Whether complaint can be filed under Repealed Provisions Of FERA During Sunset Period Of 2 Years After Enforcement Of FEMA?

 Shri Tulsi, the learned Additional Solicitor General placing reliance on O. Abdul Aziz v. Addl. Director of Enforcement [MANU/TN/0365/1983 : AIR 1983 Mad 59:(1982) 2 MLJ 359] and A.K.L. Labbai Thambi Maraicar v. Govt. of India, Enforcement Directorate [MANU/TN/0367/1983 : AIR 1983 Mad 102:(1982) 2 MLJ 59] contended that in view of Section 81(2) of the Act read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the power of the Respondents to investigate and enforce the liability or penalty incurred under the Repealed Act is saved, though the Act 7 of 1947 has been repealed Under Sub-section (2) of Section 81 of the Act. The contention of the Respondent is that the Repealed Act, after the Act had come into force in 1973, is a dead corpse and no life into it could be blown with the aid of Section 81(2) of the Act or Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. We find no force in the contention. The effect of the repealed Act by operation of Clause (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act read with Sub-section (2) of Section 81 is that, though the Act obliterates the operation of Act 7 of 1947, despite its repeal, the penalty, liability, forfeiture or prosecution for acts done while the repealed Act was in force were kept alive, though no action thereunder was taken when the Repealed Act was in force. The rights acquired or accrued or the liabilities incurred or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred during its operation are kept alive. Investigations to be made or any remedy which may have been available before the repeal be enforced are also preserved. Such rights, liabilities, penalty, forfeiture or punishment, due to repeal "shall not lapse". The saving clause, thus, aimed to preserve the legal effect and consequences of things done though those effects and consequences projected to post-repeal period. The things done adumbrated in Section 81(2) or Section 6 of the General Clauses Act or penalty or punishment incurred would envisage that the things already done or liabilities, penalty punishment or forfeiture incurred, though happened before the Act came into force, Section 81(2) of the Act empowers to effectuate the liabilities, penalties, etc. as if they have been in existence and amenable to be pursued under the Act or under the Repealed Act by operation of Section 6 of General Clauses Act. What is unaffected by the repeal of the Act 7 of 1947 is a right accrued, etc. There is a distinction between a legal proceeding for enforcing a right acquired or accrued or liability, penalty, forfeiture, punishment incurred and the legal proceedings for acquisition of a right, the former is saved whereas the latter is not. In spite of repeal the right to investigation or to take legal proceedings remain unaffected and preserved as if the old Act continues to be operative. What remains to be done, after the Act came into force, is the quantification, if necessary, after due investigation and legal proceedings and if proved to impose the penalty, forfeiture or punishment. The Court takes cognizance of the offence and not the offender or the acts done. What the Court is to enquire into is whether the Act is incompatible with the repealed Act and whether it manifested any contrary intentions to the Repealed Act. Unless a different intention has been manifested in the Act, the Repealed Act would continue to be operative. Even in a case of bare repeal accompanied by a fresh legislation on the same subject, the provisions of the new Act will have to be looked into to find where and how far the new Act envisages a contrary intention affecting the operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Unless such contrary intention is manifested, liabilities, penalties, forfeiture or punishment under the Repealed Act will continue to exist and remain in force by operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act.{Para 7}

8. We have already seen that the Act did not evince any contrary intention. It merely reiterated the earlier law operating in the field. Therefore, Clause (d) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act gets attracted to the acts done or the penalties of forfeiture or punishment for any offence which had already been committed before the repeal of the enactment, though no criminal proceedings have been actually initiated under repealed enactment before its repeal.

9. In Tiwari Kanhaiyalal v. CIT [MANU/SC/0533/1975 : (1975) 4 SCC 101: 1975 SCC (Tax) 214:1975 SCC (Cri) 312] where prosecution was laid after the repeal of the Income Tax Act, 1922, the contention raised was that saving clauses in Section 297 of 1961 Income Tax Act did not save the punishment incurred under the Repealed Act, therefore, recourse to Section 6 of General Clauses Act cannot be had, was negatived by this Court and it held that the repeal had not affected the liability incurred Under Section 52 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 and it continued even after its repeal. The same view was reiterated in CIT v. M/s. Shah Sadiq & Sons [MANU/SC/0351/1987 : (1987) 3 SCC 516, 524:1987 SCC (Tax) 270]. Accordingly, we hold that despite repeal of Act 7 of 1947 by operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act read with Section 81(2), the penalty incurred by the Appellant continued to subsist and the Respondents are entitled to institute the proceedings, conduct investigation or enquiry and impose such penalty.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2151 of 2011

Decided On: 21.09.2023

First Global Stockbroking Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Anil Rishiraj and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: Abhay Shreeniwas Oka, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1044/2023,2023/INSC/845.

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Whether repeal simplicitor will attract S 6 of general clauses Act?

On the other hand, Mr. Rupesh Kumar, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the Revenue, has taken us though the
impugned judgment and has argued that once there is a repeal

simpliciter, without any savings clause, the whole object of
such a repeal was so that the general rule under Section 6
would apply, as a result of which the law laid down in State
of Punjab vs. Mohar Singh, [1955] 1 SCR 893, would apply.
6) Having heard learned counsel for both sides, we are of
the view that the statement of objects and reasons makes it
clear that over 22 years, the results achieved under the Act
have not been encouraging and the desired objectives for which
the Act has been introduced have failed. Following the advice
of experts, who have examined issues related to the Act, the
objects and reasons goes on further to state that this Act has
proved to be a regressive measure which has caused
considerable dissatisfaction in the minds of the public and
hardship and harassment to artisans and small self-employed
goldsmiths.
7) This being the case, we are of the opinion that the
repeal simpliciter, in the present case, does not attract the
provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act as a
contrary intention is very clearly expressed in the statement
of objects and reasons to the 1990 repeal Act. In this
behalf, it would be apposite to refer to New India Assurance
Co. Ltd. vs. C. Padma and Another, (2003) 7 SCC 713 (para 10)
8) This Court noticed that, in a parallel instance of
simpliciter repeal, Parliament realized the grave injustice

and injury that had been caused to heirs of LRs of victims of
accidents if their petitions were rejected only on the ground
of limitation. This being the case, this Court found that a
different intention had been expressed and, therefore, Section
6-A of the General Clauses Act would not in that situation
apply.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10824 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 26686/2016)

SUSHILA N. RUNGTA  Vs THE TAX RECOVERY OFFICER-
Dated:October 30, 2018.
R.F. Nariman, J.

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When omission will amount to repeal?

 Fibre Board’s case is a recent judgment which, as has
correctly been argued by Shri Radhakrishnan, learned senior
counsel on behalf of the revenue, clarifies the law in holding
that an omission would amount to a repeal. The converse view

of the law has led to an omitted provision being treated as if it
never existed, as Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would
not then apply to allow the previous operation of the provision
so omitted or anything duly done or suffered thereunder. Nor
may a legal proceeding in respect of any right or liability be
instituted, continued or enforced in respect of rights and
liabilities acquired or incurred under the enactment so omitted.
In the vast majority of cases, this would cause great public
mischief, and the decision of Fibre Board’s case is therefore
clearly delivered by this Court for the public good, being, at the
very least a reasonably possible view. Also, no aspect of the
question at hand has remained unnoticed. For this reason also
we decline to accept Shri Aggarwal’s persuasive plea to
reconsider the judgment in Fibre Board’s case. This being
the case, it is clear that on point one the present appeal would
have to be dismissed as being concluded by the decision in the
Fibre Board’s case.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4280 OF 2007
M/S. SHREE BHAGWATI STEEL
ROLLING MILLS …APPELLANT
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE
& ANR. …RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4281 OF 2007
Dated;November 24, 2015.
Citation;(2016) 3 SCC 643

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Whether vested rights can be enforced after repeal of statute under which that right had accrued?

At this juncture, we would like to quote the following passage
from Commissioner of Income Tax, U.P. v. M/s. Shah Sadiq
and Sons  (1987) 3 SCC 516

“14. Under the Income Tax Act of 1922, the
assessee was entitled to carry forward the losses
of the speculation business and set off such losses
against profits made from that business in future
years. The right of carrying forward and set off
accrued to the assesee under the Act of 1922. A
right which had accrued and had become vested
continued to be capable of being enforced
notwithstanding the repeal of the statute under
which that right accrued unless the repealing
statute took away such right expressly or by
necessary implication. This is the effect of Section
6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
 In this case the 'savings' provision in the
repealing statute is not exhaustive of the rights
which are saved or which survive the repeal of the
statute under which such rights had accrued. In
other words, whatever rights are expressly saved
by the 'savings' provision stand saved. But, that
does not mean that rights which are not saved by
the 'savings' provision are extinguished or stand
ipso facto terminated by the mere fact that a new
statute repealing the old statute is enacted. Rights
which have accrued are saved unless they are
taken away expressly. This is the principle behindSection 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The
right to carry forward losses which had accrued
under the repealed Income Tax Act of 1922 is not
saved expressly by Section 297 of the Income Tax
Act, 1961. But, it is not necessary to save a right
expressly in order to keep it alive after the repeal of
the old Act of 1922. Section 6(2) saves accrued
rights unless they are taken away by the repealing
statute. We do not find any such taking away of
the rights by Section 297 either expressly or by

implication.”

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4476 OF 2015
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 24330 OF 2011)
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-19
MUMBAI 
V
M/S. SARKAR BUILDERS 

A.K. SIKRI, J.
Citation; (2015) 7 SCC 579

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