Showing posts with label principle of natural justice. Show all posts
Showing posts with label principle of natural justice. Show all posts

Friday, 22 August 2025

Supreme court: What procedure the court should follow while deciding criminal revision against the order of acquittal of accused?

We are not able to understand, on what basis the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction Under Section 401 read with Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could have converted the finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Sub- Section (3) of Section 401 reads thus: "(3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction." {Para 6}


7. There is one another feature which has disturbed us. According to the learned Counsel the High Court proceeded ex-parte without issuing notice to the three Appellants herein in the revision petition, who had already been acquitted by the Trial Court.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 5560-5561 of 2024

Decided On: 29.01.2025

Mahabir and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala,  and R. Mahadevan, , JJ.

Author:  J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation MANU/SC/0122/2025

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Sunday, 3 August 2025

What legal principles the session judge should follow while deciding criminal appeal?

Introduction

The appellate process in criminal cases is a vital mechanism to ensure justice, safeguard rights, and maintain legal integrity in India. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), accused persons have the opportunity to challenge lower court judgments through appeals. However, not every grievance qualifies for appellate intervention. Indian criminal law outlines specific grounds for appeal supported by constitutional guarantees of due process and demands reasoned judgments from appellate courts. This article explores these principles in detail to help legal practitioners, law students, and justice seekers understand the appellate framework.

Grounds for Criminal Appeal in Indian Law

When a criminal appeal is filed, it must be grounded in identifiable and legally recognized errors or issues in the trial court’s decision. The key grounds commonly invoked include:

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Tuesday, 13 June 2023

Whether it is necessary to hear accused before registration of an offence against him?

 The conclusions are summarized below:


i. No opportunity of being heard is required before an FIR is lodged and registered;


ii. Classification of an account as fraud not only results in reporting the crime to investigating agencies, but also has other penal and civil consequences against the borrowers;


iii. Debarring the borrowers from accessing institutional finance Under Clause 8.12.1 of the Master Directions on Frauds results in serious civil consequences for the borrower;


iv. Such a debarment Under Clause 8.12.1 of the Master Directions on Frauds is akin to blacklisting the borrowers for being untrustworthy and unworthy of credit by banks. This Court has consistently held that an opportunity of hearing ought to be provided before a person is blacklisted;


v. The application of audi alteram partem cannot be impliedly excluded under the Master Directions on Frauds. In view of the time frame contemplated under the Master Directions on Frauds as well as the nature of the procedure adopted, it is reasonably practicable for the lender banks to provide an opportunity of a hearing to the borrowers before classifying their account as fraud;


vi. The principles of natural justice demand that the borrowers must be served a notice, given an opportunity to explain the conclusions of the forensic audit report, and be allowed to represent by the banks/JLF before their account is classified as fraud under the Master Directions on Frauds. In addition, the decision classifying the borrower's account as fraudulent must be made by a reasoned order; and


vii. Since the Master Directions on Frauds do not expressly provide an opportunity of hearing to the borrowers before classifying their account as fraud, audi alteram partem has to be read into the provisions of the directions to save them from the vice of arbitrariness.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 7300 of 2022, 

Decided On: 27.03.2023

State Bank of India and Ors.  Vs. Rajesh Agarwal and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.I. and Hima Kohli, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0308/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Sunday, 29 January 2023

Can an adjudicatory body base its decision on any material unless they have given the affected person an opportunity to respond to it?

 It is a well-established principle of administrative law that an adjudicatory body cannot base its decision on any material unless the person against whom it is sought to be utilized has been apprised of it and given an opportunity to respond to it. Surveying the precedents extensively, MP Jain & SN Jain's treatise on Principles of Administrative Law1 notes that:

If the adjudicatory body is going to rely on any material, evidence or document for its decision against a party, then the same must be brought to his notice and he be given an opportunity to rebut it or comment thereon. It is regarded as a fundamental principle of natural justice that no material ought to be relied on against a party without giving him an opportunity to respond to the same. The right of being heard may be of little value if the individual is kept in the dark as to the evidence against him and is not given an opportunity to deal with it. The right to know the material on which the authority is going to base its decision is an element of the right to defend oneself. If without disclosing any evidence to the party, the authority takes it into its consideration, and decides the matter against the party, then the decision is vitiated for it amounts to denial of a real and effective opportunity to the party to meet the case against him. The principle can be seen operating in several judicial pronouncements where non-disclosure of materials to the affected party has been held fatal to the validity of the hearing proceedings. {Para 17}  (emphasis supplied)

39. The following principles emerge from the above discussion:


(i) A quasi-judicial authority has a duty to disclose the material that has been relied upon at the stage of adjudication; and


(ii) An ipse dixit of the authority that it has not relied on certain material would not exempt it of its liability to disclose such material if it is relevant to and has a nexus to the action that is taken by the authority. In all reasonable probability, such material would have influenced the decision reached by the authority.


Thus, the actual test is whether the material that is required to be disclosed is relevant for purpose of adjudication. If it is, then the principles of natural justice require its due disclosure.

(emphasis supplied)

19. On the issue of the impact of such non-disclosure, in T. Takano, summarizing the ratio of the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar2, we noted that:

A Constitution Bench of this Court in Karunakar (supra) held that the non-disclosure of the relevant information is not in itself sufficient to warrant the setting aside of the order of punishment. It was held that in order to set aside the order of punishment, the aggrieved person must be able prove that prejudice has been caused to him due to non-disclosure. To prove prejudice, he must prove that had the material been disclosed to him the outcome or the punishment would have been different. The test for the extent of disclosure and the corresponding remedy for non-disclosure is dependent on the objective that the disclosure seeks to achieve. Therefore, the impact of nondisclosure on the reliability of the verdict must also be determined vis-à-vis, the overall fairness of the proceeding. While determining the reliability of the verdict and punishment, the court must also look into the possible uses of the undisclosed information for purposes ancillary to the outcome, but that which might have impacted the verdict.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 88-89 of 2023, 

Deepak Ananda Patil Vs.The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.I. and Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.

Author:Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.I.

Decided On: 04.01.2023

Citation: MANU/SC/0020/2023

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Saturday, 31 December 2022

Whether Magistrate must heard borrower before Allowing Possession Of Assets U/S 14 of SARFAESI Act?

The SARFAESI Act is intended to facilitate quick recovery of secured debts without extending any opportunity of hearing to a borrower and without judicial/quasi-judicial intervention till such time possession of the secured asset is taken by the secured creditor after serving the requisite notices and responding to the objection/representation that may be lodged/preferred by the borrower under section 13(3A). 

8. Pertinently, section 14 of the SARFAESI Act was amended twice, once in 2013 and then again in 2016. If it were the intention of the legislature to extend opportunity of hearing to a borrower before the District Magistrate/Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, it was free to do so. Advisedly, the legislature did not do so, for, it would have militated against the scheme of the SARFAESI Act and more particularly section 13 thereof. It is implicit in the scheme of the SARFAESI Act that natural justice, only to a limited extent, is available and not beyond what is expressly provided. There seems to be little merit in the argument advanced by Mr. Nedumpara and we hold that the language of section 14 is too clear and unambiguous, and does not admit of any requirement of complying with natural justice by putting the borrower on notice while an application thereunder is under consideration.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition (L) No. 8418 of 2022

Decided On: 23.03.2022

 C.A. Manisha Mehta and Ors. Vs. The Board of Directors and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipankar Datta, C.J. and M.S. Karnik, J.

Citation:-MANU/MH/1377/2022

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Saturday, 9 March 2019

Whether non supply of copies of statements of witnesses recorded during preliminary enquiry will vitiate departmental enquiry?

Now, one of the principles of natural justice is that a person against whom an action is proposed to be taken has to be given an opportunity of hearting. This opportunity has to be an effective opportunity and not a mere pretence. In departmental proceedings where charge-sheet is issued and the documents which are proposed to be utilised against that person are indicated in the charge sheet but copies thereof are not supplied to him in spite of his request, and he is, at the same time, called upon to submit his reply, it cannot be said that an effective opportunity to defend was provided to him. see: Chandrama Tewari v. Union of India, MANU/SC/0617/1987 : [1988]1SCR1102 ; Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India and Ors., MANU/SC/0086/1986 : (1986)IILLJ468SC and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohd. Sharif, MANU/SC/0198/1982 : (1982)IILLJ180SC .

5. In High Court of Punjab & Haryana v. Amrik Singh, MANU/SC/0917/1995 : (1995)IILLJ656SC , it was indicated that the delinquent officer must be supplied copies of documents relied upon in support of the charges. It was further indicated that if the documents are voluminous and copies cannot be supplied, then such officer must be given an opportunity to inspect the same, or else, the principles of natural justice would be violated.

6. Preliminary inquiry which is conducted invariably on the back of the delinquent employee may, often, constitute the whole basis of the charge-sheet. Before a person is, therefore, called upon to submit his reply to the charge sheet, he must, on a request made by him in that behalf, be supplied the copies of the statements of witnesses recorded during the preliminary enquiry particularly if those witnesses are proposed to be examined at the departmental trial. This principle was reiterated in Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India and Ors., MANU/SC/0086/1986 : (1986)IILLJ468SC (supra), wherein it was also laid down that this lapse would vitiate the departmental proceedings unless it was shown and established as a fact that non-supply of copies of those documents had not caused any prejudice to the delinquent in his defence.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

C.A. No. 2469 of 1982

Decided On: 30.07.1998

 State of U.P.  Vs.  Shatrughan Lal and Ors.

Citation: (1998) 6 SCC 651
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Whether departmental enquiry will be vitiated if inspection of documents was not given to delinquent at initial stage?

 On the facts and circumstances, we are of the view that at the earliest the respondent sought for the inspection of documents mentioned in the charge sheet and relied on by the appellant. It is settled law that after the charge-sheet with necessary particulars, the specific averments in respect of the charge shall be made. If the department or the management seeks to rely on any documents in proof of the charge, the principles of natural justice require that such copies of those documents need to be supplied to the delinquent. If the documents are voluminous and cannot be supplied to the delinquent, an opportunity has got to be given to him for inspection of the documents. It would be open to the delinquent to obtain appropriate extracts at his own expense. If that opportunity was not given, it would violate the principles of natural justice. At the enquiry, if the delinquent seeks to support his defence with reference to any of the documents in the custody of the management or the department, then the documents either may be summoned or copies thereof may be given at his request and cost of the delinquent. If he seeks to cross-examine the witnesses examined in proof of the charge he should be given the opportunity to cross examine him. In case he wants to examine his witness or himself to rebut the charge, that opportunity should be given. In this case, at the earliest, the delinquent sought for inspection of the documents. It is now admitted in the affidavits filed in this Court and in the letter written by the enquiry officer, that some of the documents were seized by the police after the murder of the Manager of the appellant-institution on 31.7.80 for investigation. In that case the respondent was also one of the accused charged for the offences under Section 302 read with Section 120-B I.P.C. It is now an admitted fact that in Sessions Trial No. 228/81 dated 31.7.86 he was convicted for the said offence and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. It would appear that he filed an appeal in the High Court and bail was granted to him.

6. It is stated in the letter written by the enquiry officer that inspection of documents would be given at the time of final hearing. That obviously is an erroneous procedure followed by the enquiry officer. In the first instance he should be given the opportunity for inspection and thereafter conduct the enquiry and then hear the delinquent at the time of conclusion of his enquiry. In this case that procedure ...of the principles of natural justice. Accordingly, we agree with the High Court, though for different reasons, in the setting aside of the order of dismissal passed by the Management as approved by the Vice-Chancellor and Chancellor on the respective dates referred to hereinbefore.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7674 of 1994 

Decided On: 28.10.1994

Committee of Management, Kisan Degree College  Vs. Shambhu Saran Pandey and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
K. Ramaswamy and N.G. Venkatachala, JJ.
Citation: (1995) 1 SCC 404
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Tuesday, 19 February 2019

Whether government should recover damage rent from employee for overstaying in government quarter without issuing show cause notice?

The CAT has referred to the decision of this Court in K.B. Yadav vs. Union of India (W.P. No. 1885 of 2003 decided on 19.9.2003), in which, it is held that the action of recovery of damage rents without issuance of Show Cause Notice or compliance with principles of natural justice deserves to be set aside. To the same effect are the observations made by this court in case of Shri. N.C. Sharma vs. Union of India - MANU/MH/0301/2004 : 2004 (1) ATJ 481, where again it was held that the principles of natural justice have to be adhered and an opportunity will have to be given to the concerned employee before the recovery or adjustment are effected on the ground of any alleged unauthorised occupation of the Railway quarters. Since, the view taken by the CAT is in consonance with the ruling of the Division Benches of this Court, there is no good ground made out to interfere.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 3327 of 2006

Decided On: 30.08.2018

 Union of India Vs. Sayed Naimuddin

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Abhay Shreeniwas Oka and M.S. Sonak, JJ.

Citation: 2019(1) MHLJ 653
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Friday, 28 December 2018

Whether decree in favour of dead person is nullity?

So far as the general principles regarding the order passed against a dead person being void is concerned, the same is founded on the principle of natural justice, wherein, no person can be condemned unheard, however, as to whether the order passed in favour of a dead person would be void has been dealt with by this Court in Prahlad Singh v. The President District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum & Ors. : S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1103/2005 decided on 25/4/2005, wherein, it was laid down as under:

"10. Secondly, the order in favour of a dead person cannot be said to be nullity and, therefore also I do not find any merit in submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of the State Government is nullity. It may be true that the order against a dead person may be nullity, but same principle is not applicable when the order is in favour of a dead person."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN (JODHPUR BENCH)

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2756/2000

Decided On: 04.05.2017

Khairati Lal Vs.  State of Rajasthan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Arun Bhansali, J.

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Wednesday, 26 December 2018

Whether it is necessary to hear delinquent judicial officer prior to departmental inquiry?

In so far as the submission of the Learned Counsel for the
Petitioner that the reply of the Petitioner has not been considered and that the
Petitioner has also not been given a hearing in so far as the second
Departmental Enquiry is concerned, in our view the said submission is
misconceived. The Disciplinary Authority is under no obligation at the stage of
the show cause notice to afford any opportunity of hearing to a delinquent.
The Disciplinary Authority has only to consider whether there are grounds for
proceeding with so as to enquire into the truth of any allegations against the
judicial officer. In our view therefore, the said submission cannot be accepted
and there is no violation of the principles of natural justice merely because no
hearing was afforded prior to the Disciplinary Authority coming to a conclusion
to proceed departmentally against the Petitioner.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.643 OF 2017

Asif Badremunir Tahasildar Vs. State of Maharashtra 
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Thursday, 18 January 2018

Whether court can correct errors of arbitrator?

The 1996 Act makes provision for the supervisory role of courts, for the review of the arbitral award only to ensure fairness. Intervention of the court is envisaged in few circumstances only, like, in case of fraud or bias by the arbitrators, violation of natural justice, etc. The court cannot correct errors of the arbitrators. It can only quash the award leaving the parties free to begin the arbitration again if it is desired. So, the scheme of the provision aims at keeping the supervisory role of the court at minimum level and this can be justified as parties to the agreement make a conscious decision to exclude the court's jurisdiction by opting for arbitration as they prefer the expediency and finality offered by it.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 15545-15546 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 39038-39039 of 2012)

Decided On: 03.10.2017

Chittaranjan Maity Vs.  Union of India (UOI)

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Jasti Chelameswar and S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ.

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Sunday, 4 December 2016

When revision is not maintainable on ground of irregularity in proceedings?

The petitioner has challenged
only the proceedings on the ground of being irregular but the
petitioner is unable to show as to how the proceeding can be said to be
irregular when it has just commenced on the passing of the order dated
05-06-2015 issuing summons to him. The question of irregularity may
arise in a case where there is breach or break in the uniformity of the
actions or steps being taken by the Court. There is no question of such
breach or break in the proceeding of the case being Cril. Misc. Case No.
44 of 2015 because it is at its initial stage and in other words, it is just
the beginning of it.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
Cril. Revn. Petn. No. 8 of 2015
Shri K. Meghachandra Singh, 
 V
 Oinam (O) Itamani Devi,
B E F O R E
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KH. NOBIN SINGH


Dated: 11-08-2015
Citation: 2016 CRLJ4332 Manipur
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Friday, 2 December 2016

Delhi HC: Factor to be considered by the court while directing accused to produce documents at the pre-charge stage

The other aspect is the applicability of Section 91 of the Cr.P.C. which could be invoked during the pendency of the investigation, inquiry, trial or any other proceedings under the Code. The present case we are dealing with the trial of the petitioners which is at the stage of pre-charge evidence.
Though, it is mentioned that power under Section 91 of the Cr.P.C. could be invoked at any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial but it is still to be examined by the Court, the purpose and the object of exercising the power envisaged under Section 91 of the Cr.P.C. There could be various situations. Firstly, the documents could be summoned at the instance of the prosecution or the complainant to prove its case at the time of examination of the prosecution witnesses and to get it exhibited and proved through the witness who is under the oral examination. Similarly, it could be summoned at the instance of defence to confront the prosecution witnesses during cross-examination and similarly by the defence at the time of leading the defence evidence to put to the defence witnesses for the purpose of exhibition and establishing its plea in the defence.
Apart from the same, the Court on its own can summon the documents to clear any ambiguity or for the purpose of clarification of any disputed fact or discrepancies in the documents so exhibited by the prosecution/complainant or by the defence, in other words for clarification for reaching a just decision.
In the present case, none of the situations discussed above had arisen to summon the documents.
 The argument advanced by the complainant cannot be taken into consideration in isolation and it needs to be considered with the combined effect of the exercise of the power underSection 91 of the Cr.P.C. The facts narrated on record do not demonstrate the exercise of discretion under Section 91 of the Cr.P.C. in any other circumstance except to facilitate the evidence of the complainant. No question arises to look into the present case of exercising the power under Section 91 of the Cr.P.C. to summon the document except to render assistance and to facilitate the complainant evidence against the petitioners. In such a scenario, the plea of the complainant appreciating the order passed by the Trial Court without giving any notice or opportunity of hearing to the opposite side that too in a criminal case, would tantamount not only to the violation of principle of natural justice but also to the violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
20. Apart from the discussion made above, it is apparent from the arguments advanced that no list of witnesses or list of documents showing its connectivity with the witnesses or to the facts to be established before the Trial Court cannot be treated as proper application for rendering assistance to the Court to facilitate the evidence by way of seeking documents without demonstrating any necessity or desirability. The applications were moved in a casual manner and the orders passed on the same were also passed in a casual manner without due application of mind. The facts and circumstances mentioned above, non-issuance of notice to the opposite side and impugned orders being non-speaking and without due application of mind as per the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court, culminates into the impugned orders as ineffective, redundant and not sustainable in the eye of law and liable to be set aside.
Delhi High Court
Motilal Vora vs Subramanian Swamy & Anr. on 12 July, 2016
CRL.M.C. 671/2016
 CORAM:
  HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.S.TEJI
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Wednesday, 30 November 2016

Whether tender can be cancelled without following principles of natural justice?

In Commissioner of Police, Bombay v.
Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16, the Apex Court held as
follows :
“Public orders publicly made, in exercise of a
statutory authority cannot be construed in the light
of explanations subsequently given by the officer
making the order of what he meant, or of what was
in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders
made by public authorities are meant to have public
effect and are intended to affect the acting and
conduct of those to whom they are addressed and
must be construed objectively with reference to the
language used in the order itself. Orders are not like
old wine becoming better as they grow older.”
Similar view has also been taken in Bhikhubhai Vithlabhai Patel and
others v. State of Gujarat and another, (2008)4 SCC 144.
9. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court
mentioned supra and looking at the impugned order in Annexure-
4, a conclusion can be drawn that by a cryptic order the 
cancellation of tender has been made, which has been explained by
filing subsequent affidavit, the same is not permissible under law.
10. Relying on Air India Ltd. (supra), learned counsel
for the State has urged that in exercise of judicial review, the Court
cannot interfere with the decision, but it can interfere with the
decision-making process on grounds of mala fides,
unreasonableness or arbitrariness and Court should exercise its
discretionary power with great caution and only in furtherance of
overwhelming public interest.
11. In Maa Binda Express Carrier(supra), it is held
that submission of a bid/ tender in response to a notice inviting
tenders is only an offer which State or its agencies are under no
obligation to accept and bidders participating in the tender process
cannot insist that their bids/ tenders should be accepted simply
because a bid is the highest or lowest.
12. None of the judgments referred to by the learned
Addl. Govt. Advocate for the State is applicable to the present
context.
13. In view of the reasons assigned in the foregoing
paragraphs, it appears that since no reasons have been assigned in
the order impugned in Annexure-4 and subsequently by filing
affidavit, the opposite parties have tried to justify their action by 
giving explanation, this Court is inclined to interfere with the same.
Thus, the order impugned in Annexure-4 dated 5.2.2016 and the
consequential invitation of bid in Annexure-5 also cannot sustain
and accordingly, the same are hereby quashed.
ORISSA HIGH COURT: CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No. 2656 of 2016

M/s.Shree Ganesh Construction  v State of Orissa and others 
P R E S E N T :
THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. VINEET SARAN
AND
THE HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE B.R.SARANGI
 Dated : 18.05.2016
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Sunday, 25 September 2016

When notice for amendment of assessment list for recovery of property tax is liable to be quashed?

 On a reading of the afore-quoted provisions, it is clear that
while vesting the power in the Committee to amend an
assessment list, the Legislature has taken care to specify
the circumstances in and the grounds on which such amendment
may be made; it has also laid down the manner in which such
amendment or revision of the assessment list is to be made.
Care has also been taken to comply with the principle of
natural justice by making the provision for giving notice to
the person who is likely to be affected by the proposed
amendment giving him not less than a month’s time to tender
objection, if any, to the Committee and allowing him an
opportunity of being heard in support of the objections
raised. Notice to the affected person mandated in the
section is not an empty formality; it is meant for a
purpose. A vague and unspecific notice will not provide
reasonable opportunity to the noticee to file objection
meeting the reasons/grounds on which the amendment of the
assessment list is proposed to be made. Such a notice
cannot be taken to be complying with the statutory
requirement. On perusal of the notice issued to the
Corporation, which is on record, it is evident that the
notice is vague and lacks particulars. It neither states
the reason for/or the ground on which the amendment is
proposed to be made nor does it indicate any material on the
basis of which the revision as stated in the notice is
proposed to be made. It is stated in the notice: "Whereas
your above-mentioned property has wrongly been left out from
the assessment list, whereas it should have/should have been
in the same. Whereas the assessment of this property of
yours was assessed less due to inadvertent mistake/fraud or
intention, which needs amendment thereby".
 It is apparent that the Committee is not sure on which
ground it proposes to proceed for amending the assessment
list. Such a notice not only does not comply with the
statutory requirements, it also defeats the very purpose of
the statutory provisions. Coming to the question of
increase of the capacity of the godown in question and the
rate of rent, neither the discussions in the orders under
challenge indicate any basis for increasing the capacity of
the godown from 1,84,000 to 2,06,656 bags, nor has our
attention been drawn to any primary material in support of
the order. In the circumstances the contentions raised by
the learned counsel for Corporation that notice is vague and
it has been issued without due application of mind and the
grounds stated in the order are based on no material, have
to be accepted. 
 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 
CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 7423 1996
PETITIONER:
FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA
 Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF PUNJAB & OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/12/2000
BENCH:
D.P.Mohapatro, Y.K.Sabharwal

Citation:(2001) 1 SCC 291
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Friday, 22 July 2016

Whether contract entered by govt department with contractor can be rescinded without following principles of natural justice?

 Once a show cause notice was given and detailed
reply furnished by the parties, it is expected of the authorities to
pass an appropriate order after considering the reply, and not
merely stating that the reply was perused which was not found to
be satisfactory. Why it was not found to be satisfactory ought to
have been disclosed, which has not been done in the present case.
Issuance of notice to show cause and requirement of furnishing
reply is not to be an empty formality. The purpose would not be
achieved if the reply is not considered while passing the order.
 As we have already stated, the contract was in
operation at the time when the impugned order was passed, or else
the question of rescinding the contract would not have been there.
The extension granted by the opp. parties from time to time,
without imposing any cost or penalty on the petitioner, would itself
make it clear that the delay was not due to the fault of the
petitioner but because of the shortcoming or fault of the opp.
parties.
However, on merits, we find that the impugned order
is devoid of any reason and on this ground alone the order
deserves to be quashed. Merely completing the formality of giving
notice is not sufficient for complying with the principles of natural 
justice, as once after the notice is issued and a detailed reply is
given by the party, the authority is duty bound to pass a reasoned
order only after considering the contents of the reply, and not by
whimsically stating that the reply furnished was not found to be
satisfactory.
THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA : CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.20466 of 2015
In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India.

M/s. East Coast Constructions
Industries Ltd, Odisha … Petitioner
 -Versus
State
of Odisha and others … Opp.Parties

 P R E S E N T:
 THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. VINEET SARAN
 AND
 THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE B.R. SARANGI
Decided on : 04.04.2016
Citation:AIR 2016(NOC) 456 Orissa
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Sunday, 17 July 2016

Whether non supply of copies of deposition amounts to violation of principles of natural justice in departmental enquiry?

 In the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Saroj Kumar Sinha, cited supra, the question of non-supply of the copies of documents, more particularly the statements of witnesses, was considered. Following the decision of the Apex Court in the cases of Bhagat Ram and Kashinath Dikshita, cited supra, the Court has held as under :
"34. This Court in Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India, has clearly stated the rationale for the rule requiring supply of copies of the documents, sought to be relied upon by the authorities to prove the charges levelled against a government servant. In that case the enquiry proceedings had been challenged on the ground that non-supply of the statements of the witnesses and copies of the documents had resulted in the breach of rules of natural justice. The appellant therein had requested for supply of the copies of the documents as well as the statements of the witnesses at the preliminary enquiry. The request made by the appellant was in terms turned down by the disciplinary authority."
"35. In considering the importance of access to documents in statements of witnesses to meet the charges in an effective manner this Court observed as follows: (Kashinath Dikshita case, SCC pp. 234-35, para 10) "10. ... When a government servant is facing a disciplinary proceeding, he is entitled to be afforded a  reasonable opportunity to meet the charges against him in an effective manner. And no one facing a departmental enquiry can effectively meet the charges unless the copies of the relevant statements and documents to be used against him are made available to him. In the absence of such copies, how can the employee concerned prepare his defence, a cross-examine the witnesses, and point out the inconsistencies with a view to show that the allegations are incredible? It is difficult to comprehend why the disciplinary authority assumed an intransigent posture and refused to furnish the copies notwithstanding the specific request made by the appellant in this behalf. Perhaps the disciplinary authority made it a prestige issue. If only the disciplinary authority had asked itself the question: 'What is the harm in making available the material?' and weighed the pros and cons, the disciplinary authority could not reasonably have adopted such a rigid and adamant attitude. On the one hand there was the risk of the time and effort invested in the departmental enquiry being wasted if the courts came to the conclusion that failure to supply these materials would be tantamount to denial of reasonable opportunity to the appellant to defend himself.
On the other hand by making available the copies of the documents and statements the disciplinary authority was not running any risk. There was nothing confidential or privileged in it." (Emphasis supplied) "36. On an examination of the facts in that case, the submission on behalf of the authority that no prejudice had been caused to the appellant, was rejected, with the following observations: (Kashinath Dikshita case, SCC p.236, para 12) "12. Be that as it may, even without going into minute details it is evident that the appellant was entitled to have an access to the documents and statements throughout the course of the inquiry. He would have needed these documents and statements in order to cross-examine the 38 witnesses who were produced at the inquiry to establish the charges against him. So also at the time of arguments, he  would have needed the copies of the documents. So also he would have needed the copies of the documents to enable him to effectively cross-examine the witnesses with reference to the contents of the documents. It is obvious that he could not have done so if copies had not been made available to him. Taking an overall view of the matter we have no doubt in our mind that the appellant has been denied a reasonable opportunity of exonerating himself."
(Emphasis supplied) "37. We are of the considered opinion that the aforesaid observations are fully applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. Non-disclosure of documents having a potential to cause prejudice to a government servant in the enquiry proceedings would clearly be denial of a reasonable opportunity to submit a plausible and effective rebuttal to the charges being enquired into against the government servant."

Bombay High Court
Vijaysingh S/O Bhaidas Patil vs Shri Dhanorkar Adhunik Gram ... on 1 October, 2015
Bench: Ravi K. Deshpande
Citation: 2016(3) MHLJ 813
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Sunday, 10 July 2016

Whether court can condone delay in case of dishonour of cheque without hearing accused?

The other plea relating to delay of 62 days and taking of cognizance without issuing notice to dispense with such delay is however found to have substance. The relevant provision Under Section 142 of the Act requires making of the complaint within one month of cause of action arising on account of non-compliance with the demand in the notice to make payment within 15 days. According to Appellant the notice was dated 03.02.2006 alleging non-payment of two cheques each for Rs. 1,80,000/-. Allegedly the Appellant had sent a reply denying his liability through a reply dated 20.02.2006. The complaint was filed on 24.05.2006. Prima facie, in view of aforesaid dates the complaint was beyond the permissible period. No doubt the court has been empowered to take cognizance even after the prescribed period but only if the complainant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making complaint within the prescribed period.
Learned senior Counsel for the Appellant has relied upon judgment of this Court in the case of P.K. Choudhury v. Commander, 48 BRTF (GREF) MANU/SC/7321/2008 : (2008) 13 SCC 229 to support his submission that for condoning delay in filing complaint beyond the period of limitation, natural justice warrants notice to the accused so as to grant him an opportunity to show that the delay should not be condoned.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Criminal Appeal No. 247 of 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 8058 of 2012) and Criminal Appeal No. 248 of 2016 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 8092 of 2012)
Decided On: 11.04.2016

 K.S. Joseph Vs. Philips Carbon Black Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Dipak Misra and Shiva Kirti Singh, JJ.
Citation:AIR 2016 SC 2149
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Wednesday, 6 July 2016

When resolution passed by assembly is liable to be set aside on ground of violation of principle of natural justice?

We now deal with the submissions of the petitioners that
the impugned proceedings are violative of the fundamental
right of the petitioners under Article 14. According to the
petitioners, the said proceedings have been taken in violation
of the principles of natural justice. It is settled law that the
scope of judicial review in matters relating to action taken
against members by the legislative bodies is limited.
However, it is likewise well settled that the non-compliance
with the principles of natural justice is one of the limited
grounds on which judicial review could be undertaken against
the internal proceedings of the legislative bodies in appropriate
cases.
 The petitioners’ case, though not elegantly pleaded, is that
they have not been granted the opportunity to watch the video
recording or comment on the content and authenticity of the
video. In the questions of law raised in the writ petition, the
petitioners raised the question of “Whether denial of the right
to comment on the video material would amount to breach of
natural justice?” In the grounds taken by the petitioners, they
pray for the writ to be allowed “because on the question of
authenticity of videography and as to how far it can be pressed
into service, further, the respondents never gave a copy of the
alleged videography to the petitioner”.
 The minutes of the Privileges Committee meeting clearly
show that the video-recording played an important role in
arriving at the conclusions that the Privileges Committee did.
The video recording was specifically shown to the members of
the Privileges Committee “since some of them would have
forgot only the video recordings were shown again”15. Giving
some allowance for bad translation - the said sentence only
indicates that the Committee was not willing to rely solely on
the memory of the members of the Committee. At the risk of
repetition, we reiterate that the video recording served as the
common factual platform for all the members of the
Privileges Committee, from where the members discussed the
actions of the six petitioners, and recommended action against
them.
Even at Para 70 of the counter affidavit, the respondents assert that as the incident on 19.2.2015 happened
inside the assembly chamber, the speaker and other present members were eye-witnesses to the incident,
and that the nature of the incident was known to all members in the house, including the members of the
privileges committee.

39. This Court in Raja Ram Pal case, while dealing with the
question of the rules of natural justice in the context of
proceedings in the legislative bodies, held as follows:
“As already noted the scope of judicial review in these matters is restricted
and limited. Regarding non-grant of reasonable opportunity, we reiterate
what was recently held in Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana that the
principles of natural justice are not immutable but are flexible; they cannot
be cast in a rigid mould and put in a straitjacket and the compliance
therewith has to be considered in the facts and circumstances of each
case.”16
40. In Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC 1,
this Court discussed the scope of the principles of natural
justice in the context of the proceedings in the legislature
(action under Xth Schedule of the Constitution) and held thus:
“Undoubtedly, the proceedings before the Speaker which is also a tribunal
albeit of a different nature have to be conducted in a fair manner and by
complying with the principles of natural justice. However, the principles
of natural justice cannot be placed in a straitjacket. These are flexible
rules. Their applicability is determined on the facts of each case…”17
41. The principles of natural justice require that the
petitioners ought to have been granted an opportunity to see
the video recording. Perhaps they might have had an
opportunity to explain why the video recording does not
contain any evidence/material for recommending action
16 Extracted portion is a part of Paragraph 446 in the judgment.
17 The extracted portion is a part of paragraph 44 in the judgment.

against all or some of them or to explain that the video
recording should have been interpreted differently.
42. The Privileges Committee should have necessarily offered
this opportunity, in order to make the process adopted by it
compliant with the requirements of Article 14. Petitioner No. 1
in his reply letter to the notice issued by the Privileges
Committee seeks permission to give further explanation when
the video recording is provided to him. The Petitioner No. 3 in
his reply letter states that he believes his version of his
conduct will be proven by the video recording. The other
petitioners do not mention the video recording in their reply
letters. However, it is not the petitioners’ burden to request for
a copy of the video recording. It is the legal obligation of the
Privileges Committee to ensure that a copy of the video
recording is supplied to the petitioners in order to satisfy the
requirements of the principles of natural justice The failure
to supply a copy of the video recording or affording an
opportunity to the petitioners to view the video recording relied
upon by the committee in our view clearly resulted in the
violation of the principles of natural justice i.e. a denial of a
reasonable opportunity to meet the case. We, therefore, have

no option but to set aside the impugned resolution dated
31.03.2015 passed in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly.
The same is accordingly set aside.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 455 OF 2015
Alagaapuram R. Mohanraj & Others … Petitioners
Versus
Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly
Rep. by its Secretary & Another … Respondents
Dated:February 12, 2016.
Chelameswar, J.
Citation:(2016)6 SCC82
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Sunday, 29 May 2016

Procedure to be followed by company law board for conducting its proceeding

A conjoint reading of Section 4(C), 5 and 6 of Section
10E of the Act would show that the CLB is principally to be guided
by the principles of natural justice and can act in its discretion.
Albeit, it would be a judicial discretion. Every power is conceded
to the CLB to regulate its own procedure. Subject to this,
subsection 4(C) of Section 10E only enumerates the various 
powers, which the CLB can exercise, which are available to a
Court while trying a suit and which powers are enumerated in
clauses (a) to (f) of subsection 4(C) of Section 10E. Thus, the
legislative intent is clear that a certain free play is given to the
CLB in the matter of regulating its own procedure and generally,
the CLB has to be guided by the principles of natural justice and
shall act in its discretion. It is, thus, clear that the provisions of
the Code would not be stricto sensu applicable to the proceedings
before the CLB. Had the legislature intended it to be so, nothing
prevented it from saying that the proceedings before the CLB shall
be governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, while
enumerating specific enabling provisions under subsection 4(C) of
Section 10E of the Act, subsections 5 and 6 leave no manner of
doubt that the CLB can regulate its own procedure and has done
so by framing the regulations.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
COMPANY APPEAL NOS. 1 to 7 of 2015
 COMPANY APPEAL No. 1/2015
Anju Timblo, 
Versus
Dilip Timblo, 

CORAM :- C. V. BHADANG, J.
Pronounced on : 6thAugust, 2015
Citation: 2016(2) ALLMR 302

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