What are the scope and differences between Slum Rehabilitation Act (SRA), and Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999?

 In Maharashtra, two key legislative frameworks govern different aspects of urban development and housing: the Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, commonly known as the Slum Rehabilitation Act (SRA), and the Rent Control Act (Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999).

1. Slum Rehabilitation Act (SRA):

Scope: The Slum Rehabilitation Act primarily focuses on the improvement, clearance, and redevelopment of slum areas within urban regions of Maharashtra. Its objective is to provide better housing and living conditions for slum dwellers by rehabilitating them in situ (on the same site) or by rehousing them in alternative accommodation.

Key Features:

• Identification of Slums: The Act provides a framework for identifying slum areas based on specified criteria such as inadequate infrastructure, lack of basic amenities, and poor living conditions.

• Rehabilitation: It mandates the redevelopment of slum areas either by constructing new dwellings for slum dwellers on the same land (in situ rehabilitation) or by providing alternative accommodation in other locations (resettlement).

• Development Rights: Developers are granted development rights over the slum land for commercial or residential use in exchange for rehabilitating slum dwellers. This incentivizes private participation in slum redevelopment projects.

• Regulatory Authority: The Act establishes a regulatory authority to oversee and facilitate the implementation of slum rehabilitation projects.

2. Rent Control Act (Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999):

Scope: The Rent Control Act regulates the rent and tenancy of residential and non-residential premises in Maharashtra. Its primary aim is to protect tenants from arbitrary eviction and ensure fair rental practices.

Print Page

Important provisions of Civil minor Acts(Part 3)

 

1) Important provisions of Maharashtra Rent control Act (Part 1).

https://www.lawweb.in/2018/05/good-article-on-maharashtra-rent.html

2) Important provisions of Maharashtra Rent control Act (Part 2)

https://www.lawweb.in/2018/05/maharashtra-rent-control-act-part-2.html

3) Important provisions of Mediation Act,2023

https://www.lawweb.in/2024/06/important-provisions-of-mediation.html

Print Page

Is Affidavit Mandatory For Application Seeking Leave To Defend Under Sec 43(4) of Maharashtra Rent control Act?

 In view of the above, Section 4 of the Limitation Act could rescue the petitioner, as 24/11/2019 was a Sunday and even 23/11/2019 was a non-working Saturday (the Fourth Saturday). However, it would have to be seen, whether Exh.-8, can be said to be an application, in the eyes of law. In the entire pleadings in the memo of petition, there has not been a whisper that, Exh.-8 was supported with an affidavit that was sworn before an oath administering authority or a notary on or before 25/11/2019. Even a glance at Exh.-8, which is placed on record, would indicate that even the lawyer has not identified the petitioner on the last page of the application. The signature of the petitioner is found at two places with no signature of the lawyer, identifying the petitioner, much less an affidavit in support of Exh.-8. {Para 12}

13. In Amitabh s/o. Ramsharan Nigam v. Amit Raghunandan Saran Sharma & Ors. MANU/MH/0359/2020 : 2020 (3) All M.R. 188, it has been held that the requirement under Section 43(4)(a) of the Rent Act is mandatory in nature. An application filed by the counsel, bearing his signature, seeking leave to defend, does not satisfy the strict requirement of the said provision. No affidavit was filed by the petitioner. Hence, refusing to grant leave to defend was proper, as the petitioner did not satisfy the strict requirement of Section 43(4)(a) of the Rent Act.

14. In view of the above, it is obvious that Exh.-8, without the mandatory affidavit, would not be an application, which is within the strict prescription of law. In fact, the language used in Section 43(4)(a) requires an affidavit to be filed and not a mere application. As such, though Section 4 of the Limitation Act may have rescued the petitioner, the absence of an affidavit, which is mandatory, would render the said application non-existent in the eyes of law.

15. In view of the above, this petition being devoid of merits, is, therefore, dismissed.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 579 of 2022

Decided On: 19.01.2022

Laxman Dadasaheb Jagtap  Vs.  Additional Commissioner, Kokan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.V. Ghuge, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/0226/2022

Print Page

Whether transfer of tenancy of premises in redeveloped building will be governed by MHADA Act or Maharashtra Rent control Act?

Further it seems to us that MHADA's concern is in regard to the protection or reconstruction of cessed (that is to say tenanted) structures. The Housing Board and the MHADA Act are concerned with the condition of the housing structure. Tenancies cannot be created, surrendered or transferred under the MHADA Act. This is possible only under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act. {Para 24}

25. Moreover, the definition of 'tenant' in the Maharashtra Rent Control Act 1999 includes a person who has derived title under the tenant. Under the earlier Rent Control statute of 1947, transfers of tenancies were illegal. Now, under Sections 55 and 56 in Chapter IX of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act 1999, transfers of tenancy are permitted with the requirement that these must be registered (which has been done in this case) and that the tenant and the landlord have the right to receive lawful charges. This is specifically contemplated by Clause 18 of a Appendix- III referred to above. 

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition (L) No. 19891 of 2021

 Alice Realties Pvt. Ltd.  Vs.  State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.S. Patel and Madhav J. Jamdar, JJ.

Author: G.S. Patel, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/0227/2022

Decided On: 03.01.2022

Print Page

Whether tenant pleading oral tenancy can get protection under SARFAESI Act?

  Thus, even if we keep aside the contentions on the cause of action, it is very evident that no tenant pleading oral tenancy could get the protection from the provisions of the Securitisation Act. Besides that, as we have noted, Section 34 is emphatic in its declaration that Civil Court shall have no jurisdiction over any matter which the Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered under this Act to determine. And, last, none of the reliefs the petitioner has sought is amenable to an ordinary civil court’s jurisdiction.{Para 58}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

FIRST APPEAL NO.15 OF 2019

Modinasab Indikar V/s  Board of Directors of Indian Overseas Bank, 

Coram:- DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU, J.

Date:- 14th February 2020

Print Page

Is it mandatory to register a tenancy agreement for less than 11 months under Maharashtra's rent control Act?

 According to the petitioner, since the registration of an agreement of the nature with which this Court is concerned in the present case, is required to be registered under the Registration Act, all the provisions of the Registration Act, including Sections 17 and 18 thereof would squarely apply. Since the period for which possession of suit shop was given to the respondent under the said agreement was only 11 months and clearly less than one year, such an agreement was not compulsorily registrable under Section 17 of the Registration Act and that the registration of such an agreement was only optional under Section 18 thereof.

12. A perusal of the above quoted Section 55 of the said Act would show that it opens with a non-obstante clause, which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the said Act  or any other law for the time being in force, any agreement between the landlord and tenant after commencement of the said Act has to be in writing and shall be registered under the Registration Act, 1908. The manner in which the non- obstante clause is framed, the registration of such an agreement in writing is mandatory and it is required to be registered under the Registration Act. The non - obstante clause is followed by the words "any other law for the time being in force". These words would take into their sweep the Registration Act also, since it was in force when the aforesaid Act came into being. Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that an agreement between the landlord and tenant for a period less than one year would not be compulsorily registrable under Sections 17 and 18 of the Registration Act, yet, such an agreement for less than one year shall have to be registered under the Registration Act. Any other interpretation of such a non - obstante clause in Section 55(1) of the said Act would amount to adding words into the same like "any other law for the time being in force except requirements of Section 17 r/w 18 of the Registration Act". Such adding of words cannot be resorted to, when a plain reading of the said provision, particularly the non - obstante clause shows that every agreement between the landlord and tenant after commencement of the aforesaid Act shall be in writing and must be registered.

13. The emphasis placed on words "shall be registered under the Registration Act, 1908", placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner to contend that the registration of such an agreement for a period less than one year was optional under Section 18 of the Registration Act, cannot be accepted.

Bombay High Court

Anwar Noormohammed Pirani vs Santosh Gajanan Naskulwar on 3 December, 2019

Bench: Manish Pitale

 Writ Petition No. 5650 of 2018
Citation: 2020(6) MHLJ 257

Print Page

Whether licensee who has acquired the status of the deemed tenant as per S 15 A of Bombay Rent Act will retain their position under Maharashtra rent control Act?

  Mr. Wachasundar, secondly, submits that there is no case of deemed tenancy in the facts of the present case. Learned Counsel submits that the provisions of the old rent control law, namely, the Bombay Rent Act have been replaced by the new law of rent control, namely, Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 ("Act"). Learned Counsel submits that since there is a wholesale repeal followed by a new legislation on the same subject, only those matters under the repealed law, which are saved by Section 58 of the repealing Act, would stand saved. Learned Counsel submits that deemed tenancies of original licensees are not saved under the provisions of Section 58. Learned Counsel relies on the Supreme Court judgment in the case of State of Punjab vs. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh MANU/SC/0043/1954 : AIR 1955 SC 84 in support of his submission. He also relies on a decision of Allahabad High Court in Mahabir Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Union of India MANU/UP/0057/1975 : AIR 1975 Allahabad 239. Whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, consequences of such repeal, which are laid down in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, follow, unless as the section itself says, the repealing Act evinces a different intention. What the Supreme Court said in Mohar Singh Pratap Singh's case is that in the case of a simple repeal, there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion, but when the repeal is followed by a fresh legislation on the same subject, Courts would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. When courts thus look to the provisions of the new law, they would actually be expected to read the new law as a whole to find out if it evinces any different intention, thereby ruling out the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Looked at it from this point of view, the new Act does not at all indicate that it seeks to do away with all legal consequences which have taken place under, or legal relationships born out of, the provisions of the old law. If anything, it actually affirms such consequences or relationships. The most palpable expression of such affirmation is in the definition of "tenant" in the new Act. Sub-Section (15) of Section 7 of the new Act, which defines the expression 'tenant', includes within it a person, who is a deemed tenant. Deemed tenancy is not provided under the new Act; it is a concept which can only be treated as having been borrowed from the old Rent Act. In other words, it provides that those persons, who had become deemed tenants under the provisions of the then existing law, are to be included within the definition of 'tenant' under it. Our Court, in the case of Hindustan Ferrodo Ltd. vs. Hari Lachman Hasija MANU/MH/0226/2003 : 2003 (4) Mh.L.J. 50, has considered this particular aspect of the matter. That was a case, where the petitioners before this court were in possession of suit premises as licensees as of 1 February 1973, claiming to have acquired the status of deemed tenant as from that date. The court held that their status as deemed tenant was not taken away or put an end to by virtue of the provisions of Section 58 or Section 3 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act. The petitioners before the court in Hindustan Ferrodo were a company, which fell within the ambit of clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of the new Rent Act, and thus, were not entitled to claim benefits, privileges or protection under the new Rent Act and yet, our Court said that the character or status acquired by them as a deemed tenant under the old Act continued and unless the same was put to an end by a procedure known to law, they could not be evicted from the premises. This clearly puts paid to any controversy in that behalf.{Para 7}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 7931 of 2019

Decided On: 19.05.2020

 EEPC India  Vs.  Additional Commissioner, Konkan Division and Ors.

Print Page

Whether the court can impound photocopy of the tenancy agreement?

 By these writ petitions, the original plaintiff as well

as defendant No.1 have challenged judgment and order dated

03/10/2019, passed by the District Judge-5, Nagpur, in

Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 208 of 2019, whereby

appeal filed by the original defendant No.1 has been allowed

and an agreement of tenancy has been impounded to pay

requisite stamp duty and penalty thereon and thereafter, it is

directed that the said document be exhibited for collateral

purpose. It is significant that the said document is not original

agreement dated 26/10/1999, but, a photo copy thereof.

17. Therefore, the position of law appears to be

absolutely clear to the effect that photo copy of a document

cannot be treated as an “instrument” under Section 2(l) of the

Maharashtra Stamps Act, 1958 and no order for impounding

such document can be passed. Thus, the Court below erred in

passing the impugned order directing that the document in

question i.e. photo copy of alleged agreement dated

26/10/1999, was to be impounded for payment of requisite

stamp duty and penalty thereon. As a result, the consequent

direction for exhibiting the document for collateral purpose

after payment of requisite stamp duty and penalty can also not

be sustained.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR

Writ Petition No. 8245 of 2019

Shri Pradeep Shyamrao Kakirwar, Vs.  Dr. Smt.Seema Arun Mankar,

CORAM : MANISH PITALE, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 27.04.2020

Print Page

Bom HC: Small cause court pune has jurisdiction to decide dispute between landlord and tenant in respect of premises situated in Pune cantonment Area

 In the light of the discussion, I pass the following order:

(i) Notification dated 27.12.1969 issued by the Ministry of Defence under Section 3 of the 1957 Act has not lapsed and/or outlived after repealment of the Bombay Rent Act. The notification dated 27.12.1969 continues to hold the field that makes the provisions of Maharashtra Rent Act applicable to the cantonment areas in the State of Maharashtra;

(ii) After repealment of Bombay Rent Act and enforcement of Maharashtra Rent Act, it is not necessary to issue fresh notification under Section 3 of the 1957 Act;

(iii) The Small Causes Court, Pune has jurisdiction to entertain and try the Suits between landlords and tenants in respect of the premises situate in Pune Cantonment area.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application Nos. 249 of 2018, 352 of 2015 and Writ Petition No. 765 of 2018

Decided On: 24.09.2018

 Shireen Dady Adenwalla  Vs.  Yasmin Dinyar Ilavia 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.G. Ketkar, J.

Citation: 2019(1) RCR(Rent) 657

Print Page

Which is material date for ascertaining whether suit property is Premises for the purpose of Maharashtra rent control Act?

 Which is the material date for ascertaining, whether the suit property is 'Premises' for the purpose of Section 6 of the Bombay Rent Control Act, i.e. whether the date of letting or the date on which right conferred by the said Act is sought to be exercised, was the question before the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Nalanikant Ramadas Gujjar v. Tulasibai (Dead) by Lrs. And Others MANU/SC/0111/1997 : AIR 1997 SC 404.

In the case of Mst. Subhadra v. Narsaji Chenaji Marwadi MANU/SC/0287/1961 : AIR 1966 Supreme Court 806, it was held that material date for ascertaining whether the plot is 'Premises' for the purpose of Section 6 is the date of letting and not the date on which application for fixation of standard rent was made by the tenant or the landlord.

However, in the case of Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and Ors. MANU/SC/0531/1970 : AIR 1970 SC 1475, the Apex Court held that, 'whether the provisions of Bombay Rent Control Act shall be applicable or not, the crucial date for ascertaining the nature of the use of the land in question shall be the date when the rights under the aforesaid Act are to be exercised.'

The Constitution Bench has agreed with the views expressed in the case of Vasudev Modi (Supra) and therefore, material date for ascertaining whether suit property is 'Premises' is the date on which right conferred by the Act is sought to be exercised.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Second Appeal No. 638 of 2014

Decided On: 03.05.2019

 Narendra Harilal Jethwa  Vs.  Bholadasji Mandir 

Print Page

Whether provisions of Maharashtra rent control Act is applicable if open space is given on lease with permission to make construction on it?

Appellant/defendant was inducted as tenant vide registered lease-deed dated 21st December, 1970 in the land bearing Survey No. 182, 182-A, C.T.S. No. 5923 to 5951 admeasuring 2086.04 sq.mtrs. ('Suit Property' for short). The lease was of open land and the lessee was permitted to raise construction with a rider that upon expiry of lease period, he shall remove construction at his own cost. Lease period was for 30 years, which came to end on 31st December, 2000. 

Thus, taking into consideration facts of the case and the law laid down by the Apex Court as well as by this Court in aforesaid two cases and for the reasons stated here-in-above, suit property was not "Premises" within the meaning of Section 7(9) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 and, therefore, suit for eviction filed under the general law of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was maintainable and as such, provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act were not applicable as the lease in question was for open plot. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Second Appeal No. 638 of 2014

Decided On: 03.05.2019

 Narendra Harilal Jethwa  Vs.  Bholadasji Mandir and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sandeep K. Shinde, J.

Citation: 2019(6) MHLJ 885

Print Page

Under which law eviction suit is to be filed if open plot was let out on which saw mill was constructed?

It is pertinent to note that the definition of expression 'premises' given in the Act clearly indicates that the Act is not applicable to open lands and it applies to the buildings and structures and parts thereof used as separate premises for residence, education, business, trade or storage. However, the Rent Control Order applied to open lands also but by virtue of provisions of Section 58 of the Act, the said Rent Control Order has been repealed and by virtue of the provisions of Section 46 of the Act, the Rent Control Order is applicable only to the suits or proceedings pending on the date of commencement of the Act. Admittedly, on the date of commencement of the Act, no suit or proceeding for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises was pending and, therefore, in my opinion, it is the Transfer of Property Act which would govern the field and would be applicable to the matter in question and as such, the notice to quit issued by the plaintiffs to the defendant under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act determining his tenancy without obtaining prior permission of the Rent Controller cannot be said to be illegal or invalid and, therefore, in my opinion, the learned trial Judge has rightly held so. I, therefore, find no substance in the contentions canvassed by the learned Counsel for the applicant in this regard.

Bombay High Court

Gangdas S/O Moujibhai Patel vs Harshvardhan S/O Balkrushna ... on 14 October, 2002

Equivalent citations: 2003 (4) BomCR 712, 2003 (1) MhLj 203

Print Page

Whether provision of Maharashtra rent control Act is applicable if open space is given to tenant in which tenant has made construction?

1) The trial Court after considering the evidence on record held

that construction was carried out by the defendant and thereafter the

agreement dated 10.02.2005 at Exhibit 63 was entered into. After the

construction was made by the defendant, rights were conferred on him by

the plaintiff and the defendant was paying rent of Rs.400/per

month. It

was further held by considering the evidence on record that the defendant

was tenant of the open plot alongwith the structure standing thereon.

Thus, the provisions of the said Act were applicable and after finding that

the plaintiff had made out ground for eviction as pleaded, the suit came

to be decreed.

2) Referring to the agreement at Exhibit 63, it was submitted that on a plain

reading of the same, it was clear that on the entire plot admeasuring

1000 square feet, the defendant had erected construction to the extent of

10 Feet X 10 Feet at his expense and on the area admeasuring 6 Feet X

10 Feet a column alongwith plinth was constructed by the defendant.

The plaintiff agreed that whenever the constructed portion would be sold,

it would be only to the defendant and not anybody else. The property

was thus given to the defendant on monthly rent of Rs.400/.

3) On a plain reading of the aforesaid agreement it was clear that

the same was entered into after the construction in question was carried

out by the defendant and therefore the suit property was 'premises' as

defined under the said Act. The trial Court rightly held the suit to be

governed by the provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999

and had rightly decreed the same. 

4) The observations in Kamla Devi (supra) to the effect that if a plot

with a structure is let out, the same would fall within the meaning of the

term “premises” but if an open plot is given without any structure, it

would not fall within the meaning of the term “premises” support the case

of the plaintiff. The evidence on record indicates the open plot along

with structure being let out to the defendant as per Exhibit 63. For same

reason, the ratio of the decision in Ram Sarup Gupta (supra) does not

assist the case of the defendant.

5) It is thus held that the appellate Court erred in holding that it

was only the open plot that was given on lease to the defendant and

hence the provisions of the said Act were not applicable. Instead, it is

held that portion of the open plot alongwith structure standing thereon

had been given to the defendant at monthly rent of Rs.400/.

The subject

matter of the suit was premises within the meaning of Section 7(9) of the

said Act. The suit was therefore, maintainable and adjudication on merits

was necessary.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,

NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.

CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION No. 51/2018

Shaikh Wasim Shaikh Ismail, Vs Mohammad Faiyyaz Noor Mohammad,

CORAM : A.S. CHANDURKAR, J.

DATED:  02 TH NOVEMBER, 2018

Print Page

Whether lessee can seek protection of Maharashtra rent control Act if construction was to be removed after expiry of lease period?

 On the date of expiry of the lease period, i.e. on 31st December, 2003, the Rent Control Legislations were not in force as the same was repealed by provisions of Section 58(1)(b) of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 with effect from 31st March, 2000. In the given set of facts, the learned Judge has held thus;

"It is not in dispute that the leases in respect of open land are not governed by the provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act Hence, the only remedy available was to file a suit invoking the ordinary jurisdiction of a Civil Court for eviction of tenant and for possession under the general law of the Transfer of Property Act, and neither the provisions of the Rent Control Legislations, nor the provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act were applicable, as the lease in question was for the open land."

19. Thus, taking into consideration facts of the case and the law laid down by the Apex Court as well as by this Court in aforesaid two cases and for the reasons stated here-in-above, suit property was not "Premises" within the meaning of Section 7(9) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 and, therefore, suit for eviction filed under the general law of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was maintainable and as such, provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act were not applicable as the lease in question was for open plot. Questions are answered accordingly.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Second Appeal No. 638 of 2014

Decided On: 03.05.2019

Narendra Harilal Jethwa Vs. Bholadasji Mandir and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sandeep K. Shinde, J.

Citation: AIR 2019(NOC) 648 Bom

Print Page

Supreme Court: Provision of Maharashtra rent control Act is not applicable to Insurance Company

 From the aforesaid it is graphically clear that an Insurance

Company is not protected under the 1999 Act. Once it is held

that defendant No. 1, the New India Assurance Company, the

original tenant, is not protected, the question would be whether a

subtenant can be protected under the Act. In the case of Bhatia

Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (supra), it has been clearly

laid down that Section 4(1) of the 1947 Act applies to premises

and not to parties or their relationship. Section 3 uses the term

‘premises’. The provision commences with the non-obstante

clause that the Act does not apply to any premises belonging to

the Government or a local authority. Sub-section 3(1)(b) makes

it clear that the Act does not apply to any bank, public sector

undertaking or certain other categories of tenants. The

Insurance Company is covered under Section 3(1)(b). Thus, as a

logical corollary, the Act does not apply to the premises held by

the Insurance Company who is a tenant.

23. The learned Single Judge has allowed protection to the

Government Department on the foundation that it has become a

tenant. We are disposed to think that the analysis is

fundamentally erroneous. When the Act does not cover the

tenant, namely, the Insurance Company as basically the

exemption applies only to premises and not to any relationship,

the subtenant who becomes a deemed tenant cannot enjoy a

better protection or privilege by ostracizing the concept of

premises which is the spine of the provision.

N THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL Nos . 3356-3357/2012

Kesri Commissariat  Vs  Ministry of Food and Civil Supplies,

Dipak Misra , J

Dated:April 03, 2012.
Citation: AIR 2012 SC 1271:2012(5) MHLJ 212 SC

Print Page

Supreme Court: Protection From SARFAESI Act Not Available To Tenant-In-Sufferance

 It is pertinent to note that at the time when the SARFAESI Act

proceedings were pending, the factum of tenancy was never

revealed by the parties. The earlier order dated 09.03.2012,

passed by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Esplanade, Mumbai

directing the Assistant Registrar to take over the possession of the

secured asset, is silent about any existing encumbrance over the

secured asset. It was only after passing of the aforesaid order of

the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, that the appellanttenant

started agitating his rights before the Small Causes Court based

on a completely different fact scenario, without a whisper of the

alleged tenancy under the concluded Section 14, SARFAESI Act

proceedings. The respondent no.2borrower/

landlord did not even

respond to the claims of the appellanttenant.

The respondent

no.1bank

has produced multiple records to substantiate their

claim that the tenant was nowhere to be seen earlier and that this

tenancy was created just to defeat the proceedings initiated under

the SARFAESI Act. On the contrary, the appellanttenant

has

failed to produce any evidence to substantiate his claim over the

secured asset. In such a situation, the appellanttenant

cannot

claim protection under the garb of the interim protection granted

to him, ex parte, by solely relying upon the xerox of the rent

receipts.

32. In such an event, wherein the claim of the appellanttenant

is not

supported by any conclusive evidence, the rejection of the stay

application by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate cannot be held

to be erroneous. Although the counsel of the appellanttenant

has

placed ample reliance upon the Vishal N. Kalsaria Case (supra),

but the same would not help the cause of the appellanttenant

herein, as the earlier case proceeded with the assumption of a

valid and bona fide tenancy. But in the present case, the stay

application of the appellanttenant

seems to be an afterthought. It

is clear that the respondent no. 2borrower/

landlord never

intimated the respondent no. 1bank

about the alleged tenancy.

In light of the above, we are unable to accept the claim of bona

fide tenancy of the appellanttenant.

33. In any case, considering the counterfactual pleaded by the

appellanttenant

himself, that he was a tenant who had entered

into an oral agreement, such tenancy impliedly does not carry any

covenant for renewal, as provided under Section 65A

of T.P. Act.

Therefore, in any case, Section 13 (13) SARFAESI Act bars

entering into such tenancy beyond January, 2012. As the notice

under Section 13 (2) SARFAESI Act was issued on 30.04.2011,

subsequent reckoning of the tenancy is barred. Such person

occupying the premises, when the tenancy has been determined,

can only be treated as a ‘tenant in sufferance’. We should note

that such tenants do not have any legal rights and are akin to

trespassers.

34. In this context we may refer to R.V. Bhupal Prasad v. State of

A.P. and Ors., AIR 1996 SC 140, wherein a two Judge Bench of

this Court, speaking through Ramaswamy, J., made the following

pertinent observations in paragraph 8 of the Report:

"8. Tenant at sufferance is one who comes into

possession of land by lawful title, but who holds it,

by wrong after the termination of the term or expiry

of the lease by efflux of time. The tenant at

sufferance is, therefore, one who wrongfully

continues in possession after the extinction of a

lawful title. There is little difference between him

and a trespasser. "

35. On the same lines are the decisions of this Court in Smt. Shanti

Devi v. Amal Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1981 SC 1550, Murlidhar

Jalan (since deceased) through his Lrs. v. State of

Meghalaya and Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2690 and D.H. Maniar and

Ors. v. Waman Laxman Kudav, [1977] 1 SCR 403.

36. The operation of the Rent Act cannot be extended to a ‘tenantinsufferance’

visavis

the SARFAESI Act, due to the operation of

Section 13(2) read with Section 13(13) of the SARFAESI Act. A

contrary interpretation would violate the intention of the

legislature to provide for Section 13(13), which has a valuable role

in making the SARFAESI Act a selfexecutory

instrument for debt

recovery. Moreover, such an interpretation would also violate the

mandate of Section 35, SARFAESI Act which is couched in broad

terms.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1371 OF 2019

BAJARANG SHYAMSUNDER  AGARWAL Vs CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA 

N.V. RAMANA, J.

Dated:September 11, 2019.

Print Page

To what extent Bombay Port trust can claim exemption from rent Act?

 By its very nature, rent legislation covers the relationship between landlord and tenant. It does not deal with creation of tenancy but it places either a restriction or embargo on the right of the landlord under the general law relating to revision of rents and eviction. The Rent Act also deals with the question of charging of rent and to that extent it also encroaches upon the field of general law as to the creation of tenancy because creation may be according to general law but that part of the transaction where the tenant agrees to pay a certain amount of rent will be regulated and controlled by the provisions of the Rent Act. Unless therefore it is shown that in the Major Port Trusts Act there are similar provisions as to the control, regulation or revision of rent and relating to eviction, obviously the said theory and occupied field cannot have any place whatsoever. We, therefore, reject this submission.

76. In view of the aforesaid finding the appellant trust will stand governed by the provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. To the extent permissible therein, the appellant trust can certainly increase the rent periodically and the occupants of the plots on whatever terms and conditions at present will also have to abide by the same. We also hold that the appellant trust cannot claim any exemption from the provisions of the Rent Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Appeal Nos. 258, 313-327 of 1991

Decided On: 01.08.2000

The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay  Vs. Jayantilal Dharamsey and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

N.J. Pandya and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ.

Citation : AIR 2001 Bom 26

Print Page

Whether appeal lies against finding given in judgment of trial court?

 I have considered the submissions made on behalf of
the parties and have also perused the impugned order dated 21.07.2007.
On a reading of the order dated 21.07.2007, it is clear that the
first appellate Court committed gross illegality in rejecting the
application filed by the applicants for dismissal of the appeal. It is well
settled that an appeal could be filed only by a person who is
prejudicially or adversely affected by a decree and an appeal lies
only against a decree and not a finding. In this case, the decree is
passed by the trial Court only against the non-applicant no.2. The nonapplicant
no.2 has not, however, preferred any appeal against the
decree passed by the trial Court. Actually, no relief was sought by
the applicant against the non-applicant no.1 in the suit instituted by

them. In fact, though it was pleaded by the applicants in the suit that
the non-applicant nos.1 and 2 had broken a portion of the partition
wall in between the premises let out to the non-applicant nos.1 and 2,
the trial Court had decided that issue against the applicants with the
result that the trial Court had not rendered any adverse finding against
the non-applicant no.1. Thus, there was neither an adverse finding
against the non-applicant no.1 nor was the decree passed against the
non-applicant no.1. In these circumstances, the first appellate Court
ought to have held that the appeal filed by the non-applicant no.1
was not tenable. The first appellate Court, however, erroneously
rejected the application filed by the applicants on the ground that
the appeal is a continuation of the suit and to avoid further
complications, it was necessary to decide the appeal on merits. The
approach of the first appellate Court in deciding the application filed by
the applicants was not just and proper. The law laid down in judgment
reported in AIR 2003 SC 1989 and relied on by the learned counsel for
the applicants clearly applies to the case in hand and supports the case of
the applicants.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
Civil Revision Application No. 109/2007

 Satyanarayan Bisanlal Agrawal, Vs  Dr. Veena w/o Rajendrakumar Dhore,

CORAM : SMT. VASANTI A. NAIK, J.
DATE : 16 t h JANUARY, 2009 .
Citation: 2009(5) ALLMR 431

Print Page

Whether Civil court has jurisdiction to decide inter se dispute between legal heirs of deceased tenant?

This is not a case of landlord and tenant. The landlord is not involved in this litigation between the heirs of the deceased tenant. There is no question of any relationship of licensor and licensee or their such related rights. Both the parties are claiming rights over the tenanted flat being heirs of the deceased tenant. The plaintiffs long and settled possession is quite established as supported by documents on record. It is the case and relief against the Defendants no where refer or deal with any aspect of landlord and tenant or Licensor or Licensee relationship. This is a interse dispute between legal heirs of the deceased tenant. In absence of any proceedings or involvement of the landlord, in the present case, the Suit so filed cannot be treated as a Suit or proceedings for eviction or in relation to the Landlord and tenant relationship. The Plaintiff is claiming, being in settle possession of the flat, reliefs against the Defendants treating them trespassers. There are even Criminal Complaints filed. It is settled that all the legal heirs of the deceased, unless, accepted and/or treated by the landlord, cannot claim tenancy over the flat. Therefore, as there is dispute between the heirs of the tenant with regard to the possession or occupation rights in full or in part and in the present facts and circumstances, therefore, the Suit is maintainable in this Court.

11 Any proceedings, even if any, initiated by the Defendants for claiming tenancy rights over the suit property cannot decide the jurisdiction of this Court. The tagging of the Suit is not a issue. Both the parties have been making allegations and counter allegations of trespassing against each others and claiming rights accordingly over the flat. The Court will decide it after due trial. The Suit is not between the landlord and tenant/ licensor or licensee. The same is not initiated by the landlord. The landlord is not a party to this proceeding, initiated by the heirs of the deceased tenant to protect their respective rights and the possession. It nowhere related to the recovery of rent or possession of the tenanted premises.

12 This Suit is not barred by the provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Suit No. 1173 of 2011 With Notice of Motion No. 1548 of 2011

Decided On: 03.04.2012

Arun Bhaskar Adarkar  Vs. Mina Srinivasan Krishnan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anoop V. Mohta, J.

Citation: 2012(3) ALLMR 879,2012(3) AIR BOM R 516

Print Page

Whether servant working with tenant can become tenant?

The facts on record indicate that the defendant herein along with said Nusli Randelia had filed a suit for declaration of their status as the tenants of the suit flat. That suit is pending before the Small Causes Court. Though it was urged on behalf of the defendant that adjudication of the question as to the status of the defendant in the present appeal would prejudice the rights of the defendant in that suit, suffice it to clarify that this Court has merely answered the question whether the defendant was a trespasser or not. Once it is found on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and evidence led by them that the defendant was merely a servant of Nusli Randelia as admitted by her coupled with the fact that there was no blood relationship between said Nusli Randelia and the defendant, it becomes obvious that on the death of said Nusli Randelia the status of the defendant becomes that of a trespasser. This Court has not gone into the question as to entitlement of the defendant as regards her claim of being a tenant under provisions of Section 7(15) of the said Act which question falls within the domain of the Small Causes Court. Suffice it to say that in the light of the admitted fact that the defendant was a servant of Nusli Randelia, her continuation in the suit flat after the death of Nusli Randelia becomes unauthorised thus leading to her eviction. The plaintiffs are thus found entitled to the relief of declaration and eviction as prayed for. Point No. (ii) stands answered accordingly.

18. As a result of it being held that the defendant was a trespasser in the suit after the death of Nusli Randelia.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

First Appeal No. 2307 of 2008

Decided On: 03.12.2018

 Pilloo D. Broacha Vs.  Meena Ramesh Dewadiga

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Chandurkar, J.

Citation: 2019(1) MHLJ 924

Print Page