Showing posts with label public servant. Show all posts
Showing posts with label public servant. Show all posts

Sunday, 15 November 2026

Supreme Court: BNSS Expands Safeguards For Public Servants Before Judicial Order For FIR Registration

Mr. John has forcefully contended that as per Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India [(2023) 12 SCC 1], the State was obliged to register an FIR as per communication made to them under Section 66(2) of the 2002 Act by Enforcement Directorate. The appellants, being accused persons, do not have a right of hearing at the time of registration of such FIR. 

[Para 11]

12. We are unable to agree to such contention advanced before us. This is not a case where, on receipt of communication under Section 66(2), the State had registered a case on its own. On the contrary, the registration of the FIR and commencement of investigation thereon was pursuant to a judicial order passed by the High Court. While passing such order, the Single Judge had inter alia observed that the materials in the communication by Enforcement Directorate discloses a cognizable offence and therefore, it was obligatory for the State to register an FIR. If the appellants are not permitted to assail such finding in the appellate proceedings, the same shall come in their way, if an independent proceeding is initiated, assailing the First Information Report as per law. That apart, the scheme with regard to registration of an FIR through judicial intervention under the BNSS has undergone a change from what was envisaged under the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the erstwhile Code, Section 156(3) did not require the participation or involvement of the public servant or his superior in exercise of Magisterial discretion to issue direction for registration of FIR. However, under Section 175(4) of the BNSS, such a requirement has been incorporated, which reads as follows:


"175(4) Any Magistrate empowered under section 210, may, upon receiving a complaint against a public servant arising in course of the discharge of his official duties, order investigation, subject to-


(a) receiving a report containing facts and circumstances of the incident from the officer superior to him; and


(b) after consideration of the assertions made by the public servant as to the situation that led to the incident so alleged."


13. Mr. Zoheb Hossain, learned counsel, argues that such requirement would be hedged by the fact that the offence is committed by public servant in discharge of official duty, which would not apply to former public servants in corruption cases.


14. We have referred to Section 175(4) of the BNSS not in reference to the merits of the case before us, but to elucidate the expansive jurisdiction envisaged in the new law with regard to participation of a potential accused prior to registration of FIR. That apart, we are also minded to observe that the Single Judge has not only directed registration of an FIR, which is the mandate in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra), but also directed commencement of investigation and filing of final report, which may require consideration of other statutory requirements under the special law including sanction under Section 17A thereof.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. ... of 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave to Appeal Crl. No. 20437/2026), 

Date of Order: 21.10.2026

Pinarayi Vijayan Vs. K.M. Shajahan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SCOR/74727/2026.
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Thursday, 12 November 2026

Supreme Court: Once a public servant is arrested and remains in judicial custody for more than 48 hours, there is a deemed suspension

However, there is one disturbing feature which we

should not ignore. It appears, that upon arrest, the

appellant accused was in judicial custody for almost

a period of 15 days. Once a public servant is

arrested and remains in judicial custody for more

than 48 hours, there is a deemed suspension. He being

a public servant, he could be said to have been

placed under deemed suspension. No specific order is

required to be passed in this regard. {Para 14}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.________OF 2026

(@ SLP(Criminal) No.13108/2026)

VISHWAJEET SINGH @BISHWAJEET  RAMANAND  Vs THE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.

Dated: 06th November, 2026.

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Wednesday, 11 November 2026

Supreme Court: Trap Cut Short, Case Cut Down: Why a Premature Bribery payment to Intermediary will not prove guilt of public servant

The CBI on being informed that the Appellant was demanding bribe, decided to lay the trap for the Appellant. If the trap was really meant for the Appellant and not for PW-2, why was it executed against PW-2, Anantha Narayanan? It is relevant to consider the reason the trap was not permitted to run its full course as against the Appellant. If, the money was ultimately meant to reach the Appellant, the investigating agency ought to have kept a watch on the Appellant and not merely on PW-2 and on being told that the money was handed over to PW-2, the CBI could have waited for some more time to observe the movement of PW-2 and if PW-2 was proceeding towards the residence of the Appellant with the trap money, the CBI could have executed the trap at the residence of the Appellant which would have furnished direct and conclusive proof of receipt qua the Appellant himself. Instead, the trap was brought to an abrupt closure at the point of recovery from PW-2, which, at its highest, establishes only the unauthorized receipt of money by PW-2 and does not establish that the money was ever intended to reach, or did in fact reach, the Appellant. Further, as per the version of PW-2, the chain contemplated was that the complainant would hand the money to PW-2, as directed by the Appellant, and PW-2 would in turn carry it to the Appellant's residence. Had the investigating agency allowed that chain to complete, the resulting evidence would have spoken far more directly to the Appellant's culpability than the recovery actually effected. This is a serious lacuna and impatience of the CBI in the investigation conducted by it would enure to the benefit of the Appellant. {Para 66}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 4732 and 4733 of 2024

Decided On: 16.09.2026

Bharat Raj Meena Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipankar Datta and N. Kotiswar Singh, JJ.

Author: N. Kotiswar Singh, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 999,MANU/SC/1029/2026

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Sunday, 26 July 2026

Supreme Court: Section 195 of CRPC Bar Cannot Be Evaded by Splitting Offences

In this regard, the Court laid down the following principles to be followed while dealing with a category of offences that fall within the protective sphere of Section 195 CrPC.

(i) Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C. bars the court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 respectively of the I.P.C., unless there is a written complaint by the public servant concerned or his administrative superior, for voluntarily obstructing the public servant from discharge of his public functions. Without a complaint from the said persons, the court would lack competence to take cognizance in certain types of offences enumerated therein.

(ii) If in truth and substance, an offence falls in the category of Section 195(1)(a)(i), it is not open to the court to undertake the exercise of splitting them up and proceeding further against the accused for the other distinct offences disclosed in the same set of facts. However, it also cannot be laid down as a straitjacket formula that the Court, under all circumstances, cannot undertake the exercise of splitting up. It would depend upon the facts of each case, the nature of allegations and the materials on record.

(iii) Severance of distinct offences is not permissible when it would effectively circumvent the protection afforded by Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C., which requires a complaint by a public servant for certain offences against public justice. This means that if the core of the offence falls under the purview of Section 195(1)(a)(i), it cannot be prosecuted by simply filing a general complaint for a different, but related, offence. The focus should be on whether the facts, in substance, constitute an offence requiring a public servant's complaint.

(iv) In the aforesaid context, the courts must apply twin tests. First, the courts must ascertain having regard to the nature of the allegations made in the complaint/FIR and other materials on record whether the other distinct offences not covered by Section 195(1)(a)(i) have been invoked only with a view to evade the mandatory bar of Section 195 of the I.P.C. and secondly, whether the facts primarily and essentially disclose an offence for which a complaint of the court or a public servant is required.

(v) Where an accused is alleged to have committed some offences which are separate and distinct from those contained in Section 195, Section 195 will affect only the offences mentioned therein. However, the courts should ascertain whether such offences form an integral part and are so intrinsically connected so as to amount to offences committed as a part of the same transaction, in which case the other offences also would fall within the ambit of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. This would all depend on the facts of each case.

(vi) Sections 195(1)(b)(i)(ii) & (iii) and 340 of the Cr.P.C. respectively do not control or circumscribe the power of the police to investigate, under the Criminal Procedure Code. Once investigation is completed then the embargo in Section 195 would come into play and the Court would not be competent to take cognizance. However, that Court could then file a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR and the material collected during investigation, provided the procedure laid down in Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. is followed.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 12373 of 2025 

Decided On: 20.08.2025

Devendra Kumar Vs. The State (NCT of Delhi) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

 Citation: 2025 INSC 1009, MANU/SC/1133/2025.
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Tuesday, 28 April 2026

Questions and answers on law (Part 86)

Q :-  Whether Sanction for all offences  under corruption  act is required , for which offences  sanction is not required? How sanction for prosecution in proved in cases under prevention of corruption act

Ans:- 1) Is sanction required for all PC Act offences?

No. Sanction under Section 19 PC Act is required only when the accused is a “public servant” and the court is taking cognizance of specified PC Act offences (bribery/criminal misconduct etc.) and the person is still covered as a public servant at the relevant time.

2) For which situations/offences sanction is not required?

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Monday, 27 April 2026

Culpable Homicide and Murder under IPC: Law, Exceptions and Landmark Judgments

 Under the IPC, every murder is culpable homicide, but every culpable homicide is not murder. The easiest interview formula is: first see whether Section 299 is made out; then ask whether the case falls in any of the four clauses of Section 300, and finally check whether any of the five exceptions to Section 300 reduce it to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Core distinction

The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that culpable homicide is the genus and murder is its species. In simple terms, murder is the more aggravated form of culpable homicide, where the intention or knowledge is of a higher degree.

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Sunday, 4 January 2026

Karnataka HC: How to appreciate prosecution evidence U/S 353 of IPC regarding performance of official duty by public servant?

 As per Rule 7 of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, an offence committed under the Act shall be investigated by a Police officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintended of Police. The Investigating Officer shall be appointed by the State Government/Director General of Police/Superintendent of Police after taking into account his past experience, sense of ability and justice to perceive the implications of the case and investigate it along with right lines within the shortest possible time. {Para 29}


30. There is no document on record to show that he was appointed by Superintendent of Police to investigate this case. On perusal of his evidence, he has not at all stated anything with regard to PW1 that he was on duty and how his official duty was obstructed on account of incident in question. It is important to note that neither PW1 nor PW5 deposed with regard to the deterring by the accused in performing the official duties of PW1. There is no presumption as such with the official in the office during the office hours should be presumed to be on duty. In order to prove the offence under Section 353 of IPC, the prosecution has to prove PW1 was on official duty and the act committed by the accused deterred him from doing his duty. In the absence of these ingredients the accused could not have even convicted for the offence punishable under Section 353 of IPC. Though the Investigating Officer obtained Ex. P9, but it is not stated on what basis Ex. P9 was issued and what was the duty the complainant was doing at the time of incident. No inference can be drawn from the document that PWs. 1 and 2 were discharging any duty as such. In Ex. P9, the name of the person, who had signed is not mentioned or no office seal is attested to it. He did not know whose custody the movement register there in the office nor he has verified the same. Who obtained Ex. P9 is not forthcoming. There is no serial number of the said letter nor the name of staff who obtained and furnished the document to Investigating Officer, is not mentioned.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA (DHARWAD BENCH)

Cri. A. No. 2800 of 2010

Decided On: 15.05.2019

Ashok Sangappa Sidareddi Vs. State of Karnataka

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bellunke, J.

Citation: 2019 CRLJ 4052, AIRONLINE 2019 Kar 458,MANU/KA/7633/2019.

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Sunday, 8 June 2025

Kerala HC: Special courts shall not order an investigation U/S 156(3) CrPC against public servant in absence of prior sanction under Section 19 of PC Act.

  Section 19(1) of the PC Act says that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction of the competent authority referred to in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c). The question of sanction is of paramount importance for protecting a public servant who has acted in good faith while performing his duties. The purpose of obtaining sanction is to see that the public servant is not entangled in false and frivolous cases. The question whether a sanction under section 19 of the PC Act is necessary or not while ordering an investigation against a public servant invoking powers under section 156(3) of Cr. P.C is no more res integra. In Anil Kumar (supra), it was held that in the absence of a prior sanction under section 19 of the PC Act, the Magistrate/Court cannot order an investigation against a public servant by invoking power under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. After referring to various judgments on the issue of purport and meaning of the word "cognizance", it was concluded that "cognizance" has a wider connotation and is not merely confined to the stage of taking cognizance of the offence. In L.Narayana Swamy (supra), the Apex Court held that an order directing investigation under section 156(3) could not be passed in relation to a public servant in the absence of valid sanction. It was observed that even while directing inquiry under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., the Magistrate applies his judicial mind on the complaint, and therefore, it would amount to taking cognizance of the matter. The same issue arose before the Apex Court again in Manju Surana v. Sunil Arora and Others (MANU/SC/0296/2018 : 2018 KHC 6224). After considering the various judgments, including Anil Kumar (supra) and L. Narayana Swamy (supra), the Division Bench of the Apex Court directed the matter to be placed before the Larger Bench. Thereafter, a Division Bench of this Court in Muhammed V.A. and Others v. State of Kerala and Others (MANU/KE/3653/2018 : 2019 (1) KHC 239) held that until a final decision is taken in the reference in Manju Surana (supra), the dictum laid down in Anil Kumar (supra) will hold the field. Therefore, as the law now stands, the requirement of sanction under section 19 of the PC Act is a prerequisite for presenting a private complaint against a public servant alleging the commission of an offence specified in sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 of the PC Act. No such complaint could be forwarded for investigation under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. in the absence of sanction granted by the competent authority under section 19 of the PC Act. The decision of the Apex Court in B.A.Srinivasan (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for respondents 3 to 6 pertains to sanction under section 197 of Cr.P.C and hence the dictum laid down therein does not apply to the facts of the case.

{Para 7}

Considering the above findings, I am of the view that the court below could not have forwarded the complaints under section 156(3) of Cr.P.C for investigation without any sanction under section 19(1) of the PC Act obtained by the complainants. Hence, the impugned order cannot be sustained, and accordingly, it is set aside.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

OP (Crl.) No. 510 of 2022

Decided On: 17.02.2023

C.V. Balan and Ors. Vs. State of Kerala and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. Kauser Edappagath, J.

Citation: 2023 KER 9580,2023 KLJ 1 9252023 SCC ONLINE KER 9832023 KER 9580, MANU/KE/0324/2023
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Monday, 26 May 2025

Anticipatory Bail, Public Interest, and Corruption: Supreme Court’s New Threshold in P Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh


 Introduction

The Supreme Court’s recent judgment in P Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7532-34 of 2025) marks a significant development in Indian criminal jurisprudence, particularly regarding the grant of anticipatory bail in high-profile corruption cases involving public servants. The Court’s refusal to grant anticipatory bail, despite the petitioners’ cooperation with the investigation and their retired status, introduces a nuanced legal principle prioritizing public interest and the integrity of ongoing investigations over individual liberty in cases of grave economic offences.

Background and Context

The petitioners, former high-ranking public officials, sought anticipatory bail after being implicated in a massive alleged scam concerning the allocation of liquor brands in Andhra Pradesh. The case, registered under various sections of the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act, revolves around allegations of favoritism, manipulation of procurement processes, and kickbacks amounting to over Rs. 3,000 crores.

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Sunday, 22 December 2024

Karnataka HC: Sending Voice Sample In Graft Case For Analysis To Private Lab Instead Of Govt Forensic Science Lab Affects Rights Of Accused


 It is pertinent to note that without exhausting

the remedy before the Forensic Laboratory of Karnataka,

sending the voice sample to the Truth Labs, which is a

private agency and collecting the report which is been

placed as a gospel truth in filing the charge sheet has also

resulted in affecting the rights of the accused. Therefore,

the very cognizance itself should not have been taken by

the learned Special Judge and charge sheet should have

been returned. {Para 19}.

The Karnataka High Court upheld a trial court order discharging a public servant of graft charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act as the Lokayukta police sent the voice sample of the conversation between the official and the complainant wherein he allegedly demanded a bribe, to a private agency instead of sending it to government Forensic Science Laboratory for analysis.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

CRL.RP No. 699 of 2017

STATE OF KARNATAKA  Vs G. RAMACHARI

CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V SRISHANANDA

DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2024

Citation: 2024:KHC:50561.

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Sunday, 22 September 2024

What facts are to be proved for convicting an accused for an offence U/S 353 of IPC?

 To convict an accused under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which pertains to assault or criminal force against a public servant in the discharge of their duties, certain fundamental facts must be established. Here’s a detailed explanation of the essential elements required for conviction.

Key Elements for Conviction Under Section 353 IPC

The prosecution must prove the following essential elements:

- Assault or Criminal Force: There must be an act that constitutes an assault or the use of criminal force. According to Section 351 of the IPC, assault involves gestures or preparations that create a reasonable apprehension of imminent use of criminal force. Criminal force, as defined in Section 350, refers to the intentional use of force without consent, which is likely to cause injury, fear, or annoyance.

- Public Servant: The victim must be a public servant as defined under Section 21 of the IPC. This includes any person holding an office by virtue of which they are authorized to perform public duties.

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Bombay HC: Accused intimidating public servant by threatening to defame him on social media site as well as engineering artificial protest falls with scope of criminal force as used in S 353 of IPC.

Mr. Thobde contends that, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not make out any case for trial and that they are inherently improbable. He submitted that, ingredients of the offences as alleged are not even prima facie made out against the Petitioner. He further argues that, raising grievances in a democratic manner by protesting against illegal action or inaction of public servant does not amount to any offence. He raises a strange ground that, the Petitioner has only acted in furtherance of fundamental right bestowed upon him and hence he urges us to quash the F.I.R. as it is sheer harassment to the Petitioner to undergo the rigors of the trial. {Para 5}

8. The present case is suggestive of an emerging trend by persons such as the Petitioner herein, who with the aid of modern-day technologies devise a modus operandi to commit such offence. Hiding behind the screen of social media, irresponsible acts are done which have the propensity to effectively intimidate and cause a person to do acts which they would not otherwise lawfully do. All this while maintaining a veil of deniability of the act. The threat to use social media sites as a platform to intimidate and threat given by the petitioner and his accomplice is real enough to scare the complainant albeit a public servant ignoring their demands only at the risk of being defamed or facing an engineered protest.


9. Section 353 of the I.P.C. makes use of criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty or with intent to prevent or deter him from discharging his duties, an offence. The act of the Petitioner in intimidating the complainant by threatening to defame him on social media site as well as engineering artificial protest also falls within the scope and ambit of the word 'criminal force' used in the Section. Threats of using social media site to intimate is a manifestation of the intention of the Petitioner to abuse modern day technology by 'virtually' using criminal force on the complainant. The ulterior motive is to deter him from discharging his public duty. In such circumstances 'criminal force' must not be restricted to only include physical force, but must bring within its ambit 'virtual force'. Section 353 cannot be interpreted in a narrow or parochial manner and a myopic view cannot be taken of the same. Such acts do not merely threaten the victims of crime but also defeats the very purpose of the criminal justice system. As in the case at hand, a public servant is at his tether's end to find a resolution to the constant threats and demands of money by the Petitioner. Finally, he found courage enough to approach the police who set up the trap to ensnare the Petitioner.

10. It is most unfortunate that, a public servant has been threatened and intimidated by defamatory material being circulated on social media to lower his reputation in the eyes of the right-thinking members of the society. A Tehsildar in a district is a respected public officer and is expected to discharge important functions in revenue matters. He is required to command obedience from the public at large visiting his office. If the repute of his office is lowered in the environment over which he has jurisdiction, there is a probability of chaos and disruption in the discharge of his duties. The threat of spreading false narrative by way of engineered protests in present times is bound to be quite a scary proposition for a public servant such as the complainant. The intent of the Petitioner in giving the threats and cause concern to the complainant would easily amount to an obstruction of a public servant from carrying out his public duties, particularly when the threats are coupled with aggressive and menacing acts on the part of the Petitioner and his accomplice. The F.I.R. also reveals the threat given by the Petitioner of organizing a protest during the Legislative Assembly Session in Nagpur which gives the entire act of the Petitioner a political color. This is reason enough for the complainant to be disconcerted and place him in fear of injury to his person and reputation. These acts are deprecated and need to be discouraged at their very inception, justifying prosecution.


10.1. We have recorded our above observations in detail only to bring to the fore the dangers of public servants being intimated while discharging their public duty. Public faith in public servants cannot be allowed to erode. Such acts must be viewed seriously.


11. In view of the aforenoted facts, we are of the considered opinion that, the F.I.R. prima facie discloses ingredients of the offences as alleged. We are thus not inclined to allow the Petition.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Writ Petition No. 276 of 2024

Decided On: 01.07.2024

Ajit Prabhakar Kulkarni Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Gadkari and Dr. Neela Kedar Gokhale, JJ.

Author: Dr. Neela Kedar Gokhale, J.

Citation:  MANU/MH/4381/2024.

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Whether the court can convict an accused for an offence U/S 353 and S 332 of IPC if prosecution fails to prove that assault has link with discharge of duty by public servant?

In the present case also it is seen that the complainant was questioned with regards to some complaint lodged by him against the accused. The motive for assault has no link with the discharge of duty by the complainant. It is manifest that the assault on the PW-1 had no real nexus or causal connection or consequential relation with the performance of his duty as a public servant. There was no evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that the intent of the accused was to prevent or deter him from discharge of his duty as such public servant. As such the charge under Sections 332 and 353 of IPC cannot sustain and the conviction for the said offences is also required to be set aside. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

Criminal Revision Application No.52 of 2005

Balasaheb Nivrutti Jagtap Vs. The State of Maharashtra

Dated: 20th March, 2018.

Coram: PRAKASH D. NAIK, J.

Citation: 2018 ALL MR (Cri) 2693.

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Tuesday, 17 September 2024

Bombay HC: Officers Appointed To Assess Electricity Theft Are 'Public Servants', Court Can't Issue Process Against Them Without Sanction U/S 197 CrPC

 Section 169 of the Electricity Act, 2003 which defines the term public servants in pursuance to Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code includes the servants or the employees under Section 126 of the Electricity Act, 2003. As discussed above, the Board has authorized various officers including the Junior Engineers and linemen to detect the theft. Hence, they are covered under the definition of public servants in Section 169 of the Electricity Act, 2003. Therefore, the Court is of the view that the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class erred in issuing the process against the petitioners without sanction as required under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This issue was not dealt with at all. The impugned order also does not reflect the application of mind. Hence, the petition deserves to be allowed. {Para 22}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 744 OF 2008

 Syed Naeemuddin S/o Syed Khaja, Vs The State of Maharashtra.

 CORAM : S.G. MEHARE, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : SEPTEMBER 12, 2024.

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Sunday, 16 June 2024

Supreme Court: Cognizance of offence Against Public Servant under S 4 of SC & ST (Atrocities Act) For Offence Of Neglect Of Duty Cannot Be Taken Without Administrative Enquiry Report

 The argument of the learned Counsel for the complainant is that the word "charges" occurring in proviso to Section 4(2) of the SC/ST Act is to be interpreted that the enquiry report is to be sought before framing of charges and not before the registration of the FIR.

{Para 49}

50. To my mind, the said argument is bereft of merit as the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Charansingh (supra) and as per the proviso noted above, the enquiry report is to be sought before the criminal proceedings are initiated and not before the framing of charges.


14.4. The absence of recommendation would bar taking cognizance by the Court. In a given case, if a complaint without recommendation is filed before the Magistrate, the Magistrate before proceeding further to keep his decision conforming to Section 4(2) read with the proviso, calls for a report/recommendation from the Department against the named public servant. The Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court based on an administrative enquiry report can take cognizance of the alleged offence and thereon direct penal proceedings. By keeping in perspective, the language/scheme of Section 4, and on the literal interpretation of Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 4, it would be legally permissible that the jurisdiction for infraction of Sub-section (2) of Section 4 is attracted only on the recommendation of the administrative enquiry and then, the cognizance Under Sub-section (3) of Section 4 is ordered.


15. By adhering to the above procedure, we hold that the Magistrate would have the accusation of a party and view of the Department while deciding to take cognizance of the offence or not. At the cost of repetition stated that, the purpose of an administrative enquiry is to find out the conduct of a public servant against whom allegations of failure of duty or function are made and the omission or commission is bonafide or willful.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 349 of 2021

Decided On: 17.05.2024

The State of GNCT of Delhi and Ors. Vs. Praveen Kumar*

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.M. Sundresh and S.V. Bhatti, JJ.

Author: S.V. Bhatti, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0469/2024.

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Bombay HC: Bar contained in S. 197, CrPC cannot be read into the provisions of a special legislation like SC/ST Atrocities Act

 The net result would be that when by virtue of explanation to Sub-Section 1 of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no previous sanction is required in respect of the offence punishable under Section 509 and when even no such sanction is required in respect of offence under the Atrocities Act, the perception of the Investigating Officer in treating the impugned decision as preventing him from filing any report and the stand of the State to that effect is grossly erroneous and unsustainable in law. When no previous sanction is required for carrying out investigation and filing a final report in respect of offence punishable under Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 of the Atrocities Act, the Investigating Officer is under statutory duty to submit a final report before the Special Court and the latter would not be debarred from taking cognizance thereof for want of sanction or because of the decision, not to accord the sanction. {Para 21}

24. In view of the above, we allow the writ petition partly as

under :

i. It is declared that no previous sanction as contemplated

under Section 197 would be necessary for carrying out

investigation and filing a final report in respect of offence

punishable under Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code and

Section 3 of the Atrocities Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.1401 OF 2021

Dr. Rekha w/o Gowardhan Gaikwad Vs  The State of Maharashtra

CORAM : MANGESH S. PATIL & SHAILESH P. BRAHME, JJ.

PRONOUNCED ON: 11.06.2024

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Thursday, 25 April 2024

When prosecution U/ S 353 of IPC is liable to be quashed?

A plain reading of this provision indicates that first and foremost requirement for attracting rigour of this provision is that the public servant must be discharging his duty. Needless to say that such duty must be ‘lawful’. Unlike in some other provisions, the “purported discharge of duty” by public servant, is not contemplated herein. Hence for making this provision applicable, the discharge of lawful duty is a condition precedent.

{Para 8}

16. It further needs to be recorded that as per first information report of respondent No. 2, the said incident has not occurred at the time of actual demolition but prior to 2-3 hours thereof, when respondent No. 2 claims to have been to the spot. Thus, there is apparently no discharge of duty in any manner whatsoever sought to be done by the respondent No. 2 and hence even otherwise he has neither been obstructed nor been deterred to desist from discharge of duty. Considering the aforesaid facts even if the first informant report is accepted in his entirety as true, still no offence punishable under Section 353 is made out against the applicant.

 In the High Court of Bombay,Aurangabad Bench

(Before Anuja Prabhudessai and R.M. Joshi, JJ.)


Amer Khan  Vs State of Maharashtra and Others

Cri minal Application No. 3312 of 2019

Decided on February 22, 2023,


2023 SCC OnLine Bom 818 : (2023) 2 AIR Bom R (Cri) 399 : 2023 Cri LJ (NOC 259) 85
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Saturday, 10 February 2024

Important provisions of CRPC 1973(Part 2)(S 105-A to S 176 of CRPC)

 Chapter XII

INFORMATION TO THE POLICE AND THEIR POWERS TO INVESTIGATE

154. Information in cognizable cases.

(3) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in charge of a police station to record the information referred to in sub-section (1) may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence.

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Sunday, 19 November 2023

Whether disciplinary inquiry can be initiated against any public servant for committing the offence of adultery after joseph shine Judgment?

 In fact, this Court posed the following question. In a given case, the authority is presented with the following set of facts. An officer is proceeded against Under Section 45 of the 1950 Act; the charge against him is adultery; it is alleged, in other words, that he has committed adultery within the meaning of Section 497 Indian Penal Code which has been struck down. Mr. Kaleeswaram Raj, learned Counsel for the original Petitioner, very fairly submits that, the fact that Section 497 Indian Penal Code has been struck down may not stand in the way of the authorities proceeding against the officer with the aid of the provisions contained in Section 45 of the 1950 Act. Of course, he adds that the decision must finally depend upon the play of facts.{Para 22}


23. This Court in the case in question was concerned only with the validity of Section 497 Indian Penal Code and Section 198(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Cr.P.C.' for brevity). This Court spoke through separate but concurrent judgments. Apart from the lead judgment of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dipak Misra, former Chief Justice of this Court, and with whom, Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.M. Khanwilkar concurred, the other learned Judges wrote separate opinions. However, they agreed that Section 497 Indian Penal Code and Section 198 Code of Criminal Procedure were unconstitutional. The premise on which the provision was struck down was that it offended Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution.


In this case, this Court had no occasion, whatsoever, to consider the effect of the provisions of the Acts in question. In fact, we may notice that it is not as if this Court approved of adultery. This Court has found that adultery may be a moral wrong (per Hon'ble Ms. Justice Indu Malhotra). This Court has also held that it will continue to be a ground for securing dissolution of marriage. It has also been described as a civil wrong.


24. In view of the fact that the scheme of the Acts in the context, in particular, of Article 33 of the Constitution did not fall for the consideration of this Court, we must necessarily observe and clarify that the judgment of this Court in Joseph Shine v. Union of India MANU/SC/1074/2018 : (2019) 3 SCC 39 was not at all concerned with the effect and operation of the relevant provisions in the Acts which have been placed before us by the applicant. In other words, this Court was neither called upon nor has it ventured to pronounce on the effect of Sections 45 and 63 of the 1950 Act as also the corresponding provisions in other Acts or any other provisions of the Acts.


25. We only make this position clear and dispose of the miscellaneous application.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Miscellaneous Application No. 2204 of 2020 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 194 of 2017 and Miscellaneous Application No. 1702 of 2021 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 194 of 2017

Decided On: 31.01.2023

Joseph Shine Vs. Union of India (UOI)

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.M. Joseph, Ajay Rastogi, Aniruddha Bose, Hrishikesh Roy and C.T. Ravikumar, JJ.

Author: K.M. Joseph, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0133/2023.

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Tuesday, 15 August 2023

Whether Nationalised Bank Employee is Entitled to get protection of S 197 CrPC ?

  The Appellant was serving as an Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India, Overseas Bank at Hyderabad. State Bank of India is a Nationalised Bank. Although a person working in a Nationalised Bank is a public servant, yet the provisions of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not be attracted at all as Section 197 is attracted only in cases where the public servant is such who is not removable from his service save by or with the sanction of the Government. It is not disputed that the Appellant is not holding a post where he could not be removed from service except by or with the sanction of the Government. In this view of the matter, even if it is alleged that the Appellant herein is a public servant, still the provisions of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not attracted at all. {Para 45}

6. It is very clear from this provision that this Section is attracted only in cases where the public servant is such who is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government. It is not disputed that the Appellant is not holding a post where he could not be removed from service except by or with the sanction of the government. In this view of the matter even if it is held that the Appellant is a public servant still provisions of Section 197 are not attracted at all.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2339 of 2023 

Decided On: 08.08.2023

A. Sreenivasa Reddy  Vs. Rakesh Sharma and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai and J.B. Pardiwala, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0842/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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