Showing posts with label wife. Show all posts
Showing posts with label wife. Show all posts

Saturday, 4 October 2025

Kerala HC: Wife Cannot File Writ Petition On Behalf Of Husband Without Valid Power Of Attorney

Thus, it is evident from the provisions of

Order III of the CPC that an appearance, application or

act in or to any Court which is required to be made or

done by a party in the Court, can be effectively made or

done by the party in person or by a recognised agent. A

recognised agent, for that purpose, includes a person

who holds the power of attorney. The provisions

contained in the Powers of Attorney Act 1882 indicate

that there is no prohibition for a litigant seeking a writ

under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution

through a power of attorney holder. The donee of a

power of attorney is no more than an agent of the donor

and does not pursue the proceeding in his own

independent capacity. Instead, he acts for and on behalf

of the donor and is subject to the limitations which are

contained in the instrument. {Para 11}

12. The present writ petition is filed as though the

petitioner is the owner of the estate. Apart from a bald

assertion that the petitioner is managing the property on

account of her husband’s absence, there is no material

conferring authority on her.

13. The reliance placed on the decisions in

Narayanan Nair’s and Ashadevi N.P.’s cases are

misplaced. In Narayanan Nair’s case, this Court

recognised the right of a duly authorised agent to

institute a suit on behalf of the plaintiff in light of the

written authorisation produced along with the plaint.

Whereas, in Ashadevi N.P.’s case, this Court held that

the broader principles of the C.P.C. apply to writ

petitions. Neither the provisions in the Evidence Act,

CPC, the Rules, nor the precedents referred to above aid

the petitioner in filing the writ petition on behalf of her

husband without a power of attorney.

14.  The right that can be enforced under

Article 226 also shall ordinarily be the personal or

individual right of the petitioner himself, though in

the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or

quo warranto this rule may have to be relaxed or

modified”.

(emphasis supplied)

Tested against the aforesaid principles, I hold that

the petitioner has no locus-standi to institute and

prosecute the writ petition on behalf of her husband.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

WP(C) NO. 2862 OF 2025

SHAREEFA, W/O. ISMAIL K.P. Vs  THE SUB COLLECTOR, TIRUR,

PRESENT:  MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS

Dated:  25.08.2025

Citation: 2025:KER:65018

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Sunday, 24 August 2025

Kerala HC: Wife can claim maintenance after divorce despite prior compromise agreement if she is unable to maintain herself

Apparently, Ext.B2 was executed in the year 2004, and the claim for maintenance was raised only in the year 2012. Thus, without much discussion, it can be held that the consolidated payment of Rs. 30,000/- towards permanent alimony under Ext. B2 compromise will not disentitle the first appellant from raising a claim for maintenance at a later stage if she is actually unable to maintain herself. Therefore, it can be concluded that the first appellant is entitled to claim maintenance from the respondent, notwithstanding the terms of Ext.B2 agreement, either under Section 37 of the Act or under Section 125 of Cr. P.C., if she was unable to maintain herself during the relevant time. {Para 20}

 In the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam

(Before Sathish Ninan and P. Krishna Kumar, JJ.)

Sheela George and Another V V.M. Alexander 

Mat. Appeal No. 586 of 2017

Decided on June 2, 2025

Citation: 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 3501

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Saturday, 23 August 2025

Supreme Court: The court may award maintenance to wife up to 25% of husband's income and to child 15% of husband's income

 A sum of Rs. 250/- per month for the maintenance of the wife of a person occupying the position of the appellant cannot be said to err on the liberal side. The High Court in our opinion very rightly fixed that sum making it subject to the limit of 25 per cent of the income as found by the Income-tax authorities. We have no reason to take any different view. Subject to our observation as to the determination of the income of the appellant, the appeal against the wife is dismissed with costs.

{Para 21}

22. As regards the appeal in the case of the daughter, the High Court fixed the amount of monthly maintenance at Rs. 150/- till such time as she marries but so as not to exceed 15% on the average monthly income of the father. No ground was shown as to why we should make a variation in the amount fixed in her case. We uphold the finding of the High Court in this respect. There will be one set of hearing fee.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 2564 and 2589 of 1966

Decided On: 20.10.1970

Kulbhushan Kumar Vs. Raj Kumari and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.N. Ray and G.K. Mitter, JJ.

Author: G.K. Mitter, J.

Citation: 1970 INSC 225, MANU/SC/0349/1970,(1970) 3 SCC129.

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Wednesday, 2 July 2025

Bombay HC: Section 377 IPC and Marital Disputes: Distinguishing Grounds for Divorce from Criminal Offence

Heard submissions and pursued the FIR and other documents. The complainant has grievance against her husband, who is a gay and kept sexual relations with male friends i.e., the petitioner. The Supreme court in the case of Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. vs. Union of India1 has held section 377 of the Indian Penal Code insofar as it criminalises consensual sexual conduct between the adult of same sex, as unconstitutional. In the present case, both were having an extra marital consensual sexual relationship. Though it may be a ground for divorce on the ground of cruelty to the complainant, it does not constitute offence under section 377 because both are adults and had sexual relationship by consent. In this case, there is no victim. The complainant wife is an aggrieved person but she cannot be called as a victim under section 377 of the Indian Penal Code. There are allegations against the husband having unnatural sexual intercourse with her. {Para3}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Writ Petition No. 4470 of 2012

Decided On: 30.01.2019

Daniel Crasto Vs. The State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Mridula Bhatkar, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/0239/2019,AIRONLINE 2019 BOM 195.
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Can a Wife Prosecute Her Husband’s Male Partner for Unnatural Offence under Section 377 IPC?

Bombay High Court Discharges Accused from Section 377 IPC After Navtej Singh Johar Judgment: A Landmark Application of LGBTQ Rights

Article:

The Bombay High Court, in the case of Daniel Crasto vs The State of Maharashtra (judgment dated 30 January 2019),citations: AIRONLINE 2019 BOM 195 delivered a significant ruling that directly applied the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. vs. Union of India to ongoing criminal proceedings under Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

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Saturday, 25 January 2025

Delhi HC: The court must adopt gender neutral approach/Men facing cruelty in marriage is also entitled to same legal safeguards as women

 


In this Court‟s opinion, the hallmark of fair and just justice 
delivery system is to remain gender-neutral while adjudicating cases of such nature as the present one. In case a woman causes such injuries, a special class cannot be created for her. Crimes involving the infliction of life-threatening bodily injuries must be dealt with firmly, irrespective of whether the perpetrator is a man or a woman since the life and dignity of every individual, regardless of gender, are equally precious.

{Para 22}

23. Moreover, the notion that in marital relationships, only women suffer physical or mental cruelty without exception, may be contrary to the hard realities of life in many cases. Courts cannot adjudicate the cases before them, on the basis of stereotypes.

 24. The empowerment of one gender and protection to it can not come at the cost of fairness towards another. Just as women deserve protection from cruelty and violence, men too are entitled to the same safeguards under the law. To suggest otherwise would violate the very basic principles of equality and human dignity, and this Court cannot differentiate between genders when it comes to acts of physical violence or causing injuries. Creating a special class of leniency for one gender would erode the foundational principles of justice in cases of life threatening bodily injuries.

25. This case also highlights a broader societal challenge. Men who are victims of violence at the hands of their wives often face unique difficulties, including societal disbelief and the stigma associated with being perceived as a victim. Such stereotypes perpetuate the erroneous belief that men cannot suffer violence in domestic relationships. Thus, the Courts must recognize the need for a gender-neutral approach to such cases, by ensuring that men and women are treated alike.

  IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

  BAIL APPLN. 262/2025

JYOTI ALIAS KITTU Vs  THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI .

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA

Date of Decision: 22.01.2025.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Delhi HC: Under which circumstances wife is not entitled to anticipatory bail for causing injury to husband?

The other argument that the accused be granted bail since she has a three month old child to take care of, is also found unmerited in this case, since it is apparent from the record, from the complaint andthe statement of the witnesses recorded so far, prima facie, that accused herein had left her three months old daughter crying besides a badly burnt husband and had locked both of them in the room before fleeing from the spot with his phone. The daughter is being taken care of by the victim/husband and his family. {Para 28}

29. The argument regarding there being no motive and false implication of the accused, to entitle her to anticipatory bail, is also unmerited, since the record reveals that four days prior to the incident in question, i.e. on 27.12.2024, the victim husband had lodged a detailed complaint with the police (running into eight pages) against her wife for cheating, extortion and forced marriage. Pertinently, in the said complaint, the victim had mentioned in detail about the conduct of the accused, including her previous relationships with several men, a child born out of a previous marriage which she had not disclosed to the victim herein, the fact that she had filed several cases under Section 376 of IPC against different persons, etc., which were not in his knowledge. He had also mentioned his apprehension that his wife may kill him with the help of her mother and other family members and he had therefore sought protection from the police.

30. Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case as well as the fact that the applicant herein has failed to join investigation, the recovery of the phone of the victim is to be effected alongwith the need to confront her with the documents mentioned in the complaint, considering also the nature of injuries and the manner in which the injuries were caused, no ground for grant of anticipatory bail is made out.

  IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

  BAIL APPLN. 262/2025

JYOTI ALIAS KITTU Vs  THE STATE GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI .

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA

Date of Decision: 22.01.2025.
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Friday, 1 November 2024

Madras HC: Privacy as a fundamental right includes spousal privacy also and evidence obtained by invading this right is inadmissible

 This is primarily because there has been a clear invasion of theprivacy right of the wife. It is obvious that the husband had stealthily obtained the information pertaining to the call history of his wife. He was not the owner of the mobile device or the registered user of the sim card. He had clandestine custody of the same for probably a brief while. There has been a clear breach of the privacy of the wife. In Justice K.Puttaswamy (Retd) v. UOI (AIR 2017 SC 4161), it was held that privacy is a fundamental right. Can evidence procured in violation of this right be admissible in evidence?. This question does not admit of an easy answer. The learned amicus has tabulated the dichotomy of judicial opinion :

Admissible Inadmissible

Kethana Lokes v. Rahul Bettakotte

2024 Karnataka HC 21752

Asha Latha v. Durgesh

2023 SCC OnLine Chh 3959

Deepti Kapur v. Kunal Julka

AIR 2020 Del 156

Rayala Bhuvanewari v.

Naggaphanender AIR 2008 AP 98

Preeti v. Kunal

AIR 2016 Raj 153

Neha v. Vibhor Garg (2021)

(Punjab & Haryana HC)

Sachin Arora v. Manju

2023 DHC 3197

Sankarram v. Kalaiselvi

CMSA(MD)No.54 of 2021 (Madurai

Bench of the Madras High Court).

Neha v. Vibhor Garg has been challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP (C) No.21195 of 2021. Vide order dated 28.04.2022, the proceedings before the Family Court have been stayed. The order of the High Court had not been stayed. {Para 9}

10.The following observations and ratio laid down by the Court of

Appeal in Imerman v. Technquiz (2010 EWCA Civ 908) are relevant : “it was a breach of confidence for a person intentionally to obtain another person’s information secretly and without authorisation, knowing that he reasonably expected it to be private, and, without that other persons authority, ...... that the husband had an expectation of privacy at common law and in accordance with article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in respect of the majority of documents stored on the server which had been accessed without his authority at a stage in the divorce proceedings ....

Why should one spouse have no right of confidentiality

enforceable against the other in relation to their separate lives and personalities?...

Each spouse is entitled to a separate life, distinct from the

shared matrimonial life.

Legal protection applies to protect the confidence itself, not merely to prevent the dissemination of information. It does not need to be shown that the information will be misused; merely that it has been obtained in breach of confidence would be sufficient.”

In Katz v. United States (389 U.S 347 (1967), Justice Harlan propounded the reasonable expectation of privacy test to determine whether an action by the government has violated an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. It was a two part test ; the individual has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognise as reasonable. If both requirements are met and the government has taken an action which violates this 'expectation', then the government's action has violated the individual's right. In a research paper titled “My Diary is Your Diary : The Right to Privacy in a Marriage” by Turkish author Dr.Nadire Ozdemir, it was recommended that the Harlan test laid down in the context of state surveillance should be extended to matrimonial relationships also and that the spouses should be entitled to claim right of privacy against each other.

11.Some of the courts which leaned in favour of admissibility of

evidence obtained in breach of privacy relied on Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. The said provision is as follows :

“Application of Indian Evidence Act, 1872:—A

Family Court may receive as evidence any report, statement,

documents, information or matter that may, in its opinion, assist it

to deal effectually with a dispute, whether or not the same would

be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act,

1872 (1 of 1872).”

I am however not able to agree with such an approach. Though privacy like any other fundamental right is not absolute, it was held in Justice K.Puttaswamy case by Justice D.Y.Chandrachud for himself and three other Hon'ble Judges that any curtailment or deprivation of the privacy right would have to take place under a regime of law and that the procedure must be fair, just and reasonable and subject to constitutional safeguards. The expression

“regime of law” requires some elaboration. Taking inspiration from the title of the book “Legislating Privacy” by Priscilla M Regan, I hold that “regime of law” envisages a special and comprehensive legislation dealing with the subject of privacy. Such a parliamentary legislation would also deal with the question relating to admissibility of evidence procured in breach of one's privacy. Exceptions may be created. National security and supreme public interest could be overriding considerations. In the absence of such a

comprehensive legislation, one has to conclude that there is no “regime of law” dealing with the subject of privacy as of now. The Family Courts Act, 1984 was enacted more than three decades prior to Justice Puttaswamy judgment. The discretionary power conferred on the Family Court under Section 14 of the Family Courts Act cannot be said to fall within the meaningof the aforesaid expression “regime of law”. There is no legislative validation of evidence obtained by violating the fundamental right to privacy. In this background, it would not be proper for the courts to carve out exceptions on their own.

12.The observations made by the High Court of Harare, Zimbabwe

in CRB 57 of 2016 (S. v Nsoro) dated 25.02.2016 are apposite though rendered in a criminal case. The deceased husband refused to let the accused wife read a text message which the husband had received on his phone. Out of anger over the deceased’s refusal to divulge the message, the wife had stabbed the husband causing his death. Justice Chitapi has the following take on the right to privacy between spouses :

“...Section 57 (d) of the Constitution provides that

every person has the right to privacy of their

communications. There is no law which provides that

a husband or wife has a right to infringe on the

privacy of the other’s communications. The accused’s

insistence that the deceased should divulge a

communication made to him on his phone was in

itself an infringement upon the right of the deceased

to privacy of communication. The deceased was

lawfully entitled to refuse to divulge the message he

had received on his phone to the accused albeit the

accused being his wife....

It is the court’s view that society should learn to

respect privacy of communications. Many a time, the

cellphone has been cause of ‘matrimonial quarrels

and domestic disputes because couples do not respect

each others' right to communications made or

received. A cellphone is materially a gadget which is

intended to ease communications between persons. A

lot of cases come before the courts in which a spouse

will have invaded the private communications of

another by going through messages and other

communications on the other spouse’s phone. This

practice should be deprecated. It amounts to

investigating or eavesdropping on one another.

Usually, spouses who do this will be aiming to find

evidence of wrongful conduct by the other.

Eavesdropping on another’s cellphone is evidence of

lack of trust in that other person. Courts are flooded

with cases where couples or spouses seek to prove

wrongful conduct by the other using evidence in the

form of messages retrieved from another spouse’s

phone. Such evidence unless obtained with the

consent of the owner of the phone would have been

illegally obtained in contravention of the rights of

every person to the privacy of communication as

guaranteed by Section 57 of the constitution and

evidential rules relating to admissibility of illegally

obtained evidence should be applied....”

13.I came across an interesting article titled “Rethinking the ‘Fruits

of the poisonous tree’ doctrine: Should the ‘ends’ justify the

‘means’?” (2020 SCC OnLine Blog OpEd 76). The authors Bharat Chugh & Taahaa Khan lament the consequentialist approach that ‘the tree may be poisonous but the fruit is fine’. To them, the concept of ends justifying the means is deeply troubling and calls for judicial intervention. They also invoke the “Unfair Operation Principle” applied by the UK Courts. This principle prohibits admission of evidence if in the given case, its reception runs contrary to the principles of basic fairness. The principle gives courts the discretion to decide, on a case to case basis, as to what would operate fairly or unfairly against the accused, and in appropriate cases, exclude such evidence. Theauthors refer to 94th Report of the Law Commission of India which suggests exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained in criminal cases.

14.Trust forms the bedrock of matrimonial relationships. The

spouses must have implicit and total faith and confidence in each other. Snooping on the other destroys the fabric of marital life. One cannot pry on the other. Coming specifically to the position of women, it is beyond dispute that they have their own autonomy. They are entitled to expect that their private space is not invaded. The wife may maintain a diary. She may jot down her thoughts and intimate feelings. She has every right to expect that her husband will not read its contents except with her consent. What applies to diary will apply to her mobile phone also. The Hon'ble Supreme Court is now considering the question whether forcible sexual intercourse by the husband against the wife's will would constitute marital rape. Obtaining of information pertaining to the privacy of the wife without her knowledge and consent cannot be viewed benignly. Only if it is authoritatively laid down that evidence procured in breach of the privacy rights is not admissible, spouses will not resort to surveillance of the other. One may wonder if marital misconduct which has to be made out for obtaining relief may become impossible of proving. It is not so. It can very well be established and proved by appropriate means. Interrogatories can be served. Adverse inference can be drawn. The charged spouse can be called upon to file affidavit with the express warning that falsity will lead to prosecution for perjury. In exceptional cases, the court can even take it upon itself to unearth the truth. Law cannot proceed on the premise that marital misconduct is the norm. It cannot permit or encourage snooping by one spouse on the other. Privacy as a fundamental right includes spousal privacy also and evidence obtained by invading this right is inadmissible.

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

CRP(MD)No.2362 of 2024

R..... ... Petitioner/Petitioner/Respondent

vs.

1.B..... ...Respondent/Respondent/Petitioner

2.The Secretary to Government,

 Ministry of Electronics and

Information Technology

(MEITY), Government of India,

 New Delhi. ... 2nd respondent

CORAM

 MR.JUSTICE G.R.SWAMINATHAN

Pronounced on : 30.10.2024.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Whether the court can allow husband to prove call record of mobile of his wife downloaded from website of JIO by submitting his own S 65B certificate ?


Coming to the case on hand, the certificate enclosed by the 
husband reads that the electronic statement was taken from Jio official website and that the website is in order without any malfunction. One can take judicial notice of the fact that call history can be obtained by reaching out to the website of the concerned telecom service provider from the mobile phone. The user of the device would get OTP. After authentication, the information sought for will be provided which can be downloaded. A cursory perusal of Ex.P4 would show that the mobile phone belonged to the wife and the husband had access to the same. When the mobile phone with the sim card was in the custody of the husband, he had reached out to the telecom service provider (Jio) and obtained the call data. The certificate filed by the husband is no certificate at all. It is not a defective certificate. It is not the case of the husband that he wrote to the service provider and there was no response. The call history was downloaded from Jio website. Therefore, only a person occupying a responsible official position in Jio could have issued the certificate. The husband/respondent herein could not have issued a self serving certificate. Therefore, the case on hand will fall outside the caveat laiddown in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Ex.P4 ought to have been accompanied by a certificate as contemplated in Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The court below could not have deferred taking a decision in the matter. {Para 8}

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

CRP(MD)No.2362 of 2024

R..... ... Petitioner/Petitioner/Respondent

vs.

1.B..... ...Respondent/Respondent/Petitioner

2.The Secretary to Government,

 Ministry of Electronics and

Information Technology

(MEITY), Government of India,

 New Delhi. ... 2nd respondent

CORAM

 MR.JUSTICE G.R.SWAMINATHAN

Pronounced on : 30.10.2024.

Read full Judgement here: Click here.

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Sunday, 1 September 2024

Allah HC: Wife Declining To Cohabit With Husband By Forcing Him To Live In Separate Room Amounts To mental Cruelty to husband

 Cohabitation is an essential part of a matrimonial relationship and if the wife declines to cohabit with the husband by forcing him to live in a separate room, she deprives him of his conjugal rights, which will have an adverse impact on his mental and physical well being and which will amount to both physical and mental cruelty. The plaintiff’s allegation of being wrongfully deprived of his conjugal rights has not been controverted by the defendant-respondent and the same has been admitted by implication. {Para 20}

21. In view of the aforesaid facts, we are of the considered view that there was sufficient evidence to prove the grounds of cruelty pleaded by the plaintiff-appellant for grant of a decree of divorce the plaintiff has successfully proved by his ex-parte evidence that the defendant was treating him with cruelty.

 ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT

Case :-FIRST APPEAL No. - 32 of 2023

Jitendra Kumar Srivastava Vs  Smt. Sweta Srivastava

Coram: Hon’ble Rajan Roy J & Hon’ble Subhash Vidyarthi J.

Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC-LKO:57446-DB.

Date: 22.08.2024.

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Friday, 23 August 2024

Bombay HC: Husband's Girlfriend Is Not His Relative, Cannot Be Booked For Cruelty Under Section 498A IPC

Non-applicant No.2 Bharti, has lodged the complaint against her husband Nitesh stating that because of the affair of her husband with the applicant he tortured her.  Initially, the First Information Report is registered against the husband. During the investigation, the statements are recorded. The cause of harassment by the husband was disclosed about the affair with the applicant and therefore, the name of the applicant is added and the chargesheet is filed against the applicant.

6. As the applicant is not the relative of husband of nonapplicant No.2 498-A of the Indian Penal Code shall not be attracted. As the charge-sheet is filed against this applicant, who is not the relative and only because allegations are made that the husband of the non-applicant No.2 is having extra marital affair with this applicant, the charge-sheet filed against her which is illegal, according to law. Hence, the criminal application is allowed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.

CRIMINAL APPLICATION (APL) NO.622 OF 2020

Vaishali Janbaji Gawande Vs  Bharati Nitesh Raipure, 

CORAM : VIBHA KANKANWADI AND

 MRS.VRUSHALI V. JOSHI, JJ.

 DATE : 11th July, 2024

ORAL JUDGMENT (Per : Vrushali V.Joshi, J.)
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Monday, 12 August 2024

Bombay HC: In-Laws Can't Be Booked U/S 498A of IPC Merely On Allegations That They Supported Husband Who Subjected Wife To Cruelty

 In the case of R. P. Kapur V/s. State of Punjab, reported in MANU/SC/0086/1960 : 1960:INSC:61 : AIR 1960 SC 866, the Hon'ble Apex Court had summarized the categories of cases where inherent powers can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. The three categories are reproduced here-in below :


(i) where it manifestly appears that there is legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;


(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;


(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. {Para 15}


16. In our opinion, the case of the present Applicants would fall under the category (ii) from the above referred three categories, where the allegations in the FIR or the complaint taken to its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged. Merely, remarks in the complaint about the supporting the accused No.1 while narrating some of the incidents would not per se amount to committing the offences which they have been alleged of. It would be unfair to continue the prosecution against the present Applicants for the conduct of the accused No.1, in which they have been unfortunately dragged. From the various incidents which have been narrated by the Respondent No.2 as well as the witnesses, who are her near relatives, there does not appear to be complicity of the present Applicants. The continuation of present proceedings against the Applicants would cause injustice and hardship to the Applicants. Even otherwise, the material collected during the investigation does not support the charges levelled against the present Applicants. The malafide proceedings initiated against the present Applicants needs to be curbed at this stage itself, in order to prevent abuse or process of law and miscarriage of justice, since it is obvious that the allegations are not supported by any other cogent material and have been made with a view to wreak vengeance against the present Applicants.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Application (APL) No. 1241 of 2014 and Interim Application No. 779 of 2020

Samad Habib Mithani and Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Bharati H. Dangre and Manjusha Ajay Deshpande, JJ.

Author: Manjusha Ajay Deshpande, J.

Decided On: 25.07.2024.

Citation:  MANU/MH/4875/2024.

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Saturday, 29 June 2024

Telangana HC: Depriving Spouse Of Being On Facebook, Instagram; Damaging Partner's Reputation/ Social Standing May Amount To Cruelty

In essence, whether the conduct inflicted by one party on the other clears the threshold of cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act is wholly fact-dependent. In fact, there is no threshold test at all. The concept of cruelty is social milieu-dependent where the upbringing, level of education, sensitivity, financial position, social status, religious beliefs and cultural backgrounds of the parties would set the standard of whether the conduct complained of would be unmitigated cruel behaviour. The degree of tolerance to the conduct complained of would also depend on the outlook, experience and exposure of the complainant as well as the perpetrator. Any act of damage to reputation, social standing or work prospects by one spouse to the other would fall within the term “cruelty”. It may not be too far-fetched to say-hesitantly-that depriving a spouse from being on Facebook and Instagram may also amount to cruelty!

{Para 11}

12. The absence of a specific definition of ‘cruelty’ encourages a revisit of the requirement to prove cruel treatment as a ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act. The concept of marital duties and obligations has changed at every level with changes in social structures. Family set-ups have been transformed with financial independence and greater equality in relationships. A marriage is more of a voluntary bond these days and less of a social compulsion. The law must move with the times.

TELANGANA HIGH COURT

CORAM:  SMT. JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA AND

 SMT JUSTICE M.G.PRIYADARSINI

C.M.A. No.68 OF 2022

JUDGMENT: (Per Hon’ble. Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya)

Dated:21.06.2024.

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Saturday, 25 May 2024

Whether the court should disbelieve the fact that physical abuse was caused to wife if she fails to produce medical certificate or police report in support of it?

Insofar as the amount towards compensation fixed at Rs. 50,000/- is concerned, this Court is not impressed by the contention raised on behalf of the husband that since the wife did not place on record any material to show any physical abuse or proof of having filed any police complaint, she did not deserve to be paid any compensation. In cases of domestic violence, it is often found that the aggrieved person, in this case the wife, does not immediately rush to the police when inflicted with physical, mental and physiological and economic abuse. Even if such persons suffer injuries, they would not necessarily keep medical records of the same and it cannot be said that only because no medical documents were produced, the wife in the present case, was not entitled for compensation. {Para 22}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Criminal Writ Petition Nos. 372 of 2019, 707 of 2018 and 718 of 2018

Decided On: 27.07.2021

Aruna and Ors. Vs. Omprakash and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Manish Pitale, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1853/2021

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Wednesday, 21 February 2024

Whether the family court should refuse to give maintenance to wife if she is not ready to serve husband’s mother and maternal grandmother?

For disposal of this Criminal Revision following point of

determination are being framed:

(i) Whether the opposite party No.1-wife has refused to live

with her husband without any sufficient cause, if so its

effect? {Para 9}

 21. In view of the above in the case in hand, the issue between the

husband and wife is that the wife is not agree to serve the old aged mother in-law and maternal grandmother-in-law, who are respectively 75 years and 95 years old. She creates pressure upon her husband to live separate from his mother and maternal grandmother. It is the very reason; this ground is not found sufficient that’s why the legislature while enacted under Section 125(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has provided one of the grounds for denial the maintenance, if wife refuses to reside with the husband without any reasonable cause.

22. In Constitution of India under Article 51-A of Part IV-A, wherein the fundamental duties of the citizen of India are enumerated in Clause (f), it is provided ‘to value and preserve the reach heritage of our composite culture’. It is the culture in India to serve the old aged mother-in-law or grandmother-in-law as the case may by the wife in order to preserve this culture. It was obligatory on the part of wife to serve her husband’s mother and maternal grandmother and not to insist for unreasonable demand to live separate from his old aged mother-in-law and the maternal grandmother-inlaw. Accordingly, the point of determination No.1 is decided in favourt of the petitioner-husband and against the opposite party No.1-wife.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

Criminal Revision No.172 of 2022

Rudra Narayan Ray Vs  Piyali Ray Chatterjee, 

CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBHASH CHAND

 Pronounced on:22/01/2024.

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Monday, 19 February 2024

Under which circumstances life interest in property given to wife will not convert into ownership rights as per S 14 of Hindu Succession Act?

In our view the relevant aspect of the aforesaid conclusion is para 4 which opines where Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the said Act would apply and this does inter alia applies to a Will which may create independent and new title in favour of females for the first time and is not a recognition of a pre-existing right. In such cases of a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1) of the said Act will not operate in that sphere.{Para 30}


31. We may add here that the objective of Section 14(1) is to create an absolute interest in case of a limited interest of the wife where such limited estate owes its origin to law as it stood then. The objective cannot be that a Hindu male who owned self-acquired property is unable to execute a Will giving a limited estate to a wife if all other aspects including maintenance are taken care of. If we were to hold so it would imply that if the wife is disinherited under the Will it would be sustainable but if a limited estate is given it would mature into an absolute interest irrespective of the intent of the testator. That cannot be the objective, in our view.


32. The testator in the present case, Tulsi Ram, had taken all care for the needs of maintenance of his wife by ensuring that the revenue generated from the estate would go to her alone. He, however, wished to give only a limited lift interest to her as the second wife with the son inheriting the complete estate after her lifetime. We are, thus, of the view that it would be the provisions of Section 14(2) of the said Act which would come into play in such a scenario and Ram Devi only had a life interest in her favour. The natural sequitur is that the Respondents cannot inherit a better title than what the vendor had and, thus, the view taken by the trial court and the first appellate court is the correct view and the sale deeds in favour of the Respondents cannot be sustained.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 1543-1544 of 2019

Decided On: 01.02.2022

Jogi Ram Vs. Suresh Kumar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjay Kishan Kaul and M.M. Sundresh, JJ.

Author: Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0119/2022.

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Supreme Court: Orders Giving Visitation Right/Temporary Child Custody Cannot Be Passed In A Proceedings For Restitution Of Conjugal Right

The respondent (husband) should have filed a separate and independent petition under Section 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, instead of securing an Order in the proceedings pending under Section 9 of the Act. The Order dated 03062019 giving visitation rights or temporary custody of the child to the respondent (husband) is, thus, patently illegal. {Para 7}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Transfer Petition (Civil)  No. 964/2021

Date of Order: 08.12.2022

Priyanka Vs. Santoshkumar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Surya Kant and J.K. Maheshwari, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SCOR/123274/2022.

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Sunday, 18 February 2024

Whether husband can refuse to pay maintenance to wife if she is residing in matrimonial house?

The mere fact that she is residing in the matrimonial home is not a pretext to disentitle her to a reasonable amount of maintenance. She still needs some amount towards food, medicine, clothes and educational expenses for the child. Thus, considering the status of the parties, reasonable needs of the wife and minor son are parameters to be considered while determining the sufficiency and the reasonableness of the quantum of interim maintenance to be adjudged so that the wife is able to maintain herself and the minor son in reasonable comfort.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 11007 OF 2023

Rajkumar Amruthrao Guddadigi, Vs Shilaja Rajkumar Guddadigi,

CORAM : DR. NEELA GOKHALE, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 4th January 2024.

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Tuesday, 23 January 2024

What are different types of traditional divorce under muslim law?

 In Islamic law, divorce is known as "Talaq," and there are different types of divorce recognized within the Sunni and Shia traditions. It's important to note that the details and interpretations of these concepts may vary among different schools of thought within Islam.

  1. 1) Talaq:

    • Talaq-e-Ahsan: This is the most preferred and considered the most proper form of divorce. It involves a single pronouncement of divorce, followed by a waiting period (iddah) during which the wife cannot remarry. If the wife is not pregnant, the waiting period is three menstrual cycles; if she is pregnant, it lasts until the child is born.
    • 2)Talaq-e-Hasan:
    • It consists of three pronouncements made during three consecutive menstrual cycles, with a waiting period (iddah) following the final pronouncement.
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Sunday, 14 January 2024

Whether wife is entitled to get divorce from husband on the ground of mental cruelty if he publish allegations against her in Newspaper and prosecute her relatives?

 In our considered view, a partner in matrimonial relationship who goes to the extent of filing police complaints against mother, friend, well wishers, Prosecutor or Advocate of his own wife, is a kind of person who is difficult to deal with and certainly causing mental harassment. {Para 31}

32. Original copy of newspaper Dainik Divya Marathi dated 13.07.2014 is at Exh. 279, in which alleged defamatory news about Respondent/Wife was published at the instance of Appellant/husband. Whether the actual news is defamatory or not is irrelevant for the present purpose. The fact that allegations and accusations are leveled by a party (husband in this case) against the spouse (wife) in newspaper, itself has an effect of lowering her reputation in the eyes of her peers and colleagues. Embarrassment is a bitter bonus ! Learned counsel for the Respondent/wife has submitted that because of news published by the Appellant/husband, the reputation of the Respondent/wife got damaged and she was embarrassed before her peers, colleagues and co-workers. Judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Raj Talreja vs. Kavita Talreja MANU/SC/0493/2017 : (2017) 14 SCC 194 and K. Shrinivas Rao vs. D.A. Deepa MANU/SC/0180/2013 : (2013) 5 SCC 226, both arising out of matrimonial disputes, are relied upon in support of this case. We fully agree with the submission. The proposition of law laid down in the said cases apply to the fact of this case.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Family Court Appeal No. 36 of 2021, 

Decided On: 24.03.2023

Uday  Vs. Rupali 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.D. Dhanuka and M.M. Sathaye, JJ.

Author: M.M. Sathaye, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1142/2023.

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