Whether Special court under Electricity Act 2003 can determine civil liability in civil misc application?

 I am in the agreement with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court. In these circumstances, it was permissible for the Special Court to determine the civil liability and it was not necessary for the Court to wait till the conclusion of the trial. As stated hereinabove, the respondents have not filed the charge sheet before the special Court although the FIR was registered on 29th September, 2017. The applicant cannot be left with no remedy as the liability has to be determined in accordance with Section 154(5) of the said Act. The decision referred to by the Counsel for the respondent is in a different context and the same is not applicable in the present case. For all the reasons stated hereinabove, the application is required to be allowed. Hence, I pass the following order. {Para 13}

ORDER

i) Criminal Application No. 749 of 2018 is allowed.

ii) The impugned order dated 13th June, 2018, passed by the special Judge, Barshi below Exhibit-21 in Civil Misc. Application No. 77 of 2017, is set aside and the special Court is directed to adjudicate the application preferred by the applicant in accordance with law;

iii) The interim application preferred by the applicant be decided within a period of four weeks from today.

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before Prakash D. Naik, J.)

Dhairyashil Arun Doifode Vs Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. and Another 

Criminal Application No. 749 of 2018

Decided on August 7, 2018.

Citation: 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 2770

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Bombay HC: No Provision Under CPC To Extend Time For Filing Written Statement Due To Pendency Of Miscellaneous Application

The CPC nowhere provides that on filing a Miscellaneous Application, the time to file the written statement would be extended or excluded. Similarly, the Defendant claimed in the Application for condonation of delay that the period during which the Application under Order VII Rule 11 was pending, is entitled to be excluded and thus, the delay according to the Petitioner/ Defendant was calculated as only 14 days. Such calculation is completely on wrong advise or presumption. The written statement was filed after a period of 160 days along with the Application for delay wherein there are no sufficient reasons disclosed to exercise the discretion of the Court by condoning the delay. {para 15}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

WRIT PETITION NO. 105 OF 2024

Federal Brands Ltd.,  Vs Cosmos Premises Pvt. Ltd., 

CORAM: BHARAT P. DESHPANDE, J.

DATED: 2nd AUGUST 2024

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Bombay HC: Reply to Miscellaneous application can not be treated as written statement in Commercial suits beyond the statutory period of 120 days available for filing of a written statement

Even otherwise, on a purposive interpretation of Order V Rule 1 and Order VIII Rules 1 and 10, it is clear that there is no scope for allowing a pursis or praecipe or application to be filed after expiry of the statutory period of 120 days for treating an affidavit or pleading filed earlier in the course of a commercial suit as a written statement. The amended provisions are designed to introduce a statutory prohibition for filing of a written statement beyond the prescribed period, so that trials of commercial suits are not delayed. Strict timelines are even otherwise provided at every important stage of the trial, so that commercial disputes are expeditiously disposed of in the interest of commerce and industry. In this scheme of things, it would be an anomaly to allow a written statement to be introduced at any time in the trial by defeating the statutory prohibition. {Para 9}

 In the High Court of Bombay

(Before S.C. Gupte, J.)

Interim Application No. 1 of 2019

In

Commercial IP Suit No. 1112 of 2018

Flipkart India Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vs Flipkart India Pvt. Ltd. and Another 

Interim Application No. 1 of 2019, Commercial IP Suit No. 1112 of 2018 and Interim Application No. 2 of 2019

Decided on May 26, 2020

Citation: 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 664 : (2021) 222 AIC 346.

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Whether court should pass orders in miscellaneous applications in disposed off appeal?

We find that the Hon’ble Single Bench has committed grave

illegality in retaining the file after grant of bail to the accused on

18th February, 2019. The jurisdiction of the High Court came to an

end when an application for grant of bail under Section 439 of the

Code was finally decided.

6. In State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar & Ors. (2011) 14 SCC 770, the High Court of Punjab & Haryana after deciding a criminal appeal

continued to pass order in respect of offenders in other cases not

connected with the matter which was dealt with by the High Court.

This Court deprecated the invocation of jurisdiction in a matter not

connected with the appeal and that too after passing of the final

order. The Court held as under:

“86. In view of the law referred to hereinabove, the

Bench was not competent to entertain the said

applications and even if the same had been filed in the

disposed of appeal, the court could have directed to

place the said applications before the Bench dealing

with similar petitions.

xx xx xx

91. There could be no justification for the Bench

concerned to entertain the applications filed under

Section 482 CrPC as miscellaneous applications in a

disposed of appeal. The law requires that the Bench

could have passed an appropriate order to place those

applications before the Bench hearing Section 482 CrPC

petitions or place the matters before the Chief Justice

for appropriate orders.”

7. This Court in Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar referred to a case

reported as Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi

Mukherjee & Anr. (1990) 2 SCC 437 wherein the Court observed that inherent

powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be exercised to do

something which is expressly barred under the Code. It was held

that inherent powers cannot be exercised assuming that the

statute conferred an unfettered and arbitrary jurisdiction, nor can

the High Court act at its whim or caprice. The Code does not

confer unlimited/unfettered jurisdiction on the High Court as the

“ends of justice” and “abuse of the process of the court” have to be

dealt with in accordance with law and not otherwise. The High

Court has not been given nor does it possess any inherent power to

make any order, which in the opinion of the court, could be in the

interest of justice as the statutory provision is not intended to bypass

the procedure prescribed.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 45 OF 2020

STATE REP. BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE  Vs M. MURUGESAN 

Dated: JANUARY 15, 2020.

HEMANT GUPTA, J.

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Supreme Court has deprecated practice of entertaining miscellaneous applications in disposed of writ petitions

Learned Counsel submitted that the practice of filing miscellaneous application in disposed of writ petitions are on the rise, in spite of the fact that this practice has been deprecated by this Court in various judgments. Reference was made to the judgment of this Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa and Ors. MANU/SC/0665/2000 : (2001) 1 SCC 169. Learned Counsel further submitted that the High Court, by granting stay of arrest, is depriving the trial Courts of its power to issue orders under Section 439 Code of Criminal Procedure. Learned Counsel also submitted that the order of the High Court is also interfering with the powers of the Family Court in passing appropriate orders in the application filed under Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure.

10. Shri Arvind Kumar, Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent, submitted that the High Court has only granted stay of the arrest of 1st Respondent till the conclusion of the trial, consequently, no prejudice has been caused to the Appellant. Further, it was also pointed out that 1st Respondent is depositing the amount of Rs. 2,000/- per month in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agra, as directed by the High Court and that Appellant has made an application for withdrawal of the said amount as well. Further, it was also stated that since the Appellant was not a party to the Criminal Writ Petition No. 5877 of 2003 as well as in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 133306 of 2004, this appeal preferred by the Appellant is not maintainable.

11. We are of the view that the High Court has committed a grave error in entertaining the criminal miscellaneous application No. 133306 of 2004 in a disposed of Criminal Writ Petition No. 5877 of 2003. Criminal Writ Petition No. 5877 of 2003 was disposed of on 25.9.2003 directing that the 1st Respondent should not be arrested until the conclusion of the investigation or submission of any report under Section 173 Code of Criminal Procedure. On an application filed by the 1st Respondent in that writ petition, the High Court later passed an order on 26.8.2004 stating that the Petitioner therein (1st Respondent) be not arrested until the conclusion of the trial. The practice of entertaining miscellaneous applications in disposed of writ petitions was deprecated by this Court in Hari Singh Mann (supra).

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1693 of 2012 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2575 of 2010)

Decided On: 19.10.2012

Nazma Vs.  Javed

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.S. Panicker Radhakrishnan and Dipak Misra, JJ.

Citation: 2013 (80) ACC 182 (SC)

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Whether appeal is maintainable if miscellaneous application is dismissed in default?

The statutory provision of Order XLIII Rule 1(c) and 1(d) Code of Civil Procedure uses the words "rejecting an application". When the appeal is provided on rejection of an application, we need not read any further pre-condition in the word rejecting. When the right of appeal has been given on "rejecting" an application the said right cannot be read to limit the right of appeal only when application is rejected on merit. Taking any such interpretation will be nothing but adding words to statute which is clearly impermissible.

22. Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Nathu Prasad (supra) case had occasion to consider the words "rejecting an application" as contained in Order XLIII Rule 1(c) Code of Civil Procedure. After considering the earlier judgments of the different High Courts the Full Bench opined as follows:

...In our opinion, there is nothing in the wording of Order 43 Rule 1(c), Code of Civil Procedure to restrict it to rejection on merits. The words "rejecting an application" are comprehensive enough to include dismissal for default on rejection, in any other situation whatever.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 9409 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 28713 of 2013)

Decided On: 21.07.2017

Jaswant Singh and Ors. Vs. Prakash Kaur and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.K. Sikri and Ashok Bhushan, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 12 SCC 249

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Whether appeal is maintainable from orders passed in miscellaneous proceeding?

The application filed by Appellant dated 21.08.2002 for restoration of the application Under Order IX Rule 13 Code of Civil Procedure, which was dismissed in default, is not expressly covered by the provisions of Order IX Code of Civil Procedure. The application dated 21.08.2002 was miscellaneous proceeding on which Civil Miscellaneous Case No. 30 of 2002 was registered. What are the provisions and procedure for miscellaneous proceeding have to be looked into for deciding the issue. Section 141 of Code of Civil Procedure is relevant in this context. Section 141 Code of Civil Procedure deals with miscellaneous proceeding. An Explanation has been inserted Under Section 141 by Act 104 of 1976. Section 141 Code of Civil Procedure after amendment w.e.f. 01.02.1977 is as follows:

141. Miscellaneous proceedings.-The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction.

[Explanation.-In this section, the expression "proceedings" includes proceedings Under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding Under Article 226 of the Constitution.]

27. As per Section 141, the procedure provided in Code of Civil Procedure in regard to suit shall be followed, as far as, it can be made applicable in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction. By insertion of explanation, it has now been expressly provided that expression "proceedings" includes proceedings Under Order IX Code of Civil Procedure

28. When Section 141 expressly refers to proceedings Under Order IX, as miscellaneous proceedings and appeals from such orders are expressly provided by Order XLIII Rule 1(c) & (d), it is clear that right of appeal has been given, from the orders arising out of the miscellaneous proceeding.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 9409 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 28713 of 2013)

Decided On: 21.07.2017

Jaswant Singh and Ors. Vs. Prakash Kaur and Ors.

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Whether court can decide any miscellaneous application alongwith decision in suit?

Apex Court has staled in State of U.P. v. Chhotey Lal [(2011) 2 SCC 550] that when adjournments become routine, justice is a casualty. Consequently, it is directed that the eviction petition laid by the landlord before the Rent Tribunal be finally disposed of within a period of three months from the date of presentation of certified copy of this order. Miscellaneous applications when filed be disposed of within three days of filing and with costs when warranted. The Rent Tribunal shall also have the discretion to decide any miscellaneous application it deems fit alongwith the final order in the eviction petition.

In the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur

(Before Alok Sharma, J.)

 Smt. Kamla Devi Bohrav. Bhagvan Das Bhatia, 

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 16303/2017

Decided on October 3, 2017

2017 SCC OnLine Raj 2570

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