Showing posts with label abuse of process of law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label abuse of process of law. Show all posts

Saturday, 16 August 2025

Delhi HC: What basic principles the court should follow while deciding criminal revision?

 It is a settled position of law that the revisional jurisdiction under Section 438 of the BNSS (erstwhile 397 of the CrPC) is to be exercised sparingly and only on specific grounds, that is, when the decision under challenge is grossly erroneous; there is non-compliance with the provisions of law; the finding recorded is based on no evidence or material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These grounds are indicative and not exhaustive, emphasising the need for a well-founded error to justify interference. Fundamentally, the High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, is not to re-appreciate evidence or to arrive at a different conclusion, even if a different view is possible. {Para 66}


67. The Supreme Court has time and again laid down the limitations and contours of revisional jurisdiction in a catena of Judgments, just to note a few. In Amit Kapoor (supra) it was held as under:


" 11. Before examining the merits of the present case, we must advert to the discussion as to the ambit and scope of the power which the courts including the High Court can exercise under Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code.


12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.

20. The jurisdiction of the court under Section 397 can be exercised so as to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of an order passed by the trial court or the inferior court, as the case may be. Though the section does not specifically use the expression "prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice", the jurisdiction under Section 397 is a very limited one. The legality, propriety or correctness of an order passed by a court is the very foundation of exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 but ultimately it also requires justice to be done. The jurisdiction could be exercised where there is palpable error, non-compliance with the provisions of law, the decision is completely erroneous or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily. On the other hand, Section 482 is based upon the maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest i.e. when the law gives anything to anyone, it also gives all those things without which the thing itself would be unavoidable. The section confers very wide power on the Court to do justice and to ensure that the process of the court is not permitted to be abused"

68. In State of Kerala vs Puttumana Illath Jathavedan ; MANU/SC/0100/1999 : 1999:INSC:57 : (1999) 2 SCC 452 the Supreme Court, while examining the scope of revisional jurisdiction, held as under:-

"5. Having examined the impugned judgment of the High Court and bearing in mind the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that in the case in hand, the High Court has exceeded its revisional jurisdiction. In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Crl.Rev.P. 163/2025 and Crl.M.B. 904/2025

Decided On: 29.07.2025

Medha Patkar Vs. V.K. Saxena

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Shalinder Kaur, J.

Citation: 2025 DHC 6199, MANU/DE/5463/2025.

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Sunday, 22 December 2024

Supreme Court Explains 'Henderson Doctrine' : Re-Litigation of Issues That Could Have Been Raised Earlier Is Barred

b. The 'Henderson' Principle as a corollary of Constructive Res- Judicata.

135. The 'Henderson Principle' is a foundational doctrine in common law that addresses the issue of multiplicity in litigation. It embodies the broader concept of procedural fairness, abuse of process and judicial efficiency by mandating that all claims and issues that could and ought to have been raised in a previous litigation should not be relitigated in subsequent proceedings. The extended form of res-judicata more popularly known as 'Constructive Res Judicata' contained in Section 11, Explanation VII of the Code of Civil Procedure originates from this principle.


136. In Henderson v. Henderson reported in MANU/ENRP/1168/1843 : [1843] 3 Hare 999, the English Court of Chancery speaking through Sir James Wigram, V.C. held that where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation and the adjudication of a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties so litigating are required to bring forward their whole case. Once the litigation has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the same parties will not be permitted to reopen the lis in respect of issues which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest but were not, irrespective of whether the same was due to any form of negligence, inadvertence, accident or omission. It was further held, that principle of res judicata applies not only to points upon which the Court was called upon by the parties to adjudicate and pronounce a judgement but to every possible or probable point or issue that properly belonged to the subject of litigation and the parties ought to have brought forward at the time. The relevant observations read as under: -


In trying this question I believe I state the Rule of the Court correctly when I say that, where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a Court of competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the Court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. [...]

140. The fundamental policy of the law is that there must be finality to litigation. Multiplicity of litigation benefits not the litigants whose rights have been determined, but those who seek to delay the enforcement of those rights and prevent them from reaching the rightful beneficiaries of the adjudication. The Henderson Principle, in the same manner as the principles underlying res judicata, is intended to ensure that grounds of attack or defence in litigation must be taken in one of the same proceeding. A party which avoids doing so does it at its own peril. In deciding as to whether a matter might have been urged in the earlier proceedings, the court must ask itself as to whether it could have been urged. In deciding whether the matter ought to have been urged in the earlier proceedings, the court will have due regard to the ambit of the earlier proceedings and the nexus which the matter bears to the nature of the controversy. In holding that a matter ought to have been taken as a ground of attack or defence in the earlier proceedings, the court is indicating that the matter is of such a nature and character and bears such a connection with the controversy in the earlier case that the failure to raise it in that proceeding would debar the party from agitating it in the future. The doctrine itself is based on public policy flowing from the age-old legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium which means that in the interest of the State there should be an end to litigation and no party ought to be vexed twice in a litigation for one and the same cause.

141. The Henderson Principle was approvingly referred to and applied by this Court in State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain reported in MANU/SC/0032/1977 : (1997) 2 SCC 806 as the underlying principle for res-judicata and constructive res-judicata for assuring finality to litigation. The relevant observations read as under: -

3. The principle of estoppel per rem judicatam is a Rule of evidence. As has been stated in Marginson v. Blackburn Borough Council [(1939) 2 KB 426 at p. 437], it may be said to be "the broader Rule of evidence which prohibits the reassertion of a cause of action". This doctrine is based on two theories: (i) the finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions for the final termination of disputes in the general interest of the community as a matter of public policy, and (ii) the interest of the individual that he should be protected from multiplication of litigation. It therefore serves not only a public but also a private purpose by obstructing the reopening of matters which have once been adjudicated upon. It is thus not permissible to obtain a second judgment for the same civil relief on the same cause of action, for otherwise the spirit of contentiousness may give rise to conflicting judgments of equal authority, lead to multiplicity of actions and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It is the cause of action which gives rise to an action, and that is why it is necessary for the courts to recognise that a cause of action which results in a judgment must lose its identity and vitality and merge in the judgment when pronounced. It cannot therefore survive the judgment, or give rise to another cause of action on the same facts. This is what is known as the general principle of res judicata.


4. But it may be that the same set of facts may give rise to two or more causes of action. If in such a case a person is allowed to choose and sue upon one cause of action at one time and to reserve the other for subsequent litigation, that would aggravate the burden of litigation. Courts have therefore treated such a course of action as an abuse of its process and Somervell, L.J., has answered it as follows in Greenhalgh v. Mallard [(1947) All ER 255 at p. 257]: "I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject-matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them. This is therefore another and an equally necessary and efficacious aspect of the same principle, for it helps in raising the bar of res judicata by suitably construing the general principle of subduing a cantankerous litigant. That is why this other Rule has some times been referred to as constructive res judicata which, in reality, is an aspect or amplification of the general principle.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Contempt Petition (C) Nos. 158-159 of 2024.

Decided On: 13.12.2024

Celir LLP Vs. Sumati Prasad Bafna and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation: 2024 INSC 978,MANU/SC/1343/2024.
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Friday, 18 September 2020

Supreme Court: Repetitive filing of applications amounts to abuse of process of law

 Repetitive filing of applications amounts to

abuse of process of law. This application is filed in

spite of the order passed by this Court categorically

stating that no further application for extension of

interim bail shall be entertained. It is no more res

integra that petitions/applications filed repeatedly are

liable to be dismissed with exemplary costs. Therefore,

we dismiss this application with costs of Rs.25,000/-.


S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s).4634/2014


VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY Vs UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 


Date : 15-09-2020 These matters were called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE L. NAGESWARA RAO

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT

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Wednesday, 27 December 2017

Whether complaint can be quashed if there is abuse of process of law?

The Appellant sought quashing of the said complaint on the ground that the criminal complaint was a counterblast to the notice of dishonour of cheque upon which a summoning order had been passed and proceedings Under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were initiated by the Appellant. The Appellant relied on notice of dishonour, a copy of the criminal complaint No. 135 of 2010 filed on 16.10.2010 and order of the Court dated 4.11.2010. Reliance has been placed on the judgments of this Court in Eicher Tractor Ltd. and Ors. v. Harihar Singh and Anr. MANU/SC/8231/2008 : (2008) 16 SCC 763, Mahindra and Mahindra Financial Services Ltd. v. Rajiv Dubey MANU/SC/8354/2008 : (2009) 1 SCC 706 apart from Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque and Anr. MANU/SC/0932/2004 : (2005) 1 SCC 122 : [2004] 4 Crimes (SC) 282 : [2004] 8 Supreme 31.

4. It is submitted that while it is true that in quashing proceedings, the Court could not go into disputed version, but in the present case, the proceedings are clear abuse of process of law.

5. On being asked, learned Counsel for the State fairly stated that the complaint appeared to be absurd.

6. None has entered appearance on behalf of the complainant.

7. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties and perusing the records, we are satisfied that the complaint filed by the complainant is clear abuse of the process of law. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and quash the proceedings against the Appellant.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1774 of 2011

Decided On: 17.06.2016

Ashok Kumar Gupta Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.K. Goel and L. Nageswara Rao, JJ.

Citation: (2017) 11 SCC 239
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Saturday, 8 February 2014

Whether Successive applications for the same relief can be permitted?

 In view of the ratio in SATYADHYAN GHOSAL case (AIR 1960 SC 941), ARJUN SINGH case (AIR 1964 SC 993) and THE UNITED PROVINCES ELECTRIC SUPPLY CO. LTD. case (..supra) successive applications for the same relief cannot be permitted, and they can even be rejected as an abuse of the process of Court.

Supreme Court of India
S.Malla Reddy vs M/S Future Builders Co-Op.Sty. & ... on 18 April, 2013
Citation ;AIR2013SC3693
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