIGH COURT AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 302 OF 2025

Sunita W/o. Mohan Korde Vs  The State of Maharashtra,

CORAM : SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI &

SANJAY A. DESHMUKH, JJ.

Dated : 23rd June 2025

Citation: 2025:BHC-AUG:15847-DB

Print Page

Kerala HC: Special courts shall not order an investigation U/S 156(3) CrPC against public servant in absence of prior sanction under Section 19 of PC Act.

  Section 19(1) of the PC Act says that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction of the competent authority referred to in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c). The question of sanction is of paramount importance for protecting a public servant who has acted in good faith while performing his duties. The purpose of obtaining sanction is to see that the public servant is not entangled in false and frivolous cases. The question whether a sanction under section 19 of the PC Act is necessary or not while ordering an investigation against a public servant invoking powers under section 156(3) of Cr. P.C is no more res integra. In Anil Kumar (supra), it was held that in the absence of a prior sanction under section 19 of the PC Act, the Magistrate/Court cannot order an investigation against a public servant by invoking power under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. After referring to various judgments on the issue of purport and meaning of the word "cognizance", it was concluded that "cognizance" has a wider connotation and is not merely confined to the stage of taking cognizance of the offence. In L.Narayana Swamy (supra), the Apex Court held that an order directing investigation under section 156(3) could not be passed in relation to a public servant in the absence of valid sanction. It was observed that even while directing inquiry under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., the Magistrate applies his judicial mind on the complaint, and therefore, it would amount to taking cognizance of the matter. The same issue arose before the Apex Court again in Manju Surana v. Sunil Arora and Others (MANU/SC/0296/2018 : 2018 KHC 6224). After considering the various judgments, including Anil Kumar (supra) and L. Narayana Swamy (supra), the Division Bench of the Apex Court directed the matter to be placed before the Larger Bench. Thereafter, a Division Bench of this Court in Muhammed V.A. and Others v. State of Kerala and Others (MANU/KE/3653/2018 : 2019 (1) KHC 239) held that until a final decision is taken in the reference in Manju Surana (supra), the dictum laid down in Anil Kumar (supra) will hold the field. Therefore, as the law now stands, the requirement of sanction under section 19 of the PC Act is a prerequisite for presenting a private complaint against a public servant alleging the commission of an offence specified in sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 of the PC Act. No such complaint could be forwarded for investigation under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. in the absence of sanction granted by the competent authority under section 19 of the PC Act. The decision of the Apex Court in B.A.Srinivasan (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for respondents 3 to 6 pertains to sanction under section 197 of Cr.P.C and hence the dictum laid down therein does not apply to the facts of the case.

{Para 7}

Considering the above findings, I am of the view that the court below could not have forwarded the complaints under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C for investigation without any sanction under section 19(1) of the PC Act obtained by the complainants. Hence, the impugned order cannot be sustained, and accordingly, it is set aside.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

OP (Crl.) No. 510 of 2022

Decided On: 17.02.2023

C.V. Balan and Ors. Vs. State of Kerala and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. Kauser Edappagath, J.

Citation: 2023 KER 9580,2023 KLJ 1 9252023 SCC ONLINE KER 9832023 KER 9580, MANU/KE/0324/2023

Print Page

From Judicial Interpretation to Statutory Law: Section 156 CrPC and S 175 of BNSS, 2023

Introduction

The Supreme Court of India, in Om Prakash Ambadkar v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. (Criminal Appeal No. 352/2020), has analyzed the procedural changes introduced by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) in relation to Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). This judgment highlights the legislative codification of judicial safeguards aimed at preventing misuse of the powers vested in Magistrates for ordering investigations.

Key Changes in Section 175 of BNSS

Section 175 of BNSS corresponds to Section 156 CrPC but introduces significant procedural modifications:

Print Page

Section 156(3) of CR.P.C vs. Section 175(3) of B.N.S.S : A Comparative Analysis of Procedural Changes

The new interpretation of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), specifically Section 175(3), which replaces Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), introduces significant procedural changes that will affect its practical application. These changes aim to enhance judicial scrutiny, reduce misuse, and increase accountability in the process of ordering investigations. Below is an explanation of how these changes will impact the working of Section 156 in practice:

Key Changes and Their Practical Implications

Print Page

Supreme Court: How BNSS Modernizes Section 156(3) CrPC: Key Changes and Implications

 However, before we part with the matter, we deem it necessary to discuss the changes brought to the scheme of Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the enactment of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, "the BNSS"). {Para 28}

29. Section 175 of the BNSS corresponds to Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (1) of Section 175 of the BNSS is in pari materia with Sub-section 156(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure except for the proviso which empowers the Superintendent of Police to direct the Deputy Superintendent of Police to investigate a case if the nature or gravity of the case so requires. Sub-section (2) of Section 175 the BNSS is identical to Section 156(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 175(3) of the BNSS empowers any Magistrate who is empowered to take cognizance Under Section 210 to order investigation in accordance with Section 175(1) and to this extent is in pari materia with Section 156(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure. However, unlike Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, any Magistrate, before ordering investigation Under Section 175(3) of the BNSS, is required to:

a. Consider the application, supported by an affidavit, made by the complainant to the Superintendent of Police Under Section 173(4) of the BNSS;

b. Conduct such inquiry as he thinks necessary; and

c. Consider the submissions made by the police officer.

30. Sub-section (4) of Section 175 of the BNSS is a new addition to the scheme of investigation of cognizable cases when compared with the scheme previously existing in Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It provides an additional safeguard to a public servant against whom an accusation of committing a cognizable offence arising in the course of discharge of his official duty is made. The provision stipulates that any Magistrate who is empowered to take cognizance Under Section 210 of the BNSS may order investigation against a public servant upon receiving a complaint arising in course of the discharge of his official duty, only after complying with the following procedure:

a. Receiving a report containing facts and circumstances of the incident from the officer superior to the Accused public servant; and

b. Considering the assertions made by the Accused public servant as regards the situation that led to the occurrence of the alleged incident.

31. A comparison of Section 175(3) of the BNSS with Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates three prominent changes that have been introduced by the enactment of BNSS as follows:

a. First, the requirement of making an application to the Superintendent of Police upon refusal by the officer in charge of a police station to lodge the FIR has been made mandatory, and the applicant making an application Under Section 175(3) is required to furnish a copy of the application made to the Superintendent of Police Under Section 173(4), supported by an affidavit, while making the application to the Magistrate Under Section 175(3).

b. Secondly, the Magistrate has been empowered to conduct such enquiry as he deems necessary before making an order directing registration of FIR.

c. Thirdly, the Magistrate is required to consider the submissions of the officer in charge of the police station as regards the refusal to register an FIR before issuing any directions Under Section 175(3).

32. The introduction of these changes by the legislature can be attributed to the judicial evolution of Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure undertaken by a number of decisions of this Court. In the case of Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. reported in   MANU/SC/0344/2015 : 2015:INSC:239 : (2015) 6 SCC 287, this Court held that prior to making an application to the Magistrate Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant must necessarily make applications Under Sections 154(1) and 154(3). It was further observed by the Court that applications made Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure must necessarily be supported by an affidavit sworn by the applicant. The reason given by the Court for introducing such a requirement was that applications Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure were being made in a routine manner and in a number of cases only with a view to cause harassment to the Accused by registration of FIR. It was further observed that the requirement of supporting the complaint with an affidavit would ensure that the person making the application is conscious and also to see that no false affidavit is made. Once an affidavit is found to be false, the applicant would be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This would deter him from casually invoking the authority of the Magistrate Under Section 156(3). 

28. Issuing a direction stating "as per the application" to lodge an FIR creates a very unhealthy situation in society and also reflects the erroneous approach of the learned Magistrate. It also encourages unscrupulous and unprincipled litigants, like Respondent 3, namely, Prakash Kumar Bajaj, to take adventurous steps with courts to bring the financial institutions on their knees.

29. At this stage it is seemly to state that power Under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the Code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellow citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same.

30. In our considered opinion, a stage has come in this country where Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure applications are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. That apart, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also can verify the veracity of the allegations. This affidavit can make the applicant more responsible. We are compelled to say so as such kind of applications are being filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility whatsoever only to harass certain persons. That apart, it becomes more disturbing and alarming when one tries to pick up people who are passing orders under a statutory provision which can be challenged under the framework of the said Act or Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But it cannot be done to take undue advantage in a criminal court as if somebody is determined to settle the scores.

31. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications Under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition Under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an application Under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit is so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate Under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari [  MANU/SC/1166/2013 : 2013:INSC:748 : (2014) 2 SCC 1: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR.

(Emphasis supplied)

33. In a recent pronouncement of this Court in the case of Babu Venkatesh v. The State of Karnataka reported in   MANU/SC/0214/2022 : 2022:INSC:209 : (2022) 5 SCC 639, the observations made in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) were referred to and it was held as follows:

24. This Court has clearly held that, a stage has come where applications Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure are to be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the complainant who seeks the invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate.

25. This Court further held that, in an appropriate case, the learned Magistrate would be well advised to verify the truth and also verify the veracity of the allegations. The Court has noted that, applications Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure are filed in a routine manner without taking any responsibility only to harass certain persons.

26. This Court has further held that, prior to the filing of a petition Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure, there have to be applications Under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) Code of Criminal Procedure. This Court emphasises the necessity to file an affidavit so that the persons making the application should be conscious and not make false affidavit. With such a requirement, the persons would be deterred from causally invoking authority of the Magistrate, Under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure. Inasmuch as if the affidavit is found to be false, the person would be liable for prosecution in accordance with law.

(Emphasis supplied)

34. In light of the judicial interpretation and evolution of Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by various decisions of this Court as discussed above, it becomes clear that the changes introduced by Section 175(3) of the BNSS to the existing scheme of Section 156(3) merely codify the procedural practices and safeguards which have been introduced by judicial decisions aimed at curbing the misuse of invocation of powers of a Magistrate by unscrupulous litigants for achieving ulterior motives.

35. Further, by requiring the Magistrate to consider the submissions made by the concerned police officer before proceeding to issue directions Under Section 175(3), BNSS has affixed greater accountability on the police officer responsible for registering FIRs Under Section 173. Mandating the Magistrate to consider the submissions of the concerned police officer also ensures that the Magistrate applies his mind judicially while considering both the complaint and the submissions of the police officer thereby ensuring that the requirement of passing reasoned orders is complied with in a more effective and comprehensive manner.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 352/2020

Decided On: 16.01.2025

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0134/2025, 2025 INSC 139.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

Print Page

Supreme Court: What are essential ingredients of offence punishable U/S 294 of IPC?

 However, what is important to observe is that whenever any application is filed by the complainant before the Court of Judicial Magistrate seeking police investigation Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is the duty of the concerned Magistrate to apply his mind for the purpose of ascertaining whether the allegations levelled in the complaint constitute any cognizable offence or not. In other words, the Magistrate may not undertake the exercise to ascertain whether the complaint is false or otherwise, however, the Magistrate is obliged before he proceeds to pass an order for police investigation to closely consider whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are borne out on plain reading of the complaint. {Para 11}

12. In the case on hand, it appears that the Magistrate passed an order directing police investigation mechanically and without ascertaining whether the allegations levelled disclose commission of any offence or not.

13. It is the case of the complainant that the Appellant herein committed offence punishable Under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code. The Magistrate very promptly accepted this contention without ascertaining if the necessary ingredients required to constitute the offence were disclosed in the complaint or not. In our view, even if all the allegations as levelled in the complaint are believed to be true, none of the ingredients to constitute the offence punishable Under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code could be said to be borne out.

14. In so far as Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, this Court in N.S. Madhanagopal and Anr. v. K. Lalitha reported in MANU/SC/1805/2022 : (2022) 17 SCC 818 has explained the true purport and scope of Section 294. We quote the relevant observations as under:

6. Section 294(b) Indian Penal Code talks about the obscene acts and songs. Section 294 Indian Penal Code as a whole reads thus:

294. Obscene acts and songs.-Whoever, to the annoyance of others-

(a) does any obscene act in any public place, or

(b) sings, recites or utters any obscene songs, ballad or words, in or near any public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both.

7. It is to be noted that the test of obscenity Under Section 294(b) Indian Penal Code is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences. The following passage from the judgment authored by K.K. Mathew, J. (as his Lordship then was) reported in P.T. Chacko v. Nainan Chacko [P.T. Chacko v. Nainan Chacko,   MANU/KE/0284/1967 : 1967 KLT 799] explains as follows: (SCC OnLine Ker paras 5-6)

5. The only point argued was that the 1st Accused has not committed an offence punishable Under Section 294(b) Indian Penal Code, by uttering the words above-mentioned. The courts below have held that the words uttered were obscene and the utterance caused annoyance to the public. I am not inclined to take this view. In R. v. Hicklin [R. v. Hicklin, (1868) LR 3 QB 360], QB at p. 371 Cockburn, C.J. Laid down the test of "obscenity" in these words: (QB p. 371) '... the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences....'

6. This test has been uniformly followed in India. The Supreme Court has accepted the correctness of the test in Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra [Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra,   MANU/SC/0080/1964 : 1964:INSC:171 : AIR 1965 SC 881]. In Roth v. United States [Roth v. United States, 1957 SCC OnLine US SC 106: MANU/USSC/0157/1957 : 1 L Ed 2d 1498 : 354 US 476 (1957)], Chief Justice Warren said that the test of "obscenity" is the 'substantial tendency to corrupt by arousing lustful desires'. Mr. Justice Harlan observed that in order to be "obscene" the matter must "tend to sexually impure thoughts". I do not think that the words uttered in this case have such a tendency. It may be that the words are defamatory of the complainant, but I do not think that the words are "obscene" and the utterance would constitute an offence punishable Under Section 294(b) Indian Penal Code.

8. It has to be noted that in the instance case, the absence of words which will involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or words cannot attract the offence Under Section 294(b). None of the records disclose the alleged words used by the Accused. It may not be the requirement of law to reproduce in all cases the entire obscene words if it is lengthy, but in the instant case, there is hardly anything on record. Mere abusive, humiliating or defamatory words by itself cannot attract an offence Under Section 294(b) Indian Penal Code.

9. To prove the offence Under Section 294 Indian Penal Code mere utterance of obscene words are not sufficient but there must be a further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others, which is lacking in the case. No one has spoken about the obscene words, they felt annoyed and in the absence of legal evidence to show that the words uttered by the Appellant- Accused annoyed others, it cannot be said that the ingredients of the offence Under Section 294(b) Indian Penal Code is made out.

15. We fail to understand how the act of a police officer assaulting the complainant within public view or public as alleged would amount to an obscene act. Obscene act for the purpose of Section 294 has a particular meaning. Mere abusive, humiliating or defamatory words by themselves are not sufficient to attract the offence Under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code.

16. Thus, in so far as Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, we are of the view that no case is made out to put the Appellant/Accused to trial.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 352/2020

Decided On: 16.01.2025

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0134/2025, 2025 INSC 139.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

Print Page

Supreme Court: What precautions the Magistrate should take before ordering investigation U/S 156(3) of CRPC{S 175 of BNSS}?

 Thus, there are prerequisites to be followed by the complainant before approaching the Magistrate Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure {S 175 of BNSS} which is a discretionary remedy as the provision proceeds with the word 'may'. The Magistrate is required to exercise his mind while doing so. He should pass orders only if he is satisfied that the information reveals commission of cognizable offences and also about the necessity of police investigation for digging out of evidence neither in possession of the complainant nor can be procured without the assistance of the police. It is, thus, not necessary that in every case where a complaint has been filed Under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Magistrate should direct the Police to investigate the crime merely because an application has also been filed Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure even though the evidence to be led by the complainant is in his possession or can be produced by summoning witnesses, with the assistance of the court or otherwise. The issue of jurisdiction also becomes important at that stage and cannot be ignored. {Para 24}

25. In fact, the Magistrate ought to direct investigation by the police only where the assistance of the Investigating Agency is necessary and the Court feels that the cause of justice is likely to suffer in the absence of investigation by the police. The Magistrate is not expected to mechanically direct investigation by the police without first examining whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, investigation by the State machinery is actually required or not. If the allegations made in the complaint are simple, where the Court can straightaway proceed to conduct the trial, the Magistrate is expected to record evidence and proceed further in the matter, instead of passing the buck to the Police Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure{S 175 of BNSS}. Ofcourse, if the allegations made in the complaint require complex and complicated investigation which cannot be undertaken without active assistance and expertise of the State machinery, it would only be appropriate for the Magistrate to direct investigation by the police authorities. The Magistrate is, therefore, not supposed to act merely as a Post Office and needs to adopt a judicial approach while considering an application seeking investigation by the Police.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 352/2020

Decided On: 16.01.2025

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0134/2025, 2025 INSC 139.

Print Page

Supreme Court: Magistrate Can't Direct FIR Registration Under S.156(3) CrPC If Complainant Didn't Approach Police Before u/s 154(1) & 154(3)

We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) while filing a petition under Section 156(3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an application under Section 156(3) be supported by an affidavit is so that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR."{Para 31}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

ABHAY S. OKA; J., UJJAL BHUYAN; J.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.4313 OF 2024;

 RANJIT SINGH BATH & ANR Vs UNION TERRITORY CHANDIGARH & ANR.

Dated: March 06, 2025.

Print Page

What are powers and limitation of revisional court in criminal revision?

Before examining the merits of the present case, we must advert to the discussion as to the ambit and scope of the power which the courts including the High Court can exercise under Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code.

Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinize the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. {Para 8}

9. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Right from the case of State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha and Ors.   MANU/SC/0120/1982 : (1982) 1 SCC 561, which was reiterated with approval in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors.   MANU/SC/0115/1992 : 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, the courts have stated the principle that if the FIR does not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, the Court would be justified in quashing the investigation on the basis of the information as laid or received. It is further stated that the legal position appears to be that if an offence is disclosed, the court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit investigation into the offence alleged to have been committed; if, however, the materials do not disclose an offence, no investigation should normally be permitted. Whether an offence has been disclosed or not, must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. If on consideration of the relevant materials, the Court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, it will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation into the offence to be completed in order to collect materials for proving the offence. In Bhajan Lal's case (supra), the Court also stated that though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined, sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae or to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein power under Section 482 of the Code for quashing of an FIR should be exercised, there are circumstances where the Court may be justified in exercising such jurisdiction. These are, where the FIR does not prima facie constitute any offence, does not disclose a cognizable offence justifying investigation by the police; where the allegations are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; where there is an expressed legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code; and where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Despite stating these grounds, the Court unambiguously uttered a note of caution to the effect that power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too, in the rarest of rare cases; the Court also warned that the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice.

10. The above-stated principles clearly show that inherent as well as revisional jurisdiction should be exercised cautiously. If the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code in relation to quashing of an FIR is circumscribed by the factum and caution afore-noticed, in that event, the revisional jurisdiction, particularly while dealing with framing of a charge, has to be even more limited.

Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the 'record of the case' and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the Section exists, then the Court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code.

It may also be noticed that the revisional jurisdiction exercised by the High Court is in a way final and no inter court remedy is available in such cases. of course, it may be subject to jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Normally, a revisional jurisdiction should be exercised on a question of law. However, when factual appreciation is involved, then it must find place in the class of cases resulting in a perverse finding. Basically, the power is required to be exercised so that justice is done and there is no abuse of power by the court. Merely an apprehension or suspicion of the same would not be a sufficient ground for interference in such cases.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1407 of 2012 

Decided On: 13.09.2012

Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.K. Patnaik and Swatanter Kumar, JJ.

Author: Swatanter Kumar, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0746/2012, (2012)9 SCC 460.

Print Page

Bombay HC: FIR Won't Stand Quashed If Revision Court Sets Aside Magistrate's Order For Police Investigation Into Cognizable Offence

To equip the revisional court to exercise the discretion in a correct manner, it may be advantageous for the revisional court to ascertain whether, pursuant to the direction of the Magistrate, FIR has, in fact, been registered. Two situations are conceivable : pre and post-registration of FIR pursuant to the order by the Magistrate. {Para 125}

126. (a) If the FIR is yet not registered, an interim order passed by the revisional court, staying effect and operation of the impugned order Under Section 156(3), will have full play and the investigating agency cannot proceed to register the FIR and enter into investigation lest the order passed by the revisional court would be denuded of the meaning and content.

(b) Such an interim order before the registration of the FIR will operate with full force and vigor, irrespective of the nature of the infirmity in the impugned order which weighed with the revisional court to stay such an order.

(c) On the other hand, if the FIR has already been registered, before the revisional court passes an interim order, then the nature of the infirmity in the impugned order may become relevant.

(d) If the revisional court finds that the impugned order suffers from jurisdictional error, (of the nature referred to in Para Nos. 119, 120 and 122 above), in our considered view, the revisional court must be construed to have the power to stay further proceedings pursuant to the registration of the FIR if the matter is still at the stage of investigation.

(e) We hasten to add that while passing such an order of stay of the proceedings at the stage of investigation, the revisional Court ought to record reasons which weighed with the court to hold that there appears a jurisdictional error in passing an order Under Section 156(3) of the Code and thereupon, in terms, direct that the further proceedings be stayed.

(f) However, where the investigation culminates into lodging of the chargesheet and/or cognizance has been taken by the jurisdictional court, the interim order or final order passed by the revisional court setting aside the order passed by the Magistrate Under Section 156(3), will not have the effect of quashing the resultant prosecution.

127. We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the submission of Mr. Desai that the view that after FIR is registered revision is not an efficacious remedy, would render the statutory remedy of revision redundant. The order passed by the revisional Court setting aside a direction for investigation, even after registration of the FIR, cannot be said to be bereft of any utility. If such an order is passed before the completion of investigation, the investigating agency may take the same into account in determining the course the investigation shall culminate into. If such an order is passed, post lodging of the chargesheet, the jurisdictional Magistrate may have the benefit of the said order at the stage of taking cognizance or during the course of the inquiry, as envisaged by the Code. The High Court may also have due regard to the order of the revisional Court while considering the prayer for quashing the FIR and/or prosecution in exercise of writ or inherent jurisdiction.

128. The conspectus of aforesaid discussion is that in our view, the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Kailash Dattatraya Jadhav (supra), that in a case where on the basis of an order Under Sub-section (3) of Section 156 of the Code, FIR is registered, the remedy of revision under the Code, is not an efficacious remedy, lays down the correct position in law.

[O] ANSWERS

129. We are, therefore, inclined to answer question (i) in the negative. As regards question (ii), in our view, the revisional Court can interfere with an order Under Section 156(3) at the stage and to the extent indicated in paragraph 126 above. The Reference is answered accordingly.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition Nos. 2517 of 2022, 

Decided On: 10.04.2024

Arun P. Gidh and Ors. Vs. Chandraprakash Singh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Revati Mohite Dere, N.J. Jamadar and Sharmila U. Deshmukh, JJ.

Author: N.J. Jamadar, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/2292/2024.

Print Page