What facts are to be proved for convicting an accused for an offence U/S 353 of IPC?

 To convict an accused under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which pertains to assault or criminal force against a public servant in the discharge of their duties, certain fundamental facts must be established. Here’s a detailed explanation of the essential elements required for conviction.

Key Elements for Conviction Under Section 353 IPC

The prosecution must prove the following essential elements:

- Assault or Criminal Force: There must be an act that constitutes an assault or the use of criminal force. According to Section 351 of the IPC, assault involves gestures or preparations that create a reasonable apprehension of imminent use of criminal force. Criminal force, as defined in Section 350, refers to the intentional use of force without consent, which is likely to cause injury, fear, or annoyance.

- Public Servant: The victim must be a public servant as defined under Section 21 of the IPC. This includes any person holding an office by virtue of which they are authorized to perform public duties.

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Bombay HC: Accused intimidating public servant by threatening to defame him on social media site as well as engineering artificial protest falls with scope of criminal force as used in S 353 of IPC.

Mr. Thobde contends that, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not make out any case for trial and that they are inherently improbable. He submitted that, ingredients of the offences as alleged are not even prima facie made out against the Petitioner. He further argues that, raising grievances in a democratic manner by protesting against illegal action or inaction of public servant does not amount to any offence. He raises a strange ground that, the Petitioner has only acted in furtherance of fundamental right bestowed upon him and hence he urges us to quash the F.I.R. as it is sheer harassment to the Petitioner to undergo the rigors of the trial. {Para 5}

8. The present case is suggestive of an emerging trend by persons such as the Petitioner herein, who with the aid of modern-day technologies devise a modus operandi to commit such offence. Hiding behind the screen of social media, irresponsible acts are done which have the propensity to effectively intimidate and cause a person to do acts which they would not otherwise lawfully do. All this while maintaining a veil of deniability of the act. The threat to use social media sites as a platform to intimidate and threat given by the petitioner and his accomplice is real enough to scare the complainant albeit a public servant ignoring their demands only at the risk of being defamed or facing an engineered protest.

9. Section 353 of the I.P.C. makes use of criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty or with intent to prevent or deter him from discharging his duties, an offence. The act of the Petitioner in intimidating the complainant by threatening to defame him on social media site as well as engineering artificial protest also falls within the scope and ambit of the word 'criminal force' used in the Section. Threats of using social media site to intimate is a manifestation of the intention of the Petitioner to abuse modern day technology by 'virtually' using criminal force on the complainant. The ulterior motive is to deter him from discharging his public duty. In such circumstances 'criminal force' must not be restricted to only include physical force, but must bring within its ambit 'virtual force'. Section 353 cannot be interpreted in a narrow or parochial manner and a myopic view cannot be taken of the same. Such acts do not merely threaten the victims of crime but also defeats the very purpose of the criminal justice system. As in the case at hand, a public servant is at his tether's end to find a resolution to the constant threats and demands of money by the Petitioner. Finally, he found courage enough to approach the police who set up the trap to ensnare the Petitioner.

10. It is most unfortunate that, a public servant has been threatened and intimidated by defamatory material being circulated on social media to lower his reputation in the eyes of the right-thinking members of the society. A Tehsildar in a district is a respected public officer and is expected to discharge important functions in revenue matters. He is required to command obedience from the public at large visiting his office. If the repute of his office is lowered in the environment over which he has jurisdiction, there is a probability of chaos and disruption in the discharge of his duties. The threat of spreading false narrative by way of engineered protests in present times is bound to be quite a scary proposition for a public servant such as the complainant. The intent of the Petitioner in giving the threats and cause concern to the complainant would easily amount to an obstruction of a public servant from carrying out his public duties, particularly when the threats are coupled with aggressive and menacing acts on the part of the Petitioner and his accomplice. The F.I.R. also reveals the threat given by the Petitioner of organizing a protest during the Legislative Assembly Session in Nagpur which gives the entire act of the Petitioner a political color. This is reason enough for the complainant to be disconcerted and place him in fear of injury to his person and reputation. These acts are deprecated and need to be discouraged at their very inception, justifying prosecution.

10.1. We have recorded our above observations in detail only to bring to the fore the dangers of public servants being intimated while discharging their public duty. Public faith in public servants cannot be allowed to erode. Such acts must be viewed seriously.

11. In view of the aforenoted facts, we are of the considered opinion that, the F.I.R. prima facie discloses ingredients of the offences as alleged. We are thus not inclined to allow the Petition.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Writ Petition No. 276 of 2024

Decided On: 01.07.2024

Ajit Prabhakar Kulkarni Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Gadkari and Dr. Neela Kedar Gokhale, JJ.

Author: Dr. Neela Kedar Gokhale, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/4381/2024.

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Essential conditions for initiation of prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servant

 Their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of C.

Muniappan and others v. State of Tamilnadu, reported in (2010) 9 SCC

567 have held that the legislative intent behind Section 195 (1) (a) (i)

Cr.P.C. read with section 188 is that an individual should not face criminal

prosecution instituted upon insufficient grounds by persons actuated by

malice, ill will or frivolity of disposition and to save the time of the criminal

courts being wasted by endless prosecutions. There must be a complaint

by the public servant whose lawful order has not been complied with. The

complaint must be in writing. The provisions of Section 195 Cr.PC are

mandatory. The Court cannot assume the cognizance of the case without

such complaint. In the absence of such a complaint, the trial and

conviction will be void ab initio being without jurisdiction. Their lordships

have held as under:

“33. Thus, in view of the above, the law can be summarized

to the effect that there must be a complaint by the public

servant whose lawful order has not been complied with. The

complaint must be in writing. The provisions of Section 195

Cr.PC are mandatory. Non-compliance of it would vitiate the

prosecution and all other consequential orders. The Court

cannot assume the cognizance of the case without such

complaint. In the absence of such a complaint, the trial and

conviction will be void ab initio being without jurisdiction.”

37. The complaint filed under the signatures of SHO, PS

Dharamshala cannot be termed as complaint under Section 195 (1) (a)

Cr.P.C. The complaint could only be filed by the officer concerned.

38. Now, the Court will advert to whether there was sufficient

material to proceed against the accused for committing offence under

Section 186 IPC. In the complaint based on DDR Nos. 12(A) & 15(A), it is

stated that Insp. Jagdish Chand and other staff members were present in

Police Station (SV & ACB), Dharamshala and the accused initially entered

the Police Station and thereafter went to the Office of Superintendent of

Police (SV & ACB). They disrupted the government administration for half

an hour. It is not stated that what duties were being discharged by those

police officers/officials present in the Police Station and which one of them

was obstructed voluntarily from discharging official functions. In order to

attract the provisions of Section 186 IPC, it has to be seen whether the

public servant in the discharge of his public functions has been voluntarily

obstructed or not. It is reiterated that what mentioned in the complaint is

that the government administration was disrupted for half an hour. Merely

the disruption of government administration without mentioning that the

public servants were obstructed voluntarily from discharge of their public

functions would not attract Section 186 IPC.

39. The learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court in the case

of Janki Prasad Tibrewal and others v. The State of Bihar, reported in

1975 Crl. LJ 575 has held that the expression 'obstruct' used in Section

186 of the Indian Penal Code envisages actual resistance and obstacle in

the way of public servant and it implies use of criminal force. It has been

held as under:

“[7] Considering these decisions it is clear that the real test is

whether the facts alleged against an accused disclosed two

distinct offences or whether the facts disclosed primarily an

offence for which a complaint by a public servant is required,

The main allegation which has been made in this case against

the petitioners is that they voluntarily obstructed the Dalpati

and the Mukhia who are public servants in the discharge of

their duties as such. The expression 'obstruct' used in Section

186 of the Indian Penal Code envisages actual resistance and

obstacle in the way of public servant and it implies use of

criminal force. So if these petitioners are alleged to have

assaulted the Dalpati and the Mukhia in the course of

voluntarily obstructing the public servant from discharging

their duties, the offences under Sections 323, 324 and 353 of

the Indian Penal Code are so connected with the primary

offence of Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code that it is

difficult to say that those offences constituted separate

offences other than an offence under Section 186 of the Indian

Penal Code. The very fact of obstruction in the instant case

implies assault and hurt to the public servant concerned and

so the primary offence alleged to have been committed by these

petitioners is one under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code

and if cognizance is taken of the offences on the basis of police

report only under Sections 323, 324 and 353 of the Indian

Penal Code, it will amount to circumventing the provisions of

Section 195 of the Code which is not permissible in law.”

40. What emerges from the discussion is that Section 195 (1)(a) of

Cr.P.C. has not been complied with. Section 195 Cr.P.C. is mandatory.

The power to file the complaint could not be delegated to SHO, Police

Station, Dharamshala. The complaint should have been initiated at the

instance of the public servant concerned or his superior officer. Thus, in

view of the matter, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dharamshala had

no jurisdiction in the case as there was no complaint in writing before him

by the public servant concerned or his superior. The material placed on

record was not sufficient to initially permit the investigation of the case and

thereafter to summon the accused and put them to notice of accusation.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. Cr.MMO No. 35 of 2016.

 Decided on: 30.5.2016.

Anurag Thakur and another 

Versus

State of H.P. 

Coram

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sharma, 

Citation:2016 CRLJ 3363 HP

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