Showing posts with label assessment list. Show all posts
Showing posts with label assessment list. Show all posts

Saturday, 23 October 2021

When will the civil court have jurisdiction to entertain a suit relating to property tax?

  This makes it clear that the Act does not contemplate any valuation or assessment of any building for the liability to tax unless entry with regard to the same is made in the assessment list and the assessment list is prepared after following the prescribed procedure in sections 114 to 1 22 of the Act, issuance of the notice such as the one dated 23-10-1967 without being backed by the list of assessment required to be prepared cannot, in our opinion, create any legal liability to pay the tax. Imposition, levy and collection of taxes are three different stages. The power to collect tax does not come into existence merely by imposing the same. Liability to pay the tax can only arise, as is held in several cases of the highest Court, when the assessment list is prepared after giving the assesses enough opportunity to inspect the same and have their say in the matter. The procedure contemplated under the provisions of sections 114 to 122 furnishes some guarantee to the citizens against the excesses or arbitrariness of the officer to the assessee before the liability is imposed on them.

11. It is also difficult for us to attach any importance to the order dated 16-2-1968 on which reliance was placed by Mr. Deo because the same has not shown to have been passed after giving an opportunity to the plaintiff, respondent and secondly, because the same does not appear to have been based on any assessment list as such prepared after following the procedure prescribed under the Act. As indicated earlier, the plaintiff specifically pleaded in the plaint that assessment list was not prepared and not published and that his objections to the notice dated 23-10-1967 were not investigated in his presence, after giving an opportunity to him of hearing. The defendant could not produce any record at the trial to prove that, in fact any such hearing was given to the plaintiff.

13. On our finding it is difficult for us to hold that defendant's case is merely of an irregular exercising the power to tax preparation of the valid assessment list being the foundation of the debt of tax by the citizens to the Municipality. It is not enough that the Municipality possesses the power to impose the tax, but it must also legally levy tax and collect the same. Any lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Municipality in the matter of levy and collection is liable to be questioned in the Civil Court. As discussed earlier, it is difficult for us to hold that the calculation made in the bill amounted to valuation, assessment or levy under the provisions of the Act. No liability having arisen in the present case, the defendant was not legally entitled to recover any money from the plaintiff. The Civil Suit, therefore, in our opinion is perfectly maintainable and the bar of section 172 cannot arise in the present case. 

Bombay High Court
Municipal Council vs Shivaji Sindhi Co-Op. Hsg. ... on 15 April, 1980
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Saturday, 16 October 2021

Whether Municipal Corporation can recover retrospective property tax by amending assessment list?

 'Subbappa's case, (E)', appears to be an authority for the proposition that alterations made in an assessment list under Section 81(3) have limited retrospective operation i.e. the liability for a rate under an assessment list which is finalised and authenticated during the course of an official year arises in case of inadvertent omissions as from the date 011 which the assessment list is brought into operation and in cases where there has been new construction or alteration of a building during the course of the year from the date on which the building became liable to tax.

But 'Subbappa's case', (E), in our judgment, is no authority for the proposition that a more extensive retrospective operation to an assessment list is intended to be given so as to enable a Municipality to alter the assessment list of previous years. In other words, the assessment list for each year comes to an end on the expiry of the official year and a fresh assessment list comes into existence as from the 1st date of the official year, and the assessment list of the previous year cannot be amended so as to impose fresh liability after the close of the official year.

Bombay High Court
The Chalisgaon Borough ... vs Multanchand Fulchand Sancheti on 24 November, 1955
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Sunday, 7 October 2018

Whether assessment list is a public document which can be directly exhibited?

It cannot be seriously disputed that an assessment register is required to be kept in law and the entries therein are made for the purposes of compilation of an assessment list in cases of revision of assessment of the properties within a Municipal area. This is clearly permitted and required under the relevant Act. The documents, therefore, were clearly admissible and it was not right to keep them out of the record and not to exhibit them. It is, however, an entirely different matter as to the probative value of that document and in particular as to whether from the statements therein by themselves a particular fact is established. That depends upon various other facts and circumstances. The extracts, therefore, are directed to be exhibited.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition Nos. 1448 and 2744 of 1978


Decided On: 04.03.1983

 Sugrabi  Vs.  Cavas Navroji Patel and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.D. Tulpule, J.

Citation: 1984(2) BomCR 277
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Sunday, 25 September 2016

When notice for amendment of assessment list for recovery of property tax is liable to be quashed?

 On a reading of the afore-quoted provisions, it is clear that
while vesting the power in the Committee to amend an
assessment list, the Legislature has taken care to specify
the circumstances in and the grounds on which such amendment
may be made; it has also laid down the manner in which such
amendment or revision of the assessment list is to be made.
Care has also been taken to comply with the principle of
natural justice by making the provision for giving notice to
the person who is likely to be affected by the proposed
amendment giving him not less than a month’s time to tender
objection, if any, to the Committee and allowing him an
opportunity of being heard in support of the objections
raised. Notice to the affected person mandated in the
section is not an empty formality; it is meant for a
purpose. A vague and unspecific notice will not provide
reasonable opportunity to the noticee to file objection
meeting the reasons/grounds on which the amendment of the
assessment list is proposed to be made. Such a notice
cannot be taken to be complying with the statutory
requirement. On perusal of the notice issued to the
Corporation, which is on record, it is evident that the
notice is vague and lacks particulars. It neither states
the reason for/or the ground on which the amendment is
proposed to be made nor does it indicate any material on the
basis of which the revision as stated in the notice is
proposed to be made. It is stated in the notice: "Whereas
your above-mentioned property has wrongly been left out from
the assessment list, whereas it should have/should have been
in the same. Whereas the assessment of this property of
yours was assessed less due to inadvertent mistake/fraud or
intention, which needs amendment thereby".
 It is apparent that the Committee is not sure on which
ground it proposes to proceed for amending the assessment
list. Such a notice not only does not comply with the
statutory requirements, it also defeats the very purpose of
the statutory provisions. Coming to the question of
increase of the capacity of the godown in question and the
rate of rent, neither the discussions in the orders under
challenge indicate any basis for increasing the capacity of
the godown from 1,84,000 to 2,06,656 bags, nor has our
attention been drawn to any primary material in support of
the order. In the circumstances the contentions raised by
the learned counsel for Corporation that notice is vague and
it has been issued without due application of mind and the
grounds stated in the order are based on no material, have
to be accepted. 
 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 
CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 7423 1996
PETITIONER:
FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA
 Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF PUNJAB & OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/12/2000
BENCH:
D.P.Mohapatro, Y.K.Sabharwal

Citation:(2001) 1 SCC 291
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Sunday, 28 August 2016

Whether property tax can be recovered even if there is objection to said assessment list?

This brings us to the last submission of the appellants that there cannot be any recovery of the tax on the basis of the assessment list so published unless the appellants objections were disposed of under section 151. We were at first inclined to hold in the appellants favour. But a closer scrutiny of the provisions of the Act has persuaded us to reject the submission. Once we have held that the assessment list had been properly prepared in the sense that there had been no legal flaw in its preparation and publication, the valuation as mentioned in the assessment list must be given effect to till the time it is revised or amended under sections 151 or 152. In Shibji Khestshi Tacker v. The Commissioners of Dhanbad (supra) it was said that valuation and assessment lists remain in force until they are altered or amended in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Act. Alteration or amendment can take place pursuant to an order under sections 151 or 152. This is also clear from section 153 which says that "every valuation made by the Chief Executive Officer -- -- shall, subject to the provisions of sections 151 and 152, be final". The phrase 'subject to' means that until and unless the assessment list is revised or amended under section 151 or 152, the assessment list would continue to be final. This reading is in keeping with sub section (2) of section 138 which provides that every valuation and assessment list shall be valid from the date on which the list takes effect in the Corporation and until the first day of the quarter next following the competition of a new list, thus indicating that an assessment list is valid from the date of its completion. Such an assessment list is subject to "any alteration or amendment made" and to the result of any application under Section 150. What needs to be emphasised is that the assessment list as prepared is valid and is unaffected by the mere filing of an application under Section
150. If the result of the application is in favour of the owner, the assessment list must be amended to give effect to such result. Unless the application of the appellants under Section 150ends in a result which is different from the assessment list, the assessment list would continue to be operative, and the respondent can recover taxes on the basis of the assessment and valuation list despite the filing of objections under Section
150. Besides the reference to both sections 151 and 152 in Section 153 makes it clear that the same incidence relating to the recovery of taxes pending either the determination of the objections under section 151 or the adjudication of the appeal under section 152, would prevail. If this construction is not put on section 153, it would mean that by merely filing an objection, the objector would be able to effectively stop the realisation of tax on the basis of the assessment list until such time as his objection is heard and decided. This could not have been legislatively intended. As has been seen in this case that although the appellants had filed their objections in 1995, they are still pending. We, therefore, conclude that it is open to the Corporation to recover the tax as determined on the basis of the impugned assessment lists pending disposal of the appellants' applications under Section 151, until and unless, by virtue of an order under Section 151 or 152 passed thereon, the assessment list is amended or altered.
Supreme Court of India
Rai Vimal Krishna & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 7 July, 2003
Bench: Ruma Pal, B.N.Srikrishna.
           CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil)  8263 of 2001
Read full judgment here: click here
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What is acceptable mode of publication of assessment lists?

Nobody disputes that publication and the giving of notice to persons likely to be affected by the assessment list is a must. The appellants have admitted publication of the assessment lists in three newspapers. It is not their case that such publication did not serve the purpose of notifying those who might be affected by the assessment lists, of their existence. Indeed it appears to us that the requirement to notify people by beat of drum is an anachronism which appears to be inappropriate in the present day and age in a large city like Patna. The High Court's apprehension that "holding this provision as directory is likely to cause confusion and mischief in future and it is not for this Court to substitute the wisdom of the legislature with its own by holding that notice by newspaper will be sufficient in place of notice of the spot by beat of drum and placards" is unfounded both in law and in fact. It is an elementary principle of interpretation that words in statutory provisions take their colour from their context and object, keeping pace with the time when the word is being construed. When or where no other means of effective publication is available, no doubt, announcing the assessment list by beat of drum and by displaying placards would have to be complied with. Where equally efficacious, if not better, modes of publication are available, it would be ridiculous to insist on an obsolete form of publication as if it were a ritual. Had the High Court found that publication by newspapers was not effective enough to notify the public, the assessment list could not be given effect to unless publication were properly made. There is no such finding. On the other hand publication through newspapers is now an accepted form of giving general notice. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the portion of section 149 (1) which deals with the manner of publication, as opposed to the requirement for publication per se, is directory. Since there has been sufficient compliance in effecting the intention of the legislature to give notice to the public at large in the city of Patna, we cannot hold that the assessment lists prepared on the basis of the 1993 Rules are required to be set aside.
Supreme Court of India
Rai Vimal Krishna & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 7 July, 2003
Bench: Ruma Pal, B.N.Srikrishna.
           CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil)  8263 of 2001

Citation:2003 AIR SCW 3360:2003(5)Scale 184:
2003(4) supreme 417
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Leading Judgment on Assessment of properly tax

 The  Court laid  down  the  following  principles  for
determining rateable  value in respect of four categories of
properties involved  in these  appeals and  writ  petitions.
[452D]
       (A)  Where  the properties  arc  self-occupied i.e.
Occupied by the owners:
      4.  1. Where  the premises  are self-occupied and have
not been  let out  to any tenant, it would still be possible
to determine  the standard rent of the premises on the basis
of hypothetical  tenancy. The  question in such a case would
be as  to what would be the standard rent of the premises if
they were  lot out  to a  tenant.  Obviously, in  such  an
eventuality the  standard rent would be determinable on the
principles set out in sub-section (1) (A) (2) lb) of Section
6 of  the Rent Act. The  standard rent  would be  the rent
calculated on  the basis of 7 1/2 per cent or 8.1/4 per cent
per annum  of the aggregate amount of the reasonable cost of
construction and  the market  price of the land comprised in
the  premises on  the   date of   commencement   of  the
construction- [462H; 463A]
      4. 2. It is difficult to see how the provision enacted
in sub-section (2) (b)  of Section  6 can  be applied  for
determining the  standard rent of  the  premises  when  the
premises have  not been  actually let  out at any time. Sub-
section (2)  (b) of  Section 6 clearly contemplates  a case
where there  is  actual  letting  out  of  the premises  as
distinct from  hypothetical letting  out, because under this
provision, the annual rent agreed upon between the landlord
and the tenant at the time of first letting out is deemed to
be the rent for a period of five years from the date of such
letting out  and it is impossible to imagine how the concept
of first  letting out can fit in with anything except actual
letting out and how the period of five years can be computed
from the  date of  any hypothetical  letting out. It is only
from the date of first actual letting out that the period of
five years  can begin  to run  and for this period  of five
years, the  annual rent agreed upon between the landlord and
the tenant  at the time of first actual letting out would be
deemed lo  be the  standard rent.  Sub-section (2)  (b)  of
Section 6  can have  no application where there is no actual
letting  out  and  hence  in  case  of premises  which  are
constructed on or after 9th June, 1955 and which have never
been let  out at  any  time,  the  standard  rent  would  be
determinable on  the principles laid down in sub-section (1)
(A) (2)  (b) of  Section 6. So also in case f premises which
have been  constructed before  9th June,  1955 but after 2nd
June, 1951  the standard  rent would,  for like  reasons, be
determinable under the provisions of sub-section (1) (A) (2)
(b) of Suction 6  if they have not been actually let out at
any  time   since  their  construction.  But  if  these  two
categories of  premises have  been actually  let out at some
point of  time in  the past,  then in  the  case  of  former
category, the  annual rent  agreed upon between the landlord
and the tenant when the premises were first actually let out
shall be  deemed to   be  the standard rent for a period of
five years from the date of such letting out and in the case
444
of the latter category,  the annual  rent  calculated with
reference to  the rent at which  the premises were actually
let for  the month of March 1958 or if they were not so let,
with reference to the rent at which they were last actually
let out shall be deemed to be the standard rent for a period
of  seven   years  from   the  date  of  completion  of  the
construction of  the premises. However, even in the case of
these two categories of promises the standard rent after the
expiration of the period of five years or seven years as the
case may be, would be determinable on the principles set out
in sub-section (1) (A)  (2) (b)  of Section  6. Thus in the
case of  self-occupied residential  premises,  the  standard
rent determinable  under the  provisions of  sub-section (2)
(a) or (2) (b)  of Section  6 in  cases falling  within the
scope and  ambit of those provisions and in other cases, the
standard rent  determinable under  the provisions  of Sub-
section (1)  (A) (2)  (b) of  Section 9 would constitute the
upper limit of the rateable value of the premises Similarly,
on an analogous  process of  reasoning, the  standard rent
determinable under  the provisions of sub-section (2) (a) or
(2) (b)  of Section  6 in cases falling within the scope and
ambit of  those provisions  and in other cases, the standard
rent determinable  under the  provisions of  sub-section (1)
(A) (2) (b) of Section 6 would constitute the upper limit of
the rateable  value so far as self-occupied non-residential
premises are  concerned. The rateable value of the premises,
whether residential  or non-residential,  cannot exceed  the
standard rent, but, it may in a given case be less than the
standard rent.
         [463E-H; 464A-F]
    (B) Where the properties are partly self-occupied
and partly tenanted:
   5.1. It is the premises as a whole which is liable
to be  assessed to  property tax  and not different parts of
the premises  as distinct  and separate  units.  But  while
assessing the rateable value of the premises on the basis of
the rent which the owner may reasonably expect to get if the
premises are let out, it cannot be overlooked that where the
premises consist of different parts which are intended to be
occupied as  distinct and  separate units  the hypothetical
tenancy which  would have  to be  considered  would  be  the
hypothetical tenancy of each part as a distinct and separate
unit of  occupation and the sum total of the rent reasonably
expected from  a hypothetical  tenant  in  respect  of each
distinct and  separate unit  cannot  obviously  exceed  the
standard rent  of such unit and  the assessing  authorities
would therefore  have to  determine the standard rent with a
view to  fixing the  upper  limit  of  the  rent  which  can
reasonably be expected by the owner on letting out such unit
to a hypothetical tenant.        [466DF]
      5.2.  Where the  case falls within sub-section (2) (a)
or (2) (b) of Section 6, no problem arises, because whether
the distinct and separate unit of which the standard rent is
to be  determined is  self-occupied  or  .enanted  makes  no
difference, for  in either  case, the standard rent would be
governed by  one or  the other of these  two provisions. So
also in  cases falling outside sub-section  (2) (a) and (2)
(B) of Section 6,  it would  make no difference whether the
distinct and  separate unit of which the standard rent is to
be determined  is self-occupied  or tenanted;  for in either
case, the  standard rent  would be  determinable  under  the
provisions of sub-section (1) (A) (2) (b) or (1) (B) (2) (b)
of Section  C. But  the question  is, how is the formula set
out in sub-section (1)  (A) (2)  (b) or  (1) (B) (2) (b) of
Section 6  to  be  applied?  Obviously there  would  be  no
difficulty in applying the
445
formula, if the premises of which the standard rent is to be
determined    consist  of  the entire building.  Then  the
reasonable cost of construction of the building can be taken
and it can be aggregated with the market price of the land
comprised in  the building  on the  date of  commencement of
construction of  the building  and 7  1/2  percent  of such
aggregate amount  would represent  the standard  rent of the
building. But  whore the  building consists of more than one
distinct and  separate units  and the  standard rent  to  be
determined is  that of any particular unit, the formula may
present some difficulty of application if it is sought to be
applied literally  in relation to that particular unit alone
and by itself, because  even if  the reason  able  cost  of
construction of  that particular unit can be ascertained, it
would not  be possible to determine "the market price of the
land  comprised   in  the   premises  on  the  date  of  the
commencement of  construction" since the entire building and
not merely  that particular  unit would  be standing  on the
land and the land on which the building is standing would be
land comprised in the building and  it would be irrational
and absurd  to speak  of  it  as  land  comprised  in that
particular unit.  The formula  can, however,  be applied for
determining the  standard  rent  of  a particular  unit  by
computing the  standard rent  of the  building in accordance
with the formulas and then apportioning the standard rent so
computed amongst the different units of occupation comprised
in the building on  the basis of floor  area, taking into
consideration  differences,   if  any, on  account  of  the
situation and  condition   of  the  various  units  and  the
amenities provided  in such  unit. This  would be  the most
rational way in which the market price of the land comprised
in the building on the date of commencement of construction
can be spread ever amongst the different units of Occupation
comprised in  the building.  The standard  rent of each unit
would have  to be determined on the principles set out above
and within  the upper  limit fixed by the standard rent, the
assessing authorities would have to determine the rent which
the owner  may reasonable  expect get  if such unit were let
out to a hypothetical  tenant  and  in  arriving  at this
determination, the   assessing  authorities  to  take into
account the  same factors  which have already been discussed
in  this   judgment  while  dealing  with  the question  of
assessment of self occupied properties. The sum total of the
rent which  the owner  may reasonably  expect to  Bet from a
hypothetical tenant in respect of each distinct and separate
unit o' occupation calculated in the manner aforesaid, would
represent the reasonably value of the building. This formula
for determination of rateable value would apply irrespective
of whether  any  of  the  distinct  and  separate  units  of
occupation comprised  in the  building are  self occupied or
tenanted.[466G-H; 467A-H; 468A-B]
       (C)   Where  the   land on  which  the property  is
Constructed is lease hold  land with a restriction that the
lease-hold interest  shall not be transferable  without the
approval of the lessor:
      6.1.  Some of  these writ  petitions and appeals  are
concerned with eases where premise have been constructed by
the owners  on land  taken on  sub-lease from  a Cooperative
House Building Society which  has in its turn taken a lease
from the  Government. One  of the  clauses in  the sub-lease
executed by the Cooperative House Building Society in favour
of each  of its  members provided  that the  owner  who  has
constructed pre-
446
mises on  the plot  of land  sub-leased to  him cannot sell,
transfer or  assign his  lease-hold interest  in the plot of
land to  any one  except a  member of  the Cooperative House
Building Society and even so far as sale, transfer or assign
to a  member of  the cooperative  House Building  Society is
concerned, it  can not be made  except  with  the  previous
consent in  writing of the Government which the Government
may give  or refuse  in its absolute discretion, and in case
the Government choose to  give its  consent, the Government
would be  entitled to  claim 50% of the unearned increase in
the value  of the land at the time of such sale, transfer or
assignment and moreover, if-the  Government so  desires, it
would have  a pre-emotive right to purchase the plot of land
after deducting  50 per cent of the unearned increase in the
value of  the plot  of land. This co-tenant in the sub-lease
is clearly  a covenant running with the land and even where
hale, transfer or assignment  of the plot of land has taken
place  with   the  previous  consent  in    writing  of  the
Government  this   covenant  would   continue  to  bind  the
purchaser, transferee or assignee. [469F-H]
      Commissioner of Wealth Tax V. P. N Sikand [1977] 2 SCC
798 referred to.
    6.2. Merely because the plot of land on which the
premises are  constructed cannot  be  sold,  transferred  or
assigned except  to a  member of  Cooperative House Building
Society and  without the prior consent of the Government, it
does not  Necessarily mean that those can be no market price
for the  plot of  land. It  is not  as if  there  is  total
prohibition on the sale, transfer or assignment of the plot
of land,  so that  in no conceivable circumstance, it can be
sold, transferred or assigned. The plot of land can be sold,
transferred or assigned but  only to  one  from  amongst  a
limited class  of persons  namely, those  who are members of
the Cooperative  House Building  Society and  subject to the
Rules and  Regulations, any  eligible person can be admitted
to the membership of the Cooperative House Building Society.
There is  also a  further restriction, namely that the sale,
transfer or  assignment can  take place  only with the prior
Consent  of   the   Government.   But subject   to   these
restrictions, the  sale  transfer  or  assignment  can take
place. It cannot. therefore be said that the market price of
the plot of land cannot be ascertained. [470G-H; 471A-B]
      6.3.  To determine  what would  be the market price of
the plot of land on the date of commencement of construction
of the premises, one must proceed on the hypothesis that the
prior consent  of the Government has been given and the plot
of land is available for sale, transfer or assignment and on
that footing,  ascertain what  price it  would fetch on such
sale, transfer or assignment. Of course  when the class of
potential buyer, transferees or assignees is restricted, the
market price would tend to be depressed. But even so, it can
be ascertained and it would not be correct to say that it is
incapable of  determination. There  is also one other factor
which would  to depress the market price and that stems from
the clause  in the  sub-lease which  provides that  on sale,
transfer or  assignment of  the plot of land, the Government
shall be  entitled to claim 50% of the unearned increment in
the value of the plot of land and the Government  shall also
be entitled  to purchase  the plot  of land  at  the  price
releasable
447
in the market after deducting therefrom 50% of the unearned
increment.  since the leasehold interest of the sub-lease in
the plot  of land is cut down by this burden or restriction,
the market price of the plot of land cannot be determined as
if the leasehold interest  were free  from this  burden  or
restriction This  burden  or  limitation  attaching  to  the
leasehold interest must be taken into account in arriving at
the market  price of the plot of land, because any member of
the Cooperative House Building Society who takes the plot of
land by  way of  sale, transfer or assignment would be bound
by this  burden or  restriction which runs with the land and
that would  necessarily have  the effect  of depressing  the
market price  which be would be inclined to pay for the plot
of land.  This mode of determination of the market price has
the sanction of the decision of this Court in N.S.. Sikand's
Case (Supra). [471C-H]
      In  the instant  case, therefore,  the market price of
the plot of land at the date of commencement of construction
of the premises was  ascertainable  on  the  basis  of  the
formula indicated  above notwithstanding  the restriction on
transferability contained  in the sub-lease and the standard
rent of  the premises  constructed on  the plot  of land was
determinable under  the pro  visions of  sub-section (1) (A)
(2) (b) or [1) (B) (2) (b) of Section 6. The argument of the
Delhi Municipal  Corporation that  in all  such cases resort
has to be made  to the  provisions of sub-section  (4)  of
Section 9  for determination  of the  standard rent  of  the
premises must be rejected [472C-D]
      (D) Where the property has been constructed in stages-
      (7)  When any  adulation is  made to the premises at a
subsequent stage,  three  different  situations  may  arise.
Firstly, the  addition may not be of a distinct and separate
unit of  occupation but may be merely by way of extension of
the existing  premises which  are self-occupied.  In such  a
case the  original premises  together  with  the  additional
structure would  have to be treated as a single unit for the
purpose of  assessment and  its rateable value would have to
be determined  on the  basis of the rent which the owner may
reasonably expect to get, if the premises as a whole are lot
out, subject  to  the  upper  limit  of  the  standard rent
determinable under the provisions of sub.section (1) (A) (2)
(b) of Section 6. Secondly, the existing promises before be
addition might be tenanted and the addition might be to the
tenanted premises  so that  the  additional  structure also
forms part  of the same tenancy. Where such is the case, the
standard rent  of the  premises as  a whole  and within  the
upper limit  fixed  by such  standard rent  the  assessing
authority would  have to  determine the rent which the owner
may reasonably expect to get if the premises as a whole are
let out  as a  single unit  to a  hypothetical tenant and in
such a case, the  actual rent received  would  be  a fair
measure of the rent which the owner may reasonably expect to
receive  from such  hypothetical   tenant  unless   it  is
influenced by  extra. commercial considerations. Lastly, the
addition  may be  of a  distinct  and  separate  unit  of
occupation and in such  a case,  the rateable value of the
premises would have to  be determined on the basis of the
formula laid  down  for  assessing  the  rateable  value  of
premises which are partly self-occupied and partly tenanted.
The same  principles for determining of rateable value would
obviously apply  in case  of  subsequent  additions  to  the
existing premises. [474C-G]
448
     (8) The  formula set out in sub-section (1) (A) (2) (b)
and (1)  (B) (2)  (b) of  Section 6  cannot be applied  for
determining the  standard rent of an  addition, as  if that
addition was  the only structure standing  on the land. The
assessing authorities  cannot determine the standard rent of
the  add   structure  by   taking  the reasonable  cost  of
construction in  the additional  structure and adding to it
the  market  price  the  land  and  applying  the  statutory
percentage of  7 1/2   to  the aggregate  amount. The market
price of  the land  cannot the added twice over, once while
determining the  standard rent of the original structure and
again while  determining the standard rent of the additional
structure. Once the addition is made, the formula set out in
sub-section (1) (A) (2) (b) and (1) (B) (2) (b) of Section 6
can be applied only  in relation to the premises as a whole
and where  the additional  structure consists  of a distinct
and separate  unit of  occupation, the standard rent  would
have to  be apportioned  in  the  manner  indicated  in  the
earlier part of the judgment. [475A-C]
       9.   Merely  because   the  owner  does not  produce
satisfactory evidence  showing what  was the reasonable cost
of construction  of the  promises or the market price of the
land at  the date  of commencement  of the  construction, it
cannot be  said that  it is  not possible  to determine  the
standard rent  on the  principles set out in sub-section (I)
(A) (2) (b) or (1) (B) (2)(b) of Section 6. [473]
Supreme Court of India
Dr. Balbir Singh And Ors.  vs Municipal Corporation, Delhi And 
... on 12 December, 1984
Equivalent citations: 1986 AIR 345, 1985 SCR Supl. (3) 812
Bench: Ray, B.C. (J)
Read full judgment here:click here
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Saturday, 27 August 2016

Whether Commissioner can amend or alter assessment entry of petitioner's property with retrospective effect?

The law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Solapur Municipal Corporation and approved by the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of City of Hubli and further re-iterated in Kalyan Municipal Council is applicable on all fours in the light of the statutory provision contained in Rule 20(1)(e) and definition of the expression "official year" occurring in Section 2(44). Any amendment in the assessment book by inserting or altering an entry in respect of any building erected, re-erected, altered, added to or reconstructed in whole or in part of the assessment book shall be and can only be effective during the currency of official year. The expression "official year" defined under Section 2(44) of the Act of 1949 read with Rule 20(1)(e) indicates without doubt the legal position that the property tax being tax for the official year must be levied only during the official year. In view thereof, it was not open for the Commissioner to amend or alter assessment entry of petitioner's property with retrospective effect. In other words, the demand of property tax raised for the period from 1-4-1985 to 31-3-1990 vide demand notices dated 8-1-1991 cannot be justified and to that extent the notices as well as the demand bills have to be modified.
Bombay High Court
Satish Dattatray Shivalkar vs Pimpri-Chinchwad Municipal ... on 6 February, 2002
Equivalent citations: AIR 2002 Bom 244, 2002 (4) BomCR 183, (2002) 2 BOMLR 25, 2002 (2) MhLj 619

Bench: R Lodha, S Bobde
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Whether municipal taxes can be imposed retrospectively?

 Now I will deal with the aspect in respect of the two categories of cases envisaged under section 82(3). To my mind, it clearly appears that the two categories arise because of the provisions of section 82(1) as it provides for alteration at any time in the assessment list by inserting or altering any entry in respect of any property could be made on three grounds given below viz. (i) that an entry has been omitted, (ii) erroneously made in the assessment list through fraud, accident or mistake or (iii) in respect of any building constructed, altered, added to or reconstructed in whole or in part and where such construction, alteration, addition or reconstruction has been completed after the preparation of the assessment list. The said section provides that if these conditions are fulfilled the standing committee has the right to alter at any time the assessment list by inserting or altering an entry in it. provided of course there is notice given to the aggrieved party and their objections considered. Now the question that arises for consideration is if an entry is thus amended, what is the effect of that amendment? and that is provided by sub-section (3) of section 82 and the said sub-section (3) contemplates three different categories in which a different effect takes place, viz. (i) In the case of a building constructed, altered, added to. or reconstructed, the amendment will take effect from the day on which such construction, alteration, addition or reconstruction was completed; or (ii) On the day on which the new construction, alteration, addition or reconstruction was first occupied whichever of the two occurs first. These two clauses therefore make it clear that the amendment will operate from the date of completion or the date of occupation whichever event occurs first. Then comes the third category of cases, which is a crucial category with which we are concerned, (iii) It is the residuary category. In the cases other than the two mentioned above, the amendment shall become effective 'on the earliest day in the current official year on which the circumstances justifying the entry or alteration existed'. Now therefore though it is true that to the other case the said clause 'on the earliest day in the current official year on which the circumstances justifying the entry or alteration exist' will become applicable, it would clearly mean that the other cases will include the cases which have been entered into because of the omission of the entry or because erroneously they were made in the assessment list through fraud, accident or mistake. Clause (a) in respect of any building constructed, altered, added to or reconstructed in whole or part, where such construction, alteration, addition or reconstruction has been completed after the preparation of the assessment list definitely shows that the said category applies only to the new construction which is made after the preparation of the list. Shri Patankar tried to contend that the new construction admittedly was completed in 1984-85 and it was occupied in 1984 85 itself. Therefore, it is not a new construction which is made after the preparation of the assessment list. It is a construction which was made prior to the preparation of the assessment list, but remained to be included in the assessment list, may be accidentally, fraudulently or for any other reason. If that is so. then it would be included in the category of the other cases and the clause which is under consideration will apply. As. I have already held that sub-rule (3) of Rule 20 which is under consideration, is similar to sub-section (3) of section 82 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act. The said interpretation will apply even in the present case and, therefore, in view of the decision reported in MANU/MH/0143/1971 : 1973 Mh.L.J. 128 =74 BLR 469 which has been approved in MANU/SC/0223/1998 : 1988 (3) SCC 306, view taken by the Appellate Court cannot be said to be erroneous. The Appellate Court has rightly applied the ratio of the said decision and concluded that the amendment could be made only in the current official year and not retrospectively as was sought to be done by the petitioner. The Appellate Court, therefore, was right in setting aside the assessment order and making it effective retrospectively. Hence the petition has no merit and the same will have to be dismissed.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
W.P. No. 284 of 1990
Decided On: 10.12.1990
Appellants: Pimpri Chinchwad Municipal Corporation, Pimpri
Vs.
Respondent: Shiva Dular Misra, Pune
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
I.G. Shah, J.
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Thursday, 7 May 2015

Whether municipal council can appoint private agency to prepare assessment list for imposition of Taxes?

Reading of the above Agreement, to our mind, clearly shows that
the entire job contemplated right from Sections 113 to 170 of the
Act has been entrusted to the said agency by the Chief Officer
who has entered into an Agreement as above. We find that the
aforesaid Agreement and subsequent actions taken by the
Municipal Council with the help of the agency are contrary to the
scheme of the Act as discussed above, and Section 49A of the Act
does not save any of the actions of the Chief Officer for
implementing the resolution of the Municipal Council contemplated
by Section 105 of the Act could be implemented by appointing an
agency, since Section 49A of the Act is inapplicable.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR
Writ Petition No.2585 of 2013
Sandeep Inderchand Gandhi,


Versus
 The State of Maharashtra,

CORAM : A.B. CHAUDHARI AND
P.R. BORA, JJ.

Pronounced on : 12th Dec., 2014.
J U D G M E N T [Per A.B. Chaudhari,J.]:
Citation;2015(2) ALLMR 628
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