Showing posts with label gender equality. Show all posts
Showing posts with label gender equality. Show all posts

Saturday, 31 May 2025

LLM Notes: Air India v. Nargesh Meerza (1981) - IRAC Analysis

 Issue

The primary issue in Air India v. Nargesh Meerza was whether the service regulations imposed by Air India on female flight attendants (Air Hostesses) violated their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Indian Constitution. Specifically, the case challenged regulations that required air hostesses to retire at age 35, terminate their service upon marriage within four years of employment, or upon first pregnancy - conditions that did not apply to male flight attendants.

The petitioner Nargesh Meerza, an Air India flight attendant, contested these discriminatory workplace policies that forced women to resign based on gender-specific conditions while male employees faced no such restrictions.

Rule

Print Page

LLM Notes: The Air India v. Nergesh Meerza Case: A Landmark Supreme Court Decision on Gender Equality in Aviation

 The Air India v. Nergesh Meerza case of 1981 stands as one of the most significant judicial decisions in Indian legal history concerning gender discrimination in the workplace. This landmark Supreme Court ruling challenged deeply entrenched discriminatory employment practices in the aviation sector and became a cornerstone for advancing women's rights in India. The case highlighted the constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination while addressing the systemic barriers faced by female aviation professionals in the post-independence era.

Background and Historical Context

Formation of Air India Corporations

Print Page

Friday, 23 August 2024

Supreme Court: BNSS Removed Discriminatory Provision of CrPC Section Which Says Only Male Family Members Can Accept Summons

The Writ Petition under Article 32 challenged the constitutional validity of Section 64 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 on the ground that it was discriminatory against women by disabling them from accepting summons on behalf of the persons summoned. {Para 1}

2 Similar grievances have been made before this Court earlier.

3. Parliament, while enacting the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 has incorporated the provisions of Section 66 which addresses the grievance.

4. In that view of the matter, the cause which is sought to be pursued in the Writ Petition has been rendered infructuous.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 958 OF 2022

Kush Kalram Vs  Union of India & Anr 

Dated: July 09, 2024.

Print Page

Thursday, 9 February 2017

Whether Infidelity, By Either Spouse, Is On Equal Footing?

 The discussion of the evidence regarding the respondent alleging
that the appellant was interested more in other girls and less in him, an
allegation which falls far short of a plea of adulterous relationship, but
material enough to decide the strange matrimonial relationship between
the parties, is in paragraph 58 of the impugned decision. It reads as
under:-
“58. It is settled law that the acts of cruelty with dates and
occasions and the places where such acts were committed
must be specifically mentioned in the petition. The
petitioner has, however, failed to do so. The petitioner has
leveled different baseless allegations and has made no
efforts to prove the same. The petitioner merely claimed
that the respondent has leveled baseless allegations of his
having extramarital affairs with different women/girls and
this caused him cruelty. I am not in conformity with the 
petitioner. It has come over the record that the petitioner
himself had been indifferent towards the respondent. He did
not offer any explanation to the respondent as to why the
girls/women had been calling him. In such circumstances,
she would have thought that the petitioner had extra-marital
relations with other girls/women. It has, however, come
over the record that she has not specified any girl or woman
with whom the petitioner had alleged extra marital
relations. In fact, she has been throughout ready and
willing to join the company/society of the petitioner. If the
respondent had any doubt/suspicion against the petitioner,
that were due to his conduct only and he alone is
responsible for the same. Moreover, the allegations made
against the husband do not in terms of mental torture and
agony necessarily have a similar impact. The reason why a
false charge of unchastity against the wife is viewed
seriously, is because of the high moral ground of which the
fidelity and commitment of Hindu wives is placed towards
the husbands. A false allegation of infidelity made against
the husband can be treated as mental torture only if such
torture is proved as a fact. The social milieu in which the
parties live, their value system and outlook also assume
importance in such a situation.”

10. The finding returned by the learned Judge Family Court against the
appellant proceeds on the assumption that the testimony of the respondent
proves that the appellant was in touch over the telephone with many
women and this was the reason why he was indifferent towards the
respondent. The learned Judge Family Court has held against the
appellant on the ground that the appellant had to render an explanation as
to why so many women were calling him. The learned Judge has held
that the appellant had to remove the suspicion from the mind of his wife.
A gender bias approach to the issue is revealed, when the learned Judge
reasons that unchastity by a wife is to be viewed seriously because a
higher level of fidelity is expected from a wife. An allegation of
infidelity made against the husband cannot be treated as mental torture. 
The approach by the learned Judge is totally perverse and contrary to law.
An act of infidelity by either spouse, irrespective of the gender is on an
equal footing and would cause mental cruelty to the other spouse with the
same intensity. The assumption by the learned Judge that the respondent
has established the appellant being in touch with many women is
incorrect, for the reason it was an allegation made by the respondent
against the appellant and she had to prove the same.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Dated : February 06, 2017
 FAO 366/2012
NAVRATAN BAID v NEETU BAID 
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE YOGESH KHANNA

Print Page

Friday, 11 March 2016

Progressive Judgment under Hindu succession Act enhancing Gender Equality

As noted earlier, neither Mahadu/his legal representatives nor Sonabai/her legal representatives classify as heirs in either Class-I or Class-II of the Schedule to the said Act. Therefore, there was no question of Mahadu/his legal representatives claiming any priority over the claim of Sonabai/her legal representatives. In fact, both claim as agnates and the First Appeal Court was entirely justified in decreeing the suit for partition upon the said basis.
23] Mr. Mankapure, faced with this position, faintly urged that Sonabai did not qualify as 'agnate' within the meaning assigned to this term under Section 3(1)(a) of the said Act, since according to him, Sonabai was not related to her husband Shivba 'by blood' . This contention, however, is no longer res integra. The Division Bench of this Court, in case of Nanasaheb Devre (supra), has precisely considered and rejected such contention.
24] The Division Bench of this Court in case of Nanasaheb Devre (supra), has held that the provisions of said Act were meant to codify the law relating to intestate succession among the Hindus and to achieve uniformity and certainty about various otherwise nebulous and shifting matters. This objective has, however, to be understood against the backdrop of existing interpreting system of personal law. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to begin with any legislative premise that the term related "by blood" has been introduced in any narrow sense. Rather, effort will have to be made to reach its applicative connotation. By reference to several precedents and principles, the Division Bench has held that conceptually, the Hindu marriage, as far as the wife is concerned, clearly brings out consanguine results, the wife merging and sharing the particles of the body of her husband and as such that of their common ancestor. Such kinship or consanguinity conceptually as well as physically cannot be less than of the blood relationship.
 Marriage is not only social but religious fact to a Hindu. It distinctively brings about union of two persons involving acceptance of a female into the family of the male spouse. Relation that ensues, is not restricted to male that marries but to the entire family of the male. Married wife in a family, thus becomes related to it wholly through her male spouse. The definition of the word "related" shows that to be related, persons could be treated as related to each other only if they belong to lawful or legitimate kinship. The definition makes reference to "kinship". The accepted modes by which such kinship results are clearly implied. Kinship is blood relationship. In social unit like family, marriage is an apparent mode of forging such relation. As far as the definition of "agnate" is concerned, the statute contemplates that this relationship should arise firstly, "by blood or adoption", and secondly, wholly through males. The words employed by the defining clauses having reference to blood will have to be understood and interpreted so as to further the obvious object of the Act and as far as possible to provide uniform system of succession.
Law is not merely a biological text tracing decent and ascent. It is a sociological sanction in favour of those who can claim succession to the deceased. Sociology and history of given law often speak through the legislated words. The choice of the words "by blood" in  the definition along with the word "adoption" is clearly intended to recognise all social modes resulting in the legitimate relationship.
The words "by blood" cannot be read as "by birth" so as to restrict them to genetical incidence of family, for legislature, had it intended, would have surely spoken in that way.
25] The Division Bench of this Court at paragraph '17' has observed thus:
What then is the meaning of the word blood ? Does it signify only the vital fluid that sustains the life or is it also indicative of relationship which results in kinship by known and accepted modalities ? There are various meanings assigned to the word "blood", including the one biologically attributed. From Webster's Third new International Dictionary, pages 236 and 237, the following relevant meanings can be extracted :
"Blood" : 1 a. the fluid that circulates in the principal vascular system of vertebrate animals carrying nourishment and oxygen to all parts of the body and bringing away waste products for excretion and that consists of a liquid plasma containing dissolved nutrients, waste products and other substances and suspended red blood cells, leukocytes, and blood plateles-see CIRCULATION, RESPIRATION; COAGULATI-ON;
2a. blood regarded as a vital principle :LIFEBLOOD;
broadly: LIFE, b : human blood regarded as a hereditary differentiating factor typical of and specific to a given family, stock lineage, or race (English-) : esp : the national royal-used with the (a prince of the-), c : the whole body of physical traits passed from parent to offspring whether in men, animals, or plant; d : relationship by decent from a common ancestor (the Delaware grape shows a strong strain or vinifera-) : KIN-SHIP CONSANGUINITY (-is  thicker than water), e : person related through a common familial or racial descent : KINDRED, LINEAGE, STOCK, RACE; also, obs : KINSMAN, RELATIVE.
The connotation of the word, therefore, is not merely biological but includes familial, racial and other recognised modes of kinship amongst men. It is futile to submit that the words related by blood should be equated with related by birth, though birth may be the primary incident of relationship between the two human beings. That is, however, of the only incident that brings about human relations into existence. When community of men develops and social relationship evolves, manifold relations come into being and in the context of relations, when the word blood is used, it suitably indicates the relationship by descent from a common ancestor or a kinship or consanguinity amongst a recognised social group. Marriage is an acknowledged social form bringing two beings together amongst the society of Hindus as a result of which the female enters the family of the male and becomes kindred of the family of the male and as such gets related as a kin of that family having common ancestor in the husbands family. The term by blood, therefore, in our view, has no biological or genetic limitation, but, including that, has a wider reach in the context of the personal law of Hindus and takes in female that enters by marriage the family of the male. Only because after the words by blood, the Legislature has put the words or adoption, thus indicating another legal form by which a person becomes the kin in the family, it is not possible to exclude the marriage from the connotation of the term "by blood". To have the relationship of the kind of agnate, it follows that relationship should arise wholly through males and should be a relationship of blood. As we have indicated, even prior to the present enactment, the applicative law held that as a result of marriage, a widow truly became gotraja sapinda in her husband's family. The principle on the basis of which the applicative judgments were rendered was clearly the principle to hold that by marriage the wife shared the community of the common particles of the body and was as such a relative by blood.
 26]     Applying   the  aforesaid   principles, 
  submission   of   Mr. 




                                                                                      Mankapure that Sonabai or her legal representatives 
could not be included within the expression 'agnate'
 cannot be accepted. The first substantial 
question of law, will also have to be
 decided against the Appellants-Petitioners.
Bombay High Court
M.S.More D.H. R.M. More And Ors vs S.S.More D.H. Smt.S.S.More & Ors on 10 December, 2015
Bench: M.S. Sonak
Citation;2016(2) MHLJ341
Print Page