Whether non-payment of rent by the tenant to the landlord amounts to a forfeiture of tenancy?

  Thus, the suit of the Plaintiffs filed within 12 years of the determination of the tenancy by efflux of time is within the period of limitation. The Defendant has not proved forfeiture of tenancy prior to the expiry of lease period. Mere non-payment of rent does not amount to forfeiture of tenancy. It only confers a right on the landlord to seek possession. The Plaintiffs have filed a suit for possession against the Defendant on the basis of determination of tenancy, such suit is governed by Article 67 alone.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 9918 of 2011

Decided On: 19.03.2020

 Nand Ram  Vs.   Jagdish Prasad

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Whether tenant can raise the plea that the eviction suit is barred by limitation if he fails to produce and prove quit notice issued by the landlord?

  In respect of second question of law examined by the High Court that the Plaintiff's suit was barred by limitation is based upon the notice dated 23rd September, 1960 produced in proceedings before the Reference Court as Ex. A-3. The reference to such notice was made in an application for amendment of the written statement Under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code filed before the First Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court allowed the Defendant to raise a plea of limitation without amending the written statement. Thus, the notice (Ex. A-3) in proceedings before the Reference Court was never produced in evidence in the suit for possession and such primary evidence was not before the Court. In terms of Section 62 of the Evidence Act, primary evidence means a document itself produced for inspection by the Court. Section 64 of the Evidence Act stipulates that documents must be proved by primary evidence except in certain cases when secondary evidence can be led. The Defendant has not led any evidence, including secondary evidence of the alleged notice said to be served by the Plaintiffs. In the absence of primary or secondary evidence available in the suit for possession, the reference to such notice as the starting point of limitation is clearly erroneous and not sustainable.

{Para 28}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 9918 of 2011

Decided On: 19.03.2020

 Nand Ram  Vs.   Jagdish Prasad

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Whether court can direct the licensee to pay maintenance charges to the licensor in application U/O 15A of CPC in eviction suit?

The only question to be considered is whether the maintenance charges could have been directed to be paid under Over XV-A of the Code as prayed for by the defendants.

From the aforesaid averments it is clear that the plaintiff has admitted that it is liable to pay maintenance charges of Rs.25,000/- per month during the period of Leave and Licence agreement. As stated above the said agreement specifically refers to various amenities provided by the licensor and with a view to enable the licensee to enjoy the same the plaintiff is required to pay Rs.25,000/- per month.

10. The provisions of Section 7(14) of the said Act define the term "standard rent". The standard rent in the present case has not been determined under Section 8 of the said Act. However reading of both the agreements on the basis of which the plaintiff has been inducted as a licensee indicates that besides the amount of licence fees, it is also liable to pay maintenance charges and failure to pay maintenance charges gives a cause of action to the licensor to terminate the licence.

 In Puspa Sen Gupta vs. Susma Ghose (1990) 2 SCC 651 while considering the provisions of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and the question whether the tenant was liable to pay amount of Rs.8/- per month towards electricity besides Rs.32/- as rent, it was observed that the expression "rent" was not defined under relevant Act. However on reading the entire Act, the word "rent" would also include payment in respect of amenities or services provided by the landlord under the term of tenancy. It was observed that considering various provisions a tenancy would carry with it amenities to be provided or services to be maintained by the landlord and hence the amount of rent would include the amount of electricity charges. Drawing support from the aforesaid observations it can be said in the facts of the present case that the plaintiff was liable to pay maintenance charges besides license fees. This has infact been admitted by the plaintiff in its written statement to the counter-claim. In that view of the matter the trial Court was not justified in refusing to direct the plaintiff to pay Rs.25,000/- per month towards maintenance charges. The impugned order therefore is liable to be modified accordingly.

 Bombay High Court

Daksha  Jyotindra Patel And Vs Big V. Telecom Pvt. Ltd. Nagpur ... on 8 November, 2019

Bench: A.S. Chandurkar

  WRIT PETITION NO.3553 OF 2019



CORAM : A. S. CHANDURKAR, J.

 Judgment pronounced on : November 08, 2019 

Citation: 2020(6) MHLJ 313

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Whether the court should dismiss eviction suit if the tenant takes plea that change of user of tenanted premises is not permissible?

(j) Prohibition on the Change of User:

74. About the State Government's directions issued on 03.12.2009 and consequential regulatory orders passed by the Municipal Corporations concerned, the Courts below have held that those directions came much later, and after the decree was passed, at that. They have also opined that the Corporation could not prove that those directions apply to Nashik.

75. At any rate, on the issue about the restrictions on the change of use, this Court has ruled in Cricket Club of India Ltd. In that case, the respondent leased the suit property in March 1943 to the applicant's predecessor, for running a filling station. In December 2000, after the original tenant's death, the respondent issued quit notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to the applicant. Later, he sued the applicant for eviction. He filed the suit under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Court Act, 1882. On contest, the Small Cause Court decreed the suit. In appeal, it was confirmed.

76. The applicant took the matter to this Court as a Civil Revision Application. The applicant brought to this Court's notice a statutory change: Under Section 154 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, the State Government directed the Municipal Corporations in the State not to permit the change of use of the properties being used as fuel filling stations. So the applicant contended that even if the respondent recovered the leased property, he could not use it for any purposes other than for setting up a filling station. According to the applicant, this subsequent material change goes to the root of the matter.

77. This Court, then, has held that the respondent's effort to evict the applicant are legal, and "there is no challenge on that aspect." In the absence of any protection under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, the decree for possession must follow. On the issue of change of use, it has held that "the direction issued by the State Government will not affect the merits of the decree for eviction. The result of the said direction is that as and when the Respondent seeks permission to redevelop the suit property in question, the Mumbai Municipal Corporation will not be entitled to permit change of present user of the property." But it has nothing to do with the decree for eviction.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 561 of 2018 and 562 of 2016 in Regular Civil Appeal No. 237 of 2005 in Regular Civil Suit No. 149 of 1998

Decided On: 27.04.2020

 K.B. Lahoti and Company and Ors. Vs. Champalal Vithuram Jajoo and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dama Seshadri Naidu, J.

Citation: 2020(5) MHLJ 196,MANU/MH/0535/2020

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Whether relatives of husband can evict wife, who has secured the right of residence in their house under the Domestic Violence Act?

 

The right to reside in shared household as granted

by Section 17 of Domestic violence Act itself 

contemplates an exception in

express words, i.e., “save in accordance with the

procedure established by law”.{Para 109}

116. Drawing the analogy from the above case, we are of

the opinion that the expression “save in accordance

with the procedure established by law”, in Section

17(2) of the Act, 2005 contemplates the proceedings in

court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, suit for

mandatory and permanent injunction/eviction or

possession by the owner of the property is maintainable

before a Competent Court. We may further notice that in

sub-section (2) the injunction is “shall not be evicted

or excluded from the shared household save in

accordance with procedure established by law”. Thus,

the provision itself contemplates adopting of any

procedure established by law by the respondent for

eviction or exclusion of the aggrieved person from the

shared household. Thus, in appropriate case, the

competent court can decide the claim in a properly

instituted suit by the owner as to whether the women

need to be excluded or evicted from the shared

household. One most common example for eviction and

exclusion may be when the aggrieved person is provided

same level of alternate accommodation or payment of

rent as contemplated by Section 19 sub-section (f)

itself. There may be cases where plaintiff can

successfully prove before the Competent Court that the

claim of plaintiff for eviction of respondent is

accepted. We need not ponder for cases and

circumstances where eviction or exclusion can be

allowed or refused. It depends on facts of each case

for which no further discussion is necessary in the

facts of the present case. The High Court in the

impugned judgment has also expressed opinion that suit

filed by the plaintiff cannot be held to be nonmaintainable

with which conclusion we are in agreement.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2483 of 2020

SATISH CHANDER AHUJA Vs  SNEHA AHUJA 

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What are the rights of wife if landlord/lessor/licensor is seeking to evict her from a shared household obtained under Domestic violence Act?

  In case, the shared household of a woman is a

tenanted/allotted/licensed accommodation where tenancy/

allotment/license is in the name of husband, father-in

law or any other relative, the Act, 2005 does not

operate against the landlord/lessor/licensor in

initiating an appropriate proceedings for eviction of

the tenant/allottee/licensee qua the shared household.

However, in case the proceedings are due to any

collusion between the two, the woman, who is living in

the shared household has right to resist the

proceedings on all grounds which the

tenant/lessee/licensee could have taken in the

proceedings. The embargo under Section 17(2) of Act,

2005 of not to be evicted or excluded save in

accordance with the procedure established by law

operates only against the “respondent”, i.e., one who

is respondent within the meaning of Section 2(q) of

Act, 2005.{Para 117}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2483 of 2020

SATISH CHANDER AHUJA Vs  SNEHA AHUJA 

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Whether the husband is a necessary party to suit filed by father-in-law against daughter-in-law for her eviction from his house?

 Question No.7

118. Learned counsel for the appellant challenging the

direction issued by the High Court that the husband of

respondent be impleaded by the Trial Court by invoking

suo moto powers under Order I Rule 10 CPC, submits that

no relief having been claimed against the son of the

appellant, he (son) was neither necessary nor proper

party. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on

the judgments of this Court in Razia Begum Vs.

Sahebzadi Anwar Begum and others, AIR 1958 SC 886 and

Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal Vs. Municipal Corporation of

Greater Bombay and others, (1992) 2 SCC 524. Latter

judgment of this Court discussing judgment of Razia

Begum has laid down following in paragraphs 10 and 12:

“10. The power of the Court to add parties

under Order I Rule 10, CPC, came up for

consideration before this Court in Razia Begum

(supra). In that case it was pointed out that

the Courts in India have not treated the matter

of addition of parties as raising any question

of the initial jurisdiction of the Court and

that it is firmly established as a result of

judicial decisions that in order that a person

may be added as a party to a suit, he should

have a direct interest in the subject-matter of

the litigation whether it be the questions

relating to moveable or Immovable property.

12. Sinha, J. speaking for the majority

said that a declaratory judgment in respect of

a disputed status will be binding not only upon

parties actually before the Court but also upon

persons claiming through them respectively. The

Court laid down the law that in a suit relating

to property in order that a person may be added

as a party, he should have a direct interest as

distinguished from a commercial interest in the

subject-matter of the litigation. Where the

subject-matter of a litigation is a declaration

as regards status or a legal character, the

rule of presence of direct interest may be

relaxed in a suitable case where the Court is

of the opinion that by adding that party it

would be in a better position effectually and

completely to adjudicate upon the controversy.

…………”

119. There can be no dispute with the preposition of

law as laid down by this Court in the above two cases.

In the present case, although plaintiff has not claimed

any relief against his son, Raveen Ahuja, the husband

of the respondent, hence, he was not a necessary party

but in view of the fact that respondent has pleaded her

right of residence in shared household relying on

Sections 17 and 19 of the Act, 2005 and one of the

rights which can be granted under Section 19 is right

of alternate accommodation, the husband is a proper

party. The right of maintenance as per the provisions

of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 is that of

the husband, hence he may be a proper party in cases

when the Court is to consider the claim of respondent

under Sections 17 and 19 read with Section 26 of the

Act, 2005.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2483 of 2020

SATISH CHANDER AHUJA Vs  SNEHA AHUJA 

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Whether the court should order the abatement of a suit if the plaintiff fails to implead some of the legal heirs of deceased defendants?

In Daya Ram v. Shyam Sundari MANU/SC/0298/1964 : AIR 1965 SC 1049, the appellant had impleaded the heirs of the deceased respondent so far as known to him but had omitted to bring on record some of the heirs. Their details were unavailable with him. The question was about the effect of the appellant's having omitted to include two of the legal heirs, a son and a daughter, who admittedly had an interest in the property. The omission was brought to the court's notice before the could be heard.

74. Noting the impact of Order 22, Rule 4 of CPC, Daya Ram has observed that where a plaintiff or an appellant after diligent and bona fide enquiry ascertains who the legal representatives of deceased defendant or respondent are and brings them on record within the time limited by law, there is no abatement of the suit or appeal. It has ruled that if the impleaded legal representatives sufficiently represent the estate of the deceased, a decision obtained with them on record will bind not merely those persons impleaded but the entire estate including those not brought on record. So if one of the legal heirs is on record, the appeal or suit would not abate.

75. Then, Daya Ram answered another question. It concerns the effect of omission to include all the known legal heirs, who, admittedly, had an interest in the property, despite the plaintiff's knowing about it. It has answered this query by holding that "there would be no abatement of the suit or appeal if the estate of the deceased is sufficiently represented. It has, however, gone ahead and held that "once it is brought to the notice of the Court hearing the appeal that some of the legal heirs of the deceased have not been brought on record, and the appellant is thus made aware of this default on his part, it would be his duty to bring others on record, so that the appeal could be properly constituted." In other words, if the appellant should succeed in the appeal, it would be necessary for him to bring on record those representatives whom he had omitted to implead originally.

76. In Parvez Rustom Nekoo, this Court has relied on Daya Ram and then held that once some of the legal heirs of the deceased are brought on record, the proceeding does not abate. "[B]ut once the petitioner is put on notice with respect to the omission on his part to implead other legal heirs, in that event, it is obligatory on his part to bring the left-out legal heirs on record." It has also observed that "[i]t is not open for any litigant who has the knowledge of other legal heirs to contend that one of the legal heirs is on record and therefore, proceeding does not abate. All known legal heirs must be brought on record."

77. If we trace back the roots of the case, the present tenants' common ancestor was the tenant, as was the present owners' common ancestor was the landlord. After their death, the families spread. What was leased out is a business structure: two rooms. In about six or seven decades, neither family remained constant. And the available tenants have been brought on record. They are tenants by operation of law; they have no independent right. So one represents another unless that another establishes there is a conflict of interest among them. Here a couple of children of one of the deceased co-tenants not being impleaded, I am afraid, cannot be fatal.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revision Application No. 497 of 2016

Decided On: 06.09.2019

Rukminibai Motiram Kshirsagar  Vs.  Manoramabai Mallikarjun Bagale

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dama Seshadri Naidu, J.

Citation: 2020(2) MHLJ 756,MANU/MH/2504/2019

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Whether Small causes court Act can deal with the dispute between landlord and tenant after enforcement of Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2013?

Suit for eviction of a tenant in the State of U.P. is cognizable by Judge Small Cause under the Provincial Small Cause Act, 1971. Thus, such cases have been taken out of jurisdiction of regular civil courts and have been entrusted to Small Cause Courts for ensuring early adjudication.

39. Learned counsel would submit that in view of the amendment in the Act after terminating tenancy, tenant becomes liable for ejectment and proceeding for eviction will be undertaken under the Wakf Act (as amended in 2013). Consequently, the civil court, namely, Small Cause court will have no jurisdiction and since the decree passed by Small cause court, impugned in the revision, is without jurisdiction, same deserves to be set aside.

46. Thus, it is manifest that by means of The Wakf (Amendment) Act, No. 27 of 2013 word "encroacher" was defined and power has been given to Wakf Tribunal to pass order of eviction. This amendment does not say anything about the pending proceeding.

47. Suit was filed on 20th March, 2009. Amendment has come into force on 1st November, 2013. Will amendment apply to the pending cases? There is no saving Clause in Amendment Act. There is nothing in the Act which makes the Amending Act retrospective.

48. Section 5 of The Wakf (Amendment) Act, No. 27 of 2013 says that " In section 3 of the principal Act (I) after clause (e), the following clause shall be inserted, namely (ee) "encroacher" means any person or institution, public or private occupying waqf property, in whole or part, without the authority of law and includes a person whose tenancy, lease or licence has expired or has been terminated by mutawalli or the Board. There is no indication that this clause was sought to be made retrospective.

49. Similarly, Section 32 of the Amending Act whereby it amends Section 54 of the principal Act, says nothing that makes it retrospective. Even otherwise declaring somebody an encroacher amounts to declaring the character of a person which ordinarily cannot be done retrospectively. There is no contrary legislative intention discernible from the language of the provision.

50. Amendment of Section 54 further contemplates that application to the Tribunal for grant of order of eviction or removing shall be moved which means that Tribunal will start working prospectively. Section 54 (4) of the Act makes this position further clear and shows that Tribunal will work prospectively.

51. Section 56 of the Amending Act gives the overriding effect. Section 108A does not say anything about the pending proceedings. Consequently, proceedings which are pending on the date of amendment will continue to be dealt with in accordance with the prevalent law.

52. It is evident that by virtue of amendment, specific jurisdiction has been conferred on the Tribunal. Obviously, this will be prospective and in the absence of any provision for transfer of pending cases to the Tribunal, same will continue to be dealt with by the courts in accordance with the prevalent law and amendment at the most can take effect from 01.11.2013. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD (LUCKNOW BENCH)

S.C.C. Revision No. 62 of 2015

Decided On: 09.10.2015

 Sageer Ahmad  Vs.  Wakf Masjid Mohalla-Kazipura Wakf No. 9 and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.K. Saxena, J.

Citation: MANU/UP/1509/2015

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Whether the court should reject plaint of eviction suit at the stage of final argument?

Assailing the order, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the rent agreement dated 01.01.2014 does not reveal that he is tenant in Flat No. 606. He submits that it simply reads “TWO ROOM SET on 6th FLOOR, OUT of SOCIETY” in the layout plan of Vaidant Height, Nand Puri-B, Near Mahima Group Apartment, Guru Circle, Pratap Nagar, Sanganer, Jaipur. 

5. It is trite that for consideration of the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, averments in the petition/plaint only are relevant and defence of the respondent/defendant is not to be seen at this stage.

6. Flat No. 606 is specifically mentioned in the eviction application under tenancy of the petitioner which, as per the order impugned dated 19.02.2020, has not been disputed even by the petitioner. Even otherwise also, the effect of the absence of flat number in the rent agreement is to be examined by the learned Rent Tribunal, in case any such objection exists in the reply filed by the petitioner. The learned counsel for petitioner failed to point out any averment or omission in the eviction application which may invite application of the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Even otherwise also, the application filed by the petitioner under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC does not reveal any reason for filing it at such belated stage when the case was fixed for the final arguments. In these circumstances, it cannot be denied that the application was filed with malafide intention to delay the disposal of the eviction application. The order dated 19.02.2020 does not suffer any illegality or perversity warranting interference of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

In the High Court of Rajasthan

(Before Mahendar Kumar Goyal, J.)

Anil Joshi  Vs Beejal Chopra 

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4602/2020

Decided on August 24, 2020

Citation: 2020 SCC OnLine Raj 1256

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Whether licence granted to the licensee is revoked on the filing of eviction suit?

Also, it is clarified that the plea of the defendant she had never received the legal notice dated 18.04.2015, has not been factored in this adjudication because in view of Section 61 of the Easements Act, 1882, the licence of the defendant to stay at the second and third floor of the suit property, stood definitely revoked, with effect from the day, when the defendant had received the summons for settlement of issues of this suit.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RSA No. 23/2019 and CM No. 4782/2019

Decided On: 21.07.2020

JAGRITI@GAYATRI Vs VIKAS SHARMA

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Whether a tenant can deny the title of the landlord if the landlord has constructed a tenanted structure on leasehold land of government?

1)Tenant has contended that the landlord was not the 'owner' of the subject premises, since it is leasehold property, with the Delhi Development Authority as the owner/lessor; and the landlord was only a 'co-lessee' under the DDA alongwith one Shri Prem Nath Ohri;

2)In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Shanti Sharma (supra), all that the law requires is that the landlord should hold a premises in a capacity of something more than that of a tenant and proof of title beyond that point is not required. In the present case, as per the tenant's own allegations, the landlord holds the land on which the subject premises is constructed on long lease granted by the DDA. The landlord is therefore owner of leasehold rights in the land comprised in the subject premises. For purposes of section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, 'ownership' is not meant only to be freehold and absolute ownership of property but includes rights in the property that are more than that of a tenant, regardless of other imperfections in title. Yet again therefore, no trial is called for on this point.

3) Though it is the tenant's allegation that the landlord was only a co-lessee of the subject premises under the DDA along with one Shri Prem Nath Ohri, the fact that only one co-lessee had filed the eviction petition is no bar to its maintainability. This issue is no longer res integra and it stands settled by several decisions of the Supreme Court that even one of the co-owners can, alone and in his own right, file a proceeding for ejectment of a tenant; and a tenant cannot question the maintainability of the proceedings on this score. (cf. Kasthuri Radhakrishnan & Ors. vs. M. Chinniyan & Anr. MANU/SC/0075/2016 : (2016) 3 SCC 296 para 29).

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RC. Rev. 269/2018 and CM Appl. No. 24045/2018

Decided On: 09.07.2020

Gaffar Ahmad  Vs.   Shiv Kumar Ohri

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anup Jairam Bhambhani, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1361/2020

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Whether Court should dismiss eviction suit filed before the expiry of the statutory period prescribed U/S 15(2) of Maharashtra rent control Act as a premature suit?

I have given due consideration to the respective submissions. The facts on record indicate that the respondent who is the landlord had issued a notice to the tenant on 11-2-2008 demanding arrears of rent. This notice was served on the tenant on 19-2-2008 but the same was not complied. The suit was filed on 1-3-2008. In this factual background, the aspect whether the petitioner can be permitted to raise the plea that the suit as filed was before expiry of the statutory period of ninety days from service of the demand notice deserves to be considered.

The provisions of section 15(2) of the said Act read thus:

Section 15(2): No suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord against the tenant on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent or permitted increases due, until the expiration of ninety days next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

What has been prohibited is the institution of a suit for recovery of possession against the tenant on the ground of non-payment of standard rent or permitted increases. Unless the period of ninety days has expired after service of the notice of demand on the tenant, such suit cannot be instituted. Hence there would be no jurisdiction with the Court to entertain a suit that has been instituted prior to the expiry of the statutory period of ninety days. In Vitthalbhai (P) Ltd. (supra) the Honourable Supreme Court considered the fate of a premature suit. In paragraph 22 thereof it was observed thus:

"... However, the court shall not exercise its discretion in favour of decreeing a premature suit in the following cases (i) when there is a mandatory bar created by a statute which disables the plaintiff from filing the suit on or before a particular date or the occurrence of a particular event: (ii) when the institution of the suit before the lapse of a particular time or occurrence of a particular event would have the effect of defeating a public policy or public purpose; (iii) if such premature institution renders the presentation itself patently void and the invalidity is incurable such as when it goes to the root of the court's jurisdiction; and (iv) where the lis is not confined to parties alone and affects and involves persons other than those arrayed as parties, such as in an election petition which affects and involves the entire constituency."

The case in hand pertains to contingency No. (i) as contemplated by the Honourable Supreme Court. The said defect of premature institution also renders the presentation of the suit void thereby affecting the court's jurisdiction.

6. From the facts noted hereinabove, it is crystal clear that the suit was filed by the respondent prior to expiry of ninety days from the service of the demand notice. The presentation of the suit itself being void and going to the court's jurisdiction, the aforesaid plea would have to be permitted to be raised though it was not raised earlier. The aforesaid defect being incurable as the landlord could not have cured the said defect after filing the suit is without any doubt. Even if such plea was raised in the written statement, the defect in question was incurable. On the other hand if it is found that the Court has entertained the suit on the basis of presentation of the plaint which was patently void and affecting the jurisdiction of the Court, said legal plea would have to be permitted to be raised. This plea does not call for any factual adjudication as the date of service of the notice on the tenant and the date of presentation of the plaint are not in dispute. Moreover, the decree for eviction has been passed only on the ground of arrears of rent. The observations of learned Single Judge in paragraph 6 of the decision in Digambar Hari Sonpatki (supra) can be relied upon.

7. In view of aforesaid, the only conclusion that can be drawn from the aforesaid facts is that the suit for eviction was filed in a manner contrary to provisions of section 15(2) of the said Act. The trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain such a prematurely instituted suit. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

W.P. No. 3788 of 2015

Decided On: 07.07.2016

Jitendra Nagarkar vs Mohanlal Agrawal,

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Chandurkar, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/2659/2016,2016 SCC ONLINE BOM 7056,

(2016) 6 Mah LJ 797 : (2016) 6 Bom CR 743, 2017(2) ALLMR 69

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Whether the father can seek eviction of the daughter in law from his house without seeking eviction of his son?

 Coming back to the facts of the present case, I find that in view of the specific assertion made in the plaint that the plaintiff is the exclusive owner of the suit property, the contents of paragraph 1 of the written statement clearly indicates that it is an admitted case of the defendant-appellant in his written statement that the suit property is the exclusive property of the plaintiff. It is also not in dispute that the plaintiff is an old person and his wife, the mother-in-law of the defendant, is a handicapped person with one amputated leg. It is also not in dispute that a divorce petition is pending between the son (husband) and the defendant and the assertion/pleadings of the plaintiff that his son has left the house and is living elsewhere could not be dislodged by the defendant-appellant and there is a concurrent finding of fact by both the courts below, which do not appear to be perverse in nature so as to require any interference by this court. No objection was ever raised before the trial court that husband is a necessary party. This was not even the ground before the lower appellate court. As such this cannot be raised at this stage. As already observed a substantial question of law arises out of pleadings and the judgments of the lower court. As such, on this ground no such substantial question of law can be raised at this stage in the present appeal. Even otherwise, the answer to the substantial question of law framed in the present case is that even considering the definition of shared household as provided under Section 2 (s) of the Act, 2005, the appellant daughter-in-law can be evicted without seeking decree of eviction against son with whom she had moved on the 1st floor of the suit property after marriage of the son of the plaintiff with the appellant.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Second Appeal No. 1079 of 2019

Decided On: 12.06.2020

Sujata Gandhi  Vs.   S.B. Gandhi

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.K. Birla, J.

Citation: MANU/UP/1183/2020

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Supreme Court: Procedure which court should follow for trying eviction suit filed under the provisions of transfer of property Act

Eviction suit under Rent Control Act - Jurisdiction of

Rent Controller/Court under Rent Control Act - Eviction decree - Existence of landlord-tenant relationship between

parties sine qua non for grant of, where eviction suit is filed under Rent Control Act - Hence enquiry in such suit should

be limited to existence of landlord-tenant relationship - If such relationship is found to be not existing, eviction suit is liable

to be dismissed - Question of plaintiff's title based on his purchase of suit property or adverse possession thereof by

defendant is beyond scope of enquiry in eviction suit under Rent Control Act - However, question of title can be

considered incidentally, but only to ascertain bona fides of denial of plaintiff's title by defendant - Jurisdiction under Rent

Control Act to try eviction suit is limited to grounds specified therein only, except where alternative remedy is permissible

thereunder - Position is different where eviction suit is filed under Transfer of Property Act, in which case civil court can

grant equitable relief under Or. 7 R. 7 CPC on basis of title of plaintiff even in absence of landlord-tenant relationship -

On facts held, plaintiff having failed to establish landlord-tenant relationship, defendant not liable for eviction - However,

trial court's finding that defendant had perfected his title by adverse possession was beyond its jurisdiction and High

Court also erred in affirming trial court's judgment to that extent - Under these circumstances, plaintiff entitled to file fresh

suit for recovery of possession.

On a seemly analysis of the principle stated in the aforesaid authorities, it is quite vivid that there is a difference in exercise of jurisdiction when the civil court deals with a lis relating to eviction brought before it under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act and under any special enactment pertaining to eviction on specified grounds. Needless to say, this Court has cautiously added that if alternative relief is permissible within the ambit of the Act, the position would be different. That apart, the Court can decide the issue of title if a tenant disputes the same and the only purpose is to see whether the denial of title of the landlord by the tenant is bona fide in the circumstances of the case. We respectfully concur with the aforesaid view and we have no hesitation in holding that the dictum laid down in Bhagwati Prasad (supra) and Bishwanath Agarwalla (supra) are distinguishable, for in the said cases the suits were filed under the Transfer of Property Act where the equitable relief under Order VII Rule 7 could be granted.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 10316 of 2013

Decided On: 13.11.2013

Tribhuvanshankar  Vs.  Amrutlal

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Anil R. Dave and Dipak Misra, JJ.

Citation: (2014) 2 SCC 788

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Whether court can dismiss eviction suit on ground that rent deed was not registered?

Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 - Sec. 15 - Arrears of rent - Suit for eviction Decree - High Court setting aside decree - Validity - No dispute regarding relationship of landlord and tenant between parties - Admission of part of tenant about amount of rent payable by him - Admission of tenant about not paying rent right from day one when tenancy commenced - High Court setting aside decree on ground that rent deed was not registered document and as such not admissible in evidence - Not proper - Admission of party in proceedings either in pleading or oral is best evidence and same does not need any further corroboration - Held, Dismissal of suit simply on ground that rent deed was not registered cannot be accepted and liable to be set aside             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA [Bombay High Court]
(Before T S Thakur ; F M Ibrahim Kalifulla, JJ.) CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5316-5318 OF 2012 

Ahmedsaheb
Vs
Sayed Ismail

Citations: 2012(8)SCC516; 2012(6)JT581; 2012(6)SCALE505; 2012(6)SCR984;

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Whether power of attorney holder of landlord can file eviction suit against tenant?

At the outset, it is required to be noted that the suit premises was leased in favour of original Respondent No. 1 - original tenant - Bala Venkatram pursuant to the rental agreement dated 23.05.2007 executed by the Appellant herein. Therefore, the rental agreement was between the Appellant and original Defendant No. 1 - Bala Venkatram. Defendant No. 1 was put in possession as a tenant pursuant to the aforesaid rental agreement dated 23.05.2007 executed by the Appellant in favour of original Defendant No. 1 - original tenant - Bala Venkatram. Therefore, as such, it would not be open for the Respondents to deny the status of the Appellant as a landlady. Therefore, the original Respondents cannot challenge the authority of the Appellant to file an eviction petition. Even otherwise, considering Section 2(6) of the Act and considering the fact that Respondent No. 1 was paying the rent to the Appellant pursuant to the aforesaid rental agreement dated 23.05.2007, the Appellant can be said to be the landlord/landlady and therefore the eviction petition at the instance of the Appellant would be maintainable. {Para 6.1}


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 9443 of 2019

Decided On: 07.01.2020

 A. Mahalakshmi Vs.  Bala Venkatram

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ashok Bhushan and M.R. Shah, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2020 SC 322

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Whether a person can take an alternative plea of adverse possession and tenancy?

Once a person takes the stand that he/she has become the owner of a property on the ground of adverse possession, then he/she could not subsequently take the alternative plea that a suit for eviction was not maintainable and that the provisions of the  Rent Control Act, would apply. The Court held that a plea of adverse possession would be destructive of the rights under the Rent Act.

 Now though the appellant in his communications of June 2008 to the Monitoring Committee has alleged himself to be a tenant of this were premises but in para 15 and 22 of his written statement has denied such relationship and alleged himself to be an owner by adverse possession. Thus once the appellant claims to be in adverse possession of the premises, he cannot alleged himself to be a tenant as both these pleas cannot exist together. The principle once a tenant always a tenant ends on taking plea of adverse possession and asserting one's own right.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

RFA 633/2014

Decided On: 09.01.2020

 Hans Raj Vs.  Raghuvir Singh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Yogesh Khanna, J.

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Whether eviction suit filed by the landlord is maintainable if the tenant is claiming the title in tenanted premises by agreement of sale?

In this case it is held by court that merely because an appeal was filed by the tenant against the dismissal of his suit for specific performance against the landlord on the basis of an alleged agreement to sell in relation to the tenanted premises, would not in any manner obliterate the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties.

It is an admitted position that the predecessor of the petitioners had come into the possession of the property as a tenant. Subsequently a plea has been taken by the petitioners that there was an agreement to sell whereby the father of the respondent had agreed to sell the property to the predecessor of the petitioners and a Suit for Specific Purpose was filed.

11. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that petitioners were merely relying on an oral agreement to sell and the Suit for Specific Performance filed by the petitioners has already been dismissed by judgment dated 12.07.2017.

12. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that regular first appeal, impugning the order dismissing the Suit for Specific Performance is pending, would make no difference to the relationship between the parties of landlord and tenant. It is not the case of the petitioners that there was any merger of tenancy with ownership rights or extinction of tenancy.

13. Admittedly petitioners came in possession of the tenanted premises as tenants and not under the alleged agreement to sell. The petitioners would have to first perfect their title, if any to the property, before claiming that the eviction petition would not be maintainable. So long as the status of the petitioners continue as that of a tenant, the landlord would be entitled to maintain an eviction petition. I find no merit in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners on this ground.

14. The Rent Controller has rightly held in the impugned order that the said plea does not become a triable issue.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

R.C. Rev. 249/2017

Decided On: 27.02.2020

Chander Kanta Kainth  Vs.  Tulsi Das Talreja

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjeev Sachdeva, J.

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Whether the court should take into consideration the hardship of subtenant while deciding bonafide need of landlord in eviction suit?

Accordingly, the issue of comparative hardship is required to be decided in favour of the landlord. The tenant Thakkar has already unlawfully sublet the suit premises. The provisions contained in section 13(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 do not oblige the Court to take into consideration the issue of hardship, if any, that may occasion to unlawful sub tenants or any other persons who may be carrying on business from the suit premises. Thakkar, from the material on record appears to be content with some fixed amount or in any case 10% profits from out of the business being carried out from the suit premises. In such circumstances, it can never be the case of Thakkar that the issue of comparative hardship be decided in his favour and against the landlords.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 1940 of 1996

Decided On: 24.07.2015

Taralakshmi Maneklal Thanawalla  Vs. Shantilal Makanji Dave

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.S. Sonak, J.

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