Whether high court can debar convicted advocate from practising in court till contempt is purged?

 We may now come to the direction to be issued to the
Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh or to the Bar Council of India.
In the present case, inspite of direction of the High Court as
long back as more than ten years, no action is shown to
have been taken by the Bar Council. Notice was issued by
this Court to the Bar Council of India on 27th January, 2006
and after all the facts having been brought to the notice of
the Bar Council of India, the said Bar Council has also
failed to take any action. In view of such failure of the
statutory obligation of the Bar Council of the State of Uttar
Pradesh as well as the Bar Council of India, this Court has
to exercise appellate jurisdiction under the Advocates Act in
view of proved misconduct calling for disciplinary action. As
already observed, in SCBA case (supra), this Court
observed that where the Bar Council fails to take action
inspite of reference made to it, this Court can exercise suo
motu powers for punishing the contemnor for professional
misconduct. The appellant has already been given sufficient
opportunity in this regard.
46. We may add that what is permissible for this Court by
virtue of statutory appellate power under Section 38 of the
Advocates Act is also permissible to a High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution in appropriate cases on
failure of the Bar Council to take action after its attention is

invited to the misconduct.

 Further, in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under
Section 38 of the Advocates Act, we direct that the licence of
the appellant will stand suspended for a further period of
five years. He will also remain debarred from appearing in
any court in District Etah even after five years unless he
purges himself of contempt in the manner laid down by this
Court in Bar Council of India (supra) and R.K. Anand
(supra) and as directed by the High Court.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 63 OF 2006

Mahipal Singh Rana,  Vs State of Uttar Pradesh

Dated:July 05, 2016.
Citation:2016 CRLJ 3734

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Whether court can discharge accused on the basis of material produced by accused at stage of Section 227 of crpc?

In Union of India v. Profullakumar- 1979 Cr.L.J. 154, this Court has observed that the Judge while considering the question of framing the charge has "the undoubted power to sift and wight the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case against the accused has been made out". However, there Lordships pointed out that the test to determine a prima facie case would naturally dependent upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. "By and large, however, if who view are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him gives rise to some suspicion but not grave suspension, the Judge would be fully within his right to discharge the accused". At the same time the Court cautioned that a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the case by weighing the evidence as if he was conducting the trial is not expected or even warranted at this stage.

An incidental question which emerges in this context is whether the Session Judge can look into any material other than those produced by the prosecution. Section 226 of the Code obliges the prosecution to describe the charge brought against the accused and to state by what evidence the guilt of the accused would be proved. The Next provisions enjoins on the Session Judge to decide whether there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused. In so deciding the Judge has to consider (1) the record of the case and (2) the documents produced therewith. He has then to hear the submissions of the accused as well as the prosecution on the limited question whether there is sufficient ground to proceed. What is the scope of hearing the submissions? Should it be confined to hearing oral arguments alone?

Similar situation arise under Section 239 of the Code (which deals with trial of warrant cases on police report). In that situation the Magistrate has to afford the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard besides considering the police report and the documents sent therewith. At these two State the Code enjoins on the Court to give audience to the accused for deciding whether it is necessary to proceed to the next State. It is a matter of exercise of judicial mind. There is nothing in the code which shrinks the scope of such audience to oral arguments. If the accused succeeds in producing any reliable material at that stage which might fatally affect even the very sustainability of the case, it is unjust to suggest that no such material shall be looked into by the Court at that stage. Here the "ground" may be any valid ground including insufficiency of evidence to prove charge.

The object of providing such an opportunity as is envisaged in Section 227 of the code is to enable the Court to decide whether it is necessary to proceed to conduct the trial. If the case ends there it gains a lot of time of the Court and saves much human efforts and cost. If the materials produced by the accused even at that early stage would clinch the issue, why should the Court shut it out saying that such documents need be produced only after wasting a lot more time in the name of trial proceedings. Hence, we are of the view that Sessions Judge would be within his powers to consider even material which the accused may produce at the stage contemplated in Section 227 of the Code.

But when the Judge is fairly certain that there is no prospect of the case ending in conviction the valuable time of the Court should not be wasted for holding a trial only for the purpose of formally completing the procedure to pronounce the conclusion on a future date. We are under heavy pressure of work-load. If the Sessions Judge is almost certain that the trial would only be an exercise in futility or a sheer waste of time it is advisable to truncate or ship the proceedings at the stage of Section 227 of the Code itself.

Supreme Court of India

Sh. Satish Mehra vs Delhi Administration & Anr on 31 July, 1996

Bench: M.M.Punchhi, K.T. Thomas

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