Furthermore, in Jayedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda vs. State of Gujarat, MANU/SC/1308/2024 : (2025) 2 SCC 116 the Supreme Court while considering the guilt of the husband under Section 498A IPC observed that cruelty simpliciter is not enough to constitute the offence under Section 498A IPC; rather it must be done either with an intention to cause injury or to drive the person to commit suicide or with an intention to coerce her and her relatives to meet unlawful demands. Mere cruelty is not enough to constitute the offence. {Para 32}
33. In the present case, to bring in the clause of cruelty leading to the death of the woman, it may be noted that Ms. Shashi had died not because of any act of cruelty but for natural reasons, as stated by CW-1 and rightly noted by learned ASJ. Therefore, Clause (a) to the Explanation annexed to Section 498A IPC is not attracted.
34. Now, Clause (b) to Section 498A IPC needs to be examined to assess whether there are any allegations, which even prima facie make out that the deceased was subjected to harassment with a view to coerce her or persons related to her to meet any unlawful demand of property or valuable security.
35. In Dara Lakshmi Narayana vs. State of Telangana, MANU/SC/1309/2024 the Supreme Court while dealing with the components of Section 498A IPC and to ascertain whether the same are attracted on vague allegations raised by the wife, observed that the contents of the Complaint may be assessed to see if there is any kind of cruelty as contemplated in Clause 1 or if there is any harassment for dowry as contemplated in Clause 2 is made out. If the allegations in the FIR are found to be vague and ambiguous and lack precise allegations which are alleged after the notice of divorce, then it may be concluded that the FIR has been lodged as a retaliatory measure intended to settle the score with the husband and his relatives. In such a situation, the quashing of the FIR is justified.
36. Furthermore, the above observations were reiterated in the case of Digambar, (supra), that where the FIR or the Complaint even if taken on the face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute a case against the accused, the quashing of proceedings would be justified. Only stating cruelty has been committed by the Appellants, would not amount to an offence under Section 498A IPC.
39. It is quite understandable that he being a father, he would have been highly traumatised on account of the untimely death of his daughter. However, it is quite evident from the first statement of the Complainant that no details of the alleged harassment of the daughter was mentioned.
41. The next statement made by the Complainant was under Section 164 Cr.P.C. wherein also, similar allegations were made. However, as already noted above, no specific incidents which have been detailed in this Complaint.
43. However, Petitioner has neither given any date nor given any proof of giving any money, especially when he himself has stated that he was an Auto driver and had financial constraints. Such bald assertions, in the given situation, cannot be held to be even making out a prima facie case of harassment.
44. When the Petitioner's daughter became pregnant for the second time, he brought her to his house in the 5th month as there was threat to liquidate her in case she gave birth to the second child. He brought her to his house and left her in the matrimonial home after the birth of the second child. Pertinently, the Complainant has made contradictory statements in so much as if the Respondents had threatened to kill the Petitioner's daughter on birth of a girl child, no father would leave the daughter in the matrimonial home in the face of such imminent threat.
45. It is further claimed that there was consistent demand of Rs.2 Lacs in the name of both the children or else they threatened to kill the daughter. He sold his plot at Surya Colony, Faridabad and gave Rs.1 Lakh, despite which his daughter was killed. However, no evidence has been placed on record of either the ownership or sale or of the date on which this money was given. This assumes importance as the Petitioner's daughter died within 40 days of birth of second daughter. To accept the alleged sale and payment, some cogent evidence about the alleged demands and payment should have been disclosed by the Petitioner. Such bald assertions cannot be considered to even disclose the case of harassment.
46. The statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of Sunny, brother of the deceased, Ms. Shashi was also recorded, who stated that he had gone to meet Ms. Shashi at her matrimonial home on Holi when he found her crying and her in-Laws were harassing her. He, on return to their home, informed the same to the Petitioner.
48. However, merely because the deceased was crying, cannot per se make out any case of dowry harassment. The statements of the brother, Sunny and sister, Poonam also in no way establish even prima facie that Shashi was being harassed by her in laws for meeting their demands.
49. Furthermore, in the Petitioner's Complaint as well, aside from vague assertions that there was a constant demand of money, there are no specific incidents which have been detailed in this Complaint. The amount of Rs.45- 50,000 has been stated to have been given in Chuchak at the time of birth of the daughter and cannot be termed as a demand. There was nothing on record to even remotely suggest that there was any harassment of the deceased for fulfilling their demands for money.
50. The allegations in the Complain and the statements of the witnesses reflect that essentially the Petitioner was aggrieved by the death of his daughter and believed it to be on account of cruelty meted out to her. However, the learned ASJ had concluded that the death was on account of natural reasons and discharged the Respondents No. 3 to 5 under Section 304B IPC. This Order never got challenged and cannot be re-agitated now.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI
CRL.M.C. 4785/2017
Decided On: 13.08.2025
Gainda Lal Vs. The State Govt of NCT of Delhi and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Neena Bansal Krishna, J.
Citation: 2025 DHC 6826, MANU/DE/6021/2025
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