Supreme Court: Section 195 of CRPC Bar Cannot Be Evaded by Splitting Offences

In this regard, the Court laid down the following principles to be followed while dealing with a category of offences that fall within the protective sphere of Section 195 CrPC.

(i) Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C. bars the court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 respectively of the I.P.C., unless there is a written complaint by the public servant concerned or his administrative superior, for voluntarily obstructing the public servant from discharge of his public functions. Without a complaint from the said persons, the court would lack competence to take cognizance in certain types of offences enumerated therein.

(ii) If in truth and substance, an offence falls in the category of Section 195(1)(a)(i), it is not open to the court to undertake the exercise of splitting them up and proceeding further against the accused for the other distinct offences disclosed in the same set of facts. However, it also cannot be laid down as a straitjacket formula that the Court, under all circumstances, cannot undertake the exercise of splitting up. It would depend upon the facts of each case, the nature of allegations and the materials on record.

(iii) Severance of distinct offences is not permissible when it would effectively circumvent the protection afforded by Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C., which requires a complaint by a public servant for certain offences against public justice. This means that if the core of the offence falls under the purview of Section 195(1)(a)(i), it cannot be prosecuted by simply filing a general complaint for a different, but related, offence. The focus should be on whether the facts, in substance, constitute an offence requiring a public servant's complaint.

(iv) In the aforesaid context, the courts must apply twin tests. First, the courts must ascertain having regard to the nature of the allegations made in the complaint/FIR and other materials on record whether the other distinct offences not covered by Section 195(1)(a)(i) have been invoked only with a view to evade the mandatory bar of Section 195 of the I.P.C. and secondly, whether the facts primarily and essentially disclose an offence for which a complaint of the court or a public servant is required.

(v) Where an accused is alleged to have committed some offences which are separate and distinct from those contained in Section 195, Section 195 will affect only the offences mentioned therein. However, the courts should ascertain whether such offences form an integral part and are so intrinsically connected so as to amount to offences committed as a part of the same transaction, in which case the other offences also would fall within the ambit of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. This would all depend on the facts of each case.

(vi) Sections 195(1)(b)(i)(ii) & (iii) and 340 of the Cr.P.C. respectively do not control or circumscribe the power of the police to investigate, under the Criminal Procedure Code. Once investigation is completed then the embargo in Section 195 would come into play and the Court would not be competent to take cognizance. However, that Court could then file a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR and the material collected during investigation, provided the procedure laid down in Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. is followed.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 12373 of 2025 

Decided On: 20.08.2025

Devendra Kumar Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

 Citation: 2025 INSC 1009, MANU/SC/1133/2025.

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Questions and answers on law (Part 86)

Q :-  Whether Sanction for all offences  under corruption  act is required , for which offences  sanction is not required? How sanction for prosecution in proved in cases under prevention of corruption act

Ans:- 1) Is sanction required for all PC Act offences?

No. Sanction under Section 19 PC Act is required only when the accused is a “public servant” and the court is taking cognizance of specified PC Act offences (bribery/criminal misconduct etc.) and the person is still covered as a public servant at the relevant time.

2) For which situations/offences sanction is not required?

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Culpable Homicide and Murder under IPC: Law, Exceptions and Landmark Judgments

 Under the IPC, every murder is culpable homicide, but every culpable homicide is not murder. The easiest interview formula is: first see whether Section 299 is made out; then ask whether the case falls in any of the four clauses of Section 300, and finally check whether any of the five exceptions to Section 300 reduce it to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Core distinction

The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that culpable homicide is the genus and murder is its species. In simple terms, murder is the more aggravated form of culpable homicide, where the intention or knowledge is of a higher degree.

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Karnataka HC: How to appreciate prosecution evidence U/S 353 of IPC regarding performance of official duty by public servant?

 As per Rule 7 of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, an offence committed under the Act shall be investigated by a Police officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintended of Police. The Investigating Officer shall be appointed by the State Government/Director General of Police/Superintendent of Police after taking into account his past experience, sense of ability and justice to perceive the implications of the case and investigate it along with right lines within the shortest possible time. {Para 29}

30. There is no document on record to show that he was appointed by Superintendent of Police to investigate this case. On perusal of his evidence, he has not at all stated anything with regard to PW1 that he was on duty and how his official duty was obstructed on account of incident in question. It is important to note that neither PW1 nor PW5 deposed with regard to the deterring by the accused in performing the official duties of PW1. There is no presumption as such with the official in the office during the office hours should be presumed to be on duty. In order to prove the offence under Section 353 of IPC, the prosecution has to prove PW1 was on official duty and the act committed by the accused deterred him from doing his duty. In the absence of these ingredients the accused could not have even convicted for the offence punishable under Section 353 of IPC. Though the Investigating Officer obtained Ex. P9, but it is not stated on what basis Ex. P9 was issued and what was the duty the complainant was doing at the time of incident. No inference can be drawn from the document that PWs. 1 and 2 were discharging any duty as such. In Ex. P9, the name of the person, who had signed is not mentioned or no office seal is attested to it. He did not know whose custody the movement register there in the office nor he has verified the same. Who obtained Ex. P9 is not forthcoming. There is no serial number of the said letter nor the name of staff who obtained and furnished the document to Investigating Officer, is not mentioned.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA (DHARWAD BENCH)

Cri. A. No. 2800 of 2010

Decided On: 15.05.2019

Ashok Sangappa Sidareddi Vs. State of Karnataka

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bellunke, J.

Citation: 2019 CRLJ 4052, AIRONLINE 2019 Kar 458,MANU/KA/7633/2019.

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Kerala HC: Special courts shall not order an investigation U/S 156(3) CrPC against public servant in absence of prior sanction under Section 19 of PC Act.

  Section 19(1) of the PC Act says that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction of the competent authority referred to in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c). The question of sanction is of paramount importance for protecting a public servant who has acted in good faith while performing his duties. The purpose of obtaining sanction is to see that the public servant is not entangled in false and frivolous cases. The question whether a sanction under section 19 of the PC Act is necessary or not while ordering an investigation against a public servant invoking powers under section 156(3) of Cr. P.C is no more res integra. In Anil Kumar (supra), it was held that in the absence of a prior sanction under section 19 of the PC Act, the Magistrate/Court cannot order an investigation against a public servant by invoking power under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. After referring to various judgments on the issue of purport and meaning of the word "cognizance", it was concluded that "cognizance" has a wider connotation and is not merely confined to the stage of taking cognizance of the offence. In L.Narayana Swamy (supra), the Apex Court held that an order directing investigation under section 156(3) could not be passed in relation to a public servant in the absence of valid sanction. It was observed that even while directing inquiry under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., the Magistrate applies his judicial mind on the complaint, and therefore, it would amount to taking cognizance of the matter. The same issue arose before the Apex Court again in Manju Surana v. Sunil Arora and Others (MANU/SC/0296/2018 : 2018 KHC 6224). After considering the various judgments, including Anil Kumar (supra) and L. Narayana Swamy (supra), the Division Bench of the Apex Court directed the matter to be placed before the Larger Bench. Thereafter, a Division Bench of this Court in Muhammed V.A. and Others v. State of Kerala and Others (MANU/KE/3653/2018 : 2019 (1) KHC 239) held that until a final decision is taken in the reference in Manju Surana (supra), the dictum laid down in Anil Kumar (supra) will hold the field. Therefore, as the law now stands, the requirement of sanction under section 19 of the PC Act is a prerequisite for presenting a private complaint against a public servant alleging the commission of an offence specified in sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 of the PC Act. No such complaint could be forwarded for investigation under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. in the absence of sanction granted by the competent authority under section 19 of the PC Act. The decision of the Apex Court in B.A.Srinivasan (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for respondents 3 to 6 pertains to sanction under section 197 of Cr.P.C and hence the dictum laid down therein does not apply to the facts of the case.

{Para 7}

Considering the above findings, I am of the view that the court below could not have forwarded the complaints under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C for investigation without any sanction under section 19(1) of the PC Act obtained by the complainants. Hence, the impugned order cannot be sustained, and accordingly, it is set aside.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

OP (Crl.) No. 510 of 2022

Decided On: 17.02.2023

C.V. Balan and Ors. Vs. State of Kerala and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. Kauser Edappagath, J.

Citation: 2023 KER 9580,2023 KLJ 1 9252023 SCC ONLINE KER 9832023 KER 9580, MANU/KE/0324/2023

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Anticipatory Bail, Public Interest, and Corruption: Supreme Court’s New Threshold in P Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh

 Introduction

The Supreme Court’s recent judgment in P Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7532-34 of 2025) marks a significant development in Indian criminal jurisprudence, particularly regarding the grant of anticipatory bail in high-profile corruption cases involving public servants. The Court’s refusal to grant anticipatory bail, despite the petitioners’ cooperation with the investigation and their retired status, introduces a nuanced legal principle prioritizing public interest and the integrity of ongoing investigations over individual liberty in cases of grave economic offences.

Background and Context

The petitioners, former high-ranking public officials, sought anticipatory bail after being implicated in a massive alleged scam concerning the allocation of liquor brands in Andhra Pradesh. The case, registered under various sections of the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act, revolves around allegations of favoritism, manipulation of procurement processes, and kickbacks amounting to over Rs. 3,000 crores.

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Karnataka HC: Sending Voice Sample In Graft Case For Analysis To Private Lab Instead Of Govt Forensic Science Lab Affects Rights Of Accused

 It is pertinent to note that without exhausting

the remedy before the Forensic Laboratory of Karnataka,

sending the voice sample to the Truth Labs, which is a

private agency and collecting the report which is been

placed as a gospel truth in filing the charge sheet has also

resulted in affecting the rights of the accused. Therefore,

the very cognizance itself should not have been taken by

the learned Special Judge and charge sheet should have

been returned. {Para 19}.

The Karnataka High Court upheld a trial court order discharging a public servant of graft charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act as the Lokayukta police sent the voice sample of the conversation between the official and the complainant wherein he allegedly demanded a bribe, to a private agency instead of sending it to government Forensic Science Laboratory for analysis.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

CRL.RP No. 699 of 2017

STATE OF KARNATAKA  Vs G. RAMACHARI

CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V SRISHANANDA

DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2024

Citation: 2024:KHC:50561.

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What facts are to be proved for convicting an accused for an offence U/S 353 of IPC?

 To convict an accused under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which pertains to assault or criminal force against a public servant in the discharge of their duties, certain fundamental facts must be established. Here’s a detailed explanation of the essential elements required for conviction.

Key Elements for Conviction Under Section 353 IPC

The prosecution must prove the following essential elements:

- Assault or Criminal Force: There must be an act that constitutes an assault or the use of criminal force. According to Section 351 of the IPC, assault involves gestures or preparations that create a reasonable apprehension of imminent use of criminal force. Criminal force, as defined in Section 350, refers to the intentional use of force without consent, which is likely to cause injury, fear, or annoyance.

- Public Servant: The victim must be a public servant as defined under Section 21 of the IPC. This includes any person holding an office by virtue of which they are authorized to perform public duties.

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Bombay HC: Accused intimidating public servant by threatening to defame him on social media site as well as engineering artificial protest falls with scope of criminal force as used in S 353 of IPC.

Mr. Thobde contends that, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not make out any case for trial and that they are inherently improbable. He submitted that, ingredients of the offences as alleged are not even prima facie made out against the Petitioner. He further argues that, raising grievances in a democratic manner by protesting against illegal action or inaction of public servant does not amount to any offence. He raises a strange ground that, the Petitioner has only acted in furtherance of fundamental right bestowed upon him and hence he urges us to quash the F.I.R. as it is sheer harassment to the Petitioner to undergo the rigors of the trial. {Para 5}

8. The present case is suggestive of an emerging trend by persons such as the Petitioner herein, who with the aid of modern-day technologies devise a modus operandi to commit such offence. Hiding behind the screen of social media, irresponsible acts are done which have the propensity to effectively intimidate and cause a person to do acts which they would not otherwise lawfully do. All this while maintaining a veil of deniability of the act. The threat to use social media sites as a platform to intimidate and threat given by the petitioner and his accomplice is real enough to scare the complainant albeit a public servant ignoring their demands only at the risk of being defamed or facing an engineered protest.

9. Section 353 of the I.P.C. makes use of criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty or with intent to prevent or deter him from discharging his duties, an offence. The act of the Petitioner in intimidating the complainant by threatening to defame him on social media site as well as engineering artificial protest also falls within the scope and ambit of the word 'criminal force' used in the Section. Threats of using social media site to intimate is a manifestation of the intention of the Petitioner to abuse modern day technology by 'virtually' using criminal force on the complainant. The ulterior motive is to deter him from discharging his public duty. In such circumstances 'criminal force' must not be restricted to only include physical force, but must bring within its ambit 'virtual force'. Section 353 cannot be interpreted in a narrow or parochial manner and a myopic view cannot be taken of the same. Such acts do not merely threaten the victims of crime but also defeats the very purpose of the criminal justice system. As in the case at hand, a public servant is at his tether's end to find a resolution to the constant threats and demands of money by the Petitioner. Finally, he found courage enough to approach the police who set up the trap to ensnare the Petitioner.

10. It is most unfortunate that, a public servant has been threatened and intimidated by defamatory material being circulated on social media to lower his reputation in the eyes of the right-thinking members of the society. A Tehsildar in a district is a respected public officer and is expected to discharge important functions in revenue matters. He is required to command obedience from the public at large visiting his office. If the repute of his office is lowered in the environment over which he has jurisdiction, there is a probability of chaos and disruption in the discharge of his duties. The threat of spreading false narrative by way of engineered protests in present times is bound to be quite a scary proposition for a public servant such as the complainant. The intent of the Petitioner in giving the threats and cause concern to the complainant would easily amount to an obstruction of a public servant from carrying out his public duties, particularly when the threats are coupled with aggressive and menacing acts on the part of the Petitioner and his accomplice. The F.I.R. also reveals the threat given by the Petitioner of organizing a protest during the Legislative Assembly Session in Nagpur which gives the entire act of the Petitioner a political color. This is reason enough for the complainant to be disconcerted and place him in fear of injury to his person and reputation. These acts are deprecated and need to be discouraged at their very inception, justifying prosecution.

10.1. We have recorded our above observations in detail only to bring to the fore the dangers of public servants being intimated while discharging their public duty. Public faith in public servants cannot be allowed to erode. Such acts must be viewed seriously.

11. In view of the aforenoted facts, we are of the considered opinion that, the F.I.R. prima facie discloses ingredients of the offences as alleged. We are thus not inclined to allow the Petition.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Writ Petition No. 276 of 2024

Decided On: 01.07.2024

Ajit Prabhakar Kulkarni Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Gadkari and Dr. Neela Kedar Gokhale, JJ.

Author: Dr. Neela Kedar Gokhale, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/4381/2024.

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Whether the court can convict an accused for an offence U/S 353 and S 332 of IPC if prosecution fails to prove that assault has link with discharge of duty by public servant?

In the present case also it is seen that the complainant was questioned with regards to some complaint lodged by him against the accused. The motive for assault has no link with the discharge of duty by the complainant. It is manifest that the assault on the PW-1 had no real nexus or causal connection or consequential relation with the performance of his duty as a public servant. There was no evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that the intent of the accused was to prevent or deter him from discharge of his duty as such public servant. As such the charge under Sections 332 and 353 of IPC cannot sustain and the conviction for the said offences is also required to be set aside. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

Criminal Revision Application No.52 of 2005

Balasaheb Nivrutti Jagtap Vs. The State of Maharashtra

Dated: 20th March, 2018.

Coram: PRAKASH D. NAIK, J.

Citation: 2018 ALL MR (Cri) 2693.

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Bombay HC: Officers Appointed To Assess Electricity Theft Are 'Public Servants', Court Can't Issue Process Against Them Without Sanction U/S 197 CrPC

 Section 169 of the Electricity Act, 2003 which defines the term public servants in pursuance to Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code includes the servants or the employees under Section 126 of the Electricity Act, 2003. As discussed above, the Board has authorized various officers including the Junior Engineers and linemen to detect the theft. Hence, they are covered under the definition of public servants in Section 169 of the Electricity Act, 2003. Therefore, the Court is of the view that the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class erred in issuing the process against the petitioners without sanction as required under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This issue was not dealt with at all. The impugned order also does not reflect the application of mind. Hence, the petition deserves to be allowed. {Para 22}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 744 OF 2008

 Syed Naeemuddin S/o Syed Khaja, Vs The State of Maharashtra.

 CORAM : S.G. MEHARE, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : SEPTEMBER 12, 2024.

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Supreme Court: Cognizance of offence Against Public Servant under S 4 of SC & ST (Atrocities Act) For Offence Of Neglect Of Duty Cannot Be Taken Without Administrative Enquiry Report

 The argument of the learned Counsel for the complainant is that the word "charges" occurring in proviso to Section 4(2) of the SC/ST Act is to be interpreted that the enquiry report is to be sought before framing of charges and not before the registration of the FIR.

{Para 49}

50. To my mind, the said argument is bereft of merit as the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Charansingh (supra) and as per the proviso noted above, the enquiry report is to be sought before the criminal proceedings are initiated and not before the framing of charges.

14.4. The absence of recommendation would bar taking cognizance by the Court. In a given case, if a complaint without recommendation is filed before the Magistrate, the Magistrate before proceeding further to keep his decision conforming to Section 4(2) read with the proviso, calls for a report/recommendation from the Department against the named public servant. The Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court based on an administrative enquiry report can take cognizance of the alleged offence and thereon direct penal proceedings. By keeping in perspective, the language/scheme of Section 4, and on the literal interpretation of Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 4, it would be legally permissible that the jurisdiction for infraction of Sub-section (2) of Section 4 is attracted only on the recommendation of the administrative enquiry and then, the cognizance Under Sub-section (3) of Section 4 is ordered.

15. By adhering to the above procedure, we hold that the Magistrate would have the accusation of a party and view of the Department while deciding to take cognizance of the offence or not. At the cost of repetition stated that, the purpose of an administrative enquiry is to find out the conduct of a public servant against whom allegations of failure of duty or function are made and the omission or commission is bonafide or willful.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 349 of 2021

Decided On: 17.05.2024

The State of GNCT of Delhi and Ors. Vs. Praveen Kumar*

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.M. Sundresh and S.V. Bhatti, JJ.

Author: S.V. Bhatti, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0469/2024.

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Bombay HC: Bar contained in S. 197, CrPC cannot be read into the provisions of a special legislation like SC/ST Atrocities Act

 The net result would be that when by virtue of explanation to Sub-Section 1 of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no previous sanction is required in respect of the offence punishable under Section 509 and when even no such sanction is required in respect of offence under the Atrocities Act, the perception of the Investigating Officer in treating the impugned decision as preventing him from filing any report and the stand of the State to that effect is grossly erroneous and unsustainable in law. When no previous sanction is required for carrying out investigation and filing a final report in respect of offence punishable under Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 of the Atrocities Act, the Investigating Officer is under statutory duty to submit a final report before the Special Court and the latter would not be debarred from taking cognizance thereof for want of sanction or because of the decision, not to accord the sanction. {Para 21}

24. In view of the above, we allow the writ petition partly as

under :

i. It is declared that no previous sanction as contemplated

under Section 197 would be necessary for carrying out

investigation and filing a final report in respect of offence

punishable under Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code and

Section 3 of the Atrocities Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.1401 OF 2021

Dr. Rekha w/o Gowardhan Gaikwad Vs  The State of Maharashtra

CORAM : MANGESH S. PATIL & SHAILESH P. BRAHME, JJ.

PRONOUNCED ON: 11.06.2024

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When prosecution U/ S 353 of IPC is liable to be quashed?

A plain reading of this provision indicates that first and foremost requirement for attracting rigour of this provision is that the public servant must be discharging his duty. Needless to say that such duty must be ‘lawful’. Unlike in some other provisions, the “purported discharge of duty” by public servant, is not contemplated herein. Hence for making this provision applicable, the discharge of lawful duty is a condition precedent.

{Para 8}

16. It further needs to be recorded that as per first information report of respondent No. 2, the said incident has not occurred at the time of actual demolition but prior to 2-3 hours thereof, when respondent No. 2 claims to have been to the spot. Thus, there is apparently no discharge of duty in any manner whatsoever sought to be done by the respondent No. 2 and hence even otherwise he has neither been obstructed nor been deterred to desist from discharge of duty. Considering the aforesaid facts even if the first informant report is accepted in his entirety as true, still no offence punishable under Section 353 is made out against the applicant.

 In the High Court of Bombay,Aurangabad Bench

(Before Anuja Prabhudessai and R.M. Joshi, JJ.)

Amer Khan  Vs State of Maharashtra and Others

Cri minal Application No. 3312 of 2019

Decided on February 22, 2023,

2023 SCC OnLine Bom 818 : (2023) 2 AIR Bom R (Cri) 399 : 2023 Cri LJ (NOC 259) 85

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Important provisions of CRPC 1973(Part 2)(S 105-A to S 176 of CRPC)

 Chapter XII

INFORMATION TO THE POLICE AND THEIR POWERS TO INVESTIGATE

154. Information in cognizable cases.

(3) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in charge of a police station to record the information referred to in sub-section (1) may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence.

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Whether disciplinary inquiry can be initiated against any public servant for committing the offence of adultery after joseph shine Judgment?

 In fact, this Court posed the following question. In a given case, the authority is presented with the following set of facts. An officer is proceeded against Under Section 45 of the 1950 Act; the charge against him is adultery; it is alleged, in other words, that he has committed adultery within the meaning of Section 497 Indian Penal Code which has been struck down. Mr. Kaleeswaram Raj, learned Counsel for the original Petitioner, very fairly submits that, the fact that Section 497 Indian Penal Code has been struck down may not stand in the way of the authorities proceeding against the officer with the aid of the provisions contained in Section 45 of the 1950 Act. Of course, he adds that the decision must finally depend upon the play of facts.{Para 22}

23. This Court in the case in question was concerned only with the validity of Section 497 Indian Penal Code and Section 198(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C.' for brevity). This Court spoke through separate but concurrent judgments. Apart from the lead judgment of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dipak Misra, former Chief Justice of this Court, and with whom, Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.M. Khanwilkar concurred, the other learned Judges wrote separate opinions. However, they agreed that Section 497 Indian Penal Code and Section 198 Code of Criminal Procedure were unconstitutional. The premise on which the provision was struck down was that it offended Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution.

In this case, this Court had no occasion, whatsoever, to consider the effect of the provisions of the Acts in question. In fact, we may notice that it is not as if this Court approved of adultery. This Court has found that adultery may be a moral wrong (per Hon'ble Ms. Justice Indu Malhotra). This Court has also held that it will continue to be a ground for securing dissolution of marriage. It has also been described as a civil wrong.

24. In view of the fact that the scheme of the Acts in the context, in particular, of Article 33 of the Constitution did not fall for the consideration of this Court, we must necessarily observe and clarify that the judgment of this Court in Joseph Shine v. Union of India MANU/SC/1074/2018 : (2019) 3 SCC 39 was not at all concerned with the effect and operation of the relevant provisions in the Acts which have been placed before us by the applicant. In other words, this Court was neither called upon nor has it ventured to pronounce on the effect of Sections 45 and 63 of the 1950 Act as also the corresponding provisions in other Acts or any other provisions of the Acts.

25. We only make this position clear and dispose of the miscellaneous application.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Miscellaneous Application No. 2204 of 2020 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 194 of 2017 and Miscellaneous Application No. 1702 of 2021 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 194 of 2017

Decided On: 31.01.2023

Joseph Shine Vs. Union of India (UOI)

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.M. Joseph, Ajay Rastogi, Aniruddha Bose, Hrishikesh Roy and C.T. Ravikumar, JJ.

Author: K.M. Joseph, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0133/2023.

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Whether Nationalised Bank Employee is Entitled to get protection of S 197 CrPC ?

  The Appellant was serving as an Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India, Overseas Bank at Hyderabad. State Bank of India is a Nationalised Bank. Although a person working in a Nationalised Bank is a public servant, yet the provisions of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not be attracted at all as Section 197 is attracted only in cases where the public servant is such who is not removable from his service save by or with the sanction of the Government. It is not disputed that the Appellant is not holding a post where he could not be removed from service except by or with the sanction of the Government. In this view of the matter, even if it is alleged that the Appellant herein is a public servant, still the provisions of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not attracted at all. {Para 45}

6. It is very clear from this provision that this Section is attracted only in cases where the public servant is such who is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government. It is not disputed that the Appellant is not holding a post where he could not be removed from service except by or with the sanction of the government. In this view of the matter even if it is held that the Appellant is a public servant still provisions of Section 197 are not attracted at all.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2339 of 2023 

Decided On: 08.08.2023

A. Sreenivasa Reddy  Vs. Rakesh Sharma and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0842/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Whether the court can try accused for offences under IPC if sanction for prosecution U/S 19 of Prevention of Corruption is not granted against accused?

 It was vociferously argued by the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant that as sanction Under Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 has not been granted, the Appellant cannot not be prosecuted for the offences under the Indian Penal Code alone and he should be discharged from the criminal proceedings.

{Para 51}

58. Thus, although in the present case, the Appellant has been discharged from the offences punishable under the PC Act, 1988 yet for the Indian Penal Code offences, he can be proceeded further in accordance with law.

59. From the aforesaid, it can be said that there can be no thumb Rule that in a prosecution before the court of Special Judge, the previous sanction Under Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 would invariably be the only pre-requisite. If the offences on the charge of which, the public servant is expected to be put on trial include the offences other than those punishable under the PC Act, 1988 that is to say under the general law (i.e. Indian Penal Code), the court is bound to examine, at the time of cognizance and also, if necessary, at subsequent stages (as the case progresses) as to whether there is a necessity of sanction Under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There is a material difference between the statutory requirements of Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 on one hand, and Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the other. In the prosecution for the offences exclusively under the PC Act, 1988, sanction is mandatory qua the public servant. In cases under the general penal law against the public servant, the necessity (or otherwise) of sanction Under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure depends on the factual aspects. The test in the latter case is of the "nexus" between the act of commission or omission and the official duty of the public servant. To commit an offence punishable under law can never be a part of the official duty of a public servant. It is too simplistic an approach to adopt and to reject the necessity of sanction Under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on such reasoning. The "safe and sure test", is to ascertain if the omission or neglect to commit the act complained of would have made the public servant answerable for the charge of dereliction of his official duty. He may have acted "in excess of his duty", but if there is a "reasonable connection" between the impugned act and the performance of the official duty, the protective umbrella of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be denied, so long as the discharge of official duty is not used as a cloak for illicit acts.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2339 of 2023 

Decided On: 08.08.2023

A. Sreenivasa Reddy  Vs. Rakesh Sharma and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0842/2023.

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Does the Mention of the Expression 'Benefit of Doubt' in a Judgment of Acquittal Indicate that the Acquittal Was Not Honourable?

 However, the fact remains that mere use of the expression ‘benefit of doubt’ in the judgment of criminal court, by itself, would not deprive the employee from claiming that the acquittal was ‘honourable’ or ‘clean’. If in the totality of the circumstances, the court comes to the conclusion that the acquittal of an employee is after consideration of the entire material and recording categorical finding that the guilt is not proved, the fact that the criminal court had also used an expression ‘benefit of doubt’ in the judgment would not constitute an impediment in inferring ‘honourable acquittal’.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO.12326 OF 2017

Eknath Shankar Kamble Vs  Chief Executive Officer,

CORAM: N.J.JAMADAR, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 8 JUNE 2023

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Can the appointing authority dismiss a public servant from service by invoking the doctrine of pleasure or is the authority bound by the rule of law?

The law on “the Doctrine of Pleasure” and the

scope of judicial review, is no longer res integra; it has

been settled by the Apex Court and also by this Court in

various judgments. The “Doctrine of Pleasure” has its

genesis under the common law. A public servant could be

dismissed from service by the Crown at its pleasure.

However, the doctrine lost the said trait when it was

applied in India, which is a republic, wedded to the

rule of law functioning under a written Constitution.

The authoritarian doctrine, though couched in an

unfettered manner, is but subject to the rule of law.

While considering the justiciability on the exercise of

the power of Doctrine of Pleasure, there is no

adjudication of any lis. The contours of judicial review

is confined to, finding out if the exercise of the power

was “arbitrary, capricious or malafide”. There is no

requirement of any notice preceding exercise of the

power, or to assign any cause for exercise of the power.

Though there is no need to assign reasons, the need for

a valid and compelling reason, exists. In exercise of

the doctrine of pleasure, the principles of natural

justice have no application. [See Deepak v. University of

Kerala 2014 (1) KLT 520, Krishna vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2001 (2) SCC 441; B.P. Singhal vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. 2010 (6) SCC 331]. {Para 24}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

WP(C) NO. 33664 OF 2022

DR.K.S.CHANDRASEKAR Vs THE CHANCELLOR UNIVERSITY OF KERALA, 

PRESENT

 MR. JUSTICE SATHISH NINAN

 24TH DAY OF MARCH 2023

Dated: 24th day of March, 2023

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