Whether the legislature can set aside an individual decision inter partes by enacting legislation?

 It could thus be clearly seen that the Constitution Bench of learned Seven Judges of this Court clearly held that by a subsequent enactment, the writ of mandamus issued by the Calcutta High Court crystalizing the rights and liabilities between the parties cannot be annulled.{Para 108}

 109. It will also be apposite to refer to the following observation of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, Re. (supra), which reads thus:

76. The principle which emerges from these authorities is that the legislature can change the basis on which a decision is given by the Court and thus change the law in general, which will affect a class of persons and events at large. It cannot, however, set aside an individual decision inter partes and affect their rights and liabilities alone. Such an act on the part of the legislature amounts to exercising the judicial power of the State and to functioning as an appellate court or tribunal.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 456 of 2022, 

Decided On: 11.07.2023

Jaya Thakur  Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai, Vikram Nath and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: B.R. Gavai, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0756/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Whether the government can by a legislative enactment nullify a writ of mandamus issued by the court?

 It could, thus, clearly be seen that this Court has held that the effect of the judgments of this Court can be nullified by a legislative act removing the basis of the judgment. It has further been held that such law can be retrospective. It has, however, been held that retrospective amendment should be reasonable and not arbitrary and must not be violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. It has been held that the defect pointed out should have been cured such that the basis of the judgment pointing out the defect is removed. This Court has, however, clearly held that nullification of mandamus by an enactment would be impermissible legislative exercise. This Court has further held that transgression of constitutional limitations and intrusion into the judicial power by the legislature is violative of the principle of separation of powers, the Rule of law and of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

{Para 114}

118. As such, the said judgment cannot be said to be an authority to hold that by a legislative enactment, a writ of mandamus issued by this Court could be defused.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 456 of 2022, 

Decided On: 11.07.2023

Jaya Thakur  Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai, Vikram Nath and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: B.R. Gavai, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0756/2023.

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What is difference between The words “arising out of” and the expression “arising under”?

 The words “arising out of” have been held, by the Supreme Court, in several decisions, to be words of wide amplitude. One may refer, in this context, to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Renusagar Power Company Ltd. v General Electric Co. 1984 4 SCC 679Dhanrajmal Govindram v. Shamji Kalidas 9 and Doypack Systems Ltd. v. Union of India10. In State of Orissa v. State of Andhra Pradesh11, the Supreme Court held that the expression “arising out of” is wider in scope than the expression “arising under” and would include matters not only “arising under” but also matters “connected with” the instrument under consideration in that case. {Para 25}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

CM(M) 69/2020 & CM APPL. 2707/2020

AVNEET KAUR  Vs SADHU SINGH & ANR .

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Whether provision declared unconstitutional by court gets wiped out of statute book?

 The last limb of argument was qua twin conditions of 45 of the PMLA. Admittedly the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah (supra) declared the Section 45 of the PMLA as it stood then, as unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, but the defects pointed out by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah (supra) were cured by the Legislature and an amendment to section 45(1) was made vide the Finance Act, 2018 (No.13 of 2018). Under the amendment Act, section 45(1) was revived and for the words “punishable for a term of imprisonment of more than three years under part A of the Schedule”, the words “under this Act” were substituted in section 45(1) of the PMLA.{Para 12}

17. No doubt, the legislature has the power to cure the underlying defect pointed out by a Court, while striking down a provision of law and pass a suitable amendment. In State of Karnataka v. Karnataka Pawn Brokers Association (2018) 6 SCC 363 it was held:-

“24. On analysis of the aforesaid judgments it can be said that the Legislature has the power to enact validating laws including the power to amend laws with retrospective effect. However, this can be done to remove causes of invalidity. When such a law is passed, the Legislature basically corrects the errors which have been pointed out in a judicial pronouncement. Resultantly, it amends the law, by removing the mistakes committed in the earlier legislation, the effect of which is to remove the basis and foundation of the judgment. If this is done, the same does not amount to statutory overruling.”

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI 

Decided on : 30th July, 2021 

 BAIL APPLN. 112/2021 and CRL.M.(BAIL) 81/2021; 

BIMAL KUMAR JAIN and NARESH JAIN Vs DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT 

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE YOGESH KHANNA 

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When parents of Judicial officer can be treated as dependent on him for the purpose of medical reimbursement?

 It would also be appropriate to refer the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 13 of the judgment in the matter of State of M.P. and ors vs. M.P. Ojha and anr. - (1982) 2 SCC 554, which read thus:

"13. The expression "wholly dependent" is not a term of art. It has to be given its due meaning with reference to the Rules in which it appears. We need not make any attempt to define the expression "wholly dependent" to be applicable to all cases in all circumstances. We also need not look into other provisions of law where such expression is defined. That would likely to lead to results which the relevant rules would not have contemplated. The expression "wholly dependent"

has to be understood in the context in which it is used keeping in view the object of the particular rules where it is contained. We cannot curtail the meaning of "wholly dependent" by reading into this the definition as given in SR 8 [sic SR 2(8)] which has been reproduced above. Further, the expression "wholly dependent" as appearing in the definition of family as given in Medical Rules cannot be confined to mere financial dependence. Ordinarily dependence means financial dependence but for a member of family it would mean other support, maybe physical, as well. To be "wholly dependent" would therefore include both financial and  physical dependence. If support required is physical and a member of the family is otherwise financially sound he may not necessarily be wholly dependent. Here the father was 70 years of age and was sick and it could not be said that he was not wholly dependent on his son. Son has to look after him in his old age. Even otherwise by getting a pension of Rs.414 per month which by any standard is a paltry amount it could not be said that the father was not "wholly dependent" on his son. That the father had a separate capacity of being a retired Government servant is immaterial if his case falls within the Medical Rules being a member of the family of his son and wholly dependent on him. A flexible approach has to be adopted in interpreting and applying the Rules in a case like the present one. There is no dispute that the son took his father to Bombay for treatment for his serious ailment after getting due permission from the competent authority. It was submitted before us that the father being a retired government servant could himself get sanction for treatment outside the State as a special case from the competent authority. It is not necessary for us to look into this aspect of the matter as we are satisfied that under the relevant Medical Rules, the father was member of the family of his son and was wholly dependent on him and the 2nd respondent was thus fully entitled to reimbursement for the expenses incurred on the treatment of his father and other travelling expenses."

Bombay High Court

Nazera Sadique Shaikh vs The State Of Maharashtra And Anr on 13 February, 2019

Bench: R.M. Borde

                   CORAM : R. M. BORDE AND
                           PUSHPA V. GANEDIWALA, JJ.

DATE : 13th FEBRUARY 2019.

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Whether penal statutes can be expanded by using implication?

 Although we acknowledge the appellant’s
plight who has suffered due to alleged acts of forgery, but
we are not able to appreciate the appellant’s contentions
as a penal statute cannot be expanded by using
implications. Section 464 of the IPC makes it clear that
only the one who makes a false document can be held
liable under the aforesaid provision. It must be borne in
mind that, where there exists no ambiguity, there lies no
scope for interpretation. 
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 359-360 OF 2010

SHEILA SEBASTIAN  V R. JAWAHARAJ & ANR.

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Golden rules for interpretation if two statutes dealing with same subject matter use different language

It is a settled rule of interpretation that if two
Statutes dealing with the same subject use different
language then it is not permissible to apply the
language of one Statute to other while interpretingsuch Statutes. Similarly, once the assessee is able to
fulfill the conditions specified in section for claiming
exemption under the Act then provisions dealing with
grant of exemption should be construed liberally
because the exemptions are for the benefit of the

assessee.

Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 2812 OF 2015

Maharao Bhim Singh of Kota

V
Commissioner of Income-tax,
Rajasthan-II, Jaipur 
Dated:December 05, 2016.
Citation:(2017) 1 SCC 554

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What is modern rule of interpretation of statutes?

In Standard Chartered Bank & Ors. Vs. Directorate of
Enforcement & Ors. (2005) 4 SCC 530, a Constitution Bench while
upholding purposive construction of penal statutes, inter alia, held
that –
“24. The distinction between a strict construction
and a more free one has disappeared in modern times
and now mostly the question is “what is true
construction of the statute?” A passage in Craies on
Statute Law, 7th Edn. reads to the following effect:
“The distinction between a strict and a liberal
construction has almost disappeared with regard to
all classes of statutes, so that all statutes, whether
penal or not, are now construed by substantially the
same rules. ‘All modern Acts are framed with regard
to equitable as well as legal principles.’ ‘A hundred
years ago,’ said the court in Lyons’ case, ‘statutes
were required to be perfectly precise and resort was
not had to a reasonable construction of the Act, and
thereby criminals were often allowed to escape. This
is not the present mode of construing Acts of
Parliament. They are construed now with reference to
the true meaning and real intention of the

legislature.”

In The High Court at Calcutta
Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction
Present :
The Hon’ble Justice Joymalya Bagchi
 C.R.R. 2306 of 2015
 with
 C.R.A.N. 3420 of 2015
 M/s. Gena Marketing Pvt. Ltd. and Anr.
 Vs.
 Somnath Guin
 Citation:2016 ALLMR(CRI)JOURNAL247

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When omission will amount to repeal?

 Fibre Board’s case is a recent judgment which, as has
correctly been argued by Shri Radhakrishnan, learned senior
counsel on behalf of the revenue, clarifies the law in holding
that an omission would amount to a repeal. The converse view

of the law has led to an omitted provision being treated as if it
never existed, as Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would
not then apply to allow the previous operation of the provision
so omitted or anything duly done or suffered thereunder. Nor
may a legal proceeding in respect of any right or liability be
instituted, continued or enforced in respect of rights and
liabilities acquired or incurred under the enactment so omitted.
In the vast majority of cases, this would cause great public
mischief, and the decision of Fibre Board’s case is therefore
clearly delivered by this Court for the public good, being, at the
very least a reasonably possible view. Also, no aspect of the
question at hand has remained unnoticed. For this reason also
we decline to accept Shri Aggarwal’s persuasive plea to
reconsider the judgment in Fibre Board’s case. This being
the case, it is clear that on point one the present appeal would
have to be dismissed as being concluded by the decision in the
Fibre Board’s case.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4280 OF 2007
M/S. SHREE BHAGWATI STEEL
ROLLING MILLS …APPELLANT
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE
& ANR. …RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4281 OF 2007
Dated;November 24, 2015.
Citation;(2016) 3 SCC 643

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How to interprete statutes when both statutes are having non obstante clauses?

There is no doubt that both are special laws. SICA
is a special law, which deals with the reconstruction
of sick companies and matters incidental thereto,
though it is general as regards other matters such
as recovery of debts. The RDDB Act is also a
special law, which deals with the recovery of money

due to banks or financial institutions, through a
special procedure, though it may be general as
regards other matters such as the reconstruction of
sick companies which it does not even specifically
deal with. Thus the purpose of the two laws is
different.
Parliament must be deemed to have had knowledge
of the earlier law i.e. SICA, enacted in 1985, while
enacting the RDDB Act, 1993. It is with a view to
prevent a clash of procedure, and the possibility of
contradictory orders in regard to the same entity
and its properties, and in particular, to preserve the
steps already taken for reconstruction of a sick
company in relation to the properties of such sick
company, which may be charged as security with
the banks or financial institutions, that Parliament
has specifically enacted sub-section (2). SICA had
been enacted in respect of specified and limited
companies i.e. those which owned industrial
undertakings specified in the Schedule to the IDR
Act, as mentioned earlier, whereas the RDDB Act
deals with all persons, who may have taken a loan
from a bank or a financial institution in cash or
otherwise, whether secured or unsecured, etc.
In view of the observations of this Court in the
decisions referred to and relied on by the learned
counsel for the parties we find that, the purpose of
the two enactments is entirely different. As observed
earlier, the purpose of one is to provide ameliorative
measures for reconstruction of sick companies, and
the purpose of the other is to provide for speedy
recovery of debts of banks and financial institutions.
Both the Acts are “special” in this sense. However,
with reference to the specific purpose of
reconstruction of sick companies, SICA must be
held to be a special law, though it may be
considered to be a general law in relation to the
recovery of debts. Whereas, the RDDB Act may be

considered to be a special law in relation to the
recovery of debts and SICA may be considered to
be a general law in this regard. For this purpose we
rely on the decision in LIC v. Vijay Bahadur [(1981)
1 SCC 315 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 111] . Normally the
latter of the two would prevail on the principle that
the legislature was aware that it had enacted the
earlier Act and yet chose to enact the subsequent
Act with a non obstante clause. In this case,
however, the express intendment of Parliament in
 the non obstante clause of the RDDB Act does not
permit us to take that view. Though the RDDB Act is
the later enactment, sub-section (2) of Section 34
thereof specifically provides that the provisions of
the Act or the Rules made thereunder shall be in
addition to, and not in derogation of, the other laws
mentioned therein including SICA.” [at paras 36, 39,
40, and 48]
33. A conspectus of the aforesaid decisions shows that the
Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985
prevails in all situations where there are earlier enactments with
non obstante clauses similar to the Sick Industrial Companies
(Special Provisions) Act, 1985. Where there are later
enactments with similar non obstante clauses, the Sick
Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 has been
held to prevail only in a situation where the reach of the non
obstante clause in the later Act is limited – such as in the case
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – or in the case of

the later Act expressly yielding to the Sick Industrial Companies
(Special Provisions) Act, 1985, as in the case of the Recovery
Of Debts Due To Banks And Financial Institutions Act, 1993.
Where such is not the case, as in the case of Special Courts
Act, 1992, it is the Special Courts Act, 1992 which was held to
prevail over the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions)
Act, 1985.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS._614-615 OF 2016
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CIVIL) NOS. 26170-26171 OF 2008)
M/S MADRAS PETROCHEM LTD.
& ANR. … APPELLANTS
VERSUS
BIFR & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
Citation;(2016)4 SCC1
R.F. Nariman, J.
Dated;January 29, 2016.

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Supreme Court : Basic concept of 'mutatis mutandis'.

Section 3 (2) of the Act which makes the provisions of the principal Act mutatis mutandis applicable to the levy of additional tax is a part of the charging provision of the Act and it does not say that only those provisions of the Principal Act which relate to assessment and collection of tax will be applicable to the proceedings under the Act. Before considering what provisions of the Principal Act should be read as part of the Act, we have to understand the meaning of the expression 'mutatis mutandis'. Earl Jowitt's 'The Dictionary of English Law (1959)' defines 'mutatis mutandis' as 'with the necessary changes in points of detail'. Black's Law Dictionary (Revised 4th Edn. 1968) defines 'mutatis mutandis' as 'with the necessary changes in point of detail, meaning that matters or things are generally the same, but to be altered when necessary as to names, offices, and the like. Houseman v. Waterhouse, 191 App. Div. 850, 112 N.Y.S 249, 251.' In Bouvier's Law Dictionary (3rd Revision, Vol. II), the expression 'mutatis mutandis' in defined as '(T)he necessary changes. This is a phrase of frequent practical occurrence, meaning that matters or things are generally the same, but to be altered when necessary, as to names, offices, and the like. Extension of an 'earlier Act mutatis mutandis to a later Act brings in the idea of adaptation, but so far only as it is necessary for the purpose, making a change without altering the essential nature of the thing changed, subject of course to express provisions made in the later Act. Section 3 (2) of the Act shows that the State Legislature intended not to depart substantially from the Principal Act except with regard in matters in respect of which express provision had been made in the Act. The assumption made by the High Court that the Act was an independent Act having nothing to do with the Principal Act is not correct. The Act only levied some extra sales tax in addition to what had been levied by the Principal Act. The nature of the taxes levied under the Act and under the Principal Act was the same and the Legislature expressly made the provisions of the Principal Act mutatis mutandis applicable to the levy under the Act. The additional sales tax was in the nature of a surcharge over and above what was due and payable by assessee under the Principal Act. The Act, though it had a long title, a short title and other usual features of every statute, could not be, considered as an independent statute. It had to be read together with the Principal Act to be effective. In the circumstances the conclusion reached by the High Court that the two Acts were independent of each other was wrong. 

Supreme Court of India

Ashok Service Centre & Another Etc vs State Of Orissa on 18 February, 1983

Equivalent citations: 1983 AIR 394, 1983 SCR (2) 363

Bench: Venkataramiah, E.S. (J)

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Meaning of phrase “ Laws for the time being in force”

It is also not possible to accept the submission that the expression ''for the time being in force'' will have a nexus with the date of enactment of the Airports Authority of India Act. The expression ''for the time being in force'' merely implies that whenever the question of acquiring the land for the Airport Authority arises, the relevant corresponding laws of acquisition in force at that time can be resorted to. This is the clear thrust of section 19. Its scope and ambit cannot be circumscribed and frozen only to the point of time in the year 1994, when the Airports Authority of India Act was enacted. If such was the intention of the Parliament in framing Section 19, Section 19 would have employed a different phraseology, namely, ''laws at present in force'' instead of the phraseology ''laws for the time being in force". The phraseology ''laws for the time being in force" would necessarily mean laws in force from time to time and not laws in force only at a fixed point of time, i.e. the date on which the Airports Authority of India Act was enacted. The expression ''for the time being" denotes time indefinite and refers to indefinite state of facts which will arise in future and which may vary from time to time.1

Words and Phrases – “ Laws for the time being in force” - The phraseology “ laws for the time being in force” would necessarily mean laws in force from time-to-time and not laws in force only at a fixed point of time. The expression “for the time being” denotes time indefinite and refers to indefinite state of facts which will arise in future and which may vary from time-to-time.

Madras High Court
J.Parthiban vs State Of Tamil Nadu, Rep.By on 27 March, 2008

THE HONOURABLE MR.A.P.SHAH, THE CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
THE HONOURABLE MRS.JUSTICE PRABHA SRIDEVAN

W.P.Nos.36423, 30273, 33336, 34120, 36968,
37018, 37026, 37876, 37071, 37757, 37630, 37357
to 37359 of 2007,

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Doctrine of Lifting the veil- what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly

WHAT CANNOT BE DONE DIRECTLY-CANNOT BE DONE INDIRECTLY:

28. It is a settled proposition of law that what cannot be done directly, is not permissible to be done obliquely, meaning thereby, whatever is prohibited by law to be done, cannot legally be effected by an indirect and circuitous contrivance on the principle of ;quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur at omne per quod devenitur ad illud.; An authority cannot be permitted to evade a law by ;shift or contrivance;.

Supreme Court of India

State Of T.Nadu & Ors. vs K Shyam Sunder & Ors. on 9 August, 2011

Bench: J.M. Panchal, Deepak Verma, B.S. Chauhan

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