Bombay HC: Registered Sale Deed Cannot Be Contradicted by an Unregistered Agreement; Trial Court Cannot Act as a Mere Post Office of the Prosecution

 I am afraid this contention cannot be heard in law. The law of this subject is very well settled. The Apex Court in the matter of S.Saktivel (Dead) By Lrs vs. M.Venugopal Pillai And Ors [MANU/SC/0499/2000 : 2000:INSC:395 : AIR 2000 SC 2633] has held that terms of registered agreement can be altered only by another registered agreement. This important fact was not considered by both the Courts. {Para 16}

17. Admittedly, there is a registered document which defines the relationship between the First Informant and the present Applicants as that of Vendor and Seller. This is a document which is in the nature of sale-deed. Since the payment has been paid and the title has been transferred therefore, there is no question of their being any contrary interpretation of those documents. The reliance on the part of the First Informant upon the un-registered separate agreement dated 07.05.2014 and the Paratfed Agreement (re-payment agreement) dated 09.10.2016 is without any substance in as much as there documents were never executed by the Applicants but it was executed only by the Accused No. 1.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (KOLHAPUR BENCH)

Criminal Application No. 921 of 2025

Prabhakar Rajaram Kshirsagar and Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sandesh D. Patil, J.

Decided On: 24.07.2026

Citation: MANU/MH/5420/2026

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Supreme Court: What basic principles the court should follow while deciding application for discharge of accused?

ABSENT A STRONG SUSPICION, AN ACCUSED CAN BE DISCHARGED

14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the view that before proceeding with the matter, it is essential to outline the legal principles to be kept in mind by the Court while deciding an application seeking discharge.

“21. In the decision in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia [Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 285] , this Court held that the word “ground” in Section 227CrPC, did not mean a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial.

22. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488] , after extracting Section 227CrPC, this Court in paras 10 and 11 held thus: (SCC pp. 401-402)

“10. … If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.

11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.”

23. In para 13 in P. Vijayan case [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488] , this Court took note of the principles enunciated earlier by this Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] which reads thus: (Prafulla Kumar Samal case [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] , SCC p. 9, para 10)

“10. … (1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out.

(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to  discharge the accused.

(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.”

16. In M.E. Shivalingamurthy vs. Central Bureau of Investigation

Bengaluru, (2020) 2 SCC 768, this Court has held as under:-

“17.This is an area covered by a large body of case law. We refer to a recent judgment which has referred to the earlier decisions viz. P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and discern the following principles:

17.1. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused.

17.2. The trial Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution.

17.3. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court.

17.4. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, “cannot show that the accused committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial”.

17.5. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the

grave suspicion.

17.6. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons.

17.7. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true.

17.8. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which

can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the accused.

18. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged under Section 227 CrPC (see State of J&K v. Sudershan Chakkar). The expression, “the record of the case”, used in Section 227 CrPC, is to be understood as the documents and the articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. At the stage of framing of the charge, the submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the police (see State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi).” (emphasis supplied)

17. Consequently, at the stage of discharge, a strong suspicion suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be found on some material which can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.5146 OF 2025

TUHIN KUMAR BISWAS @ BUMBA Vs THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL 

Author: MANMOHAN, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 1373.

Dated: December 02, 2025.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: The court should consider plea of Accused On Applicability Of Section 300 CrPC before framing of the charge

At this stage, Section 227 Code of Criminal Procedure is required to be referred to, which reads as under:

227. Discharge - If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the Accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused, he shall discharge the Accused and record his reasons for so doing.

7. On a fair reading of Section 227 Code of Criminal Procedure, if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the Accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused, he shall discharge the Accused and record his reasons for doing so. As per Section 228 Code of Criminal Procedure only thereafter and if, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the Accused has committed an offence, the trial Court shall frame the charge. Therefore, as rightly submitted by Shri Siddhartha Dave, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant-Accused that the stage of discharge Under Section 227 Code of Criminal Procedure is a stage prior to framing of the charge (Under Section 228 Code of Criminal Procedure) and it is at that stage alone that the court can consider the application Under Section 300 Code of Criminal Procedure. Once the court rejects the discharge application, it would proceed to framing of charge Under Section 228 Code of Criminal Procedure.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2249 of 2022 

 Chandi Puliya Vs. The State of West Bengal

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.R. Shah and C.T. Ravikumar, JJ.

Author:M.R. Shah, J.

Decided On: 12.12.2022

Citation: MANU/SC/1604/2022

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Supreme Court: Deemed University would come within Ambit of Prevention of Corruption Act

The point of contention relates to whether a deemed University would be included within the ambit of the PC Act, particularly Under Section 2(c)(xi) of the same, where the word used is "University". The learned senior Counsel for the Appellant-State submits that the word "University" as used in Section 2(c)(xi) of the Act, must be purposively interpreted. An institution which is "deemed to be a University" under the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 [UGC Act] plays the same role in society as a "University". These institutions have the common public duty of granting degrees, which are ultimately qualifications recognized in society. As such, an institution which is "deemed to be University", such as the institution in the present case, is included within the ambit of the term "University" used under the Act.

34. On a perusal of Section 2(c) of the PC Act, we may observe that the emphasis is not on the position held by an individual, rather, it is on the public duty performed by him/her. In this regard, the legislative intention was to not provide an exhaustive list of authorities which are covered, rather a general definition of 'public servant' is provided thereunder. This provides an important internal evidence as to the definition of the term "University".

42. Under the UGC Act, University is defined and recognized Under Section 2(f) in the following manner:

University" means a University established or incorporated by or under a Central Act, a Provincial Act or a State Act, and includes any such institution as may, in consultation with the University concerned, be recognized by the Commission in accordance with the Regulations made in this behalf under this Act.

43. A 'deemed to be University' is recognized Under Section 3 of the UGC Act, in the following manner:

Application of Act to institutions for higher studies other than Universities

3. The Central Government may, on the advice of the Commission, declare by notification in the Official Gazette, that any institution for higher education, other than a University, shall be deemed to be a University for the purposes of this Act, and on such a declaration being made, all the provisions of this Act shall apply to such institution as if it were a University within the meaning of Clause (f) of Section 2.

44. As discussed earlier, the object of the PC Act was not only to prevent the social evil of bribery and corruption, but also to make the same applicable to individuals who might conventionally not be considered public servants. The purpose under the PC Act was to shift focus from those who are traditionally called public officials, to those individuals who perform public duties. Keeping the same in mind, as rightly submitted by the learned senior Counsel for the Appellant-State, it cannot be stated that a "Deemed University" and the officials therein, perform any less or any different a public duty, than those performed by a University simpliciter, and the officials therein.

45. Therefore, for all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the High Court was incorrect in holding that a "Deemed University" is excluded from the ambit of the term "University" Under Section 2(c)(xi) of the PC Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 989 of 2018

Decided On: 27.04.2020

 State of Gujarat  Vs.  Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.V. Ramana, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Ajay Rastogi, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SC/0417/2020

Authored By : N.V. Ramana, Ajay Rastogi

N.V. Ramana, J.

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Whether court can discharge accused considering his defence?

This is an area covered by a large body of case law. We refer to a recent judgment which has referred to the earlier decisions, viz., P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and Anr. MANU/SC/0058/2010 : (2010) 2 SCC 398 and discern the following principles:

i. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the Trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the Accused.

ii. The Trial Judge is not a mere Post Office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution.

iii. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the Police or the documents produced before the Court.

iv. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the Accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, "cannot show that the Accused committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial".

v. It is open to the Accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion.

vi. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons.

vii. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true.

viii. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the Accused.

15. The defence of the Accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the Accused seeks to be discharged Under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (See State of J & K v. Sudershan Chakkar and Anr. MANU/SC/0383/1995 : AIR 1995 SC 1954). The expression, "the record of the case", used in Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is to be understood as the documents and the articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the Accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. At the stage of framing of the charge, the submission of the Accused is to be confined to the material produced by the Police (See State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi MANU/SC/1010/2004 : AIR 2005 SC 359).

In view of the decisions of this Court that the Accused can only rely on the materials which are produced by the prosecution, it must be understood that the grave suspicion, if it is established on the materials, should be explained away only in terms of the materials made available by the prosecution. No doubt, the Accused may appeal to the broad probabilities to the case to persuade the court to discharge him.

 It is, no doubt, true that there may not be any other material to link the Appellant with various other acts and omissions which have been alleged against the first Accused in particular along with the fifth Accused and other Accused. However, the fact remains, if the defence of the Appellant is not to be looked into, which included the practice obtaining in the past whenever the firm was reconstituted, and also the version of the Appellant that he did in fact speak with the Deputy Director (Legal) and acted on his advice and further that this fact would be established if the Deputy Director (Legal) was questioned in his presence, they would appear to be matter which may not be available to the Appellant to press before the court considering the application Under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 957 of 2017

Decided On: 07.01.2020

M.E. Shivalingamurthy  Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, Bengaluru

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Kishan Kaul and K.M. Joseph, JJ.

Citation: (2020) 2 SCC 768

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Whether judge should record detailed reasons for framing of charge in session trial?

After referring to Amit Kapoor, in Dinesh Tiwari v. State of

Uttar Pradesh and another (2014) 13 SCC 137, the Supreme Court held that for framing charge under Section 228 Crl.P.C., the judge is not required to record detailed reasons as to why such charge is framed. On perusal of record and hearing of parties, if the judge is of the opinion that there is sufficient ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence triable by the Court of Session, he shall frame the charge against the accused for such offence.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1820 OF 2019

BHAWNA BAI Vs   GHANSHYAM 

R. BANUMATHI, J.

Dated: December 03, 2019.

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Precaution to be taken by court while deciding application for discharge of accused

“What are the factors to be considered by the court at the

time of disposal of an application under Section 227 of Cr.P.C.

 (e) When the court shall frame charges?”

21. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties have

submitted that there being no material in the statements recorded under

Section 161 of Cr.P.C. the learned trial court ought to have discharged the

accused persons. They also contended that since there is no material to go

for a trial, charges ought not to have been framed. Prior to delving into the

issue it would be profitable to refer to under Sections 227 and 228 of Cr.P.C.

Section 227. If upon consideration of the record of the case and the

documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the

accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that thereis not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall

discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.

Section 228. (1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid,

the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused

has committed an offence which-

(a) Is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a

charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the

Chief Judicial Magistrate, [ or any other Judicial Magistrate of the first class

and direct the accused to appear before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, or as

the case may be, the Judicial Magistrate of the first class, on such date as

he deems fit, and thereupon such Magistrate] shall try the offence in

accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant-cases instituted on a

police report;

(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge

against the accused.

(2)Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub-section (1),

the charge shall be read and explained to the accused and the accused shall

be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be

tried.

22. It is needless to say that Section 227 and Section 228 Cr.P.C. can

be termed as a precious safeguard i.e. pre-battle protection conferred upon

the accused by the statute.

23. In Section 227 Cr.P.C. the legislature in its wisdom used the

words ‘there is a sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused’whereas in Section 228(1) Cr.P.C. the legislature very consciously used the

words ‘there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an

offence.’

24. If we consider the said Section 227 Cr.P.C. very meticulously we

would find that discharge is possible if there is no sufficient ground

(emphasis supplied). In Section 228 Cr.P.C., the Court is empowered to see

if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence.

For the purpose of discharge sufficient ground is required but in case of

framing of charge only ground is required. The legislature very

conscientiously omitted the word ‘sufficient’ in Section 228 Cr.P.C.

25. On a conjoint reading of section 227 and Section 228 it appears to

me that the Court is to be satisfied itself only to the extent that the

allegation raised against the accused is either grossly frivolous or there is

any suspicion/presumption that the offence has been committed. Be it

mentioned, that the Court should be very cautious in allowing an

application Section 227 Cr.P.C. because without affording any opportunity

to the prosecution to substantiate the allegation through witness, the

accused gets an escape from the net of law. The Court is to see if any

material for presumption is there or not. If the answer is affirmative, charge

has to be framed.

26. While dealing with such situation, the Court is not supposed to

make an in depth study about the evidence to be carried by the prosecution

during the trial. It is not the duty of the Court to consider every nitty-gritty

of the case and to sift and weigh the materials of case diary by making a

roving enquiry, to find out the probative value of evidence to be led. Itpostulates just exercise of judicial mind of the Judge concerned. The test

that can be adopted by the Court is to consider if the statements and

documents collected during investigation are taken to be true would be

sufficient to uphold the charge or not.

 IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

(CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION)

C.R.R. No. 1396 of 2011

Ahok Kr. Todi vs. C.B.I.

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Whether court can discharge accused after framing of charge?

The question raised in the present case about discharge of an

accused at the stage of consideration of an application under Section 216

Cr.P.C. was directly involved in the case of Tapati Bag Vs. Patitpaban

Ghosh & Ors. (supra). A learned Single Bench of the Hon'ble Calcutta

High Court after considering the provisions of Sections 227, 228 and 216

Cr.P.C. held that it is needless to mention that the question whether

charge should be framed against the accused or he should be discharged

has to be considered simultaneously and if on such consideration the Court

thinks that the accused should not be discharged and rather charge should

be framed against him, in that case the charge has to be framed against

the accused. It is evident from the scheme of the provisions of the

Chapter-XVIII of the Criminal Procedure Code as well as from the logic of

the sequence that once the Court decides to frame charge under Section

228 Cr.P.C., there is no question of discharging him at a later stage by

exercising the power under Section 227 Cr.P.C. Once charge has been

framed under Section 228 the trial has to proceed according to the

procedure provided in the sections following the Section 228 Cr.P.C. and

the process cannot be put to back-gear for discharging the accused

thereafter under Section 227 Cr.P.C. Where a charge has been framed by

the Court of Session under Section 228, the said Court thereafter cannot

discharge the accused under Section 227 Cr.P.C. Even if an accused

against whom a charge has been framed under Section 228 Cr.P.C. feels

aggrieved by the framing of charge he has either to face the trial or he

may approach the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction. If the Court of

Session remains free to discharge an accused on reconsideration

under Section 227 even after a charge has been framed under Section

228, in that case it would be open to the accused persons against whom

charge has already been framed to move the same Court one after another

for reconsideration and discharge on repeated occasions thereby making it

practically impossible to proceed with the trial of the case expeditiously or

at all, even if such moves lack merit. After taking into consideration

Section 216 Cr.P.C., it was further held that a plain reading of the section

would show that the alteration or addition referred to therein contemplates

modification of or addition to charge but not discharging an accused in

respect of a charge already framed so as to bring the trial itself to an end

in respect of such accused. There may be addition of a new charge or

even substitution of a charge in an appropriate case but Section 216 does

not contemplate discharge of an accused or the termination of the trial in

respect of any accused. Sub-section (2) requires that every alteration or

addition to a charge has to be read and explained to the accused. The

question of reading and explaining such alteration or addition would be

meaningless in a good number of cases if discharge is contemplated by

such alteration or addition. Sub-sections (3) and (4) speak of proceeding

with the trial or of directing a new trial or adjourning the trial. This also is

a clear indication that any alteration or addition to charge shall not be of

such nature as to get the accused discharged and bring the trial to an end

in respect of that accused. Sub-section (5) requires that where the altered

or added charge is one for the prosecution of which previous sanction is

necessary, the case shall not be proceeded with until such sanction is

obtained, unless sanction has been already obtained on the same facts.

Here also the sub-section contemplates of proceeding with the trial with

fresh sanction, if necessary, and not ending the trial in respect of any13

accused by any obliteration of the charge. It is therefore evident

that Section 216 does not empower the court to discharge an accused and

bring the trial itself to an end in respect of an accused against whom a

charge has already been framed, without following the procedure

prescribed in the Code regarding the trial of a case. It was also held that

Section 227 being designed for a particular stage of the judicial proceeding

one cannot revert to that provision when that stage has already been

crossed. It was also held that the Court of Session has no power to

discharge an accused under Section 227 once a charge under Section 228

has already been framed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT JAIPUR

BENCH JAIPUR

S.B.Criminal Revision Petition No.577/2015

Smt.Anita Singh V State of Rajasthan 

Dated:12-9-2016

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Whether court can discharge accused on the basis of material produced by accused at stage of Section 227 of crpc?

In Union of India v. Profullakumar- 1979 Cr.L.J. 154, this Court has observed that the Judge while considering the question of framing the charge has "the undoubted power to sift and wight the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case against the accused has been made out". However, there Lordships pointed out that the test to determine a prima facie case would naturally dependent upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. "By and large, however, if who view are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him gives rise to some suspicion but not grave suspension, the Judge would be fully within his right to discharge the accused". At the same time the Court cautioned that a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the case by weighing the evidence as if he was conducting the trial is not expected or even warranted at this stage.

An incidental question which emerges in this context is whether the Session Judge can look into any material other than those produced by the prosecution. Section 226 of the Code obliges the prosecution to describe the charge brought against the accused and to state by what evidence the guilt of the accused would be proved. The Next provisions enjoins on the Session Judge to decide whether there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused. In so deciding the Judge has to consider (1) the record of the case and (2) the documents produced therewith. He has then to hear the submissions of the accused as well as the prosecution on the limited question whether there is sufficient ground to proceed. What is the scope of hearing the submissions? Should it be confined to hearing oral arguments alone?

Similar situation arise under Section 239 of the Code (which deals with trial of warrant cases on police report). In that situation the Magistrate has to afford the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard besides considering the police report and the documents sent therewith. At these two State the Code enjoins on the Court to give audience to the accused for deciding whether it is necessary to proceed to the next State. It is a matter of exercise of judicial mind. There is nothing in the code which shrinks the scope of such audience to oral arguments. If the accused succeeds in producing any reliable material at that stage which might fatally affect even the very sustainability of the case, it is unjust to suggest that no such material shall be looked into by the Court at that stage. Here the "ground" may be any valid ground including insufficiency of evidence to prove charge.

The object of providing such an opportunity as is envisaged in Section 227 of the code is to enable the Court to decide whether it is necessary to proceed to conduct the trial. If the case ends there it gains a lot of time of the Court and saves much human efforts and cost. If the materials produced by the accused even at that early stage would clinch the issue, why should the Court shut it out saying that such documents need be produced only after wasting a lot more time in the name of trial proceedings. Hence, we are of the view that Sessions Judge would be within his powers to consider even material which the accused may produce at the stage contemplated in Section 227 of the Code.

But when the Judge is fairly certain that there is no prospect of the case ending in conviction the valuable time of the Court should not be wasted for holding a trial only for the purpose of formally completing the procedure to pronounce the conclusion on a future date. We are under heavy pressure of work-load. If the Sessions Judge is almost certain that the trial would only be an exercise in futility or a sheer waste of time it is advisable to truncate or ship the proceedings at the stage of Section 227 of the Code itself.

Supreme Court of India

Sh. Satish Mehra vs Delhi Administration & Anr on 31 July, 1996

Bench: M.M.Punchhi, K.T. Thomas

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When court should not frame charge against accused?

Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on Kishan Singh v. State of Rajasthan 1995 Cri LJ 3947 in which it was held that when there was no evidence except confessional statements of co-accused to show even prima facie involvement of an accused in activity of transport or possession of contraband, framing of charge under Section 29 of the NDPS Act against the accused was unjustified. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration, 1996 SCC (Cri) 1104 has observed as follows :-

But when the Judge is fairly certain that there is no prospect of the case ending in conviction the valuable time of the Court should not be wasted for holding a trial only for the purpose of formally completing the procedure to pronounce the conclusion on a future date. Most of the Sessions Courts in India are under heavy pressure of workload. If the Sessions Judge is almost certain that the trial would only be an exercise in futility or a sheer waste of time it is advisable to truncate or snip the proceedings at the stage of Section 227 of the Code itself.

Rajasthan High Court

Pradeep Kumar Jain vs State Of Rajasthan on 23 February, 1999

Equivalent citations: 1999 CriLJ 3829, 1999 (3) WLC 455, 1999 (1) WLN 173

Bench: M Yamin

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Supreme Court: Basic principles to be considered by court while framing charge against accused

Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 & 228 of Cr.P.C.

On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Section 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:-

(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. has the undoubted  power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.

ii) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

iii) The Court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the Court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.

v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the Court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.

vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value discloses the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.

vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.

Supreme Court of India

Sajjan Kumar vs C.B.I on 20 September, 2010

Bench: P. Sathasivam, Anil R. Dave

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Whether victim can be heard in application for discharge of accused?

 It is true that normally a victim is not participating in the discharge proceedings under Section 227 Cr.P.C. If in a case wherein the victim is not sufficiently represented by the prosecution and in cases where the interest of the victim is not being adequately protected, there is nothing wrong on the part of the victim in stepping in with a request for being heard, and in such cases, the cries of the victim should not remain unheard. From the aforesaid dictum laid down by the Apex Court it cannot be said that the victim has no right to be heard during the discharge proceedings.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM 

B.KEMAL PASHA, J.

CRL.R.P. No.1903 of 2014

Dated this the 3rd day of December, 2014

DR. AJITH AND ORS.

V

STATE OF KERALA 

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Whether accused summoned U/S 319 of CRPC can be discharged as per S 227 of CRPC?

It was, however, urged by learned counsel for the
appellants that in order to avail of the remedies of discharge
under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C., the only qualification
necessary is that the person should be accused. Learned
counsel submitted that there is no difference between an
accused since inception and accused who has been added as
such under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. It is, however, not
possible to accept this submission since there is a material
difference between the two. An accused since inception is not
necessarily heard before he is added as an accused. However, a
person who is added as an accused under Section 319 of the
Cr.P.C., is necessarily heard before being so added. Often he
gets a further hearing if he challenges the summoning order
before the High Court and further. It seems incongruous and
indeed anomalous if the two sections are construed to mean that
a person who is added as an accused by the court after
considering the evidence against him can avail remedy of
discharge on the ground that there is no sufficient material
against him. Moreover, it is settled that the extraordinary power
under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C., can be exercised only if very
strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the
evidence led before the Court. It is now settled vide the
Constitution Bench decision in Hardeep Singh v. State of
Punjab and Others [(2014) 3 SCC 92] that the standard of proof
employed for summoning a person as an accused under Section
319 of the Cr.P.C., is higher than the standard of proof employed
for framing a charge against an accused. The Court observed for
the purpose of Section 319 of the Cr.P.C., that “what is,
therefore, necessary for the Court is to arrive at a satisfaction that
the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution, if unrebutted,
may lead to the conviction of a person sought to be added as the
accused in the case.” As regards the degree of satisfaction
necessary for framing a charge this Court observed in para 100:-
“100. However, there is a series of cases wherein this
court while dealing with the provisions of Sections
227, 228, 239, 240, 241, 242 and 245 of the Cr.P.C.,
has consistently held that the court at the stage of
framing of the charge has to apply its mind to the
question whether or not there is any ground for
presuming the commission of an offence by the
accused. The court has to see as to whether the
material brought on record reasonably connect the
accused with the offence. Nothing more is required
to be enquired into. While dealing with the aforesaid
provisions, the test of prima facie case is to be
applied. The court has to find out whether the
materials offered by the prosecution to be adduced as
evidence are sufficient for the court to proceed
against the accused further”.
The Court concluded in para 106 as follows:-
“106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie
case is to be established from the evidence led before
the court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of
cross-examination, it requires much stronger evidence
than mere probability of his complicity. The test that
has to be applied is one which is more than prima
facie case as exercised at the time of framing of
charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the
evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to
conviction……..”
10. Thus it does not stand to reason that a person who is
summoned as an accused to stand trial and added as such to
the proceedings on the basis of a stricter standard of proof can
be allowed to be discharged from the proceedings on the basis of
a lesser standard of proof such as a prima facie connection with
the offence necessary for charging the accused.
11. This view is further fortified by the fact that a person is
added as an accused under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C., on the
basis of evidence; whereas an accused is discharged under
Section 227 of the Cr.P.C., on a sifting of material collected i.e.
“the record of the case and the document submitted herewith” in
order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused. In fact it may be noted that the
mandate of Section 228, Cr.P.C., is that the Judge only need be
of “opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused
has committed an offence …..” before framing a charge. In fact
this Court has held in Ajay Kumar Parmar v. State of
Rajasthan reported in (2012) 12 SCC 406 that appreciation of
evidence at the stage of Section 227 of the Cr.P.C., is not
8permissible (vide para 17). It is, therefore, clear that an order for
addition of an accused made after considering the evidence
cannot be undone by coming to the conclusion that there is no
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused without
appreciation of evidence.
12. We are not unmindful of the fact that the interpretation
placed by us on the scheme of Sections 319 and 227 makes
Section 227 unavailable to an accused who has been added
under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. We are of the view, for the
reasons given above that this must necessarily be so since a
view to the contrary would render the exercise undertaken by a
Court under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C., for summoning an
accused, on the basis of a higher standard of proof totally
infructuous and futile if the same court were to subsequently
discharge the same accused by exercise of the power under
Section 227 of the Cr.P.C., on the basis of a mere prima facie
view. 
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 343 OF 2012

JOGENDRA YADAV & ORS. V STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. 

Dated;JULY 15, 2015
S. A. BOBDE, J.
Citation;2015 ALLMR(CRI)3707 SC

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Whether evidence recorded in separate trial arising out of same FIR can be considered while deciding application for discharge of accused?

 Shri Singh was submitting that the informant of the case had made a turn round as regards the First Information Report and had stated that he had filed a case under some misunderstanding and misinformation and the information was not correctly projecting the facts. This Court does not have any business to make any comment on the quality of that evidence of the informant except that which has just been pointed out by this Court, that is to say, that the evidence being an evidence in an appropriately conducted trial under Chapter-XVIII of the Cr.P.C. could not be the part of the case record or documents submitted therewith, that is, the police report and, as such, was completely outside the consideration of the Court. It has its own value and the value is to confront the maker of the statement, if he was to contest the trial on which the petitioners should be put on, to draw his attention to show the falsity of his evidence which might be coming during that trial. Except that particular use which could be made in the light of the provision ofSection 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, that recorded evidence of the informant does not have any value as regards a judge proceeding under Section 227 or 228 Cr.P.C.
Patna High Court

Subidha Devi & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Anr on 16 April, 2015

Citation; 2015 CRLJ2906 Patna

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